ROBERT AMISSAH V. ACCENTS AND ART GALLERY
by JUSTICE GIFTY DEKYEM
Jurisdiction
High Court
Judge
JUSTICE GIFTY DEKYEM
Catalog Type
Case
Judgement Date
Feb 23, 2016
Summary
Labour Law — Wrongful Termination — Burden of Proof — Absence Without Leave — Workmen’s Compensation — Effect of Compensation Agreement. The Plaintiff, a carpenter, sustained an eye injury in the course of employment and subsequently absented himself from work for nearly three months. Despite receiving several letters and queries from the Defendant requesting explanation and an indication of intention to return to work, Plaintiff failed to respond and did not produce evidence of authorized sick leave. The Defendant terminated his employment in accordance with its HR Manual. Held: 1. In an action for wrongful dismissal, the Plaintiff bears the burden to prove the terms of employment and breach thereof. Plaintiff failed to discharge this burden; the evidence showed unauthorized prolonged absence, amounting to misconduct justifying termination under section 15(e)(iii) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). 2. Defendant proved payment of Plaintiff’s medical bills except those unsubstantiated by Plaintiff. 3. Plaintiff had already accepted compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law (PNDCL 187) pursuant to a signed agreement, thereby precluding further claims for damages relating to the injury. 4. All claims dismissed; no order as to costs.
Full Content
JUDGMENT
DEKYEM, J.
Plaintiff is a carpenter by profession and ex employee of Defendant Company; the latter being a registered company under the laws of Ghana. Plaintiff had an accident during the course of his employment with Defendant and sustained an injury to his left eye. Plaintiff averred that due to the injury he was advised to go off work for a while and attend regular checks at the hospital. It is Plaintiff’s case that whilst receiving treatment for his injured eye Defendant wrote to him complaining about his inability to attend work whereupon he had a meeting with Defendant’s managing director and affirmed his commitment and desire to work as soon as the pain in the injured eye reduced. Plaintiff contended that Defendant refused to pay for the cost of medication and other incidental cost he incurred due to the injury he sustained. Plaintiff averred that when his health improved, he attended work but on 18th July 2014, Defendant terminated his appointment for no reasonable cause wherefore Plaintiff claims the following reliefs:
a. Declaration that the termination of the employment of the Plaintiff is wrongful.
b. Compensation for wrongful termination.
c. Order for payment of the Plaintiff’s salary from the date of purported termination of appointment till the final date of the determination of the matter.
d. Order for the payment of GH₵5,000.00 being the medical and other incidental cost incurred as a result of the injury of the left eye.
e. Cost of specialize medical care for the left injured eye.
f. General damages for the injury of the Plaintiff left eye and its associated discomfort and pain.
g. Cost of litigation.
Defendant in its defence contended that Plaintiff elected contrary to company policy not to wear the protective gear provided him by Defendant and sustained the injury. Defendant averred that Plaintiff was given three weeks off work by the medical officer who attended him and all compensation due under the Workmen’s Compensation Law was assessed and duly paid which Plaintiff accepted as full and final settlement of all claims in respect of the injury. Defendant’s case is that when the time limit for the excuse duty granted Plaintiff had expired, it wrote to Plaintiff inquiring why Plaintiff had not reported to work but Plaintiff failed to respond to the inquiry as well as queries issued out to him thus Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. It is Defendant’s case also that it paid all Plaintiff’s medical bills, medication and other costs incidental to his injury thus Plaintiff is not entitled to his claim.
The following issues were settled for trial:
1. Whether or not the termination of the appointment of Plaintiff by Defendants is wrongful?
2. Whether or not the medical bills and other expenses of the Plaintiff incurred as a result of the injury have been paid?
3. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to his claim
The provisions of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) regarding burden of proof in civil cases are as follows:
Section 10—Burden of Persuasion Defined.
(1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.
(2) The burden of persuasion may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact or that he establish the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 11—Burden of Producing Evidence Defined.
(1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.
(4) In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.
Section 12—Proof by a Preponderance of the Probabilities.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities.
(2) "Preponderance of the probabilities" means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non existence.
Section 14—Allocation of Burden of Persuasion.
Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.
Section 17—Allocation of Burden of Producing Evidence.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact.
