AGNES YIRENKYI V. GEORGE ATTA GYIMAH, EVANS OPOKU GYIMAH AND CECILIA KUKUA

JUDGEMENT

MARIAMA OWUSU, J.A:

Section 20 [1] of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971, ACT 367 provides as follows;

“The Court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party a sum of money or convey to the other party movable or immovable property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provision that the Court thinks just and equitable”.

The plaintiff and 1st defendant in this suit were married customarily sometime 1979. They cohabited in Kumasi, Accra and London. There are three issues between them. The marriage was dissolved on 24-11-1999. It is the case of the plaintiff that, the meeting to dissolve the marriage between her and the 1st defendant took place before relations and representatives of both sides. At that meeting, the 1st defendant openly acknowledged that, in view of the fact that, he had initiated the dissolution of the marriage, he was prepared to pacify the plaintiff. Consequently, 1st defendant offered plaintiff and her children the matrimonial home, House No. 1, 183/15, Dansoman, Accra. Plaintiff continued that, her family requested for financial provision of twenty million cedis [¢20,000,000.00] but the 1st defendant offered two million cedis [¢2,000,000.000] to which the former rejected. The plaintiff further averred that 2nd and 3rd defendants who are the children of 1st defendant by his previous marriage have rented out the outhouse in the matrimonial home through the instrumentality of the 1st defendant. In addition, the 2nd and 3rd defendants are making it impossible for her to continue to stay at the Dansoman House by raining insults on her with occasional threats. Plaintiff therefore claims against the defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs:

1. An Order compelling the 1st defendant to convey absolutely H/No. 1, 183/15, 23rd Close Dansoman, Accra, together with reasonable lump sum payment to the plaintiff on the basis of the undertaking by the 1st defendant during the proceedings for the dissolution of the marriage between the parties.

2. In the alternative compelling the 1st defendant to convey absolutely H/No. 1, 183/15 23rd Close Dansoman, Accra, together with reasonable lump sum payment as property and financial settlement arising out of the dissolution of the marriage between the parties or as consequential Order to the dissolution of the marriage.

3. Recovery of possession of H/No. 1, 183/15 23rd Close Dansoman, Accra against the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd defendants with a further order that the 2nd defendant removes all the structures he has erected on the grounds of the said house.

4. Perpetual Injunction restraining the defendants from ever interfering with the quiet enjoyment of the plaintiff in the said house.

5. Costs.

On receipt of the plaintiff’s writ of summons and statement of claim, the defendants reacted by filing their statement of defence denying plaintiff’s claim. In particular, the 1st defendant averred that, he did not promise to give the Dansoman house to the plaintiff since the said house was acquired sometime in 1976 through the joint efforts of 1st defendant and his first wife. He continued that, his first wife, Madam Toku has a beneficial interest in the Dansoman house. On the contrary, the plaintiff was offered to stay in one room with her children until the children leave the house.

In respect of the monetary compensation, 1st defendant averred that, at the meeting to dissolve the marriage, plaintiff demanded twenty million cedis [¢20,000,000.00], but after much bargaining he offered two million cedis [¢2,000,000.00]. 1st defendant concluded that, the plaintiff accepted this offer in the presence of witnesses before the marriage was dissolved. He therefore maintained that he had duly complied with the decision reached at the dissolution of the marriage by paying the agreed sum of two million cedis through one Mr. Budu. 1st defendant therefore counterclaimed for the following;

[A] A declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to continue staying in the Dansoman house after the dissolution of her marriage with 1st defendant.

[b] An Order directing plaintiff to accept the sum of two million cedis which was accepted by plaintiff as financial compensation when the marriage was dissolved.

[c] An Order for recovery of possession of H/No. 1, 183/15 23rd Close Dansoman, Accra.

[d] An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining plaintiff from laying claim to the said house.

At the trial, the plaintiff testified and called two witnesses. The 1st defendant testified for himself and on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd defendants.

At the end of the trial, the High Court gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff against defendants for reliefs [b], [c] and [d]. The 1st defendant’s counterclaim was dismissed as not proved.

It is this judgment that is in contention before us.

The defendants filed the following Grounds of Appeal:

[i] The judgment is against the weight of evidence.

[ii] The Learned Judge erred when he made financial award against 1st defendant when the parties’ means had not been gone into.

