MERCY MENSAH V. MAERSK LINE TEMA

JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff herein commenced the current action against the Defendant herein on 14th January, 2009 for the following reliefs:

(a) Refund of the sum of GH¢14,075.50 or such sum as is arrived at on computing the difference between what 1st Defendant paid, and what was due Plaintiff by virtue of Section 3(1) of PNDCL 187.

(b) Commercial interest on the sum rightly due from 25th August, 2002 when late Mensah died, till date of judgment.

(c) Cost.

The Defendant entered appearance on 29th January, 2009 and went on to file its statement of defence on 13th February, 2009 denying the claim of the Plaintiff.

On 14th June, 2011, the Plaintiff filed an amended writ of summons and statement of claim pursuant to an order of this court. In the said amended writ, the Plaintiff claims the following reliefs:

i. Payment of the difference of GH¢524.10, being the difference between what is calculated as compensation by PNDCL 187, and what Defendant paid her.

ii. Commercial interest on the sum of GH¢13,507.80 at prevailing rate due her effective from March, 2004, six months after the death of her husband, till 18th February, when the last installment of money was paid.

iii. Damages for fraudulent conduct by deliberately breaching PNDCL 187.

iv. Cost.

In her amended statement of claim the Plaintiff avers that she was the wife of the late James Kweitey Mensah who was in the employment of the Defendant Company as a driver. He died in an accident in the premises of the Defendant Company on 25th August, 2003.

Under the defendant’s insurance policy, the Defendant paid to the Plaintiff an amount of GH¢5000.00 as part compensation in respect of the death of the said Kweitey Mensah. The Plaintiff goes on to aver that he was informed by the ex-Union members of Defendant that the sum due the Plaintiff was her husband’s earnings times 60 according to the Workmen’s Compensation Law, 1987 (PNDCL 187).

Plaintiff as a result engaged a lawyer and using the August, 2003 pay slip of the deceased, which amounted to GH¢225.13, he computed the compensation in accordance with section 3(1) of the PNDCL 187 yielding GH¢13,507.80. Counsel, therefore, wrote to Defendant about the shortfall in Plaintiff’s compensation and the Defendant replied that the full compensation due her was GH¢8,262.00.

According to Plaintiff after her Counsel had intervened on her behalf, Defendant proceeded to pay additional compensation of GH¢3,262.00 on 5th June, 2008 and a further GH¢4,721.70 on 18th February, 2009 bringing the total compensation to GH¢12,983.70 and not GH¢8,262.00 as earlier claimed.

Plaintiff contends that by this act of the Defendant, it committed fraud on the Plaintiff by withholding payments due her in law for over five years till it was compelled to do so by Counsel.

Notwithstanding payments made by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, there is still a shortfall of GH¢524.10 being the difference between what is calculated as compensation under PNDCL 187, and what Defendant paid her.

The Plaintiff avers that by operation of PNDCL 187, the compensation payable to Plaintiff should have been paid out within a total of six months after the death of her husband. She says by the law, the sum of GH¢13,507.80 should have been paid her in March, 2004, six months after the death of her husband on 25th August, 2003. Defendant, however, paid her the last tranche of money on 18th February, 2009, over five years without assigning any reason whatsoever. The Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the reliefs endorsed on her writ of summons.

The Defendant denies the claim of the Plaintiff in his statement of defence and states that the payments initially made to James Kweitey Mensah’s dependants were based on a computation made by the Tema District Labour Officer and that it has paid in full compensation due the dependants of the deceased. It, therefore, denies committing any fraud on the Plaintiff.

It contends that the Plaintiff rather failed to make a claim within the stipulated period of six weeks and is estopped from making any claim, particularly a claim for interest, against the Defendant. The Plaintiff is as a result not entitled to any of the reliefs endorsed on her writ of summons.

On 11th March, 2009 the Court differently constituted set down the following issues for determination:

Whether or not the Defendants paid Plaintiff’s workmen’s compensation according to section 3(1) of PNDCL 187.

Any other issues arising from the suit.

The Plaintiff gave evidence and in the process she essentially repeated the averments in her statement of claim. She went on to tender in evidence a marriage certificate as Exhibit A to prove that she was the wife of the deceased. She also tendered in evidence a copy of a Letter of Administration obtained by her in respect of the death of the deceased as Exhibit B.

