PROSPER KWAME SOGLO V SOLACE MAWUNYO SOGLO

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Petitioner on the 26th of April 2018, filed a Petition against the Respondent for the dissolution of their marriage claiming that the marriage between the parties had broken down beyond reconciliation and wanted out of the marriage.

BRIEF FACTS

The facts as gleaned from the Petitioner’s pleadings are that, the Parties initially got married under customary law at Ve –Deme near Ve - Golokuati in the Volta Region of Ghana and subsequently converted the customary marriage into an Ordinance one at the Mamprobi Circuit of the E.P Church, Ghana on the 11th of February 2006. Both parties are citizens of Ghana. The Petitioner is a Public Servant with the Ghana Revenue Authority, whereas the Respondent is an entrepreneur and runs the parties’ business under the name Supreme Trust Micro Finance and Supreme Trust Capital. There are three issues of the marriage aged 11, 8 and 4 years respectively at the time the petition was filed.

After the celebration of the marriage, the parties lived as man and wife at Sakumono Regimanuel Estates, Adogonno, Community 18, till the 15th of January 2015, when the parties separated and the Petitioner moved out of the matrimonial home to rented place leaving behind the Respondent and their children.

In the divorce petition, the Petitioner averred that, the marriage between the parties has broken down beyond reconciliation as the Respondent has over the years behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with her as the Respondent has caused the Petitioner so much pain, suffering, distress anxiety and mental anguish. The Petitioner sought the following reliefs;

a)     An order that the marriage celebrated at the Mamprobi E.P Church on the 11th of February 2006 between the parties to this suit be dissolved on the ground that, the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation and same needs to be dissolved.

b)    An order that the uncompleted house in Community 25, Tema and the plots of land in Ho, Volta Region should be valued and sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties to the suit.

c)     An order that the parties to this suit be granted joint custody of the infant children of the marriage namely Richmond Kafui Tesewe Soglo aged 11 years, Angel Eyram Soglo aged 8 years and Joella Aseye Soglo aged 4 years.

d)    An order that the Petitioner is to be involved in all decisions which concern the infant children of the marriage.

e)   An order that the shares in Supreme Trust Capital Limited and Supreme Trust Micro Finance in the name of the Respondent be divided into two and one half given to the Petitioner

f)     An order that the respondent renders accounts to the Petitioner with respect to the Supreme Capital Limited and the Supreme Trust Micro Finance.

g)    That each party bears its own costs.

The crux of the Petitioner’s case can be found in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 17 and 18 of the Petition. The Petitioner particularized the unreasonable behavior of the Respondent amongst which were the facts that, the Respondent showed no respect to the Petitioner and had moved out of the matrimonial room and repulsed all attempts at intimacy between the parties amongst other allegations as set out in the petition.

The Respondent entered appearance on 10th May 2018 and subsequently filed an Answer and Cross Petition on 21st May 2018 .The Respondent in her Answer, denied some material particulars contained in the Petition, and also made some specific claims regarding the reasons for the breakdown of the marriage. The Respondent cross petitioned and prayed for the following reliefs;

i.            That the marriage celebrated between the parties be dissolved.

ii.           That Respondent be granted full custody of the children of the marriage on the ground that, the children have overcome the trauma of Petitioner deserting them and doing very well.

iii.           That the children of the marriage are bound together and motivate each other that Respondent would not like them to be separated.

iv.           That Respondent co-owns a Hospital and an Investment Company in which she is training the children to take part in directorship in the near future.

v.           That the children of the marriage will continue with their education with the curriculum they are pursuing now.

vi.           That the Petitioner be ordered to take care of the children of the marriage by paying the school fees of the children and providing for the general upkeep of the children of the marriage.

vii.           That the Petitioner be ordered to compensate the Respondent with an amount of Fifty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢50,000.00) for the upkeep of the Respondent and the Petitioner’s three children from the period he left the matrimonial home.

viii.            That the uncompleted building at Community 25,Tema being the only property acquired by the parties in the course of the marriage be settled in favour of the Respondent.

ix.            That the Petitioner packed away all the building materials the parties bought to complete the building that the Respondent while the Petitioner went away, incurred cost in keeping the property safe.

x.           General damages for desertion.

xi.           Costs including legal fees and

xii.           Any other order (s) as the honorable Court may deem fit.

The Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to the Respondent’s Answer and cross- petition on the 27th of June 2018 and the suit was set down for trial. Counsel for the Respondent informed the Court that, both Counsel and their clients were in talks for a possible settlement of the ancillaries but this fell through. The Parties were then ordered to file their respective witness statements and pretrial check lists. Case management conference was duly held in respect of this matter and thereafter, the matter was fixed for trial.

At the case management conference, the Court set down the following issues to be considered for trial.

Issues

1.     Dissolution of the marriage.

2.     Custody of the Children of the marriage.

3.     Whether or not the Respondent is entitled to Property settlement.

4.     Financial settlement.

5.     Whether the Respondent is entitled to her cross petition.

 

ISSUE 1

Whether or not the marriage has indeed broken down beyond reconciliation warranting its dissolution.

Section 1 (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, (1971) Act 367, provides that, “the sole ground for granting a petition for divorce shall be that, the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation”.

Section 2(1) of the said Act, also stipulates that, “For the purpose of showing that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, the Petitioner shall satisfy the Court of one or more of the following facts.”

a)     That the Respondent has committed adultery and that by reason of the adultery the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the Respondent.

b)    That the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent.

c)     That the Respondent has deserted the Petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.

d)    That the parties to the marriage have not lived as man and wife for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the respondent consents to the grant of a decree of divorce provided that the consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and where the court is satisfied that it has been so withheld the court may grant a petition of divorce under the paragraph despite the refusal.

e)     That the parties to the marriage have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.

f)      That the parties to the marriage have after diligent efforts been unable to reconcile their differences.

Section 2 (2) of Act 367 supra, provides that; “on a petition for divorce the Court shall inquire, so far as is reasonable, into the acts alleged by the Petitioner and the Respondent”.

Section 2 (3) of Act 367 supra, also stipulates that; “although the court finds the existence of one or more of the facts specified in subsection 1, the Court shall not grant a petition for divorce unless it is satisfied, on all the evidence, that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation”.

Burden Of Proof

It is trite knowledge that, he who asserts must prove. In the case of Okudzeto Ablakwa (N0.2) V Attorney General & Obetseibi –Lamptey (N0.2) 2 SCGLR 845, the Supreme Court in dealing with the burden of proof in civil trials, held at page 867 as follows; “He who asserts, assumes the onus of proof. The effect of that principle is the same as what has been codified in the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) Section 17 (a) .

What this rule literally means is that, if a person goes to Court to make an allegation, the onus is on him to lead evidence to prove that allegation, unless the allegation is admitted…… stated more explicitly, a party cannot win a case in Court if the case is based on an allegation which he fails to prove or establish”.

In the case of Ababio V Akwasi [1994-1995] 2 GBR 774, the Court held that; “The general position of the law is that, it is the duty of the Plaintiff to prove what he alleges, in other words, it is the party who raises in his pleadings, an issue essential to the success of his case, who assumes the burden of proving it”.

This has been given effect to by relevant Sections of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323).

 

Section 10 (1) provides; “For the purposes of this Act, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or Court”.

Section 11(1) of the Evidence Act NRCD 323 provides that the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling on the issue against that party.

It is also trite learning that, evidence is what the Court uses in resolving the issues of facts arising from a case and a pleading of averment in proof of which no evidence is offered, virtually serves no useful purpose in a case.

In this case, it is the Petitioner who has filed the petition for the dissolution of the marriage and has asserted that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation and so wants out of the marriage. The onus is therefore on him to prove the breakdown of the marriage. The Respondent has also in her cross petition asked that the marriage be dissolved. An equal onus is also placed on her to prove the breakdown of the marriage.

Per the law, the Petitioner is to adduce evidence on the preponderance of probabilities to demonstrate to the Court that the marriage has indeed broken down as claimed by him in his Petition due to the Respondent’s unreasonable behaviour amongst his many other claims.

Giving his evidence at the trial, the Petitioner testified on oath and relied on his Witness Statement filed on 14th August 2019 and his Exhibit A.

The Petitioner testified amongst others that, the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation and wants it dissolved because the parties have been separated for about 4 years 6 months as at the time the petition for divorce was filed in 2019, and have not had any form of intimacy since January 2015.

