JOHN EDEY V. TESANO SPORTS CLUB
JUSTICE LAURENDA OWUSU
Labour Law – Termination of Employment – Wrongful Dismissal – Probation and Confirmation – Notice – Damages – Evidence Facts The plaintiff was employed as General Manager of the defendant sports club under a one‑year renewable contract, subject to a three‑month probationary period extendable by a further three months. The plaintiff commenced work and continued beyond the probationary period without any written extension of probation. He was subsequently dismissed on grounds of unsatisfactory performance, and paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The plaintiff contended that his probation had lapsed without extension, thereby confirming his appointment, and that his termination was wrongful. Holding 1. The plaintiff’s appointment was deemed confirmed at the expiration of the initial probationary period due to the defendant’s failure to extend probation in accordance with the contract. 2. Although an employer may terminate employment upon giving due notice or pay in lieu, where reasons are assigned, the employer bears the burden of justifying them. The defendant failed to justify the alleged poor performance. 3. The termination was wrongful. 4. The defendant’s counterclaim failed.
ICU V. WORLD COOL MANUFACTURING LTD
JUSTICE LAURENDA OWUSU
Labour Law – Redundancy – Change of ownership – Duty to negotiate redundancy pay – Non‑payment of salary arrears – Terminal benefits – Fraud – Interlocutory judgment – Effect of failure to enter appearance – Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), ss 17, 18, 65 Headnote The plaintiffs, employees of the defendant company and members of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), brought an action claiming, inter alia, declarations that the defendant’s failure to negotiate and pay redundancy benefits, salary arrears, terminal benefits and statutory SSNIT contributions was wrongful and in breach of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) and the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement. The defendant failed to enter appearance or file a defence, and interlocutory judgment was entered. The plaintiffs were thereafter called upon to prove their claims. Held, granting the claims, that under section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), where a change in ownership or reorganisation of an undertaking results in redundancy, the employer is mandatorily required to negotiate redundancy pay with the employees or their recognised trade union. A change of ownership does not extinguish the employer’s statutory obligation to pay redundancy compensation and accrued employment benefits. Held further that an interlocutory judgment entered against a defaulting defendant does not finally determine the rights of the parties; however, upon satisfactory proof of the claims by the plaintiffs, the court is entitled to enter final judgment. An employer who fails to pay salary arrears, redundancy pay, terminal benefits and statutory social security contributions acts wrongfully and in breach of sections 17 and 18 of Act 651. Held further that fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. Where an employer knowingly or recklessly employs unlawful means to deprive employees of their lawful entitlements, damages for fraud are awardable. Holding Judgment entered for the plaintiffs. The defendant was ordered to pay redundancy benefits, salary arrears, terminal benefits, interest, damages for breach of conditions of service, damages for fraud, outstanding SSNIT contributions, and costs.
NANA AGYENIM BOATENG V. PRODUCE BUYING COMPANY LTD, THE MANAGING DIRECTOR (PBC), THE SOLICITOR SECRETARY (PBC) AND THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGER (PBC)
KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU J
Labour Law — Compulsory Retirement — Conflicting Dates of Birth — Fair Hearing — Natural Justice Material Facts The Plaintiff was an employee of Produce Buying Company Ltd (PBC). In October 2008, the Defendants wrote to him directing him to prepare for compulsory retirement on the basis that he would attain the mandatory retirement age of 60 years in September 2009. The Plaintiff disputed this, contending that he was only 55 years old at the time and had not reached the statutory retirement age, which under the 1992 Constitution is 60 years. The compulsory retirement decision was based on conflicting dates of birth contained in the Plaintiff’s records, including SSNIT records which indicated a birth date of 10 September 1949. Upon discovering inconsistencies, the Plaintiff produced a baptismal certificate showing his date of birth as 10 September 1954 and supported it with a statutory declaration, requesting his employer to correct its records. The Defendants ignored these documents and proceeded to retire him compulsorily. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff brought an action challenging the legality of his retirement. Reliefs Sought 1. An order compelling the Defendants to withdraw the compulsory retirement letter 2. Reinstatement until attaining the compulsory retirement age of 60 years 3. Payment of all outstanding salaries and benefits 4. General damages for suffering and distress 5. Costs, including legal fees Holding 1. The Defendants were not justified in unilaterally relying on the SSNIT record without giving the Plaintiff a fair hearing 2. The compulsory retirement was unlawful, as the Plaintiff had not attained the retirement age of 60 years 3. The Plaintiff was entitled to withdrawal of the retirement letter, reinstatement, and payment of arrears, but not general damages
PETER BOACHIE V. PRECIOUS MINERALS MARKETING CO.
KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU J
Employment Law – Termination of Employment – Unfair Termination and Wrongful Termination – Jurisdiction – Labour Commission – Public Service – Constitutional Protection – Damages Headnote The Plaintiff, a Managing Director of the Defendant public institution, had his appointment terminated by a board decision with payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice, without any stated reason or adherence to the disciplinary procedures prescribed in the Senior Staff Conditions of Service. He brought an action in the High Court seeking declarations that the termination was unfair and wrongful, and for damages. Held: 1. Unfair Termination – Jurisdiction By sections 62–64 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), complaints of unfair termination fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labour Commission. Accordingly, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the claim of unfair termination. 2. Wrongful Termination – Proof Required In an action for wrongful termination, the burden rests on the employee to prove the terms of employment and that the termination was in breach of those terms or contrary to statutory provisions regulating employment. 3. Conditions of Service – Disciplinary Procedure Where conditions of service prescribe a disciplinary procedure, an employer is bound to comply strictly with those procedures before terminating employment. Payment of salary in lieu of notice does not cure failure to observe agreed disciplinary safeguards. 4. Public Service – Constitutional Requirement of Just Cause The Defendant being a public service institution within article 190 of the 1992 Constitution, the Plaintiff could not lawfully be removed from office without just cause under article 191(b). Termination without hearing or stated grounds amounted to a breach of the Constitution. 5. Wrongful Termination Established The Defendant’s failure to afford the Plaintiff a hearing and to comply with the disciplinary procedures under the Conditions of Service rendered the termination wrongful. 6. Damages – Measure Where termination is wrongful, the employee is entitled to damages. In assessing damages, the court must consider all the circumstances of the case and comparable awards in decided cases. Decision: Termination declared wrongful. Plaintiff awarded 24 months’ gross salary as general damages, with costs.
BEATRICE LARNYOH TRAORE (MRS) VRS. PROFESSOR MOUSSA TRAORE
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE EMMANUEL A. LODOH
Family Law — Ordinance Marriage — Divorce — Breakdown Beyond Reconciliation — Unreasonable Behaviour — Allegation of Adultery — Custody, Maintenance, Alimony and Property Settlement. This case concerns a divorce petition filed by the wife under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), seeking dissolution of the marriage, custody of their seven-year-old daughter, maintenance, alimony, and property settlement. The husband filed a cross-petition also seeking dissolution and custody. The marriage, celebrated in 2014 under ordinance law at Cape Coast, produced one surviving child. Both parties agreed that the marriage had broken down, but each attributed fault differently. The Petitioner alleged unreasonable behaviour and constructive desertion, claiming the Respondent became abusive, neglected her, and eventually locked her out of the matrimonial home. The Respondent, on the other hand, accused the Petitioner of adultery, relying mainly on alleged WhatsApp messages. The court reiterated that the sole ground for divorce under Act 367 is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, which must be supported by evidence under Section 2(1). On the issue of adultery, the court held that the Respondent failed to meet the high standard of proof required, as the electronic evidence was unreliable and uncorroborated. However, the court found credible evidence that the Respondent locked the Petitioner out of the matrimonial home and failed to maintain her, amounting to unreasonable behaviour. Additionally, multiple attempts at reconciliation by religious leaders had failed, reinforcing the conclusion that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down. The court therefore granted a decree of dissolution. On custody, applying the welfare principle under the Children’s Act, the court awarded physical custody of the child to the Petitioner, noting the child’s existing living arrangements and best interests. The Respondent was granted reasonable access, including visitation during school vacations. Regarding maintenance, the Respondent was ordered to pay school fees and GH¢1,000 monthly for the child’s upkeep, while both parents were to share medical expenses. On alimony, although the Petitioner failed to fully prove the Respondent’s means, the court awarded her GH¢35,000, considering her circumstances and the Respondent’s prior support. On property, the court declined to grant the Petitioner the Efutu land due to insufficient proof of contribution and instead awarded it solely to the Respondent. Conversely, the Petitioner was granted exclusive ownership of a separate property in Tema. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage, granted custody to the Petitioner with access to the Respondent, ordered financial support for the child, awarded reduced alimony, and equitably distributed the parties’ properties.