The Plaintiff went on to tell the court that on 10th November, 2003 the Defendant gave her GH¢5000.00 as compensation in respect of the death of her husband. She claims she suspected that they had not paid her all amount due her so she engaged a lawyer who wrote to the Defendant on the issue. On receipt of the letter, the defendant paid another GH¢3,262.00 in 2008. Then on 18th February, 2009 the Defendant paid another GH¢4,721.70 to the Plaintiff. She, however, stated that whilst the Defendant wrote to her that she was entitled to be paid GH¢8,200.00 it paid her GH¢12,200.00.

The Defendant’s case was presented to court on behalf of the Defendant by Jenny Enyo Akar, the HR Business Partner for the Defendant Company. She told the Court that the initial GH¢5,000.00 paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant was in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement as a basic amount by way of Insurance Policy to be given to employees in cases of industrial or non-industrial accident. She claims it forms part of the workmen’s compensation.

She says that later, based on a request from the Labour Officer, the Defendant paid an amount of GH¢4,721.70 to the Plaintiff as additional payment.

She concluded that the Defendant has paid what is due to the dependants of the deceased in respect of the workmen’s compensation as requested by the Labour Officer. The Defendant has, therefore, not committed fraud on the Plaintiff as alleged.

Having reviewed the evidence before the Court I will go on to evaluate the evidence vis-à-vis the issues this Court has been called upon to determined. However, before going on to do the said evaluation I will consider the principle of burden of proof in civil cases.

The burden of producing evidence and the allocation of the burden of persuasion in civil cases is governed by Section 11(1) and (4) and Section 14 of the Evidence Act 1973 (NRCD 323) which provides as follows:

“11 (1) for the purposes of this Act, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on an issue.

11 (4) In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence which on the totality of the evidence, leads a reasonable mind to conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.

14 Except as otherwise provided by law, unless it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting”.

Thus in Bank of West Africa v. Ackun (1963) 1 GLR 176 it was held in holding 2 thereof with regard to the onus of proof in civil cases as follows:

“The onus of proof in civil cases depends upon the pleadings. The party who in his pleadings raises an issue essential to the success of his case assumes the burden of proof ...”

With regard to the burden of producing evidence it was held in Re Ashalley Botwe Lands; Adjetey Agbosu and others v. Kotey and Others (2003-2004) SCGLR 420 as follows:

“Under the Evidence Decree 1973 (NRCD 323) the burden of producing evidence in any given case was not fixed but shifted from party to party at various stages of the trial depending on the issues asserted and/or denied”.

As has been stated elsewhere in this judgment, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant withheld some payments from her thereby committing fraud on her. Also the compensation paid to her by the Defendant was short paid. She is, therefore, demanding payment of the difference in compensation not paid to her, damages for fraud and interest on the amount due her. The Defendant has, however, denied the claim of the Plaintiff and states that it has paid all compensation due to the Plaintiff so she is not entitled to any further payment.

The onus is, therefore, on the Plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence to prove her case against the Defendant. See the case of Fosua and Adu-Poku v. Adu-Poku Mensah-Ansah [2009] SCGLR 310. See also the case of JASS CO LTD and Another v. APPAU and Another [2009] SCGLR 265 at 270 where Dotse JSC stated as follows:

“...We wish to observe that the burden of proof is always put on the plaintiff to satisfy the court on balance of probabilities in cases like this. Thus, where in situation, the defendant has not counterclaimed; and the plaintiff has not been able to make out a sufficient case against the defendant, then the plaintiff’s claim would be dismissed...”

So in the instant case the court must find out from the evidence before it whether the Plaintiff has been able to lead sufficient evidence to establish her case on a balance of probabilities as a result of which this court must rule in her favour. In doing that, I will go on to consider the issues that this court has been called upon to determine. However, before going on to consider the issues I will consider some preliminary issues raised by counsel for the Defendant in his address. In his address counsel for the Defendant submitted that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the questions to be investigated or determined were vested in the Circuit or District Court with the High Court having supervisory or appellate jurisdiction and not an original jurisdiction. He goes on to submit that the High Court, therefore, has no original jurisdiction in the current case.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1987 (PNDCL 187) provides at Section 38 that Court in the Act is interpreted to mean a District or Circuit Court or any other Court declared by the Chief Justice to be the Court to which in an area or for a case or class proceedings under this Act may be brought.