The Petitioner testified that, the Respondent had no respect for him and his family, used insulting and abusive language as well as unpalatable and unprintable words on him anytime there was a disagreement between them, and repulsed all efforts at intimacy and had moved out of the matrimonial room to another room.

The Petitioner further testified that, the Respondent abandoned him one time throughout the night when he fell ill and left him unattended, till his brother came to attend to him. Again, the Respondent has told him to leave the matrimonial home since the Respondent and the children had no use for him. Apart from these, the Petitioner testified that the Respondent mocked and said cruel and very hurtful things to the Petitioner as well as always raining curses on him. He testified that all these and many more contributed in making him leave the matrimonial home as the Respondent’s outbursts, behaviour and attitude grew from bad to worse.

The Petitioner has said that, the Respondent has behaved in such a way that, he cannot be reasonably expected to continue living with the Respondent and has given his reasons.

Section 2 (1) (b) of Act 367 supra deals with the second fact of unreasonable behaviour which may be used to prove that a marriage has broken down. Section 2 (1(b)makes it clear that, a Petitioner must first establish unreasonable conduct on the Respondent’s part and secondly also show that as a result of the bad conduct of the Respondent, the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent any longer.

Unreasonable behaviour has been defined by English law as, “conduct that gives rise to injury, to life, limb, or health, or conduct that gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger.”

See Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644.

In establishing that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation on facts of unreasonable conduct or behaviour of the Respondent, the Petitioner must establish that the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with him. The test to be applied is whether the Respondent’s behaviour has been such that the Petitioner can no longer be reasonably expected to live with him, as her conduct has given rise to injury to his health, life, limb or reasonable apprehension of such danger.

In Knudsen vs Knudsen [1976] 1 GLR 204 the Court held that;

 

“The behaviour of a party which will lead to this conclusion would range over a wide variety of acts. It may consist of one act, if it is of sufficient gravity, or of a persistent course of conduct or of a series of acts of differing kinds, none of which by itself may justify a conclusion that the person seeking the divorce cannot reasonably be expected to live with the spouse, but the cumulative effect of all taken together would do so”.

See also the case of Mensah v Mensah [1972] 2 GLR @ page 198, where the Court held that; “in determining whether a husband has behaved in such a way as to make it unreasonable to expect a wife to live with him, the Court must consider all circumstances constituting such behaviour including the history of the marriage. It is always a question of fact. The conduct complained of must be grave and weighty and mere trivialities will not suffice, for Act 367 is not a Casanova’s charter, the test is objective”.

Thus, the behaviour or conduct complained of must be such as to cause danger to life, limb, bodily or mental health or as to give a reasonable apprehension of such danger. It needs not specifically be one grievous conduct. However, where a chain of different conduct is put together and the result is the infliction of pain or cruelty on the part of the other that will suffice as unreasonable behaviour.

The Petitioner per his evidence has told the Court what he went through in the marriage and the series of events, such as the verbal abuses, lack of intimacy, the Respondent moving out of the matrimonial home and also the Respondent neglecting him when he fell ill one day, till his brother came to his rescue. All these points to the fact that, the Respondent’s behaviour is not one that the Petitioner can be expected to reasonably continue living with the Respondent, necessitating him moving out of the marriage to save his sanity, because it is the view of this Court that, if the marriage was one healthy one, the Petitioner would not leave the matrimonial home on facts which the Court will consider as ordinary wear and tear of a marriage and the Petitioner could have stayed.

It is the view of the Court that, these facts are weighty within the test defined in the above- cited cases, such that they cannot be described as ordinary wear and tear of a normal married life. From the evidence adduced out of these facts to establish the unreasonable behaviour of the Respondent, the Court is satisfied that these facts asserted by the Petitioner will amount to unreasonable behaviour such that the Petitioner cannot reasonably continue to live with the Respondent.

The Respondent also cross petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage and so per the law, the onus is also on her to lead evidence as to why the marriage had broken down meriting its dissolution. The Respondent, testified via her witness statement which she relied on as her evidence in chief. She testified on oath and admitted that, the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and therefore prayed the Court to dissolve same and cancel the marriage certificate. With this admission by the Respondent confirming what the Petitioner has said, it is the view of the Court that, there will not be the need to call for further evidence from the Respondent to satisfy the Court that, the marriage has broken down and should be dissolved.

