EUNICE OPOKUA OTCHERE V. MONOLO PLANT LIMITED
by GIFTY DEKYEM J
Jurisdiction
High Court
Judge
GIFTY DEKYEM J
Catalog Type
Case
Judgement Date
Jun 07, 2017
Summary
Labour Law – Termination of Employment – Redundancy – Meaning of Redundancy under section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) – Negotiation of Redundancy Pay – Unfair Termination – Acceptance of Severance or Terminal Benefits – Pregnancy and Termination of Employment – Evidence – Burden of Proof In Civil Cases – NRCD 323 Material Facts The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company in September 2010. In 2014, she went on maternity leave and, upon resumption, alleged that her superior cautioned her against conceiving again soon. In late 2015, the plaintiff became pregnant again, and in February 2016, her pregnancy became visibly noticeable. On 15 February 2016, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment by a letter titled “REDUNDANCY”. The plaintiff contended that her termination was motivated by her pregnancy and that the defendant failed to negotiate redundancy pay as required under section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The defendant denied that the plaintiff was declared redundant, contending that the use of the term “redundancy” was merely nominal and that all terminal benefits due the plaintiff were paid. The plaintiff subsequently accepted and acknowledged receipt of GHS 20,033.90 as full and final settlement, stating she had no further claims against the employer. Claims 1. General damages for unfair termination 2. Redundancy pay calculated as five months’ salary for each year of service 3. 15% of the total amount claimed as costs and legal fees Holding 1. The plaintiff was not declared redundant within the meaning of section 65 of Act 651. 2. No legal duty to negotiate redundancy pay arose, as the statutory conditions for redundancy were not met. 3. By accepting the terminal benefits without protest, the plaintiff entered into a compromise agreement which extinguished any further claims. 4. The termination of employment became lawful and by mutual agreement.
Full Content
JUDGMENT
DEKYEM, J.
Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant, the latter being a company registered under the laws of Ghana. Plaintiff was engaged in September, 2010. In 2014, Plaintiff claims she fell pregnant and upon resumption from maternity leave in May, 2014, one Klaudia Raphael, her immediate boss told her that, she must give the company some more time before conceiving again. It is Plaintiff’s case that, she conceived again between October/November 2015 and her belly began to protrude visibly in February, 2016. Plaintiff averred that, on 15th February, 2016, Defendant handed her a letter headed “REDUNDANCY” terminating her employment on that ground. Plaintiff contends that, her pregnancy was the reason for the termination of her appointment which amounts to unfair termination and further that, the redundancy award was determined unilaterally by Defendant without negotiation contrary to provisions under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). Plaintiff therefore claims against the Defendant as follows:
1. General damages for unfair termination,
2. The payment of 5 months’ salary for each year she worked as an employee of the Defendant, as redundancy pay and 3. 15% of all the above as costs including legal fees.
Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim and contended that, although it used the word ‘redundancy’ in the letter terminating her employment it was not a redundancy and that payment made to Plaintiff were her entitlement. At directions stage, the following issues were settled for trial:
1. Whether or not the Plaintiff was declared redundant by the Defendant and terminated as such.
2. Whether or not the Defendant terminated the Plaintiff’s employment through redundancy because of her pregnancy.
3. Whether or not the Defendant negotiated the redundancy package with the Plaintiff.
4. Any other issues arising from the pleadings
The provisions regarding standard of proof in civil cases are found in the following sections of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) as follows:
Section 10—Burden of Persuasion Defined.
(1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.
(2) The burden of persuasion may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact or that he establish the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 11—Burden of Producing Evidence Defined.
(1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.
(4) In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.
Section 12—Proof by a Preponderance of the Probabilities.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities.
(2) "Preponderance of the probabilities" means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non existence.
Section 14—Allocation of Burden of Persuasion.
Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.
Section 17—Allocation of Burden of Producing Evidence.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact.
It was held in Takoradi Flour Mills v. Samir Faris [2005-2006] SCGLR 882 -885 at holding 4 that: “Since it was the plaintiff, …… who made a claim ……., he had to adduce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. When the plaintiff has been able to discharge the burden of proof on him and has by his evidence, established facts from which an inference can reasonably be drawn in his favour, then the onus would shift on the ….defendant ...... to dispute that inference, not by a mere denial, but by reasonable inference.” The onus is thus on Plaintiff to prove her claim. Whether or not the Plaintiff was declared redundant by the Defendant and terminated as such and whether or not the Defendant negotiated the redundancy package with the Plaintiff? In other words if Plaintiff was declared redundant, was she entitled to negotiation between her and Defendant for the payment of redundancy pay? Plaintiff relied on exhibit B in support of her assertion that she was made redundant. The said exhibit B, from Defendant to Plaintiff dated 15th February, 2016 states thus:
“REDUNDANCY
We are writing to inform you that your service with the company is no more required; management has therefore decided to terminate your appointment today 15th February 2016.
Please find attached your entitlements including your notice pay, leave pay and February salary…..”
The only provision on redundancy under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) is section 65 which stipulates as follows:
(1) When an employer contemplates the introduction of major changes in production, programme, organisation, structure or technology of an undertaking that are likely to entail terminations of employment of workers in the undertaking, the employer shall
a. provide in writing to the Chief Labour Officer and the trade union concerned, not later than three months before the contemplated changes, all relevant information including the reasons for any termination, the number and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period within which any termination is to be carried out; and
b. consult the trade union concerned on measures to be taken to avert or minimize the termination as well as measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned such as finding alternative employment.
