METROPOLITAN INSURANCE CO. LTD. V. FRANCIS NSIAH-AFRIYIEE

JUDGMENT

F.G. KORBIEH, J.A.

The case of the plaintiff/respondent/cross-appellant (hereinafter only referred to as the plaintiff) at the trial court may be summarized as follows: he was employed by the defendant/appellant/cross-respondent (hereinafter only referred to as the defendant or defendant-company) as its Chief Financial Officer (CFO) by a letter dated the 5/9/2000 and signed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the defendant company. The plaintiffs letter of employment indicated that he would be furnished with his conditions of service in due course. Subsequently he was given the conditions of service which embodied many of the contractual terms of employment between the parties. One such term was that the employment may be terminated by either the Company or the employee giving notice to the other or payment in lieu thereof as follows:—

'Grade 5 and above - three months' salary in lieu of notice...'

Another term was that the plaintiff was entitled to be paid a bonus at the end of every month. The plaintiff worked as CFO for the defendant company until January, 2002 when he received another letter from the CEO of the company informing him of a review of his conditions of service which basically involved an up-ward adjustment of his salary. In July, 2003 the plaintiff and two other top executive officers of the company, namely the CEO and the Chief Operating Officer (COO) attended various meetings of four sub-committees of the company (namely the Finance, Strategy and Development, Remuneration and Audit subcommittees) which had been set up to investigate allegations of embezzlement of funds made against the three top executive officers. Due to the poisoned environment the plaintiff found himself in, he wrote to the defendant company (on the 28/9/2003) giving it notice of his intention to resign from the employment of the company after the expiration of three months from the date of the letter. This in effect meant that the plaintiff would cease to work for the company with effect from 28/12/2003. Upon receipt of the plaintiffs letter of resignation, the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff reprimanding him for his complicity in the practice of paying himself and the two other top executive officers' salary advances and unauthorized increments in salary and requesting the plaintiff to refund an amount of $2,100.00 being the alleged difference in salary payment to him. The CEO (who had also received a similar letter of reprimand) decided to write a response for himself and on behalf of the two other top executive officers who included the COO who had also been given a similar letter of reprimand. In that letter, the CEO denied any wrong-doing on the part of the three top executive officers and explained that the salary increment for the three had been authorized by the board of directors of the defendant company. Upon receipt of the plaintiffs letter of resignation, the defendant wrote a letter accepting the resignation and bringing forward the date the plaintiff would cease to work for the defendant to the 15/10/2003. The plaintiff therefore initiated this action in court claiming from the defendant a number of reliefs. By the plaintiffs amended writ of summons and statement of claim, he claimed from the defendant the following reliefs:

(a) An amount of GH¢41,351,989.50 being salary in lieu of notice and accrued allowances for the period 16/10/2003 to 31/12/2003.

(b) An amount of GH¢92,686,617.00 being payment for 44 working days' accumulated leave commuted to cash.

(c) A sum of GH¢23,598,786.60 being bonuses earned from January to October, 2003.

(d) Interest on the said amounts (less the sum of GH¢5,448,283.40 being the value of a computer taken over by the plaintiff) at the prevailing interest rate from 16/10/2003 to the date of judgment.

The case of the defendant at the trial court, on the other hand, was that the sub-committees mentioned above had been set up generally to audit the performance of top management in the running of the affairs of the defendant company and not just to investigate the embezzlement of funds. It also averred that the investigations conducted by the defendant revealed that the plaintiff had paid himself and the two other top executive officers unearned income and allowances and that that fact notwithstanding no atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion had been created between the board of directors and the plaintiff and the plaintiff had therefore not been relieved of his post. The defendant also averred that the three month-notice that the plaintiff was required to give before terminating his contract of employment with the defendant was a right that inured to the benefit of the defendant alone and accordingly the defendant was entitled to waive that right without incurring any liability on itself. The defendant further averred that since it incurred no liability by waiving the three-month notice period, it had no liability to pay the plaintiff two and half months' salary in lieu of notice and that it had used the 44 working days' leave commuted to cash to set off part of the plaintiff's indebtedness to the defendant.