From the said provision unless the Chief Justice so directs, it is true that jurisdiction in such cases is given to the District or Circuit Court. However, the Act does not specifically oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. If the intention of the Act was to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court it would have been specifically stated in the Act. Also by Article 140 (1) of the 1992 Constitution the High Court has original Jurisdiction in all matters except where the jurisdiction of the High Court is specifically ousted. Since there is no provision in the Act ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters pertaining to the Act, by Article 140 (1) of the 1992 Constitution the High Court could preside on such matters. More so if the Defendant had wanted to raise the issue of jurisdiction then it should have raised it timeously, but not to wait till the end of the case before raising it. Since it did not raise it at the initial stages of the trial and has waited up to the end of the case before raising it, it is the view of the court that the Defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of this court so the case will not be struck out on grounds that this court has no jurisdiction.

The Defendant also raised the issue that the Plaintiff brings this action in her capacity as Administrator of the estate of the late James Kwetey Mensah and not as a dependant. The action is, therefore, incompetent.

The Plaintiff clearly identified herself as the wife of the deceased both in her amended statement of claim and in her evidence in court. He went on to tender in evidence a certificate of marriage to support the fact that she was the wife of the deceased. Her capacity as the wife of the deceased was not challenged by the defendant. It is also in evidence that whatever payment was made by the Defendant was made to the Plaintiff. This is observed from Exhibit 2. In my opinion the Plaintiff tendered in evidence the Letters of Administration to prove that she has capacity to deal with the estate of the deceased. Also at the time she applied for the Letters of Administration the amount to be paid as workmen’s compensation was not known so definitely it could not have been stated as part of the estate of the deceased. If it becomes necessary for the Court to order payment in favour of the Plaintiff of an amount in excess of the value of the estate indicated on the Letters of Administration, the Court could order amendment to be made to the value to reflect the value for the purpose of tax payment. I, therefore, do not agree with the Defendant that the action is incompetent.

Counsel for the Defendant also submitted that the action is statute barred so it is incompetent and must, therefore, be dismissed.

By Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act proceedings for the recovery under the Act of compensation for an injury is not maintainable unless the application for the compensation with respect to the accident has been made within six months or, in the case of death, within six months from the time of death. So from the provision, if the application is not made within six months of the death the application for compensation is not maintainable. However, in the current case the deceased died in the premises of the Defendant Company so no official notice was given to the Defendant. It is also observed that the Defendant on its own made initial payment of GH¢5,000.00 compensation in respect of the death of the deceased. From the evidence, the Plaintiff thought the GH¢5,000.00 was the final payment it was when she allegedly realized that the Defendant had not paid all the compensation due her that she took action against the Defendant. In view of that the failure of the Plaintiff to make an application within six months is not a bar to the maintenance of the proceedings. This court cannot, therefore, dismiss the action on ground that it is statute barred.

The Plaintiff also alleged fraud against the Defendant in respect of compensation to the Plaintiff so I will consider that issue as well.

According to Counsel for the Plaintiff when the Defendant made the initial payment of GH¢5,000.00 the Defendant did not make it known to the Plaintiff that, that was not the final payment. It was through conversation with some ex-employees of Defendant that she got to know that the amount paid to her was not what was due her. The Plaintiff claims that by this act of the Defendant it had misrepresented the facts to the Plaintiff and concealed the rest of the compensation from her. So by this the Defendant had acted fraudulently.

In her statement of claim the Plaintiff stated in paragraph 9 that Defendant practiced fraud on her by withholding payments due her in law for over five years till they were compelled to do so by Counsel.

The question then is, can it be said that the Defendant has actually committed fraud on the Plaintiff?

