RITA YAWO NNAEMEKA VRS. CHARLES OBUZULU NNAEMEKA

J U D G M E N T

BARTELS-KODWO, J.A:

By her petition filed on the 25th of October, 2007, the Petitioner/Appellant prayed that:

a. “That the marriage between the parties celebrated on 13th April, 2002 be dissolved.

b. That the Petitioner be settled with a half (1/2) share of the following properties acquired in the course of the marriage:

i. The fully completed house at Ashiaman, Middle East.

ii. The two (2) storey uncompleted building at Ashiaman, Middle East and a boy’s quarters which is one (1) storey.

iii. The five (5) electrical wholesale shops/stores at Cow Lane, Accra.

iv. One (1) big warehouse together with the electrical appliance fully stocked therein.

v. There is a warehouse under the building the parties live in, he also puts some of the goods in the other apartment in the same house. The boys’ quarters is used as a warehouse.

c.That the Petitioner be settled with Toyota Rav 4 with Registration No. GR 3000- 15 and the Mercedes Benz E320 Kompressor with Registration No. GS 7878 Y whiles the Respondent takes the remaining vehicles.

d. That an amount of Five Million Ghana Cedis (GHC 5, 000,000) be settled in favour of the Petitioner as financial settlement in lieu of her share in the large sum of money the Respondent has kept in various bank accounts and other investment at the Forex Bureau at Cow Lane.

e. That the Respondent be ordered to maintain the Petitioner pending the final dissolution of the marriage.

The Respondent/Respondent answered the petition and denied the Petitioner/Appellant’s averments but prayed for:

i. An order dissolving the said marriage.

ii. That the Respondent says the Petitioner is not entitled to any of the prayers sought.

The brief facts of the case are as follows:

The Petitioner/Appellant (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner) a Ghanaian, married the Respondent/Respondent a Nigerian, (hereinafter referred to as the Respondent) on 13th April, 2002. The 15 year old union has no children. The Respondent however in the course of the marriage has had a child outside the marriage. He however claims that it was with the consent of the Petitioner which she has denied in her Reply. She contends that it is as a result of her marriage to the Respondent that he was able to acquire Ghanaian citizenship which contention again the Respondent disagrees with.

It is the Petitioner’s case that she has suffered physical assault at the hands of the Respondent during the marriage which has caused her to suffer miscarriages and even an ectopic pregnancy. The Respondent denies the assault. The Petitioner states that during the 15 year marriage they acquired both immoveable and moveable properties e.g houses as well as vehicles and she is entitled to a share of these. The Respondent denies this and avers that the properties in issue belong to his principals in China. He also denies having any personal monies in bank accounts since any monies received in his private accounts were sent to his principals in China in the course of the business.

With regard to the vehicles in issue a Mercedes Benz 320 (Kompressor) and Mercedes Benz ML 320 he asserted that he bought them before he met the Petitioner. He however admits acquiring a Sprinter Mercedes Benz Van and a Toyota Rav 4 during the pendency of the marriage.

The trial court after hearing evidence gave Judgment as can be found on pages 346 – 365 0f the Record of Appeal (ROA) and found as follows that:

a. The properties in contention were acquired in the name of the Respondent in the course of the Parties marriage see pages 357-358 of the ROA on the acquisition of the houses in contention at Ashiaman.

b.  The learned trial judge also found that all the vehicles were also acquired during the course of the marriage.

c.   He also came to the conclusion that the Respondent was not an agent of his Principals Messrs Fuzhou Euro-Import and Export Company Limited of China. He found that Messrs Chydon Company Ltd lawfully incorporated in Ghana was formed during the course of the marriage.

d.  The learned trial judge found that the Appellant had made substantial contributions towards the acquisition of the two landed property.

At the end of the trial the court in giving judgment delivered itself as follows;

1. Accordingly, I give the Petitioner the top floor of the two storey building or in the alternative the Respondent is given two months to find the Petitioner a standard 4 bedroom self-contained house at Ashiaman or its environs.

2. I give the Petitioner the Rav 4 and the Kia Sorento vehicles.

3. The Petitioner married the Respondent for 15 years, she assisted the Respondent in running the business. Respondent also told the court that the Appellant was expensive to maintain. I think an amount of GHC 300,000.00 as financial settlement is appropriate under the circumstances to enable the Petitioner to somehow maintain her status in life.