[iii] The Learned Judge erred when he relied on oral evidence when documentary evidence showed the contrary.

[iv] The Learned Judge erred when he arrived at the decision that 1st defendant had made a promise to make a gift of his house because he called no witness.

[v] Further grounds to be filed upon receipt of the record of appeal.

At this stage let me put it on record that the defendants did not file additional grounds of appeal as indicated in their Notice of Appeal. Also in this appeal the plaintiff/respondent would be referred to simply as respondent and the 1st 2nd and 3rd defendants/appellants as 1st, 2nd and 3rd appellants respectively.

In arguing the appeal, counsel for the appellants referred to the respondent’s claim as endorsed on her writ of summons. He submitted that, the inference of the said claim is based on the purported oral promise by the 1st appellant at the dissolution of the customary marriage between the parties. He then submitted that, from the evidence of the respondent and her witnesses, there was no finality as what was to be compensated to the plaintiff at the dissolution. This is because, the witnesses said the elders suggested twenty million cedis which the 1st appellant refused and offered two million cedis instead. Whilst the respondent said the elders suggested ten million cedis and the house which 1st appellant refused. Counsel for the appellants submitted that, if this is considered against Exhibit 1, then the marriage was dissolved inconclusively as both parties did not agree on a compensatory package which was acceptable to the respondent. After quoting a portion of the cross examination of the respondent, he submitted that, the oral evidence of the respondent and her witnesses is contradictory as against the documentary evidence, Exhibit 1. The trial judge therefore erred in preferring the oral evidence to Exhibit 1. Counsel cited the case of BENTSI-ENCHILL v. BENTSI-ENCHILL [1976] 2 GLR 303, 304, holding [1] to buttress his point. He therefore submitted that, the rule of law is that;

“Property purchased by a spouse with his own money belonged to that spouse to the exclusion of the other. Therefore if a house was purchased out of the husband’s earnings, as in the instant case, the whole beneficial interest in the house vested in him and the wife would have no interest in it in the absence of express agreement”.

Based on the above decision, counsel for the appellants submitted that, the respondent’s allegation of an offer made by 1st appellant is not true and cannot be enforced by law as it does not conform to the Conveyance Act or the Contracts Act. Secondly, considering the fact that the respondent herself admitted that the property was built or purchased before the marriage, she could not prove any contribution. In respect of 2nd and 3rd appellants, he submitted that, since they are 1st appellants children by his previous marriage and they are living in the disputed house, they are entitled to be protected as the respondent’s children are all living with the appellant in London.

Based on the forgoing, counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment is against the weight of evidence.

In answer to the submissions on grounds [i], [iii] and [iv], counsel for the respondent invited us to refuse the plea that this Court should interfere with the findings by the trial judge. This is because; the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and listened to their evidence. He also assessed the evidence properly and gave good reasons for his findings. He cited the case of KOGLEX LTD [No. 2] v. FIELDS [2010] SCGLR 175, 185 to buttress his point. Additionally, he continued, the respondent led credible evidence to prove her case at least prima facie. The burden then shifted to the 1st appellant to lead evidence to rebut the evidence of the respondent. This 1st appellant failed to deliver. According to counsel for the respondent, 1st appellant just mounted the witness box and repeated his averments on oath. Counsel continued that, the respondent claim is based on the arbitration and she called her elders who were present as witnesses. 1st appellant named Master Budu and said he gave him the two million cedis financial contribution while denying the offer of the house to the respondent. Counsel submitted that, there is no evidence that Master Budu is dead. So the question is why was he not called? Counsel cited the case of MAJOLARBI v. LARBI [1959] GLR 90 on what constitutes proof in law. In respect of the case of BENTSI-ENCHILL V. BENTSI-ENCHILL case cited by counsel for the appellants, counsel for the respondent submitted that, the respondent did not dispute the ownership of the house neither did she dispute that the house was purchased by the 1st appellant. The respondent did not also claim joint ownership. She was claiming the house as something offered her as financial award during the dissolution of the marriage. Therefore the BENTSI ENCHILL v. BENTSI-ENCHILL case cited supra is not applicable to the case under consideration both on the facts and the ratio. He invited us to dismiss the appeal on these grounds.

