CHARLES AFFAM ADJEI V. STANBIC BANK

JUDGMENT

ADDO, J.

From the allegations of facts contained in the Plaintiff’s amended statement of claim filed on 1st November, 2011, it is not far-fetched that his action against the Defendant was primarily provoked by the series of events he narrated as follows:

That in or around September, 2006, it was agreed that the Defendant should employ him, the Plaintiff, and he the Plaintiff should serve the Defendant as Accounts Executive with effect from September, 2006.

The Plaintiff stated that in consideration of he leaving the assured security of tenure of his employment with the Barclays Bank of Ghana Limited, in which circumstances he was losing some benefits, entitlements and bonuses and in order to induce him the Plaintiff to enter into a contract of employment with the Defendant, it was agreed between them, the parties herein, that the Plaintiff would be entitled to a car loan and home loan by way of mortgage.

According to the Plaintiff, he accordingly transferred his home loan from Barclays Banks of Ghana and mortgaged his house situated at Anyaa and registered as No. AR/4894 A/96 and 1278/1996 to the Defendant and further took a car loan and purchased a Land Cruiser Prado with Registration No. GE 8632 Y.

The Plaintiff stated that as a condition to enjoying the said loans, the Defendant demanded and he agreed and delivered the originals of the title documents on his house to the Defendant and further caused the registration of the said motor vehicle in the joint names of Defendant and himself. Plaintiff averred that the said loans had current outstanding balances of the GH₵76,662.60 and GH₵26,596.25 respectively.

The Plaintiff averred that as a direct consequence of his leaving his former employment to join the employment of the Defendant, he accordingly forfeited his right to an annual bonus, which he would otherwise have been entitled to.

In less than one year, according to the Plaintiff, from his previous employment in the employment of the Defendant and due to his dedication and hard work, he was invited to an interview for the position of Head of Business Banking, amongst other applicants and successfully emerged the best. He was thus in March, 2007, appointed and or promoted to the position of Head of Business Banking and the Defendant agreed to reward him with an increased salary and allowances.

Plaintiff averred further that even though throughout his employment with the Defendant he had very good appraisal review, the Defendant without any cause reduced him, the Plaintiff, to the position of Head of Commercial Banking sometime in July, 2009, a step which he stated was lower than the position he was occupying. The Plaintiff stated that he subsequently observed that his position was within some few weeks offered to one Antwi Agyekum and subsequently replaced with another known as Abrie Rautenbach.

Again, according to the Plaintiff, in February, 2011, and notwithstanding a good appraisal performance, he within a few weeks of such appraisal was further reduced from Head of Commercial Banking to the position of Senior Account Executive, a position he stated was one step below Head of Commercial Banking and two steps below that of Head of Business Banking which he occupied before being reduced to Head of Commercial Banking.

The Plaintiff stated further that as Senior Accounts Executive, he was requested to perform the role and function of an Account Executive, a position he occupied in 2006, when first employed by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff further averred that it was the express term of the said agreement or alternatively implied therein by the course of dealing between he and the Defendant, as well as the practice of the business that his employment as Head of Business Banking was guaranteed, unless promoted upward and also that the Defendant would not dismiss him at all or in the alternative without due cause for doing so.

The Plaintiff listed the terms he stated were implied into the contract in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim as amended.

The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant acted in repudiatory breach of the said express and implied terms and particularised the breach in paragraphs 14(a) to (f) of his amended statement of claim. By a letter under his hand and signature dated 31st May, 2011, the Plaintiff says that he accepted the repudiation of the contract (or constructive dismissal) by resigning upon giving one month’s notice to the Defendant. The Plaintiff stated that upon giving the said one-month notice, the Defendant accepted his resignation in writing and informed him that it would rather pay his one month’s salary in lieu of the Plaintiff’s notice, less GH₵2,459.02, being 50% of his annual clothing allowance, which was paid to him sometime in the January, 2011.

The Plaintiff further averred that the deduction of the 50% of the annual clothing allowance from his one-month salary in lieu of notice was unlawful, unconscionable and unwarranted, as it was the Defendant who constructively dismissed him. The Plaintiff stated again that the Defendant also refused and or failed to refund his voluntary pension contributions, which comprised he and the Defendant’s joint monthly contributions. That he total of the contribution accrued to him currently stood at GH₵4,940.52.