In the case of Adumuah Okwei v. Ashieteye Laryea [2011] 1 SCGLR 317 the Supreme Court held at holding 1 as follows:

“Fraud qua fraud was such a serious allegation in legal proceedings. It should not be lightly made. The courts would look with disfavor on a party who made it and was unable to substantiate it and would, sometimes, dismiss his action with heavy penalties. Consequently, fraud should not be pleaded when counsel could not, from available instructions, form a strong opinion in favour of it. Thus when fraud was intended to be charged, it must be distinctively charged and its details specified. General allegations, however, strong were insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court might take notice. And a representation must be a matter of fact and not of law. If there was a misrepresentation of matter of law as to the legal consequences of admitted facts, in the absence of actual fraud, no court would grant any relief based on fraud...”

The same case goes on to state the legal position in allegation of fraud at page 324 from Odger;s Principles of Pleading and Practice, (18th ed. at page 202) as follows:

“Where fraud is intended to be charged, it must be distinctively charged, and in details specified. General allegations, however, strong, are insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice...Counsel must insist on being fully instructed before placing a plea of fraud on the record.”

In Re Agyekum (Decd); Agyekum and Others v. Tackie and Brown (substituted by) Adjindah and Others [2005-2006] SCGLR 851 at 855 Dr. Seth Twum JSC delivering Judgment of the Court said as follows:

“Where fraud is alleged, it is a different matter; for fraud vitiates every act or deed put forward as supporting a transaction or even a judgment of a court. But where fraud is alleged (we may include duress and undue influence) they must be pleaded with the requisite particularity. Vague allegations of uncommon, unusual, or even unconscionable dispositions of his own property by a testator, induced by logic rather than facts properly pleaded, should be firmly ignored.”

The principle of giving particulars of fraud in pleading is also emphasized by the High Court Civil Procedure Rules CI 47 which states at Order 11 Rule 12 (1) (a) that every pleading shall contain the necessary particulars of any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence on which the party pleading relies.

From the authorities referred to above, in pleading fraud, counsel must be certain that by the act complained of, the party concerned has made a false representation by means of a statement or conduct made knowingly or recklessly in order to gain a material advantage. That is a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. So in alleging fraud pleading particulars of fraud is mandatory. It requires that the party pleading fraud gives particulars of it at the time of pleading.

In his address Counsel for the Plaintiff referred to the definition of fraud in Sutton and Shannon on Contract, 7th ed. at page 190 which states that:

“A statement is made fraudulently if it is made dishonestly.”

Fraud in civil law is also discussed in Chitty on Contracts 29th Edition Chapter 6 Paragraph 043. It states as follows:

“...In order for fraud to be established, it is necessary to prove the absence of an honest belief in the truth of that which has been stated; in the words of Lord Herschell, “fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made: (1) knowingly; or (2) without belief in the truth; or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.” The converse of this is that however negligent a person may be, he cannot be liable for fraud, provided that his belief is honest; mere carelessness is not sufficient, although gross carelessness may justify an inference that he was not honest,”

In the current case the evidence shows that on the death of the deceased the Defendant paid to the Plaintiff an amount of GH¢5,000.00. According to the Defendant, this was insurance which was to form part of the workmen’s compensation. The evidence goes on to show that no further payment was made to the Plaintiff until Counsel for the Plaintiff intervened as a result of which an amount of GH¢3,262.00 was paid to her and upon further intervention by counsel an amount of GH¢4,721.70 was paid to her. The Plaintiff claims that by this act the Defendant has committed fraud on her.

The Defendant, however, per Jenny Enyo Akar contends that it committed no fraud on the Plaintiff in the sense that it paid to the Plaintiff what the District Labour Officer instructed it to pay. This assertion has not been denied by the Plaintiff. Even Exhibit 3 makes it clear that the Defendant made payment to the Plaintiff based on request made by the District Labour Officer. The evidence, therefore, shows that the Defendant always relied entirely on the District Labour Officer for the assessment of the compensation payable and as soon as the request was made by him for payment, the Defendant promptly paid to the Plaintiff.

In this case the Plaintiff did not plead that the Defendant had made any misrepresentation to the Plaintiff by suppressing any facts with the intention of making the Plaintiff to rely on those facts to her detriment. There is also no evidence before this court that the Defendant made any false representation to the Plaintiff knowingly or without belief in its truth or recklessly, careless whether it is true or false. A representation must be a matter of fact. If there is a misrepresentation of a matter of law as to the legal consequences of admitted facts, in the absence of actual fraud, no court will grant any relief based on fraud. It is, therefore, my opinion that withholding payments for over five years until counsel intervened as stated in paragraph 9 of the amended statement of claim does not amount to fraud. So from the evidence before the Court, there is nothing to show that the Defendant has committed fraud on the Plaintiff. Allegation of fraud is as a result not maintainable.