Our reaction to the submissions on grounds [i], [iii] and [iv] of the grounds of appeal is that, the trial judge in his judgment gave reasons for preferring and or believing the evidence of the respondent and her witnesses as against the evidence of the 1st appellant. He said;

“This Court believes the pieces of evidence of the plaintiff and her witnesses as more reasonably probable, as far as the house is concerned. The witnesses of the plaintiff in the view of the court were truthful witnesses and what they had said before the court was in the view of the court the truth. This is so because if they were bias in favor of the plaintiff because they are related to her, they would not have admitted that 1st defendant rejected the ¢20,000,000.00 compensation demanded by the plaintiff and offered ¢2,000,000.00. They would have probably said 1st defendant accepted to pay the ¢20,000,000.00.

As already said the house issue is central to this litigation and had been set down as issue for trial. The 1st defendant fully aware of this could have called any of his relations especially Okromansah to come and testify on his behalf to rebut the pieces of evidence of the witnesses for the plaintiff. Those present at the dissolution meeting are material witnesses and failing to call any of them to support his case is considered as jaundice in the case for the 1st defendant.

I therefore hold that this court believed the evidence of the plaintiff and her witnesses that the 1st defendant had actually made an offer of the said building at Dansoman to the plaintiff. The defence being put up in his pleadings and his evidence in chief were all after thought to prevent the plaintiff taking over the house”.

We agree with the trial judge on this finding as it is clearly supported by the evidence on record. We say so for the simple reason that, in their statement of defence, the appellants averred that Okromansah was asked to go with the respondent to the disputed house for her to choose the one room that was given to her during the tenure of her children. See paragraph 11 of the amended statement of defence and counterclaim filed on 14-11-2001.The 1st appellant repeated this averment in his evidence. If indeed the respondent has been living in this house all this while, what was the need for her to go and choose one room to live in? Secondly, the evidence of the respondent that the 1st appellant offered her the Dansoman house as part of the compensation package was corroborated in every material particular by PW1 and PW2. PW1 Addo Nyankpong also in his evidence said the panel who met to dissolve the marriage asked him and PW2 to go and see the Dansoman house. This is what PW1 said;

“The plaintiff refused the offer of ¢2,000,000.00. The 1st defendant confirmed what Mr. Budu told me earlier on that he was giving the house at Dansoman to Agnes as part of the compensation package. The panel asked two of us Mr. Nyankpong and I to go and see the Dansoman house. So we went back to confirm that we visited the house and saw it. All this time Agnes was living in that house and she is still living there [the emphasis is ours]”.

The trial judge was therefore right in coming to the conclusion that, 1st appellant offered the Dansoman house to the respondent.

In coming to this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that PW1 and PW2 are the relations of the respondent. Like the trial judge, we believe these witnesses were telling the court the truth. These witnesses said the 1st appellant was asked to pay ¢20 million monetary compensation to the respondent but the 1st appellant offered to pay ¢2million which respondent rejected. This piece of evidence was confirmed by the 1st appellant in his testimony as well as in the statement of defence of the appellants. Besides, the law is that, an appellate court should be slow in dismissing findings and conclusions reached by a trial judge based on the observations made during the trial of the case as a result of the advantages enjoyed in seeing, hearing and observing the demeanor of the witnesses by the trial judge. See the case of JASS CO LTD and Another v. APPAU and Another [2009] SCGLR 265, 266.

Based on the forgoing, grounds [i], [iii] and [iv] of the grounds of appeal filed fail and they are hereby dismissed.

This brings us to ground [ii] which reads;

“The Learned Trial Judge erred when he made financial award against 1st defendant when the parties’ means had not been gone into”.

On this ground, counsel for the appellants’ complaint is that the trial judge failed to comply with Order 65 Rules 23-26 of CI 47 before making the financial award of GH¢1,000.00 to the respondent. He continued that, under this Order, the parties would have to file their affidavit of means so as to enable the trial court to determine whether property should be settled on any party. Secondly, the 1992 constitution approves of an equitable distribution of material property in the event of dissolution of a marriage. He concluded on this ground that if the respondent alleged that the house in dispute is to compensate her then the court must have evidence of the properties of both parties to determine whether it is equitable to give the house to the respondent. In the absence of any evidence as to their income, the respondent’s prayer cannot be granted.