At the close of pleadings the issues set down for trial were the following:

(a) Whether or not the three-month notice of resignation in the conditions of service is a right that inures to the benefit of the defendant or both parties.

(b) Whether or not the defendant can waive the three-month notice of resignation without incurring any liability.

(c) Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his reliefs.

(d) Any other issues arising from the pleadings.

At the trial the plaintiff testified for himself and called the CEO as his only witness. The only witness called to testify in support of the defendant's case was Mr. Pryce Kojo Thompson who had once been the chairman of the board of directors of the defendant company. At the end of the trial the court below gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay the 'salary in view (sic) of notice and accrued allowances for the period 16th October 2003 to 31st December 2003' to the plaintiff. The trial court further ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 'the sum of GH¢9,267.00 being payment for 44 working days accumulated leave commuted to cash, less the sum of GH¢547.00 due to the defendants in respect of the laptop supplied to the Plaintiff by the Defendants.' The trial court however held that it was 'unable to award interest on the sums of money awarded'.

It is this judgment that the defendant has appealed against on the following grounds:

(1) The learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the defendant was not entitled to waive their right to the notice of intention to resign from the plaintiff.

(2) The learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the defendant was liable in law to pay the plaintiff three months' salary in lieu of notice.

(3) The learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the plaintiffs accumulated leave commuted to cash should have been calculated on the plaintiff's gross rather than his net salary contrary to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592).

(4) The learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the defendant should pay the plaintiff GH¢9,267.00 being accumulated leave commuted to cash.

(5) The judgment is against the weight of the evidence.

(6) Other grounds to be filed on receipt of the record of appeal.

The relief sought by the defendant was that the judgment of the trial High Court should be set aside and judgment entered in favour of the defendant.

Not to be out-done, the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal in which he complained about:

(i) The trial court's failure to award interest on the amount of GH¢4,135.00 being salary in lieu of notice and accrued allowances for the period 16/10/2003 to 31/12/2003;

(ii) The trial court's failure to award interest on the amount of GH¢9,267.00 being payment for 44 working days accumulated leave commuted to cash; and

(iii) The trial court's failure to award an amount of GH¢2,359.80 being bonuses earned from January to October 2003 and interest on the same.

The grounds of the cross-appeal were as follows:

(a) That part of the judgment complained about is against the weight of the evidence.

(b) Further grounds to be filed on receipt of the record of appeal.

The relief sought was to set aside that part of the judgment complained about and enter judgment for the plaintiff.

Before I go on to consider the various grounds of appeal it is pertinent to point out that neither side filed any additional grounds of appeal. So the grounds of appeal and cross-appeal remained those that I have already set out above. In arguing the appeal learned counsel for the defendant argued grounds (1) and (2) together. His argument was that a resolution of the issues raised by those two grounds would answer the question: whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to the amount of GH¢4,135.00 being salary and accrued allowances for the period 16/10/2003 to 31/12/2003. That argument may very well be applicable to ground (2) but not ground (1) which is couched as follows:

'The learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the defendant was not entitled to waive their right to the notice of intention to resign from the plaintiff.'

This is a serious misrepresentation of what the learned trial judge decided. The judgment of the trial court can be found on pages 175 to 177 of the record of appeal. I have studied that judgment very carefully and nowhere in it did the learned trial judge hold that the defendant was not entitled to waive its right to the notice of intention to resign from the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the defendant quoted part of the judgment on page 6 of his written submissions and then contends as follows:

'There is no provision in the contract that requires that if either party waived the right to receive notice then the other must pay a sum of money to the other as cushion during the notice period.'

This appears to be the basis for the formulation of the first ground of appeal. But it means that counsel misunderstood the basis for the trial judge awarding the first sum of money to the plaintiff. I will also quote the very last sentence of the passage in the judgment that counsel quoted.

'Thus the Plaintiff is entitled to payment in lieu of notice as to cushion the Plaintiff in the period of the notice financially.'

What the learned trial judge obviously meant in the passage quoted was that the plaintiff was entitled to payment in lieu of notice from the defendant so as to cushion him financially during the period of the duration of the notice. I say so because it must be borne in mind that the learned trial judge used exhibit B1 as part of the evidence to decide this case. In exhibit B1, the terms of the contract of employment between the parties included the term that the plaintiff was entitled to three months' notice or three months' salary in lieu of notice before the defendant could terminate his employment. So what the learned trial judge said is different from the allegation of learned counsel for the defendant that the trial judge held that the defendant was not entitled to waive their right to the requisite notice.