Whether or not the termination of the appointment of Plaintiff by Defendants is wrongful? The principle in Morgan and Others v. Parkinson Howard Limited [1961] GLR 68, is that in a claim for wrongful dismissal the plaintiff must prove the terms of his employment and then prove that his dismissal is in breach of the said terms, or that it contravenes some statutory provisions for the time being regulating employment. (see also Sarfo v. A. Lang Ltd. [1978] I GLR 142). The same principle was adopted in Kobi v. Ghana Manganese Co. Ltd [2007-2008] SCGLR 771 as follows: “The issues agreed upon for trial, were whether or not the termination of the Plaintiff’s appointment was wrongful and illegal and whether or not the Plaintiffs were entitled to their claims. This being an action for damages for wrongful dismissal, each Plaintiff assumed the burden of proving the terms of his employment; that the determination was in breach of the terms of the agreement , or in contravention of statutory provisions for the time being regulating employment. If a Plaintiff failed to satisfy the court on these points, his or her claim cannot succeed.” The onus is on Plaintiff to prove that the termination of his employment was in breach of his employment contract or in contravention of statutory provisions regulating employment.
Plaintiff averred that following the injury he was advised to go off work for a while and whilst receiving treatment he received a letter from Defendant complaining about Plaintiff’s inability to attend work. It is Plaintiff’s case that following the letter he had a meeting with Defendant’s managing director and affirmed his commitment and desire to work as soon as the pains in the injured eye reduced thus resumed work when his health improved. Plaintiff contended that on 18th July 2014 Defendant terminated his appointment without reasonable cause. The letter terminating his employment contract dated 18th July 2014 reads in part as follows:
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT
Following our last letter to you dated 13th June 2014, in respect of you declaring your intention to continue working with our establishment, we still have not heard from you to date.
You have been absent from work for close to three months without any formal explanation. In line with our HR Manual, any worker who absents himself from work for an extended period of time without permission will be dismissed.
This serves as a final letter. We thank you for your time spent with us and wish you all the best with your future endeavours.
The reason for the termination of Plaintiff’s employment contract was that that following his injury he absented himself from work for close to three months without authorization and also failed to communicate to Defendant his intention to return to work. Defendant’s letter dated 23rd April 2014 (Exhibit 3) to Plaintiff stated among others:
SICK LEAVE
Please note, as per our HR Manual, Section 10.3 states that, employees may be granted sick leave on the basis of formal certification from a recognised medical officer of health.....
You are to state in writing your intention to either continue with our establishment or to resign within this time frame as we have not heard from you.
This is necessary to enable us also decide on whether or not we need to engage the services of another carpenter as this is affecting our production output.
Further exhibit 4 of Defendant’s query letter to Plaintiff dated 3rd June 2014 reads:
QUERY
After receipt of our letter dated 23rd April, 2014 to you, following discussion with the Medical Officer who attended to you, he said ideally you can resume work.
Indeed after the third month of your unfortunate accident, we have not received any formal intention from you to continue work or when (sic) you are not returning at all.
You are to explain within 48 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against you.
Also exhibit 5 of Defendant’s letter of 13th June 2014 to Plaintiff reads as follows:
QUERY
This serves as your second query as to why you have not reported to work, or if you intend to report to work at all to be reassigned to other floor duties.
We have made every effort to keep the communication channels with you open.
We have only finally finished following up with the insurance company on the claim for compensation and also working closely with the labour commission on how to handle your case.
If you have any issues you wish to discuss, you do know the due processes to follow and as such we are at a loss for the behaviour you are putting up. You are to respond to the above in writing.
It is Defendants case that Plaintiff failed to respond to any of its letters namely exhibits 3, 4 and 5 and consequently terminated the Plaintiff’s appointment. Plaintiff testified that due to his injury he was advised to go off work for a while and go on regular medical review but failed to indicate who advised him or show evidence of same. The only medical certificate exhibited by Plaintiff was dated 24th February 2014 and signed by GP CAPT ALEX MENSAH of the 37 Military Hospital which stated that Plaintiff was “No(t) fit yet” in answer to a question on the form requiring date patient was declared fit for work. Rightly so, having been injured on 20th February 2014, it was not out of place and unexpected to declare him unfit for work four days after. In cross examination Plaintiff testified thus:
Q were you granted any sick leave at any time after your injury?
A No My Lord
Q When did you return to work after your injury?
A My Lord I returned on 22nd June, 2014.
Q As with standard practice with the Defendant company you always sign when you go to work, not so?
A Yes My Lord, but when I got injured I didn’t regularly sign.