At the risk of sounding repetitive, the trial judge held that the 1st appellant did make a promise to give the Dansoman house to the respondent and is bound by that promise. We do not intend to disturb this finding of fact. Therefore Order 65 rule 25 does not apply to this case.

On the monetary award, from the 1st appellant’s evidence, at the meeting to dissolve the marriage between him and the respondent, he did offer to pay ¢2 million instead of the ¢20 million the respondent asked for. By section 20 [1] of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 Act 367 quoted in the introduction to this judgment, the trial court has the discretion to order either party to the marriage to pay to the other a sum of money or convey to the other party movable or immovable property as financial settlement as the court thinks just and equitable.

In this case the parties were married for twenty [20] years. They had three issues between them. The respondent from the record of appeal is a hair dresser in Ghana, whilst the 1st appellant is a warehouse Manager in London. Taking all these into consideration, the award of GH¢1,000.00 as financial settlement to the respondent is fair and just.

This ground of appeal also fails and same is hereby dismissed.

From all of the forgoing, the appeal fails in its entirety and same is hereby dismissed.

MARIAMA OWUSU

[JUSTICE OF APPEAL]

SAEED K. GYAN, JA

I have had the privilege of reading beforehand the judgment of my worthy sister Mariama Owusu JA. I entirely agree with the conclusions and reasons underscoring her decision to wholly dismiss the instant appeal. I, however, wish to add a few observations and share my thoughts on some of the matters in issue.

It is obvious that customary law and traditions are changing dramatically in the light of modern trends, assisted inevitably by our present cosmopolitan existence. These changes are affecting nearly every aspect of our lives as a people. The rapidly changing and, indeed, more progressive trends have been aided and continue to be aided by judicial and statutory interventions together with our collective quest for increasing democratic advancement.

One area of considerable interest which had exercised the attention of our modern nation is the marriage relationship and the related issue of divorce. Clearly connected with the matter of marriage is the issue of gender discrimination, especially discrimination against women when it comes to the distribution of property in the sad and often tragic event of divorce or upon the death of a spouse.

Customary and traditional norms coupled with patriarchal attitudes had over the centuries frequently resulted in the woman losing out in the matrimonial contest of power and in the allocation and distribution of resources within the marriage context.

Fortunately, benign luminescence had begun to enter the dark corridors of judicial thinking in Ghana leading thereby to rather bold and proactive decisions being taken to protect the admittedly more vulnerable female partner in the marriage relationship.

In the more recent illuminating judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of MENSAH V. MENSAH [2012] 1 SCGLR 391, Ghana’s Supreme Court, unanimously speaking through DOTSE JSC, strongly and progressively declared as follows:

“The tendency to consider women (spouses) in particular as appendages to the marriage relationship, used and dumped at will by their male spouses must cease”

Indeed, the Supreme Court pronounced its probably prophetic conclusion in the manner thus:

“we are therefore of the considered view that the time has come for this court to institutionalize the principle of equality in the sharing of marital property by spouses, after divorce, of all properties acquired during the subsistence of a marriage in appropriate cases. This is based on the provisions in articles 22(3) and 33 (5) of the 1992 Constitution, the principle of “Jurisprudence of Equality” and the need to follow, apply and improve our previous decisions in Mensah v. Mensah and Boafo v. Boafo (supra). The wife should be treated as an equal

partner even after divorce in the devolution of the properties. The wife must not be bruised by the conduct of the husband and made to be in a worse situation than she would have been had the divorce not been granted” (emphasis provided).

In the Mensah v. Mensah case (supra) Dotse, JSC had provided an admirable historical development of the Ghanaian law, especially, case law, spanning the period 1959 and 2005 regarding distribution of marital property on the occasion of divorce, with particular reference to the case of Boafo v. Boafo (2005 – 2006) SC GLR 705 which his Lordship had referred to as the locus classicus in that area of the law in Ghana.

As a country, we have in fact moved far from that clearly archaic traditional attitude of seeing wives and children literally as mere servants (if not slaves) of their husbands and fathers which is typified by the words of Ollennu J (as he then was ) in Quartey v. Martey [1959] GLR 377.