The trial judge could not have meant what counsel attributed to her. It can also be inferred from the passage quoted from the judgment that the trial judge recognized that there was a rational for the three month-notice period. The period is meant to be a transitional period that will allow either side to look for either an alternative job (in the case of the employee) or a replacement (in the case of the company). The truncation of the three-month notification period therefore meant that the plaintiff would lose the salary for the three month period that he would have earned by continuing to work for the company. The payment in lieu of notice ordered by the trial judge was therefore meant to take care of the loss incurred by the plaintiff. In effect, this first ground of appeal is not based on anything the trial judge said or decided and has no legal basis. That being the case it does not disclose any reasonable ground of appeal as required by rule 8(6) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19). It is accordingly hereby struck out under rule 8(7) of C.I. 19.

I will now proceed to consider ground (2) of the grounds of appeal. It says that the learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the defendant was liable in law to pay the plaintiff three months' salary in lieu of notice. It was the contention of learned counsel for the defendant that by the provisions of clause 1.14 of the conditions of service of the plaintiff (i.e. exhibit B1), a right had accrued to the defendant whereby the plaintiff was required to give the defendant three months' notice or in lieu thereof three months' salary to terminate his contract of employment with the defendant. Counsel argued further that the defendant could waive this right to a three-month notice without incurring any liability to pay the plaintiff anything. Counsel accordingly found fault with the decision of the learned trial judge to award money to the plaintiff 'in lieu of notice so as to cushion the plaintiff in the period of notice financially' because there is no provision in the contract that required that if either party waived the right to notice then the other party must pay money to cushion the other during the notice period. The response of learned counsel for the plaintiff was encapsulated in the argument that since the plaintiff had evinced the intention to work during the period between the time he submitted his letter of resignation and the effective date of the termination of the contract of employment, his right to work as guaranteed under article 24 of the 1992 Constitution had been infringed by the defendant's action in terminating the contract of employment before the date indicated by the plaintiff in his afore-mentioned letter.

I want to approach this matter from the point of view that an appeal is by way of re-hearing and therefore I am entitled to look at the totality of the record of appeal so as to determine which of the two arguments can be supported by the record. As pointed out by both counsel, the crux of the matter on this issue is the interpretation of clause 1.14(i) of exhibit B which provides as follows:

'The employment may be terminated by either the Company or the employee giving notice to the other or on payment in lieu thereof as follows:—

Grade .. .5 ... and above - three months' notice or three months' salary in lieu of notice

Grade .. .4 ... and below - one months [sic] or one months [sic] salary in lieu of notice.'

It is clear from these provisions, especially the provision in relation to employees on 'grade 5 and above' (where the plaintiff belonged), that two sets of rights and liabilities were created. One set of rights and liabilities belonged to (so to speak) or could accrue to the defendant company. It had the right to three months' notice from a grade 5-and-above-employee who wanted to terminate his employment with the company or three months' salary from that employee in lieu of notice. This created a corresponding liability in the employee to give three months' notice to the defendant before terminating his employment or pay three months' salary in lieu of such notice. The other set of rights and liabilities could accrue to an employee who was grade 5 or above. He had the right to expect the company to give him three months' notice before terminating his contract of employment or to expect the company to give him three moths' salary in lieu of notice. Thus the company had a corresponding liability to give the employee three months' notice or pay him three months' salary in lieu of such notice before terminating the contract of employment. The two sets of rights and liabilities were not mutually exclusive. In other words, the two sets of rights and liabilities existed side by side and the operationalization of one set did not extinguish the other set.