SALAMATU MOHAMMED VS. TUNDE MOHAMMED
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
Family Law — Customary Marriage — Dissolution — Breakdown Beyond Reconciliation — Custody and Maintenance of Child. This case involves a petition by the wife for the dissolution of a customary marriage celebrated in November 2001 in Accra. The parties lived together at Adabraka and had four children, three adults and one minor at the time of the proceedings. The Petitioner, a Ghanaian, alleged that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the Respondent’s unreasonable behavior, including physical abuse, neglect of financial responsibilities toward the children, and disagreements over their education. The Respondent, a Nigerian resident in Ghana, denied these claims but admitted that efforts at reconciliation had failed and stated he could not force the Petitioner to remain in the marriage. The court considered the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), which establishes that the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, proven by specific facts such as the inability of the parties to reconcile. Despite the parties filing Terms of Settlement, the court fulfilled its duty to independently assess the state of the marriage. Based on the evidence, particularly the admitted failure of reconciliation efforts, the court found that the marriage had indeed broken down beyond reconciliation under the law. It therefore granted a decree of dissolution. The court also adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as consent judgment. Custody of the minor child was awarded to the Petitioner, with access granted to the Respondent. The Respondent was ordered to pay for the child’s education, medical expenses, and provide monthly maintenance of GH₵300, while the Petitioner would assist in upkeep. The matrimonial home was allocated for the benefit of all the children.
EUNICE OPOKUA OTCHERE V. MONOLO PLANT LIMITED
GIFTY DEKYEM J
Labour Law – Termination of Employment – Redundancy – Meaning of Redundancy under section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) – Negotiation of Redundancy Pay – Unfair Termination – Acceptance of Severance or Terminal Benefits – Pregnancy and Termination of Employment – Evidence – Burden of Proof In Civil Cases – NRCD 323 Material Facts The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company in September 2010. In 2014, she went on maternity leave and, upon resumption, alleged that her superior cautioned her against conceiving again soon. In late 2015, the plaintiff became pregnant again, and in February 2016, her pregnancy became visibly noticeable. On 15 February 2016, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment by a letter titled “REDUNDANCY”. The plaintiff contended that her termination was motivated by her pregnancy and that the defendant failed to negotiate redundancy pay as required under section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The defendant denied that the plaintiff was declared redundant, contending that the use of the term “redundancy” was merely nominal and that all terminal benefits due the plaintiff were paid. The plaintiff subsequently accepted and acknowledged receipt of GHS 20,033.90 as full and final settlement, stating she had no further claims against the employer. Claims 1. General damages for unfair termination 2. Redundancy pay calculated as five months’ salary for each year of service 3. 15% of the total amount claimed as costs and legal fees Holding 1. The plaintiff was not declared redundant within the meaning of section 65 of Act 651. 2. No legal duty to negotiate redundancy pay arose, as the statutory conditions for redundancy were not met. 3. By accepting the terminal benefits without protest, the plaintiff entered into a compromise agreement which extinguished any further claims. 4. The termination of employment became lawful and by mutual agreement.
