Nathaniel Morton (suing for and on behalf of the Grandchildren of the Late Samuel Coffie Morton) v Avenida Hotel Limited and Otoo Memorial Clinic

1.0 INTRODUCTION:

By a writ dated 21st July, 2023 the Plaintiff issued the present writ for himself and on behalf of the grand children of the late Samuel Cofie Morton against the Defendants for the following reliefs:

a. A declaration of title to the land described in paragraph 9 of the statement of claim.

b. Recovery of possession.

c. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants either by themselves, their assigns, agents, privies, and all those who claim through them from having anything to do with the land.

d. Damages for trespass.

e. Cost.

f. Any further order(s) as the Honourable court may deem fit.

1.1 The case of the Plaintiff as captured by his statement of claim is that he is one of the grandchildren of the late Samuel Cofie Morton of Korle Workon, Accra and brings this action for himself and on behalf of the grandchildren.

1.2 The 1st Defendant is a Hotel registered under the laws of Ghana and operates in Accra. The 2nd Defendant is a medical facility and also operates in Accra. The Defendants have trespassed on the Plaintiff’s family land.

1.3 It is the case of the Plaintiff that he recently discovered in 2023 that their grandfather owns a large track of land at Adabraka south-West commonly called “Ngoifa”. And that the land was acquired by his grandfather, the late Samuel Cofie Morton in or about 1938. The transaction was reduced into writing by way of an indenture and site plan executed between the late Samuel Cofie Morton and Yaoteley Yaotey of Accra.

1.4 The land was described in the indenture as ALL THAT PIECE OR PARCEL OF LAND situate lying and being at South-West Adabraka commonly called “Ngoifa” in the Accra District of the Province and colony aforesaid and bounded on the North by a proposed road measuring 200 feet more or less on the South by A. W. Kojo Thompson’s property measuring 200 feet more or less on the East by Vendor’s land measuring 54 feet more or less and on the West by Vendor’s land measuring 54 feet more or less clearly delineated on the plan hereto attached and edged pink.

1.5 Following the discovery, the Plaintiff and his siblings took the indenture to the Lands Commission, Accra where their grandfather’s ownership of the land was confirmed.

1.6 The lands Officer at the lands Commission, Accra took Plaintiff and his siblings to the land and pointed it to them on the ground. Plaintiff and his siblings found out that the land was being used as a parking area for the Defendants’ customers and clients.

1.7 A further measurement of the land confirmed that the Defendants have trespassed onto their land by about eight (8) feet. The Plaintiff and his siblings informed the Defendants about their findings and also wrote notices on the land with their telephone numbers.

1.8 The Defendants did not make any effort to contact them for discussions but rather cleared the notices Plaintiff placed on the land. The conduct of the Defendants is a direct challenge to the Plaintiff’s ownership of the land.

1.9 The Plaintiff caused his lawyer to write a letter to the Defendants for the matter to be settled amicably but the Defendants did not respond.

2.0 The Plaintiff’s lawyer was called on phone by someone who claims to be the Asafoatse Danchirafa of the Morton family. The Plaintiff and his siblings conducted their own investigations and found out that the said Asafoatse Danchirafa is not known to the Morton family.

2.1 The plaintiff avers that unless this honorable court intervenes the Defendants would not stop their trespassory activities.

2.2 The Defendants denied the claim of the Plaintiff per their statement of defence dated 4th September, 2023 and counterclaimed for

1. A declaration of title to the land occupied by the Defendants.

2. Perpetual injunction against the Plaintiff, his heirs, assigns, agents, privies and all those claiming through him from interfering with the Defendants property.

2.3 At the Application for Directions stage, the following issues were set down for determination:

1. Whether or not the Plaintiff’s grandfather, the late Samuel Cofie Morton in or about 1938 acquired the parcel of land in dispute.

2. Whether or not the transaction was reduced into writing by way of an indenture and site plan executed between the late Samuel Cofie Morton and Yaoteley Yaotey of Accra.

3. Whether or not the land occupied by the 1st Defendant was purchased by the late William Kojo Thompson on 5th November, 1919 and registered at the Accra Deeds Registry as No. 919/1919.