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), where an undertaking is closed down or undergoes an arrangement or amalgamation and the close down, arrangement or amalgamation causes
(a) severance of the legal relationship of worker and employer as it existed immediately before the close down, arrangement or amalgamation; and
(b) as a result of and in addition to the severance that worker becomes unemployed or suffers any diminution in the terms and conditions of employment,
the worker is entitled to be paid by the undertaking at which that worker was immediately employed prior to the close down, arrangement or amalgamation, compensation, in this section referred to as "redundancy pay".
(3) In determining whether a worker has suffered any diminution in his or her terms and conditions of employment, account shall be taken of the past services and accumulated benefits, if any, of the worker in respect of the employment with the undertaking before the changes were carried out.
(4) The amount of redundancy pay and the terms and conditions of payment are matters which are subject to negotiation between the employer or a representative of the employer on the one hand and the worker or the trade union concerned on the other.
Section 65 of Act 651 envisages two situations of redundancy. First is where an employer contemplates the introduction of major changes in production, programme, organisation, structure or technology of an undertaking. In this regard, both the Chief Labour Officer and the Union are consulted by the employer with the view to averting or minimizing the termination as well as finding mitigating factors such as alternative employment for affected workers.
Secondly, redundancy occurs where an undertaking is closed down or undergoes an arrangement or amalgamation and same results in the termination of the employment contract. In this regard the worker is entitled to redundancy pay which is subject to negotiation between the employer or its representative on the one hand and the worker or the trade union concerned on the other hand. Section 229 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) defines "Arrangement" as any change in the rights or liabilities of members, debentureholders or creditors of a company or any class thereof or in the Regulations of a company, other than a change effected under any of the foregoing sections of this Code or by the unanimous agreement of all the parties affected thereby; and "Amalgamation" as any merger of the undertakings or any part of the undertakings of two or more companies or of the undertakings or part of the undertakings of one or more companies and one or more bodies corporate. In the instant suit, there is no demonstration that, Defendant has closed down, or undergone an arrangement or amalgamation which has resulted in the termination of Plaintiff’s employment. There was also no evidence that, Defendant contemplated the introduction of major changes in production, programme, organisation, structure or technology within it. There is therefore no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff was declared redundant by Defendant. Consequently, no duty of negotiation was cast upon the parties herein. Plaintiff is thus not entitled to negotiation and rightly so, Defendant did not oblige her. It was held in Acquaye v. Awotwi and Another [1982- 83] GLR 1110-1118 CA that, “it was a well-known rule of evidence that although proof in a civil cases rested on the plaintiff, that burden was discharged, when once the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence of the probability of his case” The onus is thus on Plaintiff to adduce sufficient evidence in support of her claim that she is entitled to negotiation which she has failed to. Plaintiff’s employment contract, exhibit A, did not provide for redundancy pay. The court finds that, Plaintiff was not declared redundant even though the letter terminating her appointment is headed “REDUNDANCY” thus not entitled to negotiation or redundancy pay. Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden she assumed having made that assertion.
Plaintiff admitted that, attached to exhibit B was a breakdown of her entitlement upon termination including redundancy award. The said breakdown, also marked as exhibit 4, showed Plaintiff’s entitlements as basic pay, notice pay and leave pay at GHS1,797.54 each totaling GHS5,592.62 and a redundancy award of GHS 19,641.28 making a total of GHS25,033.90. An amount of GHS5,000.00 was deducted from this total amount as loans Plaintiff owed, leaving a total net amount payable to be GHS20,033.90. Exhibit 3, is evidence of receipt by Plaintiff of the total net amount dated 17th February, 2016 and on Defendant’s letterhead which states as follows:
“REDUNDANCY
I Opokua Otchere Eunice HAVE RECEIVED AN AMOUNT OF 20,033.90 BEING ALL ENTITLEMENTS DUE ME AND I HAVE NO MORE CLAIM (SIC) IN CASH OR KIND FROM DESIMONE LTD.
SIGNED WITNESS”
Exhibit 4 clearly shows that, Plaintiff received an amount of GHS20,033.90 in full and final settlement of any future claim she may have against Defendant. Although the undertaking was not to make any claim against Desimone Ltd, it was on the letterhead of Defendant. The court will accept that, that undertaking was in favour of Plaintiff’s employer, Defendant herein. It was held in Ashun v. Accra Brewery Limited Civil Appeal No. J4/18/2007, 12th November, 2008 that:“Under general contract principles, the plaintiff, by accepting the package offered him, entered into a compromise agreement which appeared to extinguish any claims that he had against his employer in respect of the termination of his employment. At the very least, he should have indicated at the time he accepted the package that he was doing so, without prejudice, or under protest.” The Ashun case further held that: “The acceptance by the Plaintiff of the redundancy package offered him by the defendant meant that the termination of his employment was not unlawful or wrongful. We are not persuaded by the Plaintiff’s contention that the redundancy package was unilaterally determined by the defendant company. It was open to the Plaintiff to reject it, if he was so minded. By accepting the package, he made the termination one by mutual agreement. He therefore had no cause of action against the defendant.”
By Plaintiff’s conduct of accepting the award offered her without protest, not only did she enter into a compromise agreement extinguishing any future claims she might have but also making the termination of her employment by mutual agreement thus lawful. Plaintiff cannot bring any claim such as the instant one against Defendant in respect of the termination of her employment. The issue whether or not the Defendant terminated the Plaintiff’s employment through redundancy because of her pregnancy is thus of no legal moment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim fails in its entirety and same is dismissed. Costs of GHS2,000.00 is awarded in favour of Defendant.
(SGD)
Justice Gifty Dekyem (Mrs)
Justice of the High Court
Labour Division I, Accra
COUNSEL
Aubrey Tamakloe ESQ for Plaintiff
William Addo ESQ for Defendant.