DAVISON ADOM OBERY & ARHIN SUADWA ANTHONY V. IGP
High Court
Headnote Labour law — Dismissal from public service — Police officers — Lawfulness of dismissal — Allegation of misconduct (extortion) — Burden and standard of proof — Hearsay evidence — Power of arrest — Right to prevent crime — Reinstatement — Measure of damages The plaintiffs, police officers of the Ghana Police Service, were dismissed following a service enquiry which found them culpable of misconduct, including alleged extortion in the course of arresting persons engaged in fuel smuggling. The plaintiffs contended that they acted lawfully in attempting to prevent a crime and that the allegations were fabricated and unsupported by evidence. They sought a declaration that their dismissal was unlawful and orders for reinstatement. Held (in favour of the plaintiffs): 1. Burden and standard of proof — In civil cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving his case on a preponderance of probabilities; however, once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut it. 2. Proof of misconduct — Allegations of misconduct such as extortion must be supported by credible and admissible evidence. Evidence based solely on information received from unnamed sources constitutes hearsay and cannot ground a finding of guilt. 3. Presence at scene of crime — Mere presence of a person at the scene of an alleged offence does not establish culpability; there must be evidence linking the person to the misconduct alleged. 4. Power to arrest and prevent crime — Both police officers and civilians have a duty to prevent the commission of crime, and may lawfully arrest persons engaged in criminal activity, even where the officer is on a fixed duty post, subject to operational discipline. 5. Lawfulness of plaintiffs’ conduct — On the evidence, the plaintiffs acted on credible intelligence and sought to prevent smuggling; their conduct was lawful and did not justify disciplinary punishment or dismissal. 6. Unlawful dismissal of public officers — Under Article 191 of the 1992 Constitution, public officers cannot be dismissed without just cause. A dismissal based on unproven allegations is unlawful 7. Reinstatement in employment — Although courts are generally reluctant to order reinstatement in contracts of service, it may be granted in the case of public service employment or where statutory protections apply and dismissal is shown to be unlawful. 8. Measure of damages in wrongful dismissal — In ordinary employment relationships, damages are generally limited to the salary or wages lost due to wrongful termination.
DANIEL MOORE APRAKUSU V. MINERALS COMMISSION
Court of Appeal
Headnote Labour law — Unfair termination — Misconduct — Right to hearing — Fair termination under Labour Act — Whether employer must prove misconduct — Remedies — Reinstatement vs compensation — Measure of damages — Appellate review The appellant, an internal auditor of the respondent Commission, was invited to appear before a fact‑finding committee investigating the respondent’s accounting practices. After appearing before the committee, his appointment was terminated on grounds that his conduct did not meet the required standards of efficiency and integrity. He lodged a complaint before the National Labour Commission (NLC) for unfair termination and sought reinstatement. The NLC found the termination unfair due to breach of due process but awarded compensation instead of reinstatement. Dissatisfied with the remedies, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. Held (allowing the appeal in part): 1. Fair termination and burden of proof — Under sections 62 and 63 of the Labour Act, termination is fair only when based on proven misconduct, incompetence, or other statutory grounds, and carried out through a fair procedure. Failure to prove both substantive justification and procedural fairness renders termination unfair. 2. Right to hearing (audi alteram partem) — Where misconduct is alleged, the employee must be given reasonable notice of the specific charge and an opportunity to respond. A fact‑finding invitation alone does not satisfy the requirement of a hearing; a query or formal charge is necessary. 3. Procedural unfairness — Termination based on findings of a committee without charging the employee or allowing him to respond to the allegations constitutes a breach of natural justice and is unfair termination. 4. Nature of appeal — An appeal is by way of rehearing; the appellate court must re‑evaluate the entire evidence and may interfere with findings of fact where they are unsupported by evidence or based on wrong inferences. 5. Remedies for unfair termination — Under section 64 of the Labour Act, the NLC has discretion to order reinstatement, re‑employment, or compensation. Reinstatement is not automatic. 6. When reinstatement may be refused — Reinstatement may be impracticable due to factors such as effluxion of time, breakdown of relationship, or supervening circumstances (e.g., proximity to retirement), in which case compensation is appropriate. 7. Measure of damages — Where termination is unfair, damages may extend beyond the notice period and are generally assessed based on the employee’s current salary for a reasonable period to enable re‑employment; speculative future promotions are not to be considered. 8. Costs — Costs are discretionary and must be reasonable, reflecting the circumstances of the case, including delay and conduct of the parties.