4. Whether or not William Kojo Thompson sold the property to the Adra Brothers (a Partnership) on 10th February, 1945 who after registering it at the Accra Deeds Registry as No. 115/1945 established the Avenida Hotel in 1948 within the same and current boundary measuring 375 feet by 270 feet.

5. Whether or not the Defendants have trespassed on the Plaintiff’s land.

2.4 In articulating his case, the Plaintiff testified that he is one of the grandchildren of the late Samuel Cofie Morton of Korle Workon, Accra and brings this action for himself and on behalf of the grandchildren.

2.5 It is the evidence of the Plaintiff that the 1st Defendant is a Hotel registered under the laws of Ghana and operates in Accra and the 2nd Defendant is a medical facility and also operates in Accra.

2.6 According to the Plaintiff, in about the year 2023 he discovered that their grandfather owns a parcel of land at Adabraka South-West commonly called “Ngoifa”. And that the land was acquired by his grandfather, the late Samuel Cofie Morton in or about 1938.

2.7 The transaction was reduced into writing by way of an indenture and site plan executed between the late Samuel Cofie Morton and Yaoteley Yaotey of Accra. See Exhibit “A”, a copy of the said indenture.

2.8 And that the land was described in the indenture as ALL THAT PIECE OR PARCEL OF LAND situate lying and being at South-West Adabraka commonly called “Ngoifa” in the Accra District of the Province and colony aforesaid and bounded on the North by a proposed road measuring 200 feet more or less on the South by A. W. Kojo Thompson’s property measuring 200 feet more or less on the East by Vendor’s land measuring 54 feet more or less and on the West by Vendor’s land measuring 54 feet more or less clearly delineated on the plan hereto attached and edged pink.

2.9 He further stated that the Defendants have trespassed onto the land. Following the discovery he and his siblings took the indenture to the Lands Commission, Accra where their grandfather’s ownership of the land was confirmed.

3.0 The lands officer at the Lands Commission, Accra took them to the land and pointed it to them on the ground and found out that the land was being used as a parking area for Defendants’ customers and clients. And a further measurement of the land confirmed that Defendants have trespassed onto the land by about eight (8) feet.

3.1 The Plaintiff therefore informed the Defendants about their findings and also wrote notices on the land with their telephone numbers. The Defendants did not make any effort to contact them for discussions but rather cleared the notices they placed on the land which conduct they took as a direct challenge to their grandfather’s ownership of the land.

3.2 The Plaintiff then caused his lawyer to write a letter to the Defendants for the matter to be settled amicably but the Defendants did not respond. See Exhibit “B”, a copy of the Letter.

The Plaintiff testified that unless this Honourable court intervenes the Defendants would not stop their trespassory activities.

3.3 In contesting the Plaintiff’s claim, the Defendants representative, one Godfred Otoo testified that he is a Dentist and owner of the Otoo Memorial Clinic, Accra, the 2nd Defendant and also the executor of the Will of the late John Christopher Otoo. The owner of the Avenida Hotel, the 1st Defendant.

3.4 It is his evidence that the Otoo Memorial Clinic of which he is the sole proprietor is situate on the compound of the 2nd Defendant and its offices were previously an integral part of the structures that make up the Avenida Hotel.

3.5 And that the Plaintiff sued the Defendants and claimed that the Defendants’ property was part of a tract of land called Ngoifa. Later on, the Plaintiff reduced his claim to 8feet of the property occupied by the Defendants. It is the case of the Defendants that the land occupied by the 1st Defendant was first purchased by the late William Kojo Thompson on 5th November, 1919, who registered the land at the Accra Deeds Registry as No. 919/1919. The said Kojo Thompson built a mansion on the land which is still visible on the 1st Defendant’s premises as one of the hotel buildings.

3.6 The property changed hands when William Kojo Thompson sold it to Adra Brothers (a partnership) on 10th February, 1945 who also registered the property as No. 115/1945 at the Accra Deeds Registry and established the Avenida Hotel. The present owner, the late John Christopher Otoo purchased the Avenida Hotel from the Adra Brothers on 18th November, 1954 and registered it at the Accra Deeds Registry as No. 45/1955. The Avenida has continued to operate till now. Exhibit “1” is the indenture executed between Adra Brothers and the late John Christopher Otoo. The indenture cites the various transactions that had taken place on the land and which has been referred to in the previous paragraphs.

