EVANS CUDJOE & 70 OTHERS V. GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY

OWUSU, J.

By a further amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 22nd January, 2016, the Plaintiffs are claiming the following:  

a. A declaration that the Communiqué on the conclusion and signing of 1st Collective  Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on the GRA/PSWI-TUC Standing Joint Negotiating  Committee at a meeting held on Thursday 22nd December 2011 which unilaterally,  unlawfully and illegally amended or varied the 1st January 2011 agreement is null, void  and of no legal effect whatsoever. 

b. A declaration that the Defendant is estopped from reneging on the express terms and  conditions of the 1st January 2011 agreement. 

c. An order directed at the GRA to pay all end of service/retirement benefits due the  Plaintiffs by virtue of the 1st January 2011 agreement forthwith. 

d. An order directed at Defendant to pay to the Plaintiffs the difference in the long service 

award based on Article 44 of the 2011 CBA. 

e. Payment of interest on Plaintiffs retirement benefits and the difference in the long  service award based on Article 44 of the 2011 CBA. 

f. General damages. 

g. Cost of the suit on full indemnity basis. 

h. Any other order that this honourable court may deem fit. 

THE CASE OF THE PLAINTIFFS 

The Plaintiffs set out their case in their Statement of Claim, Reply and Evidence in Chief contained  in the Witness Statements of the 1st and the 14th Plaintiffs. Their case is that by Exhibit A or Exhibit  1, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) dated 1st January 2011 and executed between the  Defendant and the Public Service Workers’ Union (PSWU) of Trade Union Congress (TUC), 

parties contracted that staff of the Defendant are entitled to be paid a retirement benefit of two  weeks’ salary for every year served. According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendant by a circular to all  staff dated 26th January, 2012 stated that its Standing Joint Negotiation Committee has signed a  new CBA for the Defendant and the effective date for payment of the Financial Benefits under the  January 2011 CBA is given as January, 2012. 

The Plaintiffs claimed that this violated Article 3 of the 1st January 2011 agreement which stated  that the agreement shall remain in force without any amendment or alteration for not less than two  years from the date. 

It is their case that they have not been paid their retirement benefits since they retired from the  employment of the Defendant in 2011. 

It is their case further that in terms of their long service award and by the application of the 2011  agreement, Plaintiffs should have been paid the new rates instead of using the old 2007-2008 CBA  and pray for the difference in their long service award. 

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 

The Defendant sets out its case by an amended Statement of Defence and the amended Witness  Statement of its representative filed on the 29th of January, 2016 and the Witness Statement of its witness filed on 8th December, 2015. 

The case of the Defendant is that the Plaintiffs did not exhaust the grievance procedure/mechanism  captured in Article 18 of the 2011/2012 CBA under which the Plaintiffs are claiming.  The Defendant claimed that both parties during negotiations agreed to the signing of the 2011  CBA to have the financial benefits in the said CBA take effect from January, 2012 and the  communiqué, Exhibit C or Exhibit 2 captured specific agreements on the payment of financial  benefits under the 2011 CBA. The Defendant thus refers to the 2011 CBA as the 2011/2012 CBA. They claimed further that the 2011 CBA was actually concluded and signed by both parties in  December, 2011 with the notional effective date of the CBA back-dated to January, 2011. According to the Defendant, the communiqué, Exhibit C, relating to the 2011 CBA signed and  issued by parties was and is standard industry and union practice between them that subsequent  to the signing of their CBA’s, a memorandum or communiqué is issued announcing the birth of  the new CBA and the effective implementation dates including the payment of benefits.  Defendant maintained that both parties who signed the CBA and the communiqué were at all times  clothed with the authority to do so as such the agreements in the communiqué were binding on  the workers and management of the Defendant. 

They maintained further that per Article 51, some of the Plaintiffs could not claim under the  2011/2012 CBA because some retired above the rank of Principal Revenue Officers (PRO). 