THE REPUBLIC VS. DR. STEPHEN YEBOAH EX PARTE: VIDA YEBOAH
HIGH COURT
Contempt of Court – Interference with Pending Judicial Proceedings – Conversion of Business Entity During Pendency of Matrimonial Proceedings – Standard of Proof in Contempt Proceedings – Burden of Proof – Quasi-Criminal Nature of Contempt. The Applicant sought an order committing the Respondent, her husband, to prison for contempt of court. She alleged that while divorce proceedings and an application for the preservation of matrimonial properties were pending before the High Court, Agona Swedru, the Respondent converted Lucky Herbal Clinic, a sole proprietorship, into a limited liability company in an attempt to defeat the court process and place the property beyond her reach. The Respondent denied the allegation, contending that the incorporation was part of a pre-existing business restructuring arrangement that had commenced before the divorce petition was filed. He further argued that the ownership and status of the disputed properties were issues already pending determination before the High Court and had also been considered in related appellate proceedings. The court reiterated that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, citing relevant cases. It held that although the Respondent's conduct may have been questionable, the Applicant failed to establish that he had disobeyed any court order or committed an act that clearly interfered with the administration of justice. The court further noted that the legality of the company's incorporation was a substantive issue pending before the High Court, Agona Swedru, and therefore declined to make findings that could prejudice those proceedings. Accordingly, the application for committal for contempt was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
LOUIS ANOKWAFO & 2 ORS vs PAULINA V. ANOKWAFO
HIGH COURT
Succession Law — Intestate estate — Claim of joint ownership of matrimonial property — Presumption of joint acquisition — Applicability upon death vs divorce — Customary marriage (Tongu law) — Date of marriage — Intermeddling — Burden of proof. This case concerned a dispute over the estate of the late Frank Anokwafo, who died intestate on 2nd March 2021. The central issue before the High Court, presided over by Justice Eudora Christina Dadson, was whether certain listed properties formed part of the deceased’s estate entirely for distribution under the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDCL 111), or whether the Defendant, as the surviving spouse, was entitled to a 50% share as jointly acquired matrimonial property. The Plaintiffs, being the children and customary successor of the deceased, initiated the action seeking declarations that several properties—including houses, lands, and vehicles—were the self-acquired properties of the deceased and should be administered under PNDCL 111. They further alleged that the Defendant had unlawfully transferred over GH₵1,000,000 from the deceased’s account and had been collecting rent from estate properties without authority. The Defendant, the widow of the deceased, entered appearance and counterclaimed that the properties were jointly acquired during their marriage and thus did not fall wholly into intestacy. She asserted entitlement to half of the properties and an additional share under PNDCL 111. The Defendant also challenged the capacity of the 3rd Plaintiff to act as customary successor. The Court addressed whether: (i) the Defendant was validly married to the deceased in 2001 or 2014; (ii) the disputed properties were jointly acquired matrimonial properties entitling the Defendant to a 50% share; (iii) the Defendant was entitled to any portion of the estate beyond what is provided under the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDCL 111); (iv) the estate devolved entirely to the surviving spouse and children; and (v) ancillary matters such as intermeddling and capacity of the 3rd Plaintiff. On the first issue, the Court held that the Defendant was validly married to the deceased in 2001, not 2014, as the essential customary rites under Tongu custom, particularly the presentation and acceptance of nyɔnu ha, had been duly performed in 2001, rendering the marriage valid from that date. On whether the properties were jointly acquired, the Court held that the Defendant failed to prove joint acquisition. The Court rejected the application of the “equality is equity” principle derived from divorce cases, holding that such principles under Article 22(3) do not apply to intestate succession. Consequently, the disputed properties were found not to be jointly owned matrimonial property but rather the sole estate of the deceased. On the Defendant’s entitlement, the Court held that the Defendant was not entitled to a 50% equitable share of the estate as joint owner. Instead, her rights were limited strictly to her statutory entitlement as a surviving spouse under PNDCL 111. On the devolution of the estate, the Court held that the estate does not devolve exclusively on the Defendant and children, but must be distributed in accordance with the statutory scheme under PNDCL 111, which includes the spouse, children, and customary family. On the issue of intermeddling, the Court held that it is a criminal matter that must be pursued in the appropriate forum and therefore declined to determine it in the civil proceedings. The issue of the 3rd Plaintiff’s capacity was also held to be moot and unnecessary for resolving the case. In conclusion, the Court upheld the Plaintiffs’ case in part by declaring all disputed properties as part of the deceased’s estate and limiting the Defendant’s entitlement to her statutory share under intestate succession law, while dismissing the Defendant’s claim of joint ownership.
JAMES ATTOH JNR. V. BARCLAYS BANK GHANA LTD.