3.7 It is the testimony of the Defendants that the Avenida Hotel has been around continuously for more than 75 years and has occupied the same and current boundary measuring 375 feet ×270 feet. In recent time, the wall that formed the boundary of the hotel abutting the Kojo Thompson road had to be shifted back to make room for the construction of a pavement and expansion of the Kojo Thompson Road. Otherwise the land area had remained the same until now.

3.8 And that the Plaintiff is claiming 8feet of the 1st Defendant’s property when the 1st Defendant property has been around since the time of William Kojo Thompson in 1919 through 1945 when the Adra Brothers established the Avenida Hotel and was finally purchased by the late John Christopher Otoo until now.

3.9 It is the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiff’s forebears could not have failed to notice at that time that the late William Kojo Thompson, a famous politician in the Gold Coast Colony was in effective occupation of the property. Their progenitors could not have failed to notice that others, including Adra Brothers, and the late John Christopher Otoo were also in effective occupation.

4.0 The evidence of the Defendants is that the Plaintiff does not have any valid claim to the property, after having sat down unconcerned for over 7 decades. And that the Plaintiff’s assertion that he just discovered his right to the land is denied because it is a hearsay. The Defendants denied the claim of the Plaintiff.

4.1 The standard of proof in Land suits and indeed in all civil suits, is proof by proof by preponderance of probabilities. See sections 11

 (4) and 12 of the Evidence Act 1975 (Act 323). This standard represents a deviation from the former higher standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The present state of the law, with regard to the standard of proof required of a party in title cases, therefore involves a consideration or evaluation of the relative merits of the rival claims of the parties based on the preponderance of the probabilities. To the extent that the parties aver, by their pleadings, positive facts in support of their rival claims, they bear the burden to adduce credible , admissible and sufficient evidence to establish those facts and to convince the court that the existence of those facts are more probable than their non-existence.

See SERWAH V. KESS [1960] GLR 227 at 229; ODAMETEY V. CLOUCH [1989-1990] 1 GLR 14 Supreme Court and ODONKOR V. AMARTE [1992-1993] GLR 57 Supreme Court, where the proper purview of the burden of proof was exhaustively examined and put its truer perspective by Hayfron-Benjamin JSC.

4.2 In the case of IN RE ASHALLEY BOTWE LANDS; ADJETEY AGBOSU AND ORS. V. KOTEY AND OTHERS [2003-2004]

SCGLR 420, Justice Brobbey JSC, explaining the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act at page 464 and 465 stated as follows:

“The effect of sections 11 (1) and 14 and similar sections in the Evidence Decree, 1975 may be described as follows: a litigant who is a defendant in a civil case does not need to prove anything; the plaintiff who took the defendant to court has to prove what he claims he is entitled to from the defendant. At the same time, if the court has to make a determination of a factor or an issue, and that determination depends on evaluation of facts and evidence, the defendant must realize that the determination cannot be made on nothing. If the defendant desires the determination to be made in his favour, then he has the duty to help his own cause or case by adducing before the court such facts or evidence that will induce the determination to be made in his favour…”

4.3 It must be emphasized that the burden of producing evidence is not fixed. In an explanation of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act, Brobbey JA (as he then was) explained in the case of YORKWA

V. DUAH [1992-93] GBR, at 282 that:

“However, the Evidence Decree makes provision for the duty or obligation to adduce evidence to shift from one party to the other.”

4.4 In a situation the duty or obligation could shift from the plaintiff to the defendant. If and when it is shifted, the defendant would be required to lead evidence to establish the sale once he claimed to have had possession by reason of sale of the house to him when the duty or obligation to adduce evidence shifts, and the defendant fails to adduce evidence or any evidence on the sale, the ruling of the court on the sale will be against the defendant. This is the reason for the provision in section 14 of the Evidence Act (Act 323) which states:

“Except as otherwise provide by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non- existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.”