KONAMA FELICIA VRS: EMMANUEL YEBOAH
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE GABRIEL NENE KWAO MATE TEYE
Family Law – Divorce – Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Prolonged Separation – Mutual Admission – Custody of Children – Maintenance – Compensation – Matrimonial Property – Consent Judgment – Alternative Dispute Resolution – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). This case involves a divorce petition filed by Felicia Konama against Emmanuel Yeboah on 14 January 2020, seeking dissolution of their marriage, custody of their five children, maintenance, and distribution of matrimonial property. The Respondent entered appearance and later filed an answer and cross-petition also seeking dissolution, custody, and settlement of property matters. Efforts at settlement through ADR failed, and the case proceeded to trial. Both parties testified and agreed that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, having lived apart for over five years without marital relations. Relying on the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the Court found sufficient grounds and dissolved the marriage. Custody of the children was granted to the Petitioner, with reasonable access to the Respondent. The Respondent was ordered to pay GH¢1,500 monthly for child maintenance and GH¢20,000 as compensation to the Petitioner. The Court also adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as consent judgment, under which the Respondent transferred all jointly acquired properties, including houses, plots of land, and farmlands, to the Petitioner and the children.
VIDA DOE VS. CORNELIUS FREMPONG
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
Family Law – Divorce – Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Adultery – Unreasonable Behaviour – Failure of Reconciliation – Custody of Children – Maintenance – Consent Judgment – Costs – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). This case involves a wife’s petition for the dissolution of a marriage contracted on 9th August 2003 at Koforidua under the Marriages Act (CAP 127). The parties lived together in Accra and had three minor children at the time of the petition. The Petitioner alleged that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the Respondent’s adultery and unreasonable behaviour, while the Respondent attributed the breakdown to persistent misunderstandings and failed reconciliation efforts. After hearing evidence from both parties, the Court found that the marriage had indeed broken down beyond reconciliation, particularly as all attempts to resolve their differences had failed. Relying on the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the Court granted a decree of dissolution and cancelled the marriage certificate. The Court also adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as a consent judgment. Custody of the children was granted to the Petitioner, with reasonable access to the Respondent. The Respondent was ordered to pay monthly maintenance of GH¢500 per child, subject to periodic increases, and to cover their educational, medical, and general welfare expenses. Each party was to bear their own legal costs.
DANIELLA MAWUSI NTOW SAPONG (MRS.) VS ERIC KWADWO NTOW SAPONG
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
Family Law – Divorce – Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Adultery – Failure of Reconciliation – Uncontested Petition – Effect of Unchallenged Evidence – Custody – Maintenance – Alimony – Costs – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The Petitioner initiated divorce proceedings seeking the dissolution of a marriage contracted on 11th May 1999 at the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly under the Marriages Act (CAP 127). The parties, both Ghanaian citizens, lived together in Teshie Nungua, Accra, and had three children who were in school at the time the petition was filed. The Petitioner attributed the breakdown of the marriage to the Respondent’s adultery and the parties’ inability to reconcile their differences. Despite being duly served, the Respondent failed to enter an appearance or participate in the proceedings. Consequently, the Court relied on the unchallenged evidence of the Petitioner, which established that the Respondent had engaged in an extramarital relationship with a maidservant, resulting in two children, and was cohabiting with her. The Court also found that the parties had lived apart for more than two years and that all attempts at reconciliation had failed. In accordance with the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the Court held that the Petitioner had successfully proven grounds for divorce, particularly adultery and failure to reconcile differences. It therefore concluded that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree of dissolution. With respect to the ancillary reliefs, the Court noted that the children were now adults and capable of deciding their preferred residence, subject to reasonable access by either parent. The Respondent was ordered to assume responsibility for their educational expenses, medical bills, and general upkeep. Additionally, the Court directed the Respondent to pay monthly maintenance to the Petitioner, a lump sum alimony, and legal costs, awarded in favour of the Petitioner.