It was the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendant, upon subjecting him to such ill-treatment and embarrassment, forced him out of its employment. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant then circulated an internal advertisement for the position of Head of Commercial Banking, sometime in June, 2011.

The Plaintiff claimed the reliefs in the amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim.

In its defence, the Defendant stated that the Plaintiff was by an appointment letter dated 3rd July, 2006, offered work with it as a Relationship Manager effective 17th July, 2006, but the Plaintiff started work sometime in September, 2006.

The Defendant admitted granting a car loan and a mortgage facility to the Plaintiff but denied any condition precedent for the grant of same. According to the Defendant, it merely transferred the car loan and mortgage facility that the Plaintiff had with its previous employer to it. That the facilities granted the Plaintiff are standard benefits granted generally to its employees and not only to the Plaintiff.

The Defendant averred that even though it transferred the Plaintiff’s home loan from Barclays Bank and gave him a car loan, it was in line with its policy to, upon request, transfer to itself the existing facilities of new employees from their previous employers.

The Defendant also stated that even though the Plaintiff was appointed Head of Commercial Marketing in March, 2007, with an increased salary, his grade and other conditions of service remained the same.

As part of the Defendant restructuring towards growth, according to it, in 2009, it reorganised and renamed various departments and positions and added on some new others. That the position of Head of Commercial Banking was created during the restructuring, with the Plaintiff as its first occupant. The Defendant denied that the Plaintiff’s new position was a demotion, as his grade and salary remained the same.

Indeed, I note that all the material allegations of facts by the Plaintiff were denied by the Defendant. The Defendant counterclaimed, to which the Plaintiff filed a defence to same on 16th January, 2012.

On 18th January, 2012, the Plaintiff applied for directions. The following issues are germane to the resolution of the suit.

(a) Whether the Plaintiff was reduced in rank.

(b) Whether the Plaintiff’s position as Head of Business Banking was guaranteed for a period of four (4) years.

(c) Whether the Plaintiff was induced to leave his previous employment to work with the Defendant.

(d) Whether the Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendant was constructively terminated.

(e) Whether the Plaintiff’s performance was below standard in 2008/2009 and was put on performance appraisal.

(f) Whether the Defendant committed breach of its contract with the Plaintiff as set out in the particulars of repudiatory breach.

I shall first consider issue (b), which is, whether the Plaintiff’s position as Head of Business Banking was guaranteed for a period of four (4) years.

To resolve this issue, I turn to Exhibit ‘A’, the letter evidencing the Plaintiff’s appointment to the position of Head, Business Banking. I shall reproduce Exhibit ‘A’ in extenso:

We are pleased to advise that you have been appointed as Head, Business Banking for our Retail Department – Accra where you will be stationed with effect from 2nd April, 2007.

As a result of your position, you will receive a gross salary of GH₵32,000,000.

Your grade and other conditions of service that currently apply to you will remain the same.

A job description will be made available to you in due course. Meanwhile, in the event of any further clarification, please feel free to contact the Head, Retail Banking.

May we take this opportunity to congratulate you on this appointment and wish you every success in your new role. (The emphasis is mine).

I find that there is nowhere in Exhibit ‘A’ that remotely suggested or implied that the Plaintiff’s position as Head, Business Banking was guaranteed for four (4) years. I do not think that the issue as to whether Plaintiff’s said position was guaranteed for four (4) years should be belaboured. From the express communication of his appointment as Head, Business Banking by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, it did not guarantee the Plaintiff, any position as alleged by the Plaintiff.

I shall next resolve issue (a), (d) and (f) together for the reason that same form the core of the Plaintiff’s action.

It is not in dispute that from the position of Accounts Executive in September, 2006, the Plaintiff became the Head, Business Banking, per Exhibit ‘A’. The Plaintiff, subsequent to being the Head of Business Banking became Head of Commercial Banking and finally senior Accounts Executive.

On 12th July, 2012, this is what the Plaintiff said in relation to his contention that he was reduced in rank:

PLAINTIFF: I told the Court being made a Senior Accountant Executive was a demotion from being made Head of Business Banking. It is a demotion because the Bank has drawn its own Organogram (Organisation Chart). The Head of Business Banking is at the top and the Senior Executive is way down. In terms of Job Content the two positions are entirely different. The Senior Account Executive reports to another officer before the Head of Business Banking… 

Under cross-examination of the Plaintiff on 22nd October, 2012, this is what transpired.