It is against this judgment that this appeal has been brought on the following grounds that:

Notice of Appeal (Grounds of Appeal):

i. The learned High Court Judge erred in Law when he failed to advert his mind to the fact that the Petitioner/Appellant in consonance with the Constitution of Ghana, was entitled to equal rights in the Matrimonial properties acquired in the course of the parties marriage after so holding that all the aforesaid Matrimonial properties were jointly acquired by the parties.

ii. The learned High Court Judge erred in law when he failed to vest any of the business properties the parties acquired in the course of their marriage in the Petitioner/Appellant after so holding that the aforesaid business properties did not belong to the respondent’s principals but were acquired during the course of the parties’ marriage for which the Petitioner/Appellant under law was entitled to a portion.

iii. The judgment is against the weight of the evidence adduced at trial.

Reliefs sought:

That the aforesaid judgment be set aside or varied looking at the totality of the evidence before the court.

The Respondent also filed a Notice of Cross Appeal with the following;

Grounds of Appeal

i. Judgment is against the weight of evidence

ii. That the learned trial Judge erred when he held that the petitioner is entitled to a share of the respondent property in the face of clear admission by the petitioner that she did not contribute financially to the setting up of respondent business concerns and properties.

iii. That the learned trial Judge erred in law in awarding the petitioner a 4 bedroom house and the payment of Gh¢300,000.00 without adverting his mind to the standard of living of the respondent/appellant and his circumstances in contravention of the Matrimonial Courses Act 1971 Act 378

iv. Additional grounds to be filed upon receipt of the record.

In so doing he sought the Relief that the aforesaid judgment be set aside or varied looking at the totality of the evidence before the court.

Both parties in their Appeal and Cross- Appeal contend that judgment is against the weight of evidence. Our Apex Court has held in diverse cases that where an Appellant complains that a judgment is against the weight of evidence the implication is that there exist certain pieces of evidence on record which if applied in their favour, will turn the decision around or that certain pieces of evidence have been wrongly applied against him. In such a case, it is up to the Appellant to demonstrate to the court these shortcomings such as are evident on the record. See the cases are: Djin vrs Musah Baako [2007-2008] SCGLR 687; Akufo Addo vrs Catheline [1992] 1 GLR 377 and Boateng & ors vrs Boateng [1987-1988] 2 GLR 81. It is therefore the duty of this court to examine the whole record to come to its own determinations.

In arguing ground (i), The learned High Court Judge erred in Law when he failed to advert his mind to the fact that the Petitioner/Appellant in consonance with the Constitution of Ghana, was entitled to equal right in the Matrimonial properties acquired in the course of the parties marriage after so holding that all the aforesaid Matrimonial properties were jointly acquired by the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to s.20 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971 Act 367 and Article 22 Clauses (2) & (3) of the 1992 C0nstitution where it is provided as follows:

Section 20—Property Settlement.

(1)      The court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party such sum of money or convey to the other party such movable or immovable property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provision as the court thinks just and equitable.

ARTICLE 22

(2)    Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses.

(3) With a view to achieving the full realisation of the rights referred to in clause (2) of this article.

(3) (a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage;

(3) (b) assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage.

He submitted in reference to the above portions of law that the distribution of marital property acquired during the course of a marriage is centered on equity as seen from the Constitution. He made referred to a number of Supreme Court cases such as Mensah v Mensah 1998-1999 SCGLR 350 where the Court held that in so long as the record of evidence showed that contributions were made to the acquisition of matrimonial property same will be declared as joint property.

Again in the case of BOAFO V BOAFO (2005-2006) SCGLR 705, the apex court underlined the notion of equality with reference to property jointly acquired by married couples unless a different proportion of ownership can be established. The court in latter years in the case of QUARTSON V QUARTSON (2012) SCGLR in holding 2 went further to state that domestic services rendered by a spouse can even amount to a contribution in terms of the purchase of property in a marriage. Also in the case of ARTHUR V ARTHUR (NUMBER 1) (2013 - 2014) SCGLR 543 the court held that properties acquired during the course of a marriage are presumed to be jointly acquired and rebuttable only upon contrary evidence.

Learned Counsel submitted that from these cases it is clear that for a spouse to successfully lay claim to a portion of marital property it must be established first of all that the property was acquired during the course of the marriage. Additionally it must also be established that a party worked or contributed to the acquisition of the property in issue.