Ollennu J had delivered himself thus in line with the prevailing conventional wisdom then:

“The proceeds of this joint effort of a man and his wife and/or children, and any property which the man acquires with such proceeds are by customary law the individual property of the man. It is not the joint property of the man and the wife and/or the children. The right of the wife and the children is a right to maintenance and support from the husband and father”.

This kind of thinking is clearly reflective of the dark and primitive ages and must no longer have decent space in the twenty first century.

It is obviously this somewhat backward attitude which encouraged the 1st Defendant/Appellant herein to state in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence filed on 13/11/2000 as follows:

....1st defendant says that he is the sole owner of the house in London and whatever he does with the said house is none of the business of plaintiff...”

(see page 11 of the record of appeal) (emphasis provided).

The 1st Defendant could still feel emboldened to assume such posture despite the records showing that the London property was in the joint names of the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant and that correspondence from the Metropolitan Authorities in London was constantly addressed to both of them. (Reference pages 103 to 111 of the appeal record).

Counsel for the Appellant has condemned the decision of the trial court in awarding the Dansoman house to the Plaintiff on the ground that it violates Order 65 rules 23 to 26, especially rule 25, of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004, CI 47,. According to him the respective incomes of the parties were not investigated by the court below before that award was made.

It is my respectful view that Counsel for the Appellant misread and misconceived the said Order 65 rules 23 to 26 of C.I. 47 in relation to the matters raised for determination in the instant appeal and his submissions in that connection must, accordingly, find no favour with this Court and hence ought to be summarily rejected without entering into any strenuous discussions of his aforesaid submissions.

My esteemed sister Mariama Owusu JA has in her simple and forthright judgment justified why the trial court’s decision in connection with the Dansoman property should be sustained. The circumstances of this case, established by the evidence on record, amply support the position taken by the trial judge.

Clearly, the award in respect of the Dansoman property was not necessarily or exclusively based on the principle of distribution of matrimonial property jointly acquired by the parties during the subsistence of the marriage at the time of divorce. The grant of the Dansoman house to the Plaintiff was seen and accepted as part of a compensation package to the 1st Defendant/Appellant’s wife within the context and particular circumstances of the divorce obtained by the aforesaid Appellant.

The circumstances surrounding the divorce, as amply demonstrated by the evidence on record, can properly be described as hasty, bizarre and presumptuous, if not unconscionable. The obviously belated attempt by 1st Defendant/Appellant to SMEAR his wife of twenty years standing with mere, bald and whimsical allegations of fraud, thievery and infidelity as justification for his conduct in relation to the divorce seems to me to smack off pettiness and meanness.

The Appellant appears not to have much respect or regard for his wife, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein. This can be inferred from his letter at page 19 of the record of appeal which is addressed to his daughter Florence. In that letter not only does the Appellant employ rather derogatory, demeaning and highly offensive words unbefitting of a letter sent to his young daughter, but he actually shows no regret in telling his probably vulnerable and impressionable child that he, as a father, had in fact stopped sending money to her because her mother had instituted court action against him. The Appellant apparently had no difficulty in causing pain to her own daughter and vicariously punishing her for the supposed guilt of her mother. He began his letter thus: “This is my first letter to you. I know that you are going to be very sad when you read this letter, but don’t be”. He cynically concluded the letter in the following manner:

“whoever has said that I have used my children’s benefit to build the house is stupid and are lieing(sic). I received £27,000 from Natwest Bank. Tell the people who are saying this to shut up! They need to go to the mental hospital for treatment. When George Michael came here he did not get benefit for six months. My house belongs to the Council. I pay rent so its not my own. Tell the villagers to fuck off!”

It is this mentality which drives the Appellant into believing that despite the pretty weird circumstances under which he divorced his wife, who had diligently served him during twenty years of their marriage, she did not deserve to be appropriately compensated because “whatsoever service she provided did not extend beyond her culinary and conjugal duties as a wife...” (see paragraph 16 of Amended Statement of Defence at page 30 of the record of appeal). That frame of mind is too simple by far.

On my part, I find and do heartily agree with my Learned sister Mariama Owusu JA that the award of the Dansoman property by the trial court to the Plaintiff/Respondent herein is wholly justified under and by virtue of the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971, Act 367. That award is equally supported by various decisions of our Superior Courts in recent times, as captured by Dotse JSC in Mensah v. Mensah (supra) and further expounded and deepened by Dr. Date-Bah JSC in his unreported “valedictory” judgment of 26/7/2013 in the Supreme Court case of PATIENCE ARTHUR V. MOSES ARTHUR (Civil Appeal No. J4/9/2013).