ISSUES FOR TRIAL 

The following issues were set down for trial: 

a. Whether or not the communiqué signed by Messers Blankson and Amparbeng and dated  22nd December 2011 overrides the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed on  22nd December 2011. 

b. Whether or not Defendant’s defence on notional and effective dates is tenable. c. Whether or not the communiqué s signed by Messers Blankson and Amparbeng and  dated 22nd December 2011 is binding on the Plaintiffs. 

d. Whether or not the Plaintiffs, upon retiring from the GRA, by virtue of CBA dated  22nd December 2011, are entitled to End of Service Benefit and Long Service Awards.

e. Whether or not Plaintiffs have been paid Long Service Awards upon their respective  Retirements from the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). 

f. Whether or not all the Plaintiffs are clothed with the capacity to claim under the 2011  CBA. 

g. Whether or not the 2011 CBA is consistent with the communiqué (and the agreement  contained therein) signed between the workers and GRA dated 22nd December 2011. h. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings. 

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

It is trite that the legal burden of proof will generally lie on a party asserting the affirmative of an  issue. It is a basic principle in the law of evidence per section 10(1) of the Evidence Act 1975  (NRCD 323) that the burden of providing evidence as well as the burden of persuasion on proving  all facts essential to any claim lies on whoever is making the claim. Indeed, from the earlier  authorities such as MAJOLAGBE v. LARBI AND OTHERS [1959] GLR @ page 192 and ZABRAMA v. SEGBEDZI [1991] 2 GLR @ page 221 to recent authorities such as ABBEY V. ANTWI [2010] SCGLR 17 @ 19 (holding 2) and ACKAH v. PERGAH TRANSPORT [2010]  SCGLR 728 @ page 730 this standard of proof was applied. 

In a trial therefore, this legal burden may not be fixed but may shift from party to party at various  stages of the trial depending on the issues asserted and or denied. I refer to the case of In Re  Ashalley Botwe Lands; Adjetey Agbosu and Others v. Kotey and Others [2003-2004] SCGLR  420 @ page 444. 

The standard of proof required to discharge the burden of persuasion is one of ‘preponderance of  the probabilities’ by virtue of section 12(1) of NRCD 323 and ‘preponderance of the probabilities’,  according to section 12(2) of NRCD 323 means: 

“…. that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court by which  it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence.” 

Again, by section 11(4) of NRCD 323, the burden of producing evidence is discharged when a party produces “… sufficient evidence which on the totality of the evidence, leads a reasonable  mind to conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.”  

I shall propose to address issues (a) and (g) together. 

a. Whether or not the communiqué signed by Messers Blankson and Amparbeng and dated  22nd December 2011 overrides the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed on  22nd December 2011. 

g. Whether or not the 2011 CBA is consistent with the communiqué (and the agreement  contained therein) signed between the workers and GRA dated 22nd December 2011.

Exhibit C was signed by the Commissioner-General of the Defendant and the General Secretary  of the PSWU of TUC on the 22nd of December 2012. EXHIBIT C provides: “COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CONCLUSION AND SIGNING OF 1ST COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) AGREED ON AT THE GRA/PSWU-TUC STANDING  JOINT NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY, 2 2ND DECEMBER,  2011. 

The Standing Joint Negotiating Committee of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) and the Public  Services Workers’ Union/GTUC successfully concluded and signed a new CBA between  Management and PSWU of TUC at a meeting held on Thursday, 22nd December, 2011. In line with the above, the following specific agreements were reached with respect to effective date of the agreement: 

a. A NOTIONAL effective date of January 1, 2011 when this CBA was supposed to have  succeeded the CBA’s of the erstwhile Revenue Agencies which expired on 31st December, 2010. This is deemed proper to ensure legal continuity of the CBA process  and its two-year renewal cycle. It is also to legalize all non-financial transactions which  have been carried out since January 1, 2011; and 

b. A FINANCIAL effective date of JANUARY 1, 2012 when the actual commitment to  paying all financial implications of the CBA, including in particular, the payment of  End of Service Benefits, will be deemed to have come into force.