Q: You told the Court that despite a good appraisal you were demoted from Head of Personal Banking to Head of Commercial Banking.

A: No my Lord, I was rather reduced from Head of Commercial Banking to Senior Accounts Secretary.

Q: I suggest to you that you testified in this Court that you were reduced from Head of Personal Banking to Head of Commercial Banking.

A: That is not true. I was Head of Business Banking to Head of Commercial Banking and finally Senior Accounts Executive.

Q: Is it not the case that in 2007 when you were made Head of Commercial Banking it was simply a re-designation of your position.

A: That is not correct my Lord. Per the Bank’s Organogram Head of Business Banking is different from Head of Commercial Banking.

Q: As Head of Commercial Banking you were on the same grade and same salary.

A: That is so my Lord, but the functions were different. (The emphasis is mine)

It is clear from Exhibit ‘A’ that when the Plaintiff was appointed as Head, Business Banking, the Defendant stated that his grade and other conditions of service that currently applied to him would remain the same.

Before he became Head of Business Banking, the Plaintiff was an Accounts Executive in September, 2006. I find from Exhibit ‘A’ that when the Plaintiff became Head of Business Banking his grade and other conditions of service were that of the Accounts Executive.

From the Plaintiffs own showing, when he was subsequently made Head of commercial Banking from the Head, Business Banking, he remained on the same grade and salary.

Still under cross-examination on 22nd October, 2012, the Plaintiff again stated:

Q: …… Further to that, you were then assigned to a different position as Senior Accounts Officer.

A: That is not correct my Lord.

Q: Even though you were reassigned your salary remained the same.

A: My performance never gone down.

Q: Your salary and other Conditions of Service remained the same.

A: That is partially correct my Lord, my salary was the same but other conditions were not.

From the testimony of the Plaintiff, he enjoyed the same salary irrespective of the position he held. Indeed, it is surprising that whilst the Plaintiff considered his positional movement from Head, Business Banking to Head Commercial Banking as a reduction in rank even though his salary remained the same, he did not consider the reception of the same salary, when he became Head of Business Banking from the position of Accounts Executive, as a demotion.

In my view, the Plaintiff’s whole grievance rested with the different roles he was tasked to perform.

The Defendant itself explained how the different roles came into play. On 22nd November, 2012, the Defendant speaking through Samuel Kwodjo Tei said:

In March, 2009, Plaintiff was Head of Commercial Bank. Around that time there was restructuring in the Business Banking Department. The department was divided into three (3) main units, being Commercial Banking, SME Banking (Small, Medium Banking) and Private Banking. Plaintiff was to take charge of Commercial Banking, managing the same thing as he had as Head of Business Banking. After the restructuring the position of Head of Business Banking was abolished. As Head of Commercial Banking, plaintiff’s grade was a middle manager, the same level as he  held and he enjoyed the same staff benefits as before as Head of Business Banking.

In 2010 there was further restructuring in the department to standardize and align to Standard Bank. Standard Bank is the parent company. As a result the department now have six (6) main units instead of three (3). These were Commercial Banking, SME Banking, New Business, Vehicle and Assets Finance, Trade Finance and Agric.

The entire unit was managed by a new Head of Business Banking in the person of Mr. Abu Rautenback. Head of Business Banking in 2007 is different from Head of Business Banking in 2010. In 2007, the head managed only one (1) unit, where as in 2010 the Head managed six (6) units. There was an increase in size of the span of control and level of responsibility. The functions of Head of Business Banking in 2007 were different functions of Head of Business Banking 2010. Around April, 2011 plaintiff was the Senior Accounts Executive with the Defendant’s Bank. His grade was a middle manager and was under the same terms and condition of service as he head as Head of Commercial. The Senior Accounts Executive Plaintiff was expected to manage the portfolio of accounts and customers with higher values and volumes. He had the responsibility as the senior among the other Accounts Executives.

On 19th April, 2013, the Defendant per its witness was subjected to cross-examination:

Q: Look at Exhibit ‘D’?

A: Yes.

Q: Can you tell the content of that Exhibit?

A: It is a letter stating that Plaintiff’s assessment performance will be done.

Q: Look at the attachment.

A: Yes.

Q: What is the position of the Plaintiff as described?

A: Accounts Executive.

Q: I suggest to you that you do not know all that transpired between the Plaintiff and his heads as concerns the re-designation?