The main issue set down for determination is whether or not the Defendant paid Plaintiff’s workmen’s compensation according to section 3 (1) of PNDCL 187. By the said section of the Act, the dependants of the deceased were to be paid compensation of a sum of money equal to sixty months earnings.

The evidence before the court as stated above shows that within two months of the death of the deceased the Defendant paid an amount of GH¢5,000.00 to the Plaintiff through an insurance company as part payment of the workmen’s compensation. Upon the intervention of counsel for the Plaintiff the District Labour Officer requested the Defendant to pay an amount of GH¢3,262.00 to the Plaintiff which it complied and paid it to the Plaintiff. Later the Defendant made another payment of GH¢4,721.70 to the Plaintiff upon a request made to it by the District Labour Officer. So in all, the Defendant paid a total amount of GH¢12,983.70 to the Plaintiff as compensation in respect of the death of the deceased. So according to the Defendant this represents the amount due the Plaintiff. This is supported by Exhibit 3. However, the Plaintiff claims the Defendant still owes her an amount of GH¢524.10 which is the difference between what is calculated as compensation by PNDCL 187 and the amount paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. The Defendant has disputed this figure so the onus is on the Plaintiff to prove that she is actually entitled to be paid that amount.

It is observed from the evidence that all the payments made to the Plaintiff by the Defendant were made upon calculation made by the District Labour Officer. That is, it was the District Labour Officer who calculated the amount due and requested the Defendant to pay. So that, if for any reason the Plaintiff thinks that she has been short paid then she should have asked the District Labour Officer to re-calculate it and if he finds that there should be more payment then he directs the Defendant to pay. On the other hand the District Labour Officer should have been invited by the Plaintiff to give evidence for the court to know the method used to calculate it and also find out whether or not the Plaintiff had been short paid. It is, therefore, not surprising that counsel for the Plaintiff recognized the District labour officer as a material witness in his address.

In his address counsel for the Plaintiff stated that it is regrettable that the Labour officer was not invited to give evidence on his documents as what Defendant said was so unsatisfactory, speculative and nugatory. He goes on to state that he was hoping the Labour Officer would be called as a witness to be cross-examined on the documents tendered in evidence. He goes on to state as follows:

“So critical was the role of the labour officer in this suit that his evidence was materially significant in clarifying the murkiness surrounding the various sums paid to plaintiff, and on the dates they were paid. However, defendant failed to call him.”

Counsel for Plaintiff goes on to state in the address:

“It is not for plaintiff to state how defendant should conduct his case, though we very much wished the labour officer had been present to assist the court.”

Counsel for the Plaintiff refers the court to the case of Barima Gyamfi and Anorther v. Ama Badu (1963) 2 GLR 596 in that case the Supreme Court states at holding 1 as follows:

“In a claim made by a plaintiff, there is no onus on the defendant to disprove the claim so that however unsatisfactory or conflicting the defendant's evidence may be, it cannot avail the plaintiff. The evidence of the defence only becomes important if it can upset the balance of probabilities which the plaintiffs evidence might have created in the plaintiff's favour or if it tends to corroborate the plaintiff's evidence or tends to show that evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff was true.”

So from the submission made by counsel for the Plaintiff in his address, the Labour Officer was a material witness in this case. Since it is the Plaintiff who is alleging that she has been short paid, the onus is on her to lead sufficient evidence to prove her case and since she has recognized the District Labour Officer as a material witness then she should have invited him to give evidence but not to assume that he would be called by the Defendant so that she would have the opportunity to cross examine him.

In civil proceedings, the consequences of a party’s failure to call a material witness depend on the onus of proof placed on him by the facts of the case. If a party has to establish his case and, therefore, assumes the onus of proof, he must call witnesses material to establish that case. In that event his failure to call a material witness may result in a ruling being given against him for the reason that he has failed to establish that case. See Section 11(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) which states as follows:

“For the purposes of this Act, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling on the issue against that party.”