High Court
Headnote Labour law — Termination of employment — Fixed-term contract — Whether employee becomes permanent after six months — Whether differential conditions constitute discrimination — Validity of termination on notice — Effect of National Labour Commission (NLC) decision — Estoppel — Redundancy and severance pay The plaintiff was employed by the defendant bank under a one-year fixed-term contract which provided for two weeks’ notice or pay in lieu for termination. He alleged that after working for more than six months he ought to have been treated as a permanent employee under the Labour Act, and that his treatment (including shorter notice period, no meal allowance, and fewer leave days) was discriminatory. Upon receiving two weeks’ notice terminating his employment, he claimed wrongful termination and sought various entitlements including severance pay. The defendant contended that the contract governed the relationship and that termination complied with both the contract and the Labour Act. The National Labour Commission (NLC) had earlier dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, and he did not appeal. Held (dismissing the claims): 1. Burden in wrongful termination claims — A claimant must prove the terms of the employment contract and show that termination was in breach of those terms or of statutory provisions; failing which the claim fails. 2. Nature of employment (fixed-term vs temporary) — An employee engaged under a fixed-term written contract cannot be classified as a “temporary worker” under section 75 of the Labour Act merely because he worked for more than six months; hence he is not automatically converted into a permanent employee. 3. Freedom to terminate contract of employment — At common law and under statute, parties are bound by their contract; an employer may terminate employment for any reason, provided it complies with the contractual or statutory notice requirements. 4. Validity of termination — Termination effected in accordance with the terms of the contract (two weeks’ notice) and section 17 of the Labour Act is lawful and not wrongful. 5. Alleged discrimination — Differences in conditions of service between a fixed-term employee and permanent employees do not constitute unlawful discrimination where such differences arise from and are consistent with the agreed contract of employment. 6. Effect of NLC decision — A decision of the National Labour Commission made under the Labour Act is binding unless appealed against within the statutory period; failure to appeal renders the claimant estopped from relitigating the same issues. 7. Redundancy and severance pay — Where a contract expressly excludes entitlement to severance or end‑of‑service benefits and termination is not by redundancy, the employee is not entitled to such payments.
OPARE YEBOAH & 8 ORS V. BARCLAYS BANK GHANA LIMITED
Supreme Court
Headnote Labour law — Summary dismissal — Collective bargaining agreement (CBA) — Whether suspension a condition precedent — Whether employer must follow Article 15 before Article 17 — Whether notice of summary dismissal valid — Whether employees denied hearing — Effect of failure to reply to notice — Appellate review of concurrent findings The 1st–8th appellants were employees of the respondent bank and executives of a trade union. Following an alleged illegal strike action instigated by them, the respondent issued notices under Article 17 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) indicating its intention to summarily dismiss them for proven misconduct. The appellants challenged the legality of their dismissal, contending, inter alia, that (i) the respondent was obliged to first suspend them under Article 15 before invoking Article 17, (ii) the notices were in effect immediate dismissals contrary to the CBA, (iii) they had replied to the notices, and (iv) no strike had occurred. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed their claims. On further appeal: Held (dismissing the appeal): 1. Construction of CBA provisions — Articles 15 (suspension) and 17 (summary dismissal) of the CBA are not conjunctive; they may operate independently. Suspension is not a condition precedent to summary dismissal. An employer may invoke Article 17 without first resorting to Article 15 where misconduct is established. 2. Validity of summary dismissal procedure — The procedure stipulated in a contract of employment for summary dismissal must be complied with; however, on the facts, the respondent substantially complied with Article 17 of the CBA. 3. Nature of notice — A notice issued under Article 17 indicating intention to dismiss is not itself a dismissal but part of the procedural steps. The effective dismissal may validly take retrospective effect from the date of notice once the procedure is completed. 4. Right to be heard (natural justice) — Where a CBA provides an opportunity to respond to allegations prior to dismissal, the audi alteram partem rule is satisfied if the employee is given notice and opportunity to reply. Failure or refusal to utilise that opportunity precludes complaint of breach of natural justice. 5. Reply to notice — A valid reply under Article 17 must address the substantive misconduct alleged. A communication that merely threatens litigation or issues an ultimatum does not constitute a proper reply within the meaning of the CBA. 6. Existence of strike and misconduct — Findings that the appellants instigated and participated in an illegal strike contrary to the Labour Act were supported by evidence and would not be disturbed on appeal. 7. Concurrent findings of fact — The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless shown to be perverse or occasioning a miscarriage of justice; no such circumstances existed. 8. Victimisation — Allegations of victimisation were not established on the evidence.