But, beside and beyond that, I would still have held that, on the facts as found by the trial Judge and established by the record, the Plaintiff/Respondent would still have been entitled to be given the Dansoman house based on the principle of estoppel-promissory estoppel and/or estoppel by conduct as immortalized by Lord Denning in the High Trees case [see Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1947) KB 130; (1956) 1 All ER [256].

It is clear to me, from the evidence on record, that at the so-called arbitration where the 1st Defendant/Appellant herein sought and obtained his divorce against the Plaintiff/Respondent herein, he made representation by way of promise, or otherwise evinced conduct which was intended or tended to create legal relations. See Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim [1950] 1 KB 616.

The principle of the High Trees case prevents a party insisting upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties;.

It has well been established that, in particular cases, where a man has so conducted himself that it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to depart from a particular state of affairs which another has taken to be settled or correct, the court ought not to permit him to retreat from his earlier stance: Panchand Freres S.A v. Et General Grain Company (1970) 1 Lloyds Rep. 58

In Evenden v. Guildford Football Club [1975] 1 QB 917 Lord Denning had explained that “.. promissory estoppel applies whenever a representation is made, whether of fact or law, present or future which is intended to be binding, intended to induce a person to act upon it and he does act upon it.”

This was further expounded in Moorgate Ltd. v. Twitchings [1976] 1 QB 225 as follows:

“Estoppel is not a rule of evidence, it is not a cause of action. It is a principle of justice and equity. It comes to this: when a man, by his words or conduct has led another to believe in a particular state of affairs he will not be allowed to go back on it when it would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so”

Thus, estoppel will be held to operate by reason of a person’s conduct which had led another to believe a state of affairs even though the person never intended it to be that way. Ref. CRABB V. ARUN DC [1976] 1 Ch 179.

It is obvious from the evidence on record that the Plaintiff/Respondent felt inclined to rely on the faith of the representation of the 1st Defendant/Appellant to the effect that he was offering the Dansoman house to her as part of the package to secure the divorce which he so desparately desired and, consequently, she refrained from contesting or resisting the divorce sought by the Appellant herein. She had acted on the belief or faith induced by the representation and conduct of the 1st Defendant/Appellant, herein.

It is too late then to allow the Appellant to go back on what he had said or done. It would be unjust and inequitable for him to do so.

I must also add that this common law position has found further and strong statutory support in Section 26 of the Evidence Act of Ghana, (NRCD 322 of 1975).

In respect of the monetary award, I am inclined to not merely affirm the trial Court’s decision but I would even have desired that the quantum be varied and increased considerably having regard to the circumstances of this case and the conduct and behavior of the Appellant herein.

Finally, I entirely agree that the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the Defendants’ counter-claim be affirmed. There is very little by way of credible and proven evidence on record to sustain that counter-claim. The trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence can hardly be faulted. He observed the witnesses and their demeanour during the trial. He preferred the case of the plaintiff to that of the Defendant. There is no good and substantial cause established on this appeal to persuade me to overturn the findings and conclusions of the trial court in that regard. See: Agbeshie and Anor. v. Amorkor and Anor (2009) SCGLR 594 at page 601; Ntiri v. Essien [2001-2002] SCGLR 451; Koglex Ltd. v. Field (2000) SGLR 175.

I deeply regret that this case had been suffered to come thus far. In the supreme interest of the children of the Plaintiff and the 1stt Defendant/Appellant herein, I hope that the matter would be made to proceed to a well-deserved rest and that, going forward, the parties will find a place in their hearts to smoke the peace-pipe and bury the hatchet.

In conclusion, I would also affirm the trial Court’s decision as being in accord with reason and justice and, consequently, dismiss the appeal in its entirety.

SAEED K. GYAN

[JUSTICE OF APPEAL]

S. MARFUL-SAU

[JUSTICE OF APPEAL]

Appearances

MR. THOMAS HUGHES FOR APPELLANT, MR. FRIMPONG BOADU FOR RESPONDENT