A: I know.

Q: Are you saying that the position of Senior Accounts Executive goes with the job description of Accounts Executive?

A: Yes. The difference in the two is the size of the portfolio being managed and the size of the business.

Q: I suggest to you that that is not so?

A: That is so.

Q: You said the position of Head of Business Banking was abolished after the re-structuring?

A: Yes that was the first re-structuring in 2007.

From the cross-examination of the Defendant, I am of the view that no damage was done to the testimony in chief of the Defendant per Samuel Kwodjo Tei. The Defendant’s explanation of the different positions the Plaintiff held in the wake of the first and second restructuring stood unchallenged. It became clear that the position of the two heads of Business Banking in 2007 and 2010 were completely different. It is also the case that when the position of Head of Business Banking was abolished and three new positions of Commercial Banking, SME Banking, and private Banking were instituted, the Plaintiff only moved to a lateral position and not a demoted or reduced position.

Indeed, I am of the considered view that like other organisations, the Defendant had the authority and right to restructure and reorganise and post staff to fill new positions.

In the instant case, the Plaintiff’s salary and other conditions of service remained the same no matter which position he occupied.

I find and resolve issue (a) that the Plaintiff was never reduced in rank at any time.

Issue (d) is whether the Plaintiff’s employment with the Respondent was constructively terminated. 

Constructive termination occurs where the termination of the contract of employment by one party to the contract is induced by the behaviour or conduct of the other party. In other words, there is constructive termination where the employee terminates the contract of employment as a result of the employer’s conduct, also sometimes referred to as a discharge by breach. From the facts of the instant case, it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff resigned from the Defendant’s employment. However, a critical examination of the Plaintiff’s evidence-in-chief commencing 2nd May, 2012, through to 12th July, 2012, shows that there is nowhere that the Plaintiff tendered in evidence his resignation letter to enable the Court assess the reasons therein for his resignation vis a vis, the claims of repudiating breach purporting to have forced him out of the Defendant’s employment.

The Plaintiff did not put into evidence any conduct of the Defendant such as would lead the Court to irresistibly conclude that the Plaintiff had been induced to quit his job.  

I find therefore that the particulars of breach in paragraphs 14 (a) to (f) of the amended statement of claim of the Plaintiff were not supported by any shred of evidence, either verbal or documentary.

I already found that the Defendant had the authority and right to restructure and or reorganise any department of its establishment or organisation. The various positions the Plaintiff held did not constitute any such acts of the Defendant inducing the Plaintiff to quit his job. I find that the Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and that his contract was not constructively terminated. This finding is buttressed by the case of JOHN AKORLIE v. GOLDEN TULIP HOTEL, CIVIL APPEAL NO. H1/22/2011, [2011], UNREPORTED. Where it was held, among others, as follows:

… As regard the finding by the trial judge that the transfer of the Plaintiff from the position of Senior Credit Controller to a storeman tantamounted to constructive dismissal, I disagree. There is evidence on record to show that that transfer was simply a departmental and an in-house reshuffle. There is evidence showing that the Plaintiff suffered no diminution in terms of salary and rank as a result of the transfer... (The emphasis is mine).

Issue (c) as set down herein (whether the Plaintiff was induced to leave his previous employment to work with the Defendant) is also accordingly disposed of for the reason that no shred of evidence was adduced by the Plaintiff to prove same. 

I also find that issue (e) (whether the Plaintiff’s performance was below standard in 2008/2009 and was put on performance appraisal) in the face of the disposal of issue (a) (c) and (f) also goes to rest.

The Defendant cannot be held liable for the Plaintiff’s resignation, which was voluntary. Further, there is no cause attributable to the Defendant for the Plaintiff’s exit from Defendant’s employment. To the extent that he resigned on his own accord, his job performance is of no moment. The Defendant did not dismiss the Plaintiff for poor performance. It only accepted the Plaintiff’s voluntary decision to resign.

The Defendant counterclaimed for a number of reliefs.

From Exhibit ‘12’, the Plaintiff was offered a car loan subject to the terms and conditions in Exhibit ‘12’. The principal sum was GH¢35,000.00. At page 2 of the Exhibit ‘12’, the Plaintiff stated that “I am pleased to accept the offer for the loan on the terms and conditions contained in this letter”.