SELEGBE KWAMW MANCHIE VS. EMMANUELA EDEM AGBEMAVA
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Failure of Reconciliation Efforts – Adoption of Terms of Settlement The petitioner and respondent, both Ghanaian citizens domiciled in Ghana, contracted a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance on 19 April 2008 at the Evangelical Presbyterian Church, Mamprobi, Accra, and had three children while living together at Ashalley-Botwe and Ashongman Estate. On 19 June 2019, the husband petitioned for divorce on the ground that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the wife’s alleged unreasonable behaviour, including quarrelsomeness, verbal and physical abuse, destruction of property, and neglect of household responsibilities. The wife denied these allegations in her Answer and Cross-Petition, instead attributing the breakdown of the marriage to the husband’s unreasonable behaviour. She claimed that after the birth of their third child, during a period of postpartum depression, she suffered verbal, emotional, and physical abuse from the husband, including an incident where he allegedly poured hot water on her, publicly labeled her mentally unstable, and eventually had her removed from the matrimonial home. Despite their conflicting accounts, both parties agreed that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and submitted Terms of Settlement for the court’s adoption. The court, however, emphasized that under sections 1(2), 2(2), and 2(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), it retained a duty to independently assess the state of the marriage and hear evidence before granting a divorce. Upon reviewing the evidence, the court found that the parties had experienced persistent conflicts, mutual allegations of abuse, and unsuccessful reconciliation efforts by family members. The court concluded that these circumstances satisfied section 2(1)(f) of Act 367, which recognizes failure of reconciliation after diligent efforts as proof of breakdown beyond reconciliation. Consequently, the court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree dissolving the marriage.
SETH ADJETEY MENSAH & ORS V. AFRICAN CONCRETE PRODUCTS
High Court
Labour Law — Dismissal — Summary dismissal — Illegal strike — Whether participation in illegal strike justifies dismissal — Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) — Interpretation — Role of National Labour Commission — Burden of proof in wrongful dismissal — Evidence (conflict between oral and documentary evidence). HEADNOTE The plaintiffs, employees of the defendant company and members of a trade union, brought an action for a declaration that the termination of their employment was unlawful, together with claims for salaries, benefits, interest and damages. They contended that they embarked on a lawful industrial action following the defendant’s refusal to renegotiate their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), and that their subsequent dismissal was effected without due process and contrary to directives of the National Labour Commission (NLC). The defendant argued that the plaintiffs engaged in an illegal strike without notice, disrupted operations, and intimidated management staff. It relied on provisions of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) and the CBA which permitted summary dismissal for participation in an illegal strike. It further counterclaimed for losses allegedly suffered due to the strike. HELD: Dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim and the defendant’s counterclaim, the court held: 1. In an action for wrongful dismissal, the burden lies on the employee to prove that the dismissal was unlawful or in breach of contract; where no evidence is led, the plaintiff fails. 2. On the evidence, the plaintiffs embarked on a strike without the notice required by law; such a strike is illegal under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). 3. Participation in an illegal strike constitutes misconduct and entitles an employer to summarily dismiss the employees involved without notice. 4. The employer’s right to dismiss is not vitiated by failure to follow recommendations of the National Labour Commission or by not invoking internal disciplinary processes. 5. Where oral testimony conflicts with documentary evidence, the court will prefer documentary evidence unless there are compelling reasons to reject it. 6. On the facts, the plaintiffs’ conduct during the strike—including disruption of operations and intimidation—justified their summary dismissal, which was therefore lawful. 7. A counterclaim must be proved on the balance of probabilities; the defendant failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the alleged losses and its counterclaim accordingly failed.
PROSPER KWAME SOGLO V SOLACE MAWUNYO SOGLO
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial law – Divorce – Breakdown beyond reconciliation – Unreasonable behaviour – Long separation exceeding five years – Burden of proof – Custody of children – Best interest principle – Property distribution – Presumption of joint ownership – Financial responsibility for children – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367); Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323); Constitution, 1992, article 22. This case concerns a petition for the dissolution of marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The parties, who initially married under customary law and later converted the union into an ordinance marriage in 2006, had three children. The Petitioner sought divorce on the ground of breakdown of marriage beyond reconciliation, alleging unreasonable behaviour by the Respondent, including disrespect, verbal abuse, denial of intimacy, and neglect during illness, which compelled him to leave the matrimonial home in 2015. The Respondent denied portions of these allegations but also cross‑petitioned for dissolution, effectively admitting that the marriage had broken down. The Court reaffirmed that under Sections 1(2) and 2(1) of Act 367, the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, which must be established by proving facts such as unreasonable behaviour or prolonged separation. Applying the burden of proof principles under the Evidence Act, the Court found that the Petitioner’s evidence of sustained marital discord, lack of intimacy, and separation for over five years was credible and satisfied the statutory requirements. The Respondent’s admission that the marriage had broken down further reinforced the conclusion. Accordingly, the Court held that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down and granted a decree of dissolution. On custody, the Court applied the best interest of the child principle, awarding custody of the three children to the Respondent (mother), with reasonable access to the Petitioner to ensure continued parental involvement. Regarding maintenance, the Court emphasized that parental responsibility is shared and ordered the Petitioner to pay 70% of the children’s school fees, while the Respondent would bear the remaining 30%, with both parties contributing to their general upkeep. On property settlement, the Court invoked the presumption of joint acquisition under the Constitution and Act 367. In the absence of documentary evidence rebutting this presumption, it held that the uncompleted house at Tema and the lands in Ho were jointly acquired and ordered an equal (50–50) distribution. Claims for damages for desertion and other unspecified reliefs were dismissed.