See the case of Kwadwo Dankwa, Francis Adom, Kwaku Addae, Yaw Boateng & 249 ors V Anglogold Ashanti Ltd [2019]DLSC 5684 at page 7 per Akoto Bamfo JSC. “The general position of the law is that, where a party makes an admission of a certain state of facts, the defendant is relieved from his/her duty to prove evidence on the admitted facts. In the face of the admission made by the Plaintiff it would be a waste of the Court’s time to insist that the defendant files a statement of defence”.

From the evidence placed before this Court, it is noted that, the parties are ad idem that, the marriage has broken down as they have not lived together for a period of about 6 years prior to the presentation of the petition in 2019 and afterwards till 2023 and according to the Petitioner, the parties have not had any sexual intercourse all these period. In the opinion of this Court, the fact that the parties who are a married couple have not lived together for about 8 years proves that, they have not had any intimacy during that period. The Court is accordingly satisfied that, the parties having lived apart all these years is enough justification for the dissolution of the marriage as from the evidence, it does not look like they are ready to patch things up to continue with the marriage.

Per Section 2 (1) (b) and (e) of Act 367 supra, two of the facts that the Petitioner must prove to show that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation is the unreasonable behaviour of the Respondent, and the fact also that the parties to the marriage have not lived as man and wife for a continuous period of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of this petition.

This Court finds as a fact that, the parties have not lived together for at least 8 years now since the Petitioner moved out of the matrimonial home in 2015. This brings them under the condition stipulated in Section 2 (e) of Act 367.From the evidence adduced, this Court makes a finding that, the marriage between the parties has been plagued with many problems rendering the marriage irreconcilable. This is enough proof to satisfy the Court that, the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down beyond reconciliation under Section 2(1) (b), (e) and (f) of the Matrimonial Causes Act supra.

Accordingly, on the totality of the evidence adduced by this Court, I am satisfied that the marriage celebrated between the parties has indeed broken down beyond reconciliation warranting its dissolution. The Court will therefore be justified to dissolve the marriage on the basis of this fact.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, I decree that the marriage celebrated between the parties at the Mamprobi Circuit of the EP Church, Ghana on the 11th of April, 2006 with Certificate Number EPC/B1/008/06 per licence number EPC/MAM/08/06 BE AND IS HEREBY DISSOLVED forthwith and the said marriage Certificate is cancelled.

A copy of the divorce Certificate should be served on the Registrar of marriages at the place where the marriage took place by the parties for the amendment of the records thereof.

Having dissolved the marriage, I shall now turn my attention to the other issues pertaining to custody of the children, financial and property settlement as stated above.

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that, at the case management conference the Petitioner indicated that, he was abandoning his reliefs E and F. As such, reliefs E and F will not be considered in this judgment. They remain abandoned.

On the issue of custody, the Petitioner has asked that, the parties be granted joint custody of the infant children of the marriage and the Respondent in her cross – petition, is also asking that, she be granted full custody of the children.

Section 22 of Act 367 supra provides that, “in proceedings under this Act, the Court shall inquire whether there are any children of the household and the Court either on its own initiative or on an application by a party, make an order concerning a child of the household which it thinks reasonable and for the benefit of the child. And the order may include the award of custody of the child to any person.

Generally, the rule is that, children of tender ages ought to be looked after by their mothers, unless there are circumstances pointing to the contrary. The children involved in this suit, are aged about 15, 13 and 9. Two of the children are in their teenage years now and the other is still in the nascent stages of life, it must be noted that, at these various stages of their young lives, whatever decisions are taken in respect of them, should have their best interests and welfare in mind.

In an application for custody, the paramount consideration of the Court is the best interest and welfare of the child. In awarding custody, the Court would do so in the best interest and welfare of the children. See the cases of Attu V Attu [1984-86] GLRD @144, and Opoku –Owusu V Opoku Owusu [1973] 2 GLR @349.

Per the evidence before this Court, the children were previously living with both parents till the Petitioner left the matrimonial home after which the children continued living with the Respondent and have continued doing so till date, and so the Respondent is the one living with the issues of the marriage.

In the respectful view of the Court, to ensure continuity and stability in the children’s care and their education, it would be in the best interest of the children, to grant custody to the Respondent whom the children have lived with all this while. I have no hesitation in granting custody of the children to the Respondent with reasonable access to the Petitioner.