4.5 The Supreme Court further explained the point in the case of ADJETEY AGBOSU & OTHERS V. EBENEZER NIKOI KOTEY & ORS. [2003-2005] 685 at 710 that;

“It is trite learning that by the statutory provisions of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), the burden of producing evidence in any given case is not fixed, but shifts from party to party at various stages of the trial, depending on the issues(s) asserted or denied or both.”

4.6 COUNTERCLAIM:

To the extent that the defendants counterclaimed, they carried an equal burden as the plaintiffs. In the case of JAAS CO. LTD. & ANOTHER V. APPAU & ANOTHER [2009] SCGLR 263 at 270,

the Supreme Court, per Dotse JSC, commenting on the burden of proof where a defendant also counterclaims, stated:

“We wish to observe that the burden of proof is always put on the plaintiff to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities in an action for declaration of title. Where the defendant has not counterclaimed and the plaintiff has not been able to make out a sufficient case against the defendant, then the plaintiff’s claims be dismissed.”

4.7 Continuing at page 21, the held thus:

“Thus, whenever a defendant also files a counterclaim, then the same standard or burden of proof would be used in evaluating and assessing the case of the Defendant just as it was used to evaluate and assess the case of the plaintiff against the defendant.”

“In the instant appeal, the defendants counterclaimed and that meant that they also assumed the position of a plaintiff in respect to their counterclaim.”

4.8 It is the light of these statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements on the burden of proof and persuasion as enshrined in sections 11, 12 and 14 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323), and placed on the parties, that the issue and facts of this case should be measured.

4.9 In land litigation, the law requires a party to prove his or her root of title, mode of acquisition and various acts of possession exercised over the subject-matter of litigation. In the case of YEHANS INTERNATIONAL LTD. V. MARTEY TSURU FAMILY & ANOR

(2018) DLSC 2488 at page 8. Justice Adinyira (Mrs.) JSC, had this to say on proof of title with respect to land:

“It is settled and trite law that a person claiming title has to prove:

i. His root of title

ii. Mode of acquisition and

iii. Various acts of possession exercised over the disputed land.”

5.0 Also in MONDIAL VENEER (GH) LTD. V. AMUAH GYEBU XV [2011] 1SCGLR 466 at 475, where Georgina Wood (Mrs.) JSC (as she then was), stated as follows:

“In land litigation even where living witnesses who were directly involved in the transaction under reference are produced in court as witnesses, the law requires the person asserting title and on whom the burden of persuasion requires the person asserting title and on whom the burden of persuasion falls, as in this instant case, to prove his root of title, mode of acquisition and various acts of possession exercised over the subject-matter of litigation.”

See also the case of AWUKU V. TETTEH [2011] 1SCGLR 366.

5.1 To these may be added that, once the issue of identity of the land is in dispute, issues relating to the identity of the land becomes material and must be proved. In the case of NYIKPLORKPO V. AGBEDOTOR [1987-1988] 1 GLR 165 at 171, the court

considered the requirements essential to success in an action for declaration of title, injunction and recovery of possession thus:

“The principle of that to successful maintain an action for declaration of title to land, the appellants had to prove with certainty the boundaries of the land claimed…and the documentary proof establishing his title, the plaintiff must establish by positive evidence the identity and limits of the land he claims.”

5.2 It is salient to note that before the trial commenced counsel for the Defendants applied for the Plaintiff’s action to be dismissed per the reason that action was statute barred.

5.3 However, this court differently constituted dismissed the application for same to be considered after evidence has been taken in this matter.

5.4 If I may ask per the evidence of the parties, is the Plaintiff’s action statute barred or the Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this action?

5.5 Under section 26 of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323) a person is estopped by his own conduct if he intentionally causes another to believe something to be true and the person to whom the representation is made relied upon such belief to his detriment. The language of the provision is that:-

“Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, when a party has, by his own statement, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, the truth of that thing shall be conclusively presumed against that party or his successors in interest in any proceedings between that party or his successors in interest and such relying person or his successors in interest.”