THOMAS OWUSU-DANQUAH VS. THERESA OWUSU-DANQUAH
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
Family Law – Divorce – Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Separation – Failure of Reconciliation – Uncontested Petition – Effect of Unchallenged Evidence – Costs – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The Petitioner sought dissolution of a marriage contracted in 1974, stating that the relationship had broken down beyond reconciliation. The parties had two adult children and had lived apart for over 15 years, with repeated failed attempts at reconciliation. The Respondent filed an appearance but did not participate in the trial or present evidence. The Court accepted the Petitioner’s unchallenged evidence that the parties had lived separately for over 16 years and could not reconcile their differences. It therefore found that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The marriage was dissolved, the Petitioner’s reliefs were granted, and no costs were awarded.
JACOB AKUTU VRS ANTOINETTE AGUDZEMABE
CHARITY A. ASEM (MRS.) J.
Family Law – Divorce – Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Living Apart – Mutual Consent – Failure of Reconciliation – Cross‑Petition – Costs – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The Petitioner filed for divorce from a marriage contracted on 19 March 2016, stating that the relationship had broken down beyond reconciliation due to lack of care, communication, and suspected infidelity. The parties had been living apart since 2020 and had no children together. The Respondent filed an Answer and Cross-Petition but also agreed that the marriage had broken down irreconcilably, blaming the Petitioner for the breakdown and seeking maintenance, compensation, and costs. At trial, both parties confirmed they had not lived together as husband and wife since 2020 and admitted that reconciliation efforts had failed. Neither party provided strong evidence to support their allegations against the other. The Court found that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), mainly because the parties had lived apart for more than two years and both consented to dissolution. The marriage was therefore dissolved, with no order as to costs.
HELENA APPIAH ANFO VRS ANDREWS KOFI HANSON
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE RITA AGYEMAN-BUDU (MRS)
Family Law – Divorce – Customary and Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Unreasonable Behaviour – Failure of Reconciliation – Jointly Acquired Property – Contribution – Equitable Distribution – Custody of Children – Alimony – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) – 1992 Constitution, Article 22. This case involves a divorce petition by Helena Appiah Anfo seeking dissolution of both a customary and ordinance marriage contracted in 1995, along with claims for property, alimony, and other reliefs. The Respondent filed an answer and cross-petition disputing her contribution to the matrimonial home and seeking custody and other orders. The court considered three main issues: whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, whether the matrimonial property was jointly acquired, and custody of the children. On the first issue, both parties alleged unreasonable behaviour and admitted to prolonged lack of intimacy and failed reconciliation. The court found that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) and granted dissolution. On property, the court held that the matrimonial home at Community 25, Tema was jointly acquired since it was developed during the marriage and the Petitioner made some contributions, including maintenance and finishing works. However, her contribution was not substantial enough to justify equal sharing. The court therefore ordered that the property be valued and awarded the Petitioner 10% of its value, rejecting her claim for full ownership. Regarding custody, the court granted custody of the children to the Petitioner with unrestricted access to the Respondent, considering their welfare. Other reliefs sought by the Petitioner, including alimony and costs, were refused. The Respondent’s claim of sole ownership of the house was also rejected, though he succeeded in obtaining an order for the return of his personal documents. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage, recognized limited joint ownership of the matrimonial home, awarded the Petitioner a 10% share in its value, granted her custody of the children, and made no order as to costs.