The Standing Joint Negotiating Committee expresses its continued appreciation to staff  for their immense cooperation during the negotiation process” 

The PSWU of TUC is the umbrella body representing employees in this sector and these  employees included the Plaintiffs who were members at the time of the signing of the  communiqué, Exhibit C. This union is authorized and licensed to bargain with employers on all  issues of labour concerning their members. In effect, the PSWU of TUC holds the Bargaining  Certificate for its members. At all material times the said union represented the employees of the  Defendant and had their mandate to enter into and conclude negotiation on their behalf.  

The Plaintiffs have not denied that these agreements were duly concluded and executed by their  representatives. At page 3 of the record of proceedings for the 11th day of February, 2016 and at  page 3 of the record of proceedings for 16th February, 2016, both the 1st and 14th Plaintiffs admitted  that Mr. Richard Amparbeng had the mandate to sign on behalf of the employees. 

It is settled law that a person of full age and understanding would normally be bound by his  signature. Where a person signs a document which apparent on the face of it is intended to have  legal consequences he is bound by his signature. I refer to the cases of YAW OPPONG V. CHARLES ANARFI [2011] 32 GMJ 118 @ 127 and GALLIE v. LEE [1969]2CH. 17.  

Although Exhibit C was signed by only the representatives of the workers and management of the  Defendant, the absence of signatory witnesses in Exhibit C unlike Exhibit A or Exhibit 1, the 2011 CBA itself should not in any way invalidate the agreement so signed between the workers and  management 

The Court may thus be right in holding that the communiqué binds the parties including the  Plaintiffs. 

However, prior to the signing of Exhibit C, Exhibit A, with effective date 1st January 2011 was  executed between the Defendant and the PSWU of TUC representing the employees in December,  2011.  

Article 3 of Exhibit A provides: 

“ARTICLE 3- DURATION

The Agreement shall come into force and operate from 1st January, 2011 and shall remain in force without any amendment or alteration for not less than two (2) years from that date except under  the following conditions: - 

(a) At any time after two (2) years, either party to this agreement may give one (1) month’s  notice in writing expressing its wish for this agreement to continue for further period  to be agreed between the parties and its intention to terminate the agreement. 

(b) A notice of not less than 60 days, before this agreement is due to expire may be given  by either party in writing expressing its wish for this agreement to continue for a further  period of not more than ninety (90) days or its intention to terminate, amend or modify  the Agreement. 

(c) In the absence of such notice within the specified period the Agreement shall continue  in force from year to year unless notice is given as above within two (2) months of such  yearly expiration date….” 

Despite the fact that Article 3 of Exhibit A stipulates that the agreement shall come into force and  operate from 1st January, 2011 and shall remain in force without any amendment or alteration for  not less than two (2) years from that date, the General Secretary of the employees union and  management of the Defendant went ahead and signed Exhibit C which they claim is the conclusion  and signing of the 2011 CBA, which communiqué informed all staff that January 1st 2011 is the  notional effective date whereas January 1st, 2012 is the effective date for payment of the financial  benefits. This communique altered the payment of financial benefits which should have taken  effect from 1st January, 2011 as per Article 3 to 1st January, 2012. 

Defendant visisted that per Article 3(d) and 3(e) of Exhibit A, the CBA can be altered and allows  for both parties to agree on effective date for the commencement of the 2011 CBA and based on  this, 1st January, 2011, the notional effective date of the 2011 CBA fixed an agreed financial  effective date of January 1st, 2012. 

Article 3(d) and (e) provides: 

“(d) In the event that both parties will enter into negotiation on the Terms and Conditions  of a new agreement, the present Agreement will continue in force until a new  agreement is signed and the effective date of its commencement agreed upon, but in no case shall negotiations extend beyond 90 days after the anniversary date, except  a date of extension had been mutually consented to by both sides. 

(e) Wage Opener Clause: 

At any time after one (1) year from the date of the commencement of this Agreement,  and once only during the life of this Agreement, either party may give to the other  notice that it wishes to negotiate a change in the rate of basic wages or other matters  affecting conditions of service as contained in this agreement, but until new rates  are agreed upon, the rate specified in the Appendix to this agreement shall remain  in-force”. 