But let me return to the complaint that the trial judge held that the defendant incurred a liability by waiving its right to the notice. As I have already pointed out, the trial judge said no such thing directly or indirectly. In any case, it is trite knowledge that a person can waive a right without incurring any liability. So the defendant could not have incurred and did not incur any liability merely because it waived its right to the three months' notice. In arguing that the defendant was held to have incurred a liability by waiving its right to the three-month notification period, learned counsel for the defendant probably forgot that one set of rights and liabilities (as I have just explained) operated just as much as the other. The liability of the defendant to give the plaintiff three months' notice or three months' salary in lieu thereof before terminating his contract created in the plaintiff the right to expect three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof from the defendant before terminating the contract of employment. So even though the defendant could waive its right to three months' notice from the plaintiff it did not mean that plaintiff also had to waive his right under the provisions of the conditions of service to be given either three months' notice or three months' salary in lieu thereof. That is to say that the fact that the plaintiff gave his notice did not mean that he had waived his right to the three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof. So the defendant had no right to change the terms of the contract of employment merely because the plaintiff had given his notice first. There was still a valid and subsisting contract between the parties during the period of the plaintiff's notice. If anything at all, the fact that the plaintiff followed the terms of the contract to the letter made it imperative for the defendant to do likewise or risk acting in breach of those terms. I therefore hold that the defendant acted in breach of the terms of the contract of employment between it and the plaintiff by failing to give the plaintiff the required three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof before terminating his contract of employment. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to demand three months' salary in lieu of notice but since he has asked for two and half months' salary, we cannot give him more than that. Ground (2) of the appeal therefore fails and ought to be dismissed.

Having held that ground (1) is not a valid ground of appeal and that ground (2) has failed, I hold that the learned trial judge was right to have awarded the plaintiff the GH¢4,351.00 being salary in lieu of notice and accrued allowances for the period 16/10/2003 to 31/12/2003. This is only logical and accords with the reasoning of counsel for the defendant himself that the outcome of those two grounds of appeal should determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to that money. In other words, since the employment of the plaintiff had been wrongfully terminated, he was entitled to three months' salary in lieu of notice. The position is analogous to a case of wrongful dismissal. In the case of Nartey- Tokoli v. Volta Aluminum Ltd. [1990] 2 GLR 341 the Supreme Court held that:

'The measure of damages for wrongful dismissal from employment was not to be confined to only loss of wages or salary but in addition the employee was to receive his entitlements under the contract of employment. The plaintiffs were therefore entitled to receive their salaries from the dates they ceased to receive them to the dates of their respective de facto termination, including an additional twelve months' salary (as awarded by the High Court in the exercise of its discretion) as damages for wrongful dismissal as at the respective dates of the de facto termination of their employment. As the termination of their employment was held to be void and of no legal effect they remained employees de jure and would therefore, be entitled to earn leave allowances, bonus, long service awards, including food packages and all other benefits said to be enjoyed on a so-called gentleman agreement basis; all of which should be converted into cash if feasible as at the respective dates of the plaintiffs' de facto dismissal. They were also to receive their entitlement under article 40 of the collective agreement. However, in calculating their entitlements, account should be taken of any period within which any employee had obtained employment within the relevant period covered by the award. Hemans v. Ghana National Trading Corporation [1978] G.L.R. 4 at 10, C.A. and Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board v. Agbettoh (supra) cited. Hatley v. Haman (1840) 3 E.R. 617 and Lavarack v. Woods [1967] 1 Q.B. 278 C.A. not followed.'

This case is also legal authority for my position that the learned trial judge did not err in ordering the defendant to pay accumulated leave commuted to cash to the plaintiff. That therefore takes care of ground (4) of the grounds of appeal which complains that the learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the defendant should pay the plaintiff GH¢9,267.00 being accumulated leave commuted to cash. In its pleadings, the defendant claimed that it had used the 44 working days' leave commuted to cash to set off part of the plaintiff's indebtedness to the defendant. But in its evidence, the defendant made no effort to justify the plaintiff's indebtedness to it. The claim by the defendant that the plaintiff had over-paid himself and two others was not borne out by any evidence led by the defendant's only witness. What the defendant's only witness said was that he, as board chairman, was not aware of the review of the plaintiff's terms of employment. He also tendered in evidence exhibit C1 which is the letter written by the CEO adjusting the salary of the plaintiff upwards. But this in itself cannot constitute evidence that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant. There is no evidence that the CEO lacked the capacity to write exhibit C1 and so the plaintiff was entitled to use it as the basis to draw his new salary. In any case, the former board chairman exonerated the plaintiff from any wrong-doing. This is what he said:

'Throughout his terms (sic) of office the defendant never accused the plaintiff of embezzlement.'