JOSEPH AGYARE & 43 ORS. V. ODART STEVEDORING CO. LTD.
High Court
Labour Law — Redundancy/Severance pay — Closure of business — Entitlement of employees — Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) — Whether MOU is binding — Breach of agreement — Claim for damages and interest — Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), s. 65. HEADNOTE The plaintiffs, former employees of the defendant company, brought an action for payment of agreed redundancy (severance) pay following the closure of the defendant’s business due to non-renewal of its operational licence. They also claimed interest on the sums due and general damages for breach of an agreement embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into between the defendant and the Maritime and Dockworkers Union acting on behalf of the plaintiffs. Under the MOU, the defendant agreed to pay redundancy benefits calculated on specified terms and in instalments. The defendant admitted the agreement and partial payments but contended that the MOU was not binding, that some plaintiffs were not parties to it, and that its financial difficulties prevented full payment. [JOSEPH AGY...judy.legal] HELD: Giving judgment for the plaintiffs (in part), the court held: 1. Where an undertaking is closed down and employees are laid off, they are entitled to severance (redundancy) pay under section 65(2) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). 2. On the evidence, the defendant’s business was shut down and the plaintiffs’ employment terminated; accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to severance pay. 3. Although a Memorandum of Understanding is ordinarily not binding, it becomes binding where the parties demonstrate intention to be bound and act upon it, as by agreeing on specific payment terms and implementation arrangements. 4. The defendant, having negotiated and agreed on redundancy payments and payment schedules with the union representing the plaintiffs, was bound by the terms of the MOU. 5. Employees represented by a union in negotiations may benefit from the agreement where the employer’s conduct shows acceptance of their inclusion. 6. A claimant is not entitled to general damages for breach of contract in the absence of proof of specific loss; however, an award of interest on unpaid sums may compensate for delay in payment.
LEKITTA JEMEKI VRS. JACOB WEMEGAH
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial law – Divorce – Breakdown beyond reconciliation – Irreconcilable differences – Unreasonable behaviour – Separation and loss of consortium – Maintenance between spouses – Financial provision – Burden of proof – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), ss. 2 & 20 – Evidence of failure of reconciliation. This case concerns a petition for dissolution of marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The Petitioner sought divorce on the grounds of breakdown of marriage beyond reconciliation caused by the Respondent’s unreasonable behaviour and irreconcilable differences. The parties were married in 2013 and experienced persistent marital conflict, particularly regarding infertility issues. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent was uncooperative in addressing fertility challenges, verbally abusive, and withdrawn from marital relations, including abstaining from sexual intimacy for two years and deserting the matrimonial home. She further stated that repeated interventions by family members and church leaders failed to resolve their differences. The Respondent denied these allegations and accused the Petitioner of desertion, disrespect, and public embarrassment regarding the issue of infertility. Despite these conflicting claims, the Court found as common ground that the parties had irreconcilable differences and that several attempts at reconciliation by family and religious authorities had failed. The Court held that the Petitioner had successfully established grounds under Section 2(1) of Act 367, particularly failure to reconcile differences and the fact that the parties had not lived as husband and wife for the requisite statutory period. Consequently, the Court granted a decree of dissolution of the marriage. On financial relief, the Court considered the parties’ earnings and circumstances and held that the Respondent lacked the capacity to pay the GH¢50,000 lump sum requested. Instead, the Court awarded a reduced sum of GH¢3,000 as reasonable financial provision. The claim for arrears of maintenance was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, with the Court emphasizing that spouses share maintenance responsibilities under modern law.