In Owusu v. Tabiri and Another [1987-88] 1 GLR 287, the defendant contended that the issue before the court was res judicata as it had been resolved by a chief at a valid arbitration. The plaintiff on the other hand argued that what took place before the chief was a negotiated settlement. The chief who alone could have established that there was a valid arbitration was not called to testify. The court held that since the onus of proof was on the defendant who asserted that there was a valid arbitration, his failure to call the chief was fatal to his allegation that there was a valid arbitration.

In the current case the evidence shows that it is the District Labour Officer who could have given evidence to prove whether or not the Plaintiff had been short paid and no other person could have done that. He was, therefore a material witness who should have been invited by the Plaintiff to give evidence on the issue. So failure to invite him to give evidence is fatal to Plaintiff’s case on the issue. It is, therefore, my opinion that since the Labour Officer did not give evidence on the issue the Plaintiff has failed to lead sufficient evidence to prove that the Plaintiff still owes her an amount of GH¢524.10. This court cannot, therefore, base on Plaintiff’s evidence to declare that the Defendant still owes the Plaintiff that amount. The Plaintiff is as a result not entitled to be paid that amount.

The last issue to consider is whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to be paid interest on the amount due her.

In her relief (ii) the Plaintiff is claiming commercial interest on the sum of GH¢13,507.80 at prevailing rate due her with effect from March, 2004 till 18th February, 2009 when the last installment of money was paid to her.

In the first place it is not clear from the evidence how the Plaintiff arrived at the sum GH¢13,507.80 since the evidence before the court clearly shows that, the amount that was due to the Plaintiff and which was paid to her was GH¢12,983.70. The evidence goes on to show that within two months of the death of the Plaintiff’s husband the Defendant paid an amount of GH¢5,000.00 to plaintiff. So on what basis can the Defendant be asked to pay interest on that amount when it had up to six months time to pay the compensation due the Plaintiff? So if there is any interest to be paid it can’t be on the whole amount but on GH¢12,983.70 less the GH¢5,000.00 which would amount to GH¢7983.70. However, to declare that the Defendant is liable to pay interest, the evidence before the court must prove that the delay in payment of the compensation was caused by the Defendant.

In the current case, the Act shows that when the death of an employee from a cause is brought to the notice of the employer it shall within three months give notice to the nearest Labour Officer. The evidence before the court does not show when this report was made to the Labour Officer. It cannot, therefore be determined whether or not the Defendant in the current case made the report within the stipulated time.

It is also a requirement of the Act that on the death of such an employee an application must be made by the dependants to claim the amount due. In the current case the deceased died in the premises of the Defendant so it immediately came to the notice of the Defendant. This explains why it went ahead to pay the GH¢5,000.00 within two months. It is, however, not clear from the evidence before the court, who actually caused the delay in the payment of the compensation to the Plaintiff. This is because per section 35 of the Act, the Labour Officer is expected to notify the Defendant of the amount of compensation to pay.

The evidence before the court shows that the only notification given to the Defendant by the District Labour Officer was given on 12th December, 2008 per Exhibit 3 for the payment of an amount of GH¢4,721.70 which it promptly paid to Plaintiff. The evidence does not show when the notification was given to the Defendant by the Labour Officer in respect of the second payment of GH¢3,262.00. It is, therefore, not clear from the evidence, the person who actually caused the delay in the payment of the compensation to the plaintiff. If the Labour Officer had been invited to give evidence as stated in this judgment, this issue would have been resolved and the court would have known who to be faulted for the delay in the payment.

As it stands now the evidence before the court is not sufficient to determine who actually caused the delay in the payment of the compensation to the Plaintiff. In view of that the Defendant could not be faulted based on the evidence before the Court. It is, therefore, my opinion that the Defendant could not be called upon to pay interest on the amount paid to the Plaintiff. So from the evidence this court cannot order the Defendant to pay interest on the amount.

The Plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to any of the reliefs endorsed on her writ of summons. Her action is as a result dismissed.

In conclusion I enter judgment in favour of the Defendant. No order as to costs.

SGD

KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

COUNSEL

MR. AHUMAH OCANSEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF

MR. GEORGE THOMPSON FOR THE DEFENDANT