AKOSUA K. FORI-DWUMAH VS. MARK FORI-DWUMAH
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
Family Law – Divorce – Ordinance Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Adultery – Unreasonable Behaviour – Failure of Reconciliation – Consent Judgment – Financial Settlement – Costs – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). This case involves a wife’s petition for divorce seeking dissolution of a marriage contracted in 2018 in Accra under the Marriages Act. The parties had no children and lived together in Accra. The Petitioner alleged that the marriage had broken down due to adultery and unreasonable behaviour, while the Respondent attributed the breakdown to mutual misunderstandings. The main issue before the court was whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). Evidence from both parties confirmed that they had serious differences and that all efforts at reconciliation had failed. The court held that the inability of the parties to reconcile their differences satisfied Section 2(1)(f) of Act 367. It therefore found that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree of dissolution. The court also adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as a consent judgment. Under the agreement, the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner a substantial amount as financial settlement in instalments over time. Each party was to bear their own costs. In conclusion, the marriage was dissolved based on failed reconciliation, and the agreed financial settlement was enforced by the court.
KWASI MFUM BOATENG VS. VIDA SRABIE
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
This case involves a husband’s petition for divorce seeking dissolution of a marriage contracted in 2004 in Accra under the Marriages Act. The Petitioner, now resident in Canada, claimed that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, emphasizing that the parties had lived apart for a long period. The Respondent, who resides in Accra, entered appearance and consented to the divorce but did not file a formal defence. The only issue before the court was whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). Evidence from both parties confirmed that they had not lived together as husband and wife for about sixteen years and had had little to no contact since 2007. The Respondent also expressly agreed to the dissolution. The court held that the prolonged separation and failure to reconcile satisfied the legal requirements under Section 2(1)(e) (living apart for at least five years) and Section 2(1)(f) (failure of reconciliation). It therefore found that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree of dissolution, cancelling the marriage certificate. Additionally, the court adopted the parties’ Terms of Settlement as a consent judgment. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage based on long separation and mutual consent, and upheld the agreed financial settlement between the parties.
DZIFA MADUGU BOYE VRS EDWARD BOYE
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE RITA AGYEMAN-BUDU (MRS)
Family Law – Divorce – Customary Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Consent to Divorce – Custody – Maintenance – Alimony – Matrimonial Property – Jointly Acquired Property – Contribution – Equitable Distribution – Costs – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) – 1992 Constitution, Article 22. This case involves a divorce petition filed by Dzifa Madugu Boye seeking dissolution of her customary marriage to Edward Boye, along with custody, maintenance, alimony, and property settlement. The Respondent filed an answer and cross-petition but both parties later agreed on partial terms of settlement, leaving the court to determine property distribution. The court identified two main issues: whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and whether the Petitioner was entitled to a share in the matrimonial properties. Both parties consented to the divorce and evidence showed prolonged separation and failure of maintenance by the Respondent. The court therefore held that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down and granted dissolution. On ancillary matters, the court adopted and modified the parties’ partial settlement. Custody of the two children was granted to the Petitioner with reasonable access to the Respondent. The Respondent was ordered to pay monthly for maintenance, cover school fees and medical expenses, and pay a lump sum settlement. Regarding property, the court found that several assets were acquired during the marriage and that the Petitioner had contributed, including through renovations and support. Applying constitutional principles on joint property, the court awarded the matrimonial home at Community 19 to the Petitioner. In lieu of other properties, the Respondent was ordered to pay a substantial amount of money as property settlement. Additionally, costs were awarded in favour of the Petitioner. Overall, the court dissolved the marriage, granted custody and financial reliefs to the Petitioner, and ensured equitable distribution of marital property.
LT. COL. GEORGE BOAMAH VS. EWURAMA MENSIMAA MENSAH
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
This case concerns a husband’s petition for divorce filed in 2018 seeking dissolution of an ordinance marriage contracted in 2006 in Accra. The parties, both Ghanaian, had no children and lived together initially at the Military Officers Flats in Accra. The Petitioner alleged that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the Respondent’s unreasonable behaviour, while the Respondent also filed a cross-petition alleging misconduct on the part of the Petitioner. At trial, both parties gave conflicting accounts of each other’s behaviour, including allegations of verbal abuse, physical violence, and neglect. However, it was undisputed that the parties had lived apart for about six years prior to the filing of the petition and that all attempts at reconciliation by family and friends had failed. The sole issue before the court was whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The court found that the prolonged separation of over five years and the inability of the parties to reconcile satisfied the statutory requirements under Section 2(1)(e) and (f). Accordingly, the court held that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down and granted a decree of dissolution. Additionally, the parties had reached a settlement through mediation, which the court adopted as a consent judgment.