5.6 In his book “Essentials of Ghana Law on Evidence” published in 2014 the eminent Ghanaian jurist Justice S. A. Brobbey a retired justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana stated at paragraph 8-6-11 page 311 under the rubric ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT” as follows:-

“Estoppel by Conduct arises this way:

A person puts up behavior or makes a statement on the basis of which he knows the other party will act and when that other party acts on its to his detriment, that person will be prevented from asserting the opposite of what his behavior has led the other party to believe in. that person will be estopped from denying his behavior or statement or the consequences of his behaviour or statement. The doctrine is said to have been formally articulated in the old case of PICKARD V. SEARS [1837] 6AD & EI 469, as follows:-

“Where one by his own words or conduct willfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from averting against the latter a different state of things as existing at that time.”

5.7 In our jurisdiction, the general principles for the application of estoppels are predicated on the principles of fairness and justice.

This was summed up in the case of SOCIAL SECURITY BANK V. AGYARKWA [1991-1992] holding 1 in the following words;

“The principle of estoppel by conduct was applicable only in those circumstances where it was just to invoke it, namely in those circumstances in which it could be unjust, inequitable or inconceivable to permit a party against whom a plea of estoppel by conduct was raised to go back on his word or conduct. Consequently, in invoking a plea of estoppel by conduct one has to have regard to the circumstances surrounding the particular conduct which was the subject of the plea. Invariably each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts.”

5.8 Another judicial application of the principle was made in the case of

ASIA V. AYEDUVOR [1987-1988] 1 GLR 175 where a person

sold a house under the representation that he owned it but later testified in court that the house belonged to his son, the court held that his evidence should have been rejected in preference to his earlier representation on the basis of the principle of estoppel by conduct under section 26 of the Evidence Act (1975) NRCD 323. The court clearly read into the testimony, collusion between father and son to defeat the purpose of the Act and to overreach on innocent third party.

5.9 One of the cardinal maxims of equity is that equity aids the vigilant and to the indolent. The application of the maxim has evolved into the equitable defence of laches. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (8 ed. 2004) laches is “reasonable delay in pursuing a right or a claim almost always an equitable one in a way that prejudices the party against whom relief is sought. Also termed sleeping on rights. “Early in its history: Chancery developed the doctrine that where the plaintiff in equity delayed beyond the period of the statute applicable at law, relief would be refused on the ground of laches even though no specific prejudice to the defendant was shown today in most states, there are statutes of limitations applying to suits in equity. Despite these, however, the doctrine still holds that even if the delay is for a shorter period of time then that of the statute, it may still bar equitable relief if it is unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant” John F. O’Connell Remedies in a Nutshell 16 (2d ed. 1985).

6.0 The above definition finds support in the decision of the Court of appeal case in MORGAN KWAME OPOKU V. AKOSUA OSAA Civil Appeal No. H1/214/205 dated 21st March, 2019, where the court held:

“Laches means unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a right or claim. It is an equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed or been negligent in asserting the claim when that delay or negligence has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought.”

6.1 Paragraph 17 of Snell’s Principles of Equity 23rd Edition states: “In the words of Lord Comden the court of Equity has always refused its aid in state demand where a party has slept over his right great length of time. Nothing call forth this court into acting but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence, where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing.”

6.2 It is salient to note that the subject-matter land in dispute is measured eight (8) feet. Paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff’s reply reads:

“7. Paragraph 14 is denied. Plaintiff says a further measurement of the land was done, it confirmed that the Defendants have trespassed onto their land by about eight

(8) feet,” (emphasis supplied).

6.3 A perusal of the evidence on record depicts between the Defendants, their grantor and their grantor’s grantor, they have been in occupation of the subject-matter land for over 70 years without any challenge from the Plaintiff.

6.4 There is evidence before the court that the grantor of the Defendants acquired his land in 1919. He subsequently transferred his interest to the Adra Brothers in 1945 who also sold same to the Defendants’ father in 1954.

6.5 It is of essence to note that on the acquisition of the land in 1919, the late Kojo Thompson put up a huge mansion on the land and occupied same. The Adra Brothers after the acquisition of the subsequent land converted same to a hotel, which they later sold to Mr. Christopher Otoo in 1954.

6.6 There is no evidence before me depicting that before 2023 that the Plaintiff brought this action, their grandfather or their father ever raised the issue of trespass during their lifetimes. This was what

the Defendants representative told the court when he was cross examined on the issue.