In her written address, Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that, although the Petitioner had requested joint custody, it would be prudent for custody of all the children to be given to the Respondent and the Petitioner to be given reasonable access, as doing this, will be in accord with the best interest and welfare principle considering the ages and sex of the children.

See Opoku Owusu V Opoku Owusu supra.

As said earlier, The Respondent has been living with the children since the Petitioner moved out of the matrimonial home and so the children will be used to being with her and would have bonded with her all these years that they have been with her, but that does not mean also that the Petitioner should be left out of the picture in their upbringing.

In this wise, the Petitioner is granted reasonable access to the 3 children so that he will have the opportunity to bond also with the children as a father and children ought to bond, especially in their formative years by virtue of the fact that, the Petitioner has not been involved much in their lives.The children are to continue living with the Respondent during the school term and the Petitioner should have access to them during the weekends when they get to spend time with the Petitioner. They will spend part of their school holidays with the Petitioner, and during National holidays the children will spend part of the national holidays with the Respondent and part with the Petitioner.

Access to the children means that, the Petitioner shall have access to the children through virtual means as well, such as telephone and video calls every day between the times that the children are home from school and at weekends when they are not with the Petitioner, in the evenings for a period of about 30 minutes every day between the hours of 5pm – 7 pm. The Respondent having custody of the children does not mean that the Petitioner cannot be involved in the children’s lives. It is hereby ordered that the Petitioner should be directly involved in decisions to be made in respect of the children’s upbringing and education.

I shall now turn my attention to the issue of property settlement.

From the evidence adduced at the trial, the parties have both said that they acquired an uncompleted house at Community 25 and plots of land at Ho in the Volta Region. Whereas, the Petitioner is asking that the property be sold, the Respondent is asking that, the house should be settled on her.

In determining this issue of property settlement, I shall refer to what the law says on property settlement upon the dissolution of a marriage under Articles 22(2) & (3) and 33(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the provisions of Section 20 (1) of Act 367 supra.

Articles 22 (2) & (3) and 33(5) of the 1992 Constitution supra, states that;

22(2) states; “Parliament shall as soon as practicable, after the coming into force of the Constitution enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses.

(3) “with a view to achieving the full realization of the rights referred to in clause 2) of this article-

Spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage;

(b)  Assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage”.

Section 20 (1) of Act 367 supra states: 

“The Court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party a sum of money or convey to the other party movable or immovable property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provision that the Court thinks just and equitable”.

From a combined reading of these provisions of the law, it is deducible that, any property or properties acquired during the subsistence of the marriage upon divorce should be shared between them equitably.

The Court may also order in the settlement of property rights of spouses, the conveyance of a property or the payment of a sum of money or, both, to a spouse irrespective of how and or when acquired and the property may be conveyed to a spouse in lieu of money and if the Court is satisfied, that a party holds title to the movable or immovable property, shall order transfer or conveyance of the interest to the party entitled to it.

Therefore, in a divorce, a Court in exercising its jurisdiction in property settlement derived from the 1992 Constitution and Statute, may make orders if satisfied that, either party to the marriage holds title to movable or immovable property to convey any property to the other spouse as property settlement, and this will be ordered to be shared by the equity of the case till the contrary is proven.

Interestingly, the parties in this instant case, though have said that they acquired properties in the course of the marriage, did not provide any form of evidence on how and when the properties under discussion were acquired, whether they were jointly acquired during the pendency of the marriage and whether by the two of them. All the parties did was to repeat their averments that they acquired properties without any documents to support their claims that, they jointly acquired the properties both in Accra and Ho.

Without any evidence provided the Court by the parties, I am unable to determine whether the properties they speak of, were jointly acquired by them during the subsistence of the marriage, to merit an equitable distribution. I would go under the presumptive ownership principle which says that, any property acquired during the subsistence of the marriage is presumed to have been jointly acquired by the parties and upon divorce, should be shared between them on the equality is equity principle.

In that regard, based on the presumptive principle I shall hold that, the parties are presumed to have acquired the properties jointly and in what the Court thinks is just and equitable, I hold that, both parties are entitled to 50% share in the property at Community 25, Tema and a 50% share in the plots of land in Ho based on the assumption that the properties were jointly acquired by them in the absence of prove to the contrary.