Exhibit ‘13’ is a Deed of Assignment of a motor vehicle. The vehicle is a Toyota Land Cruiser Prado with registration number GE 86324.

Exhibit ‘14’ is a letter from Barclays Bank, the Plaintiff’s previous employer on the subject of an outstanding staff housing loan in the sum of GH¢89,978.00.

Exhibit ‘15’ is the application for a staff loan. The loan type is housing.

Exhibit ‘16’ is the approval letter for the housing loan with the said principal amount of GH¢89,978.00.

The Plaintiff stated at page 2 of Exhibit ‘16’ that “I am pleased to accept the offer for the loan on the terms and conditions contained in this letter”.

In Exhibit ‘17’, Article 5.5.4 on Clothing allowance, the evidence is that in the event of a staff member leaving the service of the Bank, he or she shall be required to refund to the Bank clothing allowances paid in excess of the actual months served.

From paragraphs 46 to 55 of the Defendant’s counterclaim this is what it averred.

The Defendant’s stated that the Plaintiff owed the Defendant GH¢2,459.02 for already paid clothing allowance for July to December, 2011 since the Plaintiff worked for only half of the year in 2011. The Defendant stated that even though it indicated in its letter accepting the Plaintiff’s resignation that the Plaintiff had to refund six months unutilised closing allowance, it did not deduct the amount from the Plaintiff’s salary in lieu of notice. The Defendant further stated that it granted a car loan in the amount of GH¢35,000.00 at an interest rate of 5% to the Plaintiff on 19th January, 2010. The Defendant added that it also granted a mortgage facility in the amount of GH¢89,978.00, at an interest rate of 5% to the Plaintiff on 10th December, 2008. The Defendant further stated that as at 31st May, 2011, the Plaintiff had an outstanding balance on the car loan and mortgage facilities in the sum of GH¢26,596.26 and GH¢76,662.60 respectively. The Defendant stated that the Plaintiff had not serviced the facilities since 19th September, 2011. That the outstanding amount on the  Defendant’s facilities as at 26th October, 2011 was GH¢102,913.47. The Defendant further stated that interest continued to accrue on the facilities granted to the Plaintiff.

At paragraph 16 of the defence to the counterclaim, all that the Plaintiff said in reply to paragraphs 46 to 55 is to deny same and put the Defendant to strict proof.

On 7th November, 2012, however, the Plaintiff spoke under cross-examination as follows:

Q: You said you were given car loan in January, 2010, by the Defendant.

A: Yes my Lord, I took a car loan from Defendant. I don’t remember the date.

Q: From 19th September, 2011, you have not served that facility.

A: I have not my Lord.

Q: Your outstanding amount on the car loan as at 26th October, 2011, is GH¢26,527.19.

A: I cannot tell my Lord. I don’t have access to the accounts.

Q: You were also given a housing loan by your previous employers.

A: That is so my Lord.

Q: By a letter dated 9th December, 2008, Barclays Bank wrote to you to settle the debt.

A: Yes my Lord.

Q: Pursuant to this letter you requested a loan from the Defendant.

A: That is so my Lord.

Q: On 10th December, 2008, the Defendant approved a housing loan for you.

A: Yes, but I don’t know the date.

Q: The loan was an amount of GH¢89,978.00.

A: That is so my Lord.

Q: The amount due in this facility as at 31st May, 2011, stood at GH¢76,632.60.

A: I cannot tell the balance my Lord. I don’t have access to the accounts.

Q: From 19th September, 2011, you have not serviced the housing loan.

A: That is so my Lord.

Q: As at 26th October, 2011, the outstanding amount on the housing loan stood at GH¢76,386.28.

A: I have no access to the accounts, so I don’t know the balance.

Q: During the time you were working with the Defendant, you were given monthly and annual clothing allowance.

A: No my Lord. We were given annual clothing allowance paid in January.

Q: I suggest to you that the clothing allowance per month due you was GH¢409.08.

A: I have not calculated, my Lord.

Q: In 2011, the annual clothing allowance paid you was GH¢4,918.4.

A: I was paid a figure but I don’t remember.

Q: The figure you were paid for in 2011 was for the whole year.

A: It was tagged annual clothing allowance.

Q: You left Defendant’s employment in June, 2011.

A: Yes my Lord.

Q: You will agree with me that you were not entitled to the full amount you took as clothing allowance.

A: I don’t agree with you.