Firstly, Article 3(d) relates to a new CBA. Exhibit C, the communiqué, is not a new CBA as  according to the Defendant, it is supposed to be a conclusion to the signing of Exhibit A. Again, Article 3(e) requires either party to give to the other notice that it wishes to negotiate a  change. There is no evidence of such notice.  

Also the change shall be in respect of negotiating a change in the rate of basic wages or other  matters affecting conditions of service. This is not the situation here. 

Parties to an agreement are bound by the contents and effects of agreements. It is trite law that  where parties have entered into a contract or an agreement and same has been reduced into writing  it is from that document that the Court must ascertain the intention of the parties and to construe  the contract in terms of the document.  

In the case of ABOAGYE v. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED [2001-2002]  SCGLR 797 and KOBI AND OTHERS v. GHANA MANGANESE COMPANY LIMITED  [2007-2008] SCGLR 771 @ 772, it was emphasized that procedures outlined in contracts of  employment, such as the CBA must be followed and applied fully. 

Until a new collective agreement is negotiated by the Standing Negotiating Committee, the rights  conferred by previous collective agreements are rights which cannot be waived. Indeed, it stands  to reason that terms of an agreement may be varied at any time however, where the agreement  expressly provides for no such variations, the Courts have to respect same. At page 14 of his  written address to the Court, counsel for the Defendant submitted that Exhibit C was the final  expression of the intention and agreement of both the workers and management of the Defendant as far as the payment/actualization of the Financial Provisions of Exhibit A was concerned but did  Exhibit A make any express provision for such a communique? No. The terms of the agreement  are clearly spelt out and there is an express provision to the effect that it shall remain in force  without any amendment or alteration for not less than two (2) years from that date of the agreement  which is 1st January 2011.  

Employment relationship is a contract and it is the Court’s duty to respect the sanctity of such  contracts. The Courts will defer to such agreements in the determination of a dispute between the  employer and the employee.  

In OPARE YEBOAH and 8 OTHERS v. BARCLAYS BANK GHANA LTD. SUIT NO.  J4/9/2010 delivered on 26th May, 2010, her ladyship the Chief Justice stated that ABOAGYE V. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK LTD (supra) and more recent authorities of LAGUDA V. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [2005-2006] SCGLR @ 388 and KOBI AND OTHERS V. GHANA MANGANESE COMPANY LIMITED (supra), affirm the time honored proposition  that procedures outlined in contracts of employment, such as the Collective Bargaining Agreement  must be followed. 

Section 105 of the Labour Act 2003, (Act 651), particularly subsection (2) provides: “The provisions of a collective agreement concerning the terms of employment and termination  of employment, and personal obligations imposed on, and rights granted to, a worker or  employer shall be regarded as terms of a contract of employment between each worker to whom  the provisions apply and his or her employer” 

In so far as Exhibit C altered Exhibit A, Exhibit A is not consistent with the communiqué (and the  agreement contained therein) signed between the workers and GRA dated 22nd December 2011, Exhibit C is null and void as it violates the speaking conditions of Article 3 and the excuse of the  Defendant that it is standard industry and union practice between parties that subsequent to the  signing of their CBA’s, a memorandum or communiqué is issued announcing the birth of the new  CBA and the effective implementation dates including the payment of benefits cannot hold.  The Court finds so as a fact. 

b. Whether or not Defendant’s defence on notional and effective dates is tenable. 

According to the Defendant, it is the practice of the parties to use notional effective dates and  having different notional and financial effective dates for the operationalization of Defendant’s  CBA’s. 

Some agreements clearly state their effective date and other’s do not. If an agreement does not  specify its effective date it goes into effect on the date it is signed. If the agreement on the other  hand specifies its effective date, then the contract or agreement is valid from the effective date. In Exhibit 2, the phrase ‘notional effective date’ is used to apply to the 1st January, 2011 effective  date in Exhibit A. 

Nowhere in Exhibit A have the parties made reference to the phrase ‘notional effective date’ and  this was admitted by the Defendant’s representative under cross examination at pages 2 and 3 of  the record of proceedings for the 10th of March, 2016. These were his answers to questions asked: 

Q. Now take a look at exhibit 1 by Article 3, exhibit 1 came into force and operates from  1st January 2011. Is that correct? 