MARTIN A. ATUAHENE V GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Redundancy/Severance pay — Privatization of subsidiary — Employer–employee relationship — Separate legal personality — Whether divestiture severs employment — Diminution of conditions of service — Burden of proof — Labour (Amendment) Act, 1969 (NLCD 342), s. 34. HEADNOTE The appellant, on behalf of 683 former workers, brought an action against the respondent for severance pay following the privatization of the Produce Buying Company Ltd. (PBC Ltd.), formerly a subsidiary of the respondent. The appellants contended that the divestiture of PBC Ltd. in 2000 severed their employment relationship with the respondent and adversely affected their conditions of service, thereby entitling them to severance pay. The respondent denied liability, asserting that the appellants remained employees of PBC Ltd. both before and after privatization and that their employment was never terminated. It further contended that the appellants were retained in employment with continuity of service and suffered no diminution in their conditions of service. The High Court entered judgment for the appellants, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: 1. For entitlement to severance pay under section 34 of the Labour (Amendment) Act, 1969 (NLCD 342), two conditions must co-exist: (a) a severance of the legal relationship between employer and employee; and (b) unemployment or diminution in terms and conditions of employment resulting from that severance. 2. The incorporation of a subsidiary company creates a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders; consequently, the employer of the appellants was PBC Ltd. and not the respondent. 3. The privatization or divestiture of shares in a company does not, without more, terminate or sever the employment relationship between the company and its employees, where the employees continue in the service of the same company. 4. On the facts, the appellants remained employees of PBC Ltd. both before and after privatization, and therefore no severance of employment occurred. 5. The appellants were not rendered unemployed and failed to prove any diminution in their terms and conditions of service; alleged losses such as scholarship privileges, medical fees, and salary differences were either unfounded or insufficient in law. 6. A claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to severance pay; failure to adduce sufficient evidence is fatal to the claim.
ABEL OHENE ACQUAYE VS. LYNDA ACQUAYE
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial law – Divorce – Dissolution of marriage – Breakdown beyond reconciliation – Unreasonable behaviour – Short separation – Failure of reconciliation – Alimony and financial provision – Consent judgment – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), ss. 1 & 2. This case concerns a petition by the husband for dissolution of marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The parties, who first married customarily and subsequently under the Marriage Ordinance in 2019, had no children and cohabited in Accra until the Respondent left the matrimonial home in June 2021. The Petitioner sought a divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown due to the Respondent’s alleged unreasonable behaviour, including adultery, neglect of marital duties, refusal to communicate, and abandonment of the matrimonial home. The Respondent denied these allegations and cross-petitioned, accusing the Petitioner of unreasonable behaviour, including emotional neglect, financial irresponsibility, controlling conduct, abuse, and lack of intimacy. The Court reaffirmed that under Section 1(2) of Act 367, the only ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, which must be demonstrated through one or more facts listed under Section 2(1). Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court found that both parties had experienced persistent disagreements, communication breakdown, and incompatibility, with unsuccessful reconciliation efforts by family and friends. Although the period of separation was about one year, the Court was satisfied that the parties had been unable to reconcile their differences and that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down. Accordingly, the Court granted a decree of dissolution and cancelled the marriage certificate. The Court further adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as a Consent Judgment, under which the Petitioner was ordered to pay the Respondent GH¢20,000 as alimony, GH¢25,000 in rent-related payments, and GH¢10,000 for legal fees, with both parties waiving all further claims.
GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD V. MARTIN A. ATUAHENE
Court of Appeal
Labour Law — Redundancy — Severance pay — Privatization/divestiture — Subsidiary company — Whether divestiture constitutes “arrangement” — Requirement of severance of employment — Diminution of terms and conditions — Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), s. 65 — Burden of proof. HEADNOTE The respondent, a long-serving employee of the Produce Buying Company Ltd. (PBC Ltd.), a former subsidiary of the appellant, brought an action on behalf of himself and others for severance pay following the appellant’s divestiture of its shares in PBC Ltd. in 1999/2000. He contended that the privatization resulted in a severance of the employment relationship between the appellant and employees of PBC Ltd., and that they consequently suffered diminished conditions of service. The trial court upheld the claim and granted reliefs for severance pay. The appellant appealed, arguing that the respondents were not entitled to severance pay since their employment had not been terminated and no legal severance within the meaning of section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) had occurred. HELD: Allowing the appeal, the court held: 1. For an employee to be entitled to redundancy (severance) pay under section 65 of Act 651, there must be: (a) a severance of the legal relationship between employer and employee; and (b) unemployment or diminution in terms and conditions of employment resulting from that severance. 2. The mere divestiture or privatization of a subsidiary company does not, without more, constitute a severance of the employment relationship between the employees and their employer where the employees continue in employment with the new entity under continuous service. 3. Where employees retain their jobs and their service is deemed continuous, they are not entitled to redundancy pay, as the essential conditions under section 65 of Act 651 are not satisfied. 4. A claim for severance pay cannot be founded on remote or indirect changes such as loss of privileges or differences in conditions of service, especially where such conditions are subject to collective bargaining. 5. The burden lies on the claimant to prove entitlement to severance benefits and any alleged diminution in conditions of service; failure to adduce sufficient evidence is fatal to the claim.