“Q: I am putting it to you that both Defendants have trespassed on the Plaintiff’s land.

A: Certainly no. The property predates when their grandfather acquired the land.”

6.7 This clearly denotes that as at the time the Plaintiff’s grandfather acquired his land the late Kojo Thompson was already in occupation of the subject-matter land in 1938. I therefore wonder why the Plaintiff’s grandfather never challenged the late Kojo Thompson. I also wonder why the Plaintiff is now raising the issue in 2023.

6.8 Thus for over seventy (70) years the Plaintiff’s family failed to raise the issue of trespass but now. In the circumstance, I hold that assuming the Plaintiff’s family had any interest in the subject-matter land at all, they slept on same since equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent.

6.9 The question is, has the Plaintiff’s action been caught by section 10 of the Limitations Act, 1972, NRCD 54? Our laws set the limits of time that parties involved in a dispute are to initiate legal proceedings from the date of an alleged wrong. The proponents of the statute of limitations argue that for practical reasons, it is most

equitable to limit the initiation of legal proceedings to a reasonable period after the event.

7.0 On actions to recover land, section 10 (1-7) of the Act provides:

“10 Recovery of land.

(1) A person shall not bring an action to recover a land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or, if it first accrued to a person through whom the first mentioned claims to that person.

(2) A right of action to recover land does not accrue unless the land is in the possession of a person in whose favour the period of Limitation can run.

(3) Where a right of action to recover land has accrued, and before the right of action is barred, the land ceased to be in adverse possession, the right of action does not accrue until the land is again taken into adverse possession.

(4) For the purpose of this Act, a person is in possession of a land by reason only of having made a formal entry in the land.

(5) For the purposes of this act, a continual or any other claim on or near a land does not preserve a right of action to recover the land.

(6) On the expiration of the period fixed by this Act, for a person to bring an action to recover land, the title of that person to the land is extinguished.

(7) For the purpose of this section “adverse possession” means possession of a person in whose favour the period of limitation can run.”

7.1 It is trite learning that issues on limitation of actions is a matter of law, and where it is found that an action is barred, this court would not have to determine the action on its merits. The question of limitation is very important and fundamental when raised.

7.2 See ASSI V. ATTORNEY GENERAL Civil Appeal No.

J4/4/17/2016, where the Supreme court speaking through Dotse

JSC in determining whether or not the plaintiff’s action which he commenced against the defendant was statute barred concluded as follows; “if indeed it is (statute barred) then there is no need to look at the merits of the case since the statute of limitation is a venerable shield that can be used to ward off indolent and piecemeal litigators.”

7.3 The courts have in a number of cases discussed the necessity for a party seeking to rely on limitation to specifically plead it, in tandem with Order 11 rule 8 (1) of CI. 47.

See AMANKWA V. NSIAH [1994-95] GBR 758, DOLPHYME V. SPEEDLINE STEVEDORING CO. LTD [1997-98] 1GLR 786 SC.

See also BASIL V. KABBARA [1966] GLR 102 where it was held that “the stature of limitation may be pleaded by the title or by making such averments in the pleading as would evince an intention to invoke the statute.”

7.4 Again in the more recent decision of the Supreme Court in KWAKU AMEYAW V. DR. FRANCIS OSAFO MENSAH & ANOR. [2021]

DLCA 10779, the court opined about the application of the statute of limitation to cases; “the short answer as was held by this court in LARTEY V. NETEY [2010-2012] 1GLR 370, GIHOC REFRIGERATION HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS LIMTED V. HANNA ASSI [2005-2006] SCGLR 458; HANNA ASSI (NO.2) v. GIHOC REFRIGERATION HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS LIMTED (NO.2) [2007-2008] SCGLR 160 and AMUZU V.

OKLIKAH [1997-98] 1 GLR 89, SC is that the Limitations Act being a statute, it is the duty of the court to apply the law to the facts of the case even if the parties are not aware of it or irrespective of how the parties wrongly perceived the law.”

7.5 Per my analysis as above discussed, I hold that the Plaintiff’s action has been caught by the Limitations Act, 1975, (NRCD 54) for which reason I dismiss same. In contrast I enter judgment for the Defendants per their counterclaim.