Q: Defendant indicated that it will deduct half of the clothing allowance from your salary from June, 2011, but it failed to do so.

A: I don’t remember anybody telling me they were going to deduct any clothing allowance from my salary.

Q: I suggest to you that that was the case.

A: I don’t know about it.

Q: You were therefore supposed to refund an amount of GH¢2,459.2 as unutilized clothing allowance for 2011.

A: I am not aware.

Q: I put it to you that this is because you worked for only half a year for Defendant.

A: The Bank gives you the money to buy clothing and I used the money to buy clothing.

Q: You are expected to refund all the monies you owe the Bank to it.

A: I will do so at the appropriate time. (The emphasis is mine).

On 11th December, 2012, the Defendant also testified in-chief concerning the monies owed to it by the Plaintiff as follows:

DEFENDANT: Plaintiff before he resigned took loan facility from the Bank, being a car loan and a house loan. Plaintiff applied for a car loan. I have the application forms here. I wish to tender same in evidence.

Pl. Counsel: No objection.

By Court: Tendered and marked Exhibit ‘11’.

Defendant: The loan was approved and a facility letter was issued which he accepted. I wish to tender the approval letter in evidence.

Pl. Counsel: No objection.

By Court: Tendered and marked Exhibit ‘12’.

Defendant: We have Plaintiff’s acceptance on Exhibit ‘12’. He accepted by appending his signature. The loan amount is GH¢35,000.00. The amount was to be repaid over 84 month’s period by monthly instalment. In terms of security, the vehicle was to be assigned to the Bank. The assignment of the vehicle was done. I have the assignment here. I wish to tender same in evidence.

Pl. Counsel: No objection.

By Court: Tendered and marked Exhibit ‘13’.

Defendant: Plaintiff had not fully paid his loan to the Bank. GH¢25,000.00 is outstanding on the car loan as at October, 2011. The interest keeps on accruing. The Plaintiff also took a housing loan. He presented a letter from his previous employers demanding full settlement of his outstanding loan to them. He completed an application form for the housing loan that he owes his previous employer. I have the letter and the form here. I wish to tender same in evidence.

Pl. Counsel: No objection.

By Court: Exhibit ‘14’ and ‘15’.

Defendant: The loan was approved and the facility was issued to Plaintiff, which he accepted by appending his signature. I have the approval letter here. I wish to tender same in evidence.

Pl. Counsel: No objection.

By Court: Tendered and marked Exhibit ‘16’.

Defendant: The loan in Exhibit ‘16’ was given to Plaintiff on 10th December, 2008. He was given GH¢89,878.00. He was to repay in 156 months by monthly instalment. The full amount has not yet been paid. The outstanding balance is GH¢76,662.00 as at October, 2011. The loan keeps on accruing interest. We provide Plaintiff with clothing allowance. The clothing allowance is paid in January, of every year. If the employee leaves in the course of the year the employee is made to refund the unutilized portion. The regulation is found in the Bank Human Resource Policies and proceedings, Section 554. I have made an extract of the said proceedings. We want to tender same in evidence.

Pl. Counsel: No objection.

By Court: Tendered and marked Exhibit ‘17’.

Defendant: In 2011, the Plaintiff was paid GH₵4,908.00. The Plaintiff resigned 6thJune, 2011. It is expected that clothing allowance for the rest of the year be refunded to the Bank. He is to refund GH¢2,458.00. This amount was not deducted from Plaintiff’s salary before he left. Plaintiff left his previous employment on his own accord and therefore had forfeited what benefits he was enjoying there. He cannot claim those benefits…..

The cross-examination of the Defendant by Plaintiff commenced 15th February, 2013, through to 19th April, 2013, and ended on 23rd March, 2015.

The Defendant’s testimony on the Plaintiff’s indebtedness to it stood unchallenged.

On the totality of the evidence before this Court, I dismiss all the Plaintiff’s reliefs. This is because not a shred of evidence was provided by the Plaintiff to warrant the grant of same.

The Defendant’s counterclaim are granted as same are substantiated by evidence.

Costs of GH¢5,000.00 is hereby awarded in favour of the Defendant against the Plaintiff.

(SGD)

GIFTY AGYEI ADDO, J

HIGH COURT JUDGE

Appearances

Dora Asamoah for Kwame Anyimadu for the Plaintiff

Golda Denyo (with her Ama Abraham) for the Defendant.