Bringing this home counsel for the Appellant submitted that there was no dispute that the parties engaged in some business ventures. Though the Appellant claims she was helping her husband in his business operations the Respondent claimed he supplied her with goods for which she failed to render accounts. She however used the proceeds to build a house for her mother in Achimota. Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the Appellant denied this and the Respondent failed to lead any evidence to prove it. He submitted further that in line with the case of KLAH VRS PHOENIX INSURANCE CO LTD (2012) 2 SCGLR 1139 it was incumbent on the party making an averment of a matter to produce the evidence in support of it. Consequently they had laid bare the evidence that the parties were doing business together as supported by their Exhibits F, G and H attached to their Witness Statement. He also took issue with the Respondent’s stance that the two properties acquired in the course of the marriage belonged to his principals in China since he was unable to provide any evidence in support thereof. He pointed out that the Power of Attorney attached to the Respondent’s sole witness’s Witness Statement does not show any ownership of the two properties by the Chinese Company. It only states that the witness is aware the Managing Director transferred money for the purchase of same. Besides the Power of Attorney states that the Respondent’s witness Paul Asare Apea had been given a Power of Attorney by the M.D. of Messrs Fuzhou Euro Import & Export company to represent his interest in the suit and NOT the interest of the Company. The Power of Attorney counsel notes was executed in Tema on 10th May, 2017 and though stamped is not notarized. In effect the Power of Attorney was not even properly executed and raised issues on its authenticity.

Furthermore learned counsel submitted that nowhere in Exhibit 2, the Principal/Agency Agreement (Pg 118 of the ROA) was it indicated that the Agent was empowered to buy properties on behalf of the Principal. It was therefore not correct or true that the properties in issue belonged to the Respondent’s Principal. He submitted that it was no wonder that the trial court came to the conclusion based upon this that the properties were acquired by the parties during the subsistence of their marriage. The Appellant, he stated, by Exhibits I, J K and L showed that the two properties in issue were acquired in the course of the marriage.

From establishing that the properties were acquired during the course of the marriage counsel submitted that it was important to determine whether the Appellant contributed to the acquisitions of these properties. He stated that from the evidence it was clear that during the 15 years marriage of the parties the Appellant assisted her husband in his business operations. This was confirmed by the Appellant’s witness, Dawu Gado at page 40 to 42 of the ROA and he was never challenged under cross- examination. This being the case it was evident that the Appellant had helped the Respondent in his business therefore she has a beneficial interest in the two properties in issue. However the trial court in holding that the properties were acquired during the course of the marriage only made orders in respect of one. The court ordered the Appellant to be given only the top part of the two storey building without making any orders in respect of the second property. He prayed this court to therefore to examine the facts before it and make its own inferences. See the case of ACKAH VRS PERGAH TRANSPORT LTD (2010) SCGLR 728 Holding 2. He therefore prayed the court to vary its orders.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent on ground one argued that his learned friend’s reliance on Article 22 (3) (a) was ill-advised since the article granted spouses equal access and not rights to properties jointly acquired during the subsistence of a marriage. He pointed to Article 23 (3) (b) rather as what guarantees spousal rights to the equitable distribution of properties acquired during the subsistence of a marriage. In accordance with this he submitted that the Supreme Court interpreted this Article into the principle of equality is equity in cases such as MENSAH VRS MENSAH 2012 1 SCGLR and what is considered equitable is accounted for in the case of BOAFO V BOAFO [2005-2006] SCGLR in that it accords with common sense and fair play being a question of fact depending on the particular circumstances of each case.

In that wise he submitted that it is not every property acquired during the pendency of a marriage that automatically belongs to the couple jointly but that which is ‚jointly acquired‛ by the couple which belongs to them. He submitted that Respondent was able to show or prove during the trial that though certain properties were acquired during the marriage he acquired them without the help of the Appellant. This he did by proffering evidence as per Exhibits 1 Series that prior to his arrival in Ghana in 1999 he was engaged in an established business in the same line of business since1996 with 15 years’ experience as a business man. This was all before he married the Appellant so she could not have contributed to the acquisition of the ‘spousal properties’. He stated further that the Appellant herself collaborated this when she admitted under cross- examination at page 256 ROA that the Respondent was doing his own business before he met her. She also admitted it was the Respondent’s money that was used to set up the business, see page 258 0f the ROA. As a result of this, the trial court made a finding of fact on this at page 356 of the ROA in acknowledging the Appellant’s admissions above. In his view there is no miscarriage of justice brought about by the Court’s findings and it will not be proper to accept the Petitioner’s reliance on the blanket interpretation of the presumption of jointly acquired property. This he said is so because the Appellant did not and could not have contributed to the setting up of the businesses to be entitled to the proceeds.