So the only problem with the accumulated leave commuted to cash the accumulated leave commuted to cash is its computation. The computation must be done on the basis of the plaintiff's net salary alone and not his gross salary. It was the contention of learned counsel for the defendant that by the plaintiff's own confession, his accumulated leave commuted to cash was worked out on the basis of his gross, rather than net, salary. According to counsel, this method of computation of the plaintiff's accumulated leave commuted to cash is wrong and contrary to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592). I agree with that argument in principle. In any case on the authority of the decision in Bannerman-Mensah v. Ghana Employers Association [1996-97] SCGLR 417, the cash payment can only be computed on the basis of the plaintiff's basic salary excluding fringe benefits. The 44 working days leave that the plaintiff earned was however the equivalent of roughly two months' salary since one month has about 20 working days in it. This would mean that with a net monthly income of US$1,750.00 (see page 51 of the record of appeal), the plaintiff's accumulated leave commuted to cash should have come up to about US$3,848.00. To that extent therefore ground (4) of the appeal is allowed.

I will go on to consider ground (3) which says that the learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the plaintiff's accumulated leave commuted to cash should have been calculated on the plaintiff's gross rather than his net salary contrary to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592). This ground of appeal is very similar to ground (4) in relation to the computation of the quantum of accumulated leave commuted to cash that is payable to the plaintiff. As ordered in immediately preceding paragraph, the quantum should be worked out by the parties and their counsel, taking into account the relevant provisions of Act 592. Any money due the Ghana Revenue Authority must however be paid to the body without fail. This brings me to the end of the defendant's appeal.

I will now deal with issues arising from the plaintiff's cross-appeal. The basis for the plaintiff's cross-appeal is the failure of the trial court to (i) award interest on the amount of GH¢4,135.00 being salary in lieu of notice and accrued allowances for the period 16/10/2003 to 31/12/2003; (ii) award interest on the amount of GH¢9,267.00 being payment for 44 working days accumulated leave commuted to cash; and (iii) award an amount of GH¢2,359.80 to the plaintiff being bonuses earned from January to October 2003 and interest thereon as all that is against the weight of the evidence on the record. The plaintiff's complaint therefore is that despite the evidence on the record and the provisions of the law, the trial judge failed to award interest on the sums of money awarded him as well as the amount of GH¢2,359.80 being bonuses earned from January to October 2003 and interest thereon. The plaintiff wants this Court t to set aside that part of the judgment complained about and enter judgment for the plaintiff. The law is that when an appellant complains that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, he has the duty to point out those pieces of evidence which, if considered by the trial judge, would have turned the case in his favour but which the trial judge failed to consider or those pieces of evidence wrongly applied against him but for which the case would have gone in his favour and that the onus is on such an appellant to clearly and properly demonstrate to the appellate court the lapses in the judgment being appealed against. See the cases of Djin v. Musa Baako [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 686; Bonney v. Bonney [1992-93] Part 2 GBR 779 and Chou Sen Lin v. Tonado Enterprises Ltd. (2008) 13 MLRG 197 at pages 206-207. What an appellate court is required to do in the circumstances is to go through the entire record of appeal and re-hear the case, as required under Rule 8(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.1. 19). It was also held in Tuakwa v. Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61 that it was incumbent on the appellate court, in a civil case, to analyze the entire record of appeal, take into account the testimonies and all documentary evidence adduced at the trial before arriving at its decision, so as to satisfy itself that, on the preponderance of the probabilities, the conclusions of the trial judge are reasonably or amply supported by the evidence. In the recent case of Aryeh and Akapko v. Ayaa Iddrisu [2010] SCGLR 891 the Supreme Court again held as follows:

"It was a well-established principle of law that where an appellant (such as the defendants in the instant case) had appealed on the omnibus ground that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court was bound to consider comprehensively the entire evidence on the record before coming to a conclusion on the matter."