The Respondent in her reliefs is asking that the Petitioner be ordered to take care of the children by paying their school fees and providing for the general upkeep of the children. From the pleadings, the Petitioner said that he is a Public Officer and the Respondent is an Entrepreneur. From the evidence, the Respondent took the sole decision of taking the children to their present schools without much input from the Petitioner.

As such, it will be unfair to order the Petitioner to bear all the cost of the education of the 3 children and as well provide for their general upkeep.

The Court is of the respectful view that, the Petitioner was not informed about the schools the Respondent was taking the children to, for his consent and for that mutual understanding between them, in respect of the school fees to be paid. Not having been made aware of the type of schools the children attend, and its commensurate school fees, it would be unfair to order that, the Petitioner be asked to foot the whole school fees of the Children, when he had no input in the choice of schools for them.

However, being a parent and a father at that, with the responsibility of looking after his children, the Petitioner is to be involved in maintaining the children as well as educating and providing them with the necessaries of life. To this end, the father shall pay 70% of the school fees and the Respondent shall also top up with the other 30%. Both parents will be responsible for the maintenance of the children by providing them with the necessaries of life, as maintaining the children is a shared responsibility of both parents.

Relief ix of the Respondent’s cross petition is not decipherable and so the Court cannot make any order in respect of the relief. Since the Respondent just stated something but did not make any particular prayer, Relief (Ix) is accordingly dismissed.

In respect of the Respondent’s relief “X” of asking that she should be awarded general damages for desertion on the part of the Petitioner, no evidence was led by the Respondent to satisfy the Court that the desertion by the Petitioner was wilful or not. This relief, damages for desertion being sought by the Respondent is not grounded in law. Same is therefore dismissed.

FINAL ORDERS 

All matters considered and for the reasons given above, I order as follows,

1.     That the ordinance marriage celebrated between the parties on 7th February 2016 at the Mamprobi Circuit of the E.P Church, Ghana on the 11th of February 2006 is dissolved.

2.     The Respondent is granted custody of all the three children with reasonable access to the Petitioner as stated above.

3.     The Petitioner shall be responsible for paying 70% of the children’s school fees and the Respondent shall also be responsible for the other 30%.

4.     Both parties shall be responsible for maintaining the children and shall be responsible for providing them with the necessaries of life as mentioned above.

5.     The parties are entitled to 50% share in the property at Tema and 50% share of the plots of land in Ho.

6.     Any other reliefs not granted are dismissed.

I shall make no order as to Cost. The parties are to bear their own cost in this matter.

 

 

(SGD)

…………………………………………….

MAVIS AKUA ANDOH (MRS)

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

DIVORCE & MATRIMONIAL COURT “2” ACCRA.

COUNSEL:

AKU SHIKA DADZIE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER PRESENT.

ANDY EFFAH HOLDS SENANU ASHIAGBOR’S BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT.

AUTHORITIES:

1.      SECTION 1 (2) OF THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, (1971) ACT 367

2.      SECTION 2 (2) OF THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, (1971)ACT 367

3.      SECTION 2 (3) OF THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, (1971) ACT 367

4.      OKUDZETO ABLAKWA (N0.2) V ATTORNEY GENERAL & OBETSEIBI – LAMPTEY (N0.2) 2 SCGLR 845

5.      ABABIO V AKWASI [1994-1995] 2 GBR 774

6.      SECTIONS 10(1), 11(1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 1975 (NRCD 323)

7.        GOLLINS V GOLLINS [1964] AC 644

8.      KNUDSEN VS KNUDSEN [1976] 1 GLR 204

9.      MENSAH V MENSAH [1972] 2 GLR @ PAGE 198

10.  KWADWO DANKWA, FRANCIS ADOM, KWAKU ADDAE, YAW BOATENG &

249 ORS V ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD [2019]DLSC 5684 AT PAGE 7

11.  ATTU V ATTU [1984-86] GLRD @144, AND OPOKU –OWUSU V OPOKU OWUSU [1973] 2 GLR @349

12.  ATTU V ATTU [1984-86] GLRD @144, AND OPOKU –OWUSU V OPOKU OWUSU [1973] 2 GLR @349