A. That is correct, my lord 

Q. And exhibit 1 remains in force without any amendment or alteration for not less than 2  years but with exceptions. Is that correct? 

A. Yes that is correct 

Q. Now nowhere in exhibit 1 has the parties made reference to the phrase “notional effective  date”. Is that correct? 

A. That is correct 

Q. Now in fact, the phrase “notional effective date” does not appear in any of the Collective  Bargaining Agreements from 2011 till today. Is that correct? 

A. That is correct my lord 

Q. So you see your use of the phrase “notional effective date” in exhibit 2 to apply to exhibit  1 was an afterthought. I put it to you 

A. My lord, that is incorrect. This was standard practice and is still a standard practice where  the parties agree on effective dates for the financial benefits. This practice goes back to  2007. 

Q. Now look at exhibit 6 and exhibit 7 and you will see that no mention was made of “notional  effective date” 

A. My lord, if I can refer you to article 3 of exhibit 6 (witness reads). That is the notional  effective date of the agreement. Exhibit 7 talks about the effective date of the revised benefit  which is 1st August 2007.” 

Again this was admitted by the Defendant’s witness at page 4 of the record of proceedings for 16th March, 2016. 

In his address to the Court, counsel for the Defendant referred to Section 177 of NRCD 323 and  submitted that agreements may be explained or supplemented by a course of dealing or usage of  trade or by course of performance and the trend as per Exhibits 2, 3,5 and 6 show that there has  always been a different date for the payment of the revised financial benefits under a new CBA.  That this is the basis of the distinction between the Notional and Financial Effective dates. In view  of the fact that Exhibit A makes no mention of notional effective date and in view of my earlier  findings of fact, the Defendant’s defence on notional and effective dates is not tenable. 

c. Whether or not the communiqué s signed by Messers Blankson and Amparbeng and  dated 22nd December 2011 is binding on the Plaintiffs. 

The Court has found as a fact that Exhibit C is null and void. Exhibit C is thus not binding on the  Plaintiffs. 

I shall next proceed to discuss issues (d) and (e) together. 

d. Whether or not the Plaintiffs, upon retiring from the GRA, by virtue of CBA dated  22nd December 2011, are entitled to End of Service Benefit and Long Service Awards. e. Whether or not Plaintiffs have been paid Long Service Awards upon their respective  Retirements from the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA).

Article 41 (e) of Exhibit 1 provides that a staff who retires from the Authority shall be paid a  retirement benefit of two (2) weeks salary for every year served and this benefit shall be extended  to serving staff who die before their retirement date or who are retired on medical grounds.  The Defendant shall set up a Retirement Fund into which monies shall be paid for the purposes of  payment of the benefits. 

Again under Article 44 of Exhibit 1, an employee who has continuously worked with the  Defendant for ten (10) years and above shall be awarded depending on the number of years the  employee has worked with the Defendant and the award shall be paid to beneficiaries once in their  employment life with the Defendant.

According to the Plaintiffs they are entitled to end- of service benefits by virtue of the fact that  Exhibit 1, the CBA which came into force from 1st January, 2011 covers them because they retired  in the year 2011. They claimed they have not been paid their end- of service benefits under the  2011 CBA. Again they claimed they have not been paid the difference in the long service award. 

Defendant on the other hand maintained that the 2011/2012 CBA does not cover the Plaintiffs.  According to them, Exhibit C, which was agreed on by both parties gave the effective date of payment of financial benefits as January 2012. Based on this therefore, the Plaintiffs who retired  in 2011 would claim their financial benefits under Article 44 of Exhibit 6, which is the pre-GRA  CBA’s or the CBA in place before the coming into force of Exhibit A. This they claim is because  Article 3(iv) of Exhibit 6, provides amongst others as follows: 

“In the event that both parties will enter into negotiation on the Terms and Conditions of new  Agreement, the present Agreement will continue in force until a new Agreement is signed and the  effective date of its commencement agreed upon, but in no case shall negotiations extend beyond  ninety (90) days after the anniversary date, except a date of extension had been mutually  consented to by both sides.” 