In view of the position of the law regarding this omnibus ground of appeal, I will first look at the arguments advanced by the plaintiff though his counsel (of course) to see where the trial judge faulted (if any) in her consideration of the evidence. It was contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff was entitled to be awarded interest on the sums of money awarded him as well as bonuses earned from January to October 2003 and interest thereon. Learned counsel for the plaintiff pointed out that the evidence on record justified his position. He also cited the cases of Heloo v. Tettey [1992] 2 GLR 112 and NTHC Ltd. v. Antwi [2009] SCGLR 117 in support of his argument in relation to the award of interest.

I will deal with that argument first; especially that learned counsel on the other side did not address the issue at all. My first comment is to agree that the plaintiff was entitled as a matter of law to be awarded interest on the sums awarded him by the trial court. In deciding not to award interest on the sums awarded to the plaintiff, the learned trial judge failed to assign any reason(s) for her decision. This was clearly an error on her part. As pointed out by learned counsel for the plaintiff the rational for the award of interest is that the party awarded money as a judgment debt but which money had been kept by the other party for some time has lost the use of the money so kept and the award of interest is meant to compensate that party for the loss of the use of the money. The cases already cited are both authority for the proposition that the award of interest is meant to compensate the party whose money was due him but was kept by the other party. According to Mr. Justice Brobbey, the 'power of the court or tribunal to award interest is also founded on statute'. (See Practice and Procedure in the Trial Courts and Tribunals of Ghana by S.A Brobbey, page 357 at paragraph 859.) The Courts (Award of Interest) Instrument, 1984 (LI 1295) (as amended by the Court (Award of Interest and Post Judgment Interest) Rules, 2005 (C.I. 52)) makes provision for the court to award interest on sums of money ordered to be paid to a party. In the case of IBM World Trade Corporation v. Hasnem Enterprise Limited [2001-2002] SCGLR 393 her ladyship, Justice Sophia Akuffo, JSC had this to say:

'The underlying principle for the award of interest is now well settled and was spelt out by Lord Denning MR, in the celebrated case of Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 All ER 225 at page 236, as follows:—

" ... the basis of an award of interest is that the defendant has kept the plaintiff out of his money; and the defendant has had the use of it himself. So he ought to compensate the plaintiff accordingly."

(See also Jefford v. Gee [1970] 1 All ER 1202, wherein the English Court of Appeal was guided by this principle.) In the earlier case of London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co. v. South Eastern Railway Co. [1893] AC 429, Lord Herschell had put the matter even more graphically as follows:—

"...when money is owing from one party to another and that other is driven to recourse to legal proceedings in order to recover the amount due to him, the party who is wrongfully withholding the money from the other ought not in justice to benefit by having that money in his possession and enjoying the use of it, when the money ought to be in the possession of the other party who is entitled to its use. Therefore, if I could see my way to do so, I should certainly be disposed to give the appellants, or anybody in a similar position, interest upon the amount withheld from the time of action brought at all events.'''

Accordingly I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the monies awarded him by the trial court from 15/10/2003 to the date of final payment at the current commercial bank rate. It is now left with the issue of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to be paid bonus. It is very clear from the totality of the evidence on record, especially the evidence of the defendant's sole witness, that the plaintiff not only belonged to a bonus scheme but that bonuses were declared in 2003. By the confession again of the defendant's own witness, the plaintiff is entitled to be paid his bonuses for 2003. I therefore hereby order that the plaintiff be paid the bonuses due him for the year which P.W.1 calculated to be GH¢2,359.90. Since this figure was not challenged in cross-examination and counsel for the defendant did not comment on it, it has to be accepted by this Court. It is further hereby ordered that the bonus money due the plaintiff (i.e. GH¢2,359.90) be paid plus interest thereon at the prevailing commercial bank rate from the date the bonus was due to the date of final payment.

Finally, this appeal is dismissed save for the computation of the accumulated leave commuted to cash that is payable to the plaintiff. The cross-appeal is however allowed in its entirety.

ARYEETEY J.A.

(JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL)

ADINYIRA J.A.

(JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL)

ASIAMAH J.A

(JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL)

COUNSEL

MR. STANLEY AMARTEIFIO FOR THE APPELLANT

BENTSI-ENCHILL LETSA & ANKOMAH FOR THE RESPONDENT