REV. FAUSTINA DANSO VS. REV. JACOB DANSO
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial law – Divorce – Dissolution of marriage – Breakdown beyond reconciliation – Unreasonable behaviour – Long separation – Failure of reconciliation – Consent judgment – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), ss. 1 & 2. This case involves a petition by the wife for the dissolution of marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The parties, who married in 1997 under the Marriage Ordinance, had four children and cohabited in various locations before their relationship deteriorated. The Petitioner alleged that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the Respondent’s unreasonable behaviour, including abuse, dehumanising treatment, and the circulation of false allegations of adultery against her. She testified that she fled the matrimonial home out of fear for her safety. The Respondent denied these allegations and contended that the Petitioner had neglected her marital duties and refused reconciliation despite interventions by family and religious leaders. The Court reiterated that under Section 1(2) of Act 367, the sole ground for divorce is irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage, which must be established through one or more statutory facts under Section 2(1). The evidence before the Court showed that the parties had significant marital conflicts, failed reconciliation attempts, and had lived apart for approximately six years prior to the filing of the petition. The Court held that the continuous separation of more than five years and the inability of the parties to reconcile satisfied Sections 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court found that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree of dissolution. The Court further adopted the Terms of Settlement filed by the parties as a Consent Judgment, under which the Petitioner withdrew certain reliefs, and both parties agreed to bear their own costs.
KOFI SENKYIRE V. ABOSSO GOLDFIELDS LTD
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Employment — Dismissal — Wrongful dismissal — Misconduct — Loss of trust and confidence — Disciplinary procedure — Compliance with conditions of service — Standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings — Distinction between termination and dismissal. HEADNOTE The appellant, an employee of the respondent mining company, was found at the company’s security gate in possession of gold-bearing rocks under suspicious circumstances after working hours. He failed to give a satisfactory explanation for his conduct. Following a disciplinary inquiry conducted in accordance with the company’s conditions of service, he was dismissed for misconduct. The appellant brought an action in the Circuit Court for wrongful dismissal and succeeded. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the dismissal was justified. The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the evidence against him was insufficient and that the dismissal required a higher standard of proof. HELD: Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: 1. In an action for wrongful dismissal, the burden lies on the employee to prove the terms of the contract of employment and that the dismissal was in breach of those terms. 2. Where an employer elects to proceed under a disciplinary procedure provided by the contract, the employer must comply with that procedure and justify the dismissal accordingly. 3. An employer is not required to prove misconduct beyond reasonable doubt; disciplinary proceedings are not criminal trials, and proof on the basis of reasonable suspicion affecting trust and confidence is sufficient. 4. Misconduct involving dishonesty or conduct giving rise to a reasonable doubt as to the employee’s trustworthiness constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal, particularly in an industry involving valuable materials. 5. On the facts, the respondent complied with the disciplinary provisions in the conditions of service, and the appellant’s conduct justified his dismissal.
KENNETH KOJO BAIDEN VS. MRS AGATHA BAIDEN
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial law – Dissolution of marriage – Breakdown beyond reconciliation – Unreasonable behaviour – Adultery – Burden and standard of proof – Custody of children – Best interest of child – Property distribution – Joint property presumption – Alimony/financial provision – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367); Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323); Constitution, 1992, art. 22. This case concerns a petition for the dissolution of marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) between parties who married in 2006 under the Marriage Ordinance. The petitioner (husband) sought divorce on the grounds of breakdown of marriage beyond reconciliation, alleging unreasonable behaviour and adultery by the respondent (wife), including neglect of marital responsibilities, poor communication, social media exposure of marital issues, and infidelity. The respondent denied these allegations and counter-petitioned, accusing the petitioner of adultery, emotional abuse, and misconduct, while also seeking custody of the children, maintenance, alimony, and division of marital property. The Court reiterated that under Act 367, the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, which must be proven by at least one statutory fact such as unreasonable behaviour or adultery. Applying the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities under the Evidence Act, the Court found that both parties had engaged in mutual accusations and marital discord, and neither could solely be blamed for the breakdown. The evidence showed a sustained breakdown in communication, cohabitation, and mutual trust, with failed reconciliation attempts. Consequently, the Court held that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down and granted a decree of dissolution. Regarding custody, the Court applied the best interest of the child principle and relevant provisions of the Children’s Act, awarding custody to the respondent (mother) with reasonable access to the petitioner, noting the children’s need for stability and the petitioner’s demanding work schedule. The petitioner was ordered to pay monthly maintenance of GH¢1,500, in addition to continuing educational and medical support. On property distribution, the Court affirmed the principle that property acquired during marriage is presumed jointly owned, subject to rebuttal. It held that the respondent contributed non-financially to the acquisition and renovation of certain property (Kwaprow), entitling her to a beneficial interest. However, not all claimed properties were proven to be jointly acquired. The respondent was awarded two plots of land at Amosima and GH¢40,000 as alimony, which the Court deemed just and equitable given the parties’ financial circumstances.