Learned counsel for the Appellant proceeded to argue Ground two; The learned High Court Judge erred in law when he failed to vest any of the business properties the parties acquired in the course of their marriage in the Petitioner/Appellant after so holding that the aforesaid business properties did not belong to the respondent’s principals but were acquired during the course of the parties marriage for which the Petitioner/Appellant under law was entitled to a portion.

He pointed out to the properties listed in paragraph 27 of the Petition found at page 5 of the ROA as part of the properties the couple acquired during their marriage which the Respondent denied at paragraphs 23, 25 and 26, 27, 33, of his answer, see 238-239 of ROA. Learned counsel argued that the Respondent admitted the Sprinter Mercedes Benz Van used for business and the Toyota Rav 4 vehicles were acquired during the course of the marriage. He however failed to establish that his Principals are the sole owners of the Shops and goods at Cow lane. He finds the Respondent’s answer at paragraph 25 and at page 16 of the ROA as inconsistent when he states that he denies he has 5 electrical wholesale shops/stores at Cow lane and says he operates 2 shops which are guided by the same arrangement with his principals who are resident in China. Further during the Respondent’s cross-examination Counsel says he admits these averments in his Answer at pg 286 of the ROA but with a lot of inconsistencies. The trial judge however found out all the vehicles were acquired during the marriage of the parties. The trial judge however was unsatisfied that the Respondent was indeed the Agent of the Fuzhou Euro- Import and Export Company Ltd since the exhibits tendered were fraught with inconsistencies.

The learned trial judge also found out that the only Company existing at the time of this Petition was Chydom Limited formed during the course of the marriage and it has nothing to do with Fuzhou Euro- Import and Export Company Ltd. See page 360 of the ROA. Again learned counsel for the Appellant drew the court’s attention to the fact that though the Respondent in paragraph 25 of his answer admitted operating two shops in Cow lane for his principal there is no evidence that there is any principal yet the learned trial judge failed to hold that the Appellant has an interest in these shops. More so when he had at page 360 of the ROA held that the company Chydom Limited was formed during the course of the marriage and there is ample evidence on record that the Appellant did help the Respondent with the running of the business in the course of the marriage. She ought then to be entitled to a portion of the business proceeds counsel submitted.

Concerning Ground two, Respondent counsel is of the view that it is a misguided ground since Companies are separate legal entities distinct from their owners with legal rights. Hence it is mind boggling that the business properties will be considered as spousal property coming up for distribution upon the dissolution of a marriage. He relied on the case of MACAURA V NORTHERN ASSURANCE CO LTD [1925] AC 619

where it was held that not even members of a company have an interest in the properties of a company. That being the case Chydom Co Ltd properties cannot be the subject matter of distribution in this case. Learned Counsel contended that they had been able to prove by Exhibit 2 that the properties in issue belonged to the Respondent’s Principals in China and so the Respondent cannot give them to the Appellant.

Regarding the third ground of Appeal that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence adduced at trial counsel for the Appellant relied on the case of ABBEY AND OTHERS VRS ANTWI (2010) SCGLR 17 @ 34-35 to remind this court that when an Appeal is launched on such a ground it is the duty of the court to look at the whole Record of Appeal to see whether what the Appellant alleges is the case and subsequently address the shortcomings that become apparent. It is also the duty of the Appellant to bring to the fore what he finds lacking about the judgment.

Consequently it is his view that there is no doubt that the properties in contention between the parties are two and the judge made that determination in his judgment. He also came to the conclusion that the properties did not belong to any so called Principal of the Respondent (see pages 357-358 ROA). This being so counsel argues that the properties remain assets of the marriage and both parties are entitled to same. However the learned trial judge only made a determination on one of the properties as captured in the orders made at page 365 of the ROA. The trial judge in his orders vested only the top floor of one of the properties in the Appellant and in the alternative gave the Respondent the right to find a standard 4 bed room self-contained house for the Appellant at Ashiaman which to date has not materialized.