The Defendant insisted that to this extent, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to end-of-service benefits  or long service awards. According to them, as per Exhibit P series, one Emmanuel Adjatey was  however mistakenly paid under Exhibit A even though he retired in year 2011 In paragraphs 22 to 26 of the Plaintiffs amended Statement of Claim they admitted that they have  been paid their long service award but were paid using Exhibit 6, the 2007 CBA instead of the 2011 CBA and that by the application of the new rates as envisaged under the 2011 CBA, they are  entitled to be paid their difference in their long service award. The Defendant does not deny that  Plaintiffs were paid using Exhibit 6. 

The Court has made findings of fact that since the Plaintiffs retired in 2011, they can claim under  the provisions in Exhibit A. Upon retiring from the GRA in 2001 and by virtue of Exhibit A, the  Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid their end- of- service benefit in line with Exhibit A and the  difference in the long service award. 

e. Whether or not all the Plaintiffs are clothed with the capacity to claim under the 2011  CBA. 

That Defendant made reference to Article 52 of Exhibit A which should have been Article 51 and  argued that Plaintiffs number 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,  23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 who all retired above the rank of Principal Revenue Officers (PRO) cannot claim under Exhibit A. 

The said Article 51 provides: 

“ARTICLE 51-COVERAGE 

The Articles contained in this Collective Bargaining Agreement shall cover employees of PRO  and below of the Authority” 

The CBA specifically excludes employees above this rank. 

Plaintiffs who retired above the rank of PRO cannot claim under Exhibit A, by virtue of Article  51. I find as a fact. 

I would like to briefly touch on Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiffs did not exhaust the  grievance procedure captured in Article 18 of Exhibit A before invoking the jurisdiction of this  Court. At the time the Plaintiffs raised this issue, they had retired and were no longer employees  of the Defendant. They can thus not be faulted for taking the steps they took. 

As earlier stated the law relating to the standards of proof in all civil actions without exception  was stated to be proof by preponderance of probabilities. This means that the successful party  must show that his claim is more probable than that of the other. In assessing the balance of probabilities, all the evidence, be it that of the Plaintiff or Defendant must be considered and the  party in whose favour the balance tilts is the person whose case is the more probable of the rival  version and is deserving of a favourable verdict. I refer to the case of TAKORADI FLOUR MILLS v. SAMIRA FARIS [2005 – 2006] SCGLR 882 

From the totality of the evidence before the Court and for all the reasons herein before stated, the  Plaintiffs, with the exception of those who retired above the rank of PRO have succeeded in  proving their case on the balance of probabilities and accordingly judgment is hereby entered for  the said Plaintiffs as follows: 

▪ The Court hereby declares that the Communiqué on the conclusion and signing of  1st Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on the GRA/PSWI-TUC Standing Joint  Negotiating Committee at a meeting held on Thursday 22nd December 2011 which  unilaterally, unlawfully and illegally amended or varied the 1st January 2011 agreement is  null, void and of no legal effect whatsoever. 

▪ The Court declares that the Defendant is estopped from reneging on the express terms and  conditions of the 1st January 2011 agreement. 

▪ The Court hereby orders the Defendant to pay all end of service/retirement benefits due the  said Plaintiffs by virtue of the 1st January 2011 agreement forthwith. 

▪ The Court again orders the Defendant to pay to the said Plaintiffs the difference in the long  service award based on Article 44 of the 2011 CBA. 

▪ The Defendant is to pay interest on the retirement benefits and the difference in the long  service award based on Article 44 of the 2011 CBA. 

▪ The Court awards an amount of Ten Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵10,000.00) as General  damages 

▪ Cost of One Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵1,000.00) in favour of each Plaintiff for whom  judgment has been entered. 

 (SGD) 

JUSTICE LAURENDA OWUSU 

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

COUNSEL

EDWARD SAM CRABBE FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

MAXWELL OWUSU BOADI FOR THE DEFENDANT.