Q Is there a particular reason why you chose as when to sign when you resume work
A Yes My Lord, the reason was that the time I was still going for treatment. At the time I was using 2 types of eye drop which I apply 4 times a day due to that I was not regular at work in a week I go to work two times.
Q I suggest to you that after that accident the only time you showed up and signed the attendance book was the 30th of June 2014.
A My Lord I already said when I go for treatment and come back to the office I don’t normally sign.
At paragraph 16 of Plaintiff’s witness statement, he testified that he has difficulty in expressing himself in written English so he had a meeting with DW2, the managing director of Defendant instead and agreed that Plaintiff should return to work when his health improved. This assertion was denied by Defendant. In the light of exhibits 3, 4 and 5, I find Defendant’s story more probable than Plaintiff’s.
Amah v. Kaifio [1959] GLR 23 at 25 held that “the burden of proof rests upon the party who would fail if no evidence at all, or no more evidence, as the case may be, were given on either side - i.e. it rests, before evidence is gone into, upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue; and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the party [p.26] against whom the tribunal, at the time the question arises, would give judgment if no further evidence were adduced” Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proof that his absence was authorized or agreed upon by DW2.
From Plaintiff’s own showing, he was not granted sick leave yet he absented himself after the injury until 30th June 2014 per his own exhibit RAG 5. Plaintiff admitted receiving at least exhibit 3 which is the same as his exhibit RAE yet he failed to respond by stating in writing his intention to return to work or resign as required of him by the letter. The court finds from the evidence placed before it that Plaintiff absented himself for over three months following the injury to his eye. Section 15 (e) (iii) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) is explicit on the ground relating to an allegation of misconduct upon which a worker’s employment may be terminated. The provision stipulates that a lawful termination of employment is upon proven misconduct of the worker. The court will hold that Plaintiff misconducted himself by absenting himself without permission and failed also to defend himself when the opportunity was given him. The termination of Plaintiff’s employment was therefore not unlawful.
The next issue is whether or not the medical bills and other expenses of the Plaintiff incurred as a result of the injury have been paid? Plaintiff averred that apart from medical bills incurred on 20th and 21st February 2014, Defendant refused to pay further bills he presented. Under cross examination Plaintiff admitted that Defendant paid receipt dated 10th March 2014. The evidence placed before the court shows per exhibits 2 and 2A that apart from medical bills of 20th and 21st February 2014 paid by Defendant in respect of Plaintiff, it also paid pharmacy bill dated 25th February 2014 and cost of lens dated 10th March 2014. Throughout his testimony Plaintiff did not indicate which bills he presented to Defendant but same remains unpaid. Plaintiff is also claiming GHS5,000.00 being medical and other incidental costs incurred as a result of the injury to his left eye and also cost of specialized medical care for the injured eye but failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate his claim. Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden he assumed when he asserted that Defendant refused to pay his medical bills apart from the ones dated 20th and 21st February 2014 and also that he has incurred costs of GHS5,000.00 among others.
Plaintiff is also claiming general damages for the injury and its associated discomfort and pain. Exhibit 10 is an agreement entered into by parties herein pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Law, 1987 (PNDCL 187) and witnessed by the Metro Labour Officer. The agreement is dated 20th November 2014 and the parties agreed that Defendant will pay Plaintiff the sum of GHS10,481.16 as compensation for the injury. Plaintiff averred that he received GHS1, 000.00 from Donewell Insurance in connection with the injury which amount Defendant deducted from the compensation amount of GHS10, 481.16 agreed upon and paid the remaining to him. Exhibit 10 precludes Plaintiff from taking proceedings independently of PNDCL 187 to recover damages in respect of the injury. It is therefore not out of order when the GHS1, 000.00 initially given to Plaintiff was taken into account to achieve the compensation sum of GHS10, 481.16. Plaintiff is thus not entitled to anymore damages having received the compensation sum of GHS10,481.16 thereby Defendant having discharged all liabilities to pay compensation under the law. I do empathize with the predicament Plaintiff finds himself in but the evidence must be weighed on its own merit. In conclusion, Plaintiff’s claim fails in its entirety. Plaintiff’s action is hereby dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to cost.
(SGD)
Justice Gifty Dekyem (Mrs)
Justice of the High Court
Labour Division 1, Accra
COUNSEL
Joyce Wireko Ampim Opoku ESQ for Plaintiff;
Amartei Amarteifio ESQ with Michael Karikari Yeboah ESQ & Mrs Christiana Bruce Ashirifi for Defendant.