Counsel for the Appellant submitted further that though the court found out the parties have been married for 15 years which is not in dispute and also found that the Appellant contributed to the running of the business she was awarded only Ghc 300,000.00 which in his view based on the evidence is inadequate. He relied on the cases of WACHTEL VRS WACHTEL (1973) 1 AER 829 @ 830; S VRS S (1977) 1 AER 56 as well

as section 20 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Act 367 and prayed this court to make an adequate award of a lump sum. He asked the court to look at all the circumstances of the case whereby the Appellant had given up her work to become a full time employee or a partner to her husband in the business for 15 years. She is coming out of a childless marriage with no investment at all. It is therefore in order that this court makes her an adequate award in her favour.

The learned counsel for the Respondent on Ground 3 contended that the Appellant failed to lead evidence to support her case but rather appropriated properties that belong to the Respondent’s companies. A case in point is the departure of the Appellant from the matrimonial home with a brand new Rav 4 whose documents were still with the Respondent. See page 103 0f the ROA. He submitted that the Appellant failed to show that she was entitled to her claims of joint ownership of the business. Concerning the KIA Sorento vehicle that the Appellant claimed Respondent had sold to her brother learned counsel stated that though the trial judge had made a finding against this (see page364 ROA) because there was no evidence of payment of the purchase price he erroneously awarded the vehicle to the Appellant. He stated that this vehicle was bought for the Chydom Company and so cannot fall into the list of marital properties to be distributed upon the dissolution of marriage.

With regard to the vehicles counsel argued that since the Respondent had a V Boot Mercedes car and an ML Mercedes before he got married to the Appellant and sold the V Boot during the course of the marriage to buy the E320 Kompressor, the Kompressor cannot form part of the jointly acquired properties subject to distribution upon dissolution of the marriage. Also the Rav 4 earlier mentioned in belongs to the Respondent though the Appellant has taken it away unceremoniously when she left the matrimonial home.

Learned counsel for the Respondent relied on Exhibits 1, from Chydom Motors Nigeria Ltd, 2, the Agency Agreement and 6a – 22c evidence of monetary transfers to Respondents agents to support the fact that the Respondent held property on behalf of his Principals. Therefore in the absence of the Appellant proving that they jointly acquired the landed properties her claim to same must fail.

With regard to the provision of the 4 bedroom house and the award of Ghc300,000.00 learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the court failed to examine the means of the parties as was held in BARAKE V BARAKE [1993-1994] 1 GLR 635, that upon an application for a sum of money to be paid or the transfer of some moveable or immoveable property the court has to examine the needs of the parties before making a reasonable provision out of what was available from the spouse. The Appellant also failed to lead any evidence to show that the Respondent was in a position to pay the Ghc5,000,000.00 she asked for in her reliefs. Learned counsel reminded the court that an order for financial provision out of Act 367 is need-based and not meant to punish the party perceived to be the cause of the breakdown. See AIKINS VRS AIKINS [1979] GLR

233. Learned counsel pointed the court to the case of OBENG VRS OBENG [2013] 63 GMJ where the Court of Appeal held that what is ‚ ‚just” and “equitable” may be determined by considering the following factors: the income, earning capacity, property, and other financial resources which each of the parties has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, the standard of living enjoyed by the parties before the breakdown of the marriage; the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage”

It is learned counsel’s view that the Appellant is single with no child, without any direct financial responsibilities and is still in the lucrative business of catering unlike the Respondent who has a lifetime responsibility towards his child and his principals in China. Consequently this court should not countenance the punishment metered out to him in the award of payments made.

We note that the Respondent in arguing the grounds of Appeal also indirectly argued the Cross-Appeal filed by him. Therefore as far as he is concerned the Appellant is not entitled to a share of the respondent property in the face of clear admission by the petitioner that she did not contribute financially to the setting up of respondent business concerns and properties. Neither on the evidence is she deserving of the award of a 4 bedroom house and the payment of Gh¢300,000.00 since same was made in contravention of the Matrimonial Courses Act 1971 Act 376.

Our mandate in this Appeal is not lost on us as we are simply to look out by going through the entire Record of Appeal and consider any lapses complained of by the Appellant, to establish whether or not her case is more probable or not. In this case, were the trial Judge’s finding and conclusions supported by the evidence on the Record of Appeal? The trial judge found that the properties in issue i.e. the houses in Ashiaman were acquired in the Respondent’s name in the course of the marriage between the parties. See page 13, 357 – 368 of the ROA. On the evidence before the court we are in agreement with him. He also held that all the vehicles were acquired during the course of the marriage see page 359 of the ROA and this is also supported by the evidence on record.