JOHN ETSIBAH V. AFRICAN MINING SERVICES GH. LTD.
Court of Appeal
Labour Law — Wrongful dismissal — Disciplinary procedure Appeal — Judgment against weight of evidence — Role of appellate court Natural justice — Applicability in private employment Facts The respondent (employee), an auto electrician of the appellant company, was interdicted and later dismissed for alleged involvement in an illegal strike, including activating a siren and calling an emergency to disrupt operations. He denied the allegations and claimed that his dismissal was wrongful, asserting that the employer failed to comply with disciplinary procedures under the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The Circuit Court found in favour of the respondent, holding that the termination was wrongful due to procedural irregularities and unfair hearing. The employer appealed. Issues 1. Whether the judgment of the trial court was against the weight of the evidence. 2. Whether the trial judge erred in applying public law principles (fair hearing/natural justice) to a private employment relationship. 3. Whether the respondent’s dismissal was justified despite alleged procedural lapses. Holding The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the Circuit Court was set aside.
MARIAN NYARKOA OWUSU VS. NANA DJAN AMANIAMPONG
HIGH COURT
Matrimonial law – Divorce – Dissolution of marriage – Breakdown beyond reconciliation – Unreasonable behaviour – Separation exceeding five years – Custody and maintenance of children – Consent judgment – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), ss. 1 & 2. The case concerns a petition for the dissolution of a marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The Petitioner and Respondent, both Ghanaian citizens, were married under the Marriage Ordinance in 2016 and had two children. The Petitioner sought divorce on the grounds that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, citing the Respondent’s unreasonable behaviour, including verbal abuse and disrespect, as well as failed reconciliation efforts. Evidence before the Court also established that the parties had lived apart since 2017. Under Act 367, the sole ground for divorce is that a marriage has irreconcilably broken down, which must be proven by one or more statutory facts, including unreasonable behaviour or separation for at least five years. In this case, the Court found that the Petitioner’s evidence of unreasonable behaviour was unchallenged, particularly as the Respondent failed to file a witness statement. More importantly, the Court held that the parties had lived apart for over five years, thereby satisfying Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. The Court, in fulfilment of its duty to independently assess the state of the marriage, concluded that the marriage had indeed broken down beyond reconciliation. Accordingly, it granted a decree dissolving the marriage and cancelled the marriage certificate. The Court further adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as a Consent Judgment, making provisions for custody of the children, access rights, maintenance, and their general welfare.
PAULINA EFFISAH V. TULLOW GHANA LIMITED
High Court
Labour Law — Termination of employment — Probationary employee — Unlawful dismissal — Absence from duty — Certified illness — Whether employer entitled to terminate — Burden of proof — Effect of failure to cross‑examine — Remedies — Damages. Headnote The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a Travel Assistant and posted to Takoradi shortly after her appointment. Prior to taking up duty, she had undergone surgery and informed the defendant of her medical condition. Upon assumption of duty, she fell ill and was granted sick leave. Thereafter, she remained in Accra undergoing medical reviews and additional examinations at the instance of the defendant. While still within her probationary period, the defendant terminated her employment on grounds of absence from duty and inability to perform her duties. The plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaration that the termination was unlawful, reinstatement, or alternatively compensation. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had failed to report to her post as required and had been reluctant to work despite being declared medically fit. However, the defendant failed to call evidence in support of its assertions and did not effectively challenge the plaintiff’s evidence in cross‑examination. Held: 1. The plaintiff’s appointment effectively commenced on 17 October 2008, and not 1 October 2008 as alleged by the defendant. 2. The plaintiff disclosed her medical condition to the defendant; the contrary allegation was not proved. 3. The plaintiff’s absence from duty was with the knowledge and consent of the defendant, as she was on sick leave and acted upon the defendant’s instructions. 4. The defendant was not entitled to terminate the plaintiff’s employment under the contract, as: the condition for abandonment of post was not satisfied; and her performance could not reasonably have been assessed within the brief period she worked. 5. The termination was unlawful and amounted to unfair termination within the meaning of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), since it was based on the plaintiff’s illness. 6. Failure by the defendant to cross‑examine the plaintiff on material facts amounted to an admission of those facts. 7. Reinstatement would not be ordered in a contract of employment; the appropriate remedy was damages. 8. The plaintiff was entitled to compensation assessed at 12 months’ salary, together with costs.