The learned trial judge also found that the respondent was not an agent of his alleged principal Fuzhou Euro-Import and Export Company Ltd. The power of attorney tendered by the respondent’s witness seen at page 243-245 of the ROA appears to be given by a Managing Director of the company to the witness Paul Asare to represent his interest personally in the suit and not the company. The power of attorney is also fraught with issues of its execution not being notarised etc etc. generally the respondent failed to lead any cogent evidence that he had principals on whose behalf he acquired any properties. Even the exhibit 2 which is supposed to be a Principal/Agency Agreement is silent on the purchase of any properties.

However the evidence establishes that Chydom Company Ltd was lawfully incorporated during the course of the parties’ marriage. It is as a result that the learned trial finds that by the Appellant helping him ran his business the appellant made substantial contributions to the acquisition of the two landed properties. Even though she admitted it was his money that was used to start the business there is ample evidence on record to show that the Appellant worked assiduously in making the business flourish. She was physically engaged standing for long hours in the shop toiling daily to see to a successful business. The evidence also showed that the Respondent could travel to his home country and be away for months and it was the Respondent who manned the business in his absence. The judge therefore rightly held at page 360 of the record that the properties in contention were jointly acquired during the course of the marriage.

We have taken a bird’s eye view of all the evidence on the Record of Appeal we do not fault the learned trial judge on his findings. There is no doubt that the Appellant was the Respondent’s wife of a good period of 15 years who helped him in the businesses that were established during the course of their marriage. She worked hard to see to the success of their trade. It is also clear from the evidence that the two buildings in contention were acquired during the course of the marriage.

On these two criteria, i.e. the Appellant lending herself or contributing to the success of the business and the overall acquisition of properties during the course of the marriage we say that she is entitled to the benefits of property distribution envisaged under Section 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971, (Act 367) supra. She need not have made financial contributions as the Respondent would want this court to believe that because she did not make any financial contribution she was not entitled to anything. See QUARTSON supra.

More so Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the rights of spouses to have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage. It also makes provision for assets which are jointly acquired during marriage to be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage. Section 20(1) of Act 367 envisages an equitable distribution of property upon dissolution of marriage. Therefore when the trial judge came to the conclusion at page 363 of the ROA that the parties had jointly acquired the two landed properties why then did he make an award in respect of only one of them? He dealt with only ‘the top floor of the two storey building’ which he gave to the Appellant and added that in the alternative to that ‘the Respondent is given two months to find the Petitioner a standard 4 bedroom self-contained house at Ashiaman or its environs’.

The Appellant is praying this court to vary or set aside the judgment of the court. We are satisfied with the findings of the trial judge with regard to the landed property in issue however we are not satisfied with the conclusions he came to in distributing same. Going by the principle of the equitable distribution of property upon the dissolution of marriage we are of the opinion that the trial judge should have considered both properties in making his award. On that score we will vary his order in respect of the single property and order that both parties having jointly acquired the properties in issue; one fully completed house at Ashiaman Middle East, Accra and the uncompleted two- storey building with a boys quarters also at Ashiaman the parties are to share these in equal shares of their value.

Regarding the award of Ghc300,000.00 to the Appellant the Respondent complains in his cross-appeal that the judge did not take his circumstances into consideration before making the award. In other words he contravened the Matrimonial Causes Act. See the OBENG case supra. Though the record is silent on whether the means of the parties were examined or not it is clear from the record that the parties had been engaged in a thriving business. The Respondent himself ran his mouth by saying that he sent substantial sums of money to his business partners outside the country. The trial judge also remarked in the concluding parts of the judgment that the Respondent said the Appellant was expensive to maintain. We will therefore not tamper with this award and leave same intact so as not to leave the Appellant worse off as she walks out of a childless marriage of 15 years during which she contributed greatly in putting Respondents business on a sound footing.

The Appeal thus succeeds in part to the extent that the order in respect of the property award is varied as mentioned earlier in this judgment.

(Sgd.)

JANAPARE A. BARTELS-KODWO (MRS.)

(JUSTICE OF APPEAL)

(Sgd.)

Dzamefe, J.A                                   I agree                                 SENYO DZAMEFE

(JUSTICE OF APPEAL)

(Sgd.)

Dodoo,                           I also agree                JENNIFER DODOO (MRS.)

(JUSTICE OF APPEAL)

COUNSEL:

Eddie Yao Harvey Esq. for the Petitioner/Appellant with Marese Okpei

William Oko Okornoe Esq. for Respondent/Respondent