ANDREWS MINTAH VRS PRISCILLA BEMPAH
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE GABRIEL NENE KWAO MATE TEYE
This case involves a divorce petition filed by Andrews Mintah seeking the dissolution of his ordinance marriage to Priscilla Owusu Bempah, contracted in 2017. The Petitioner asked the court to dissolve the marriage and make any further orders it deemed appropriate. The Respondent, through her lawful attorney, did not oppose the petition and expressly stated that she had moved on with her life and did not seek any financial settlement. Both parties participated in the proceedings through lawful attorneys and filed witness statements. The evidence showed that the couple had lived together in Ghana and later in Ireland, but the marriage deteriorated due to misunderstandings, lack of intimacy, and incompatibility. The Respondent eventually moved out, and the parties had lived apart for over two years. Efforts by friends to reconcile them were unsuccessful. The main issue before the court was whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation under Section 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The court found that both parties admitted the breakdown of the marriage, had lived separate lives, and were unable to reconcile their differences. The Respondent’s clear consent to the divorce and the evidence of separation supported this finding. The court concluded that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down, particularly under Section 2(1)(f), which relates to failure of reconciliation efforts. It therefore granted the petition and dissolved the marriage.
NAOMI QUAYSON VRS JOSEPH ACQUAH
HIS LORDSHIP BERNARD BENTIL
Family Law – Divorce – Customary Marriage – Breakdown of Marriage – Adultery – Unreasonable Behaviour – Prolonged Separation – Proof – Property Rights of Spouses – Jointly Acquired Property – Contribution – Equitable Distribution – Alimony – Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) The Petitioner, a trader, initiated proceedings (with leave of court granted on 3rd July 2018) seeking to dissolve a customary marriage contracted in or around April 1984. The parties, both Ghanaian, had cohabited since 1981 and had five adult children. The Petitioner alleged that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the Respondent’s adultery and unreasonable behaviour. She detailed a long history of neglect, threats, police harassment, verbal abuse, denial of marital companionship, and alleged infidelity. Additionally, she claimed joint ownership of several properties acquired during the marriage and sought equitable distribution and financial provision. The Respondent denied most of these allegations and offered a sharply different narrative. He contended that he had an existing customary marriage with another woman prior to marrying the Petitioner and that the Petitioner never truly cohabited with him as a wife. He rejected allegations of adultery and misconduct, asserting instead that he had supported the Petitioner financially, including providing accommodation, commercial shops, and capital for her business. He further denied that the listed properties were jointly acquired and counterclaimed an interest in property allegedly acquired by the Petitioner. However, he later abandoned his cross-petition. The Court identified three key issues: whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation; whether the properties in dispute were jointly acquired; and whether a property settlement would be just and equitable. On the first issue, the Court reiterated that under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the sole ground for divorce is breakdown of the marriage beyond reconciliation, which must be established through specific statutory facts such as adultery, unreasonable behaviour, or prolonged separation. The Court found that the Petitioner failed to prove adultery. Similarly, the claim of unreasonable behaviour was not sufficiently established. The Court held that many of the alleged acts, such as initiating legal proceedings, selling a vehicle, or failing to provide maintenance, either lacked proof of malice or were not grave enough to exceed the “ordinary wear and tear” of marital life. Notably, the Court accepted that the Respondent had provided some financial support, including business capital, which undermined claims of neglect. Despite rejecting these specific allegations, the Court found that the parties had lived apart for over five years, satisfying Section 2(1)(e) of Act 367. This prolonged separation, coupled with evidence of estrangement and the Respondent’s relocation, demonstrated that the marriage had indeed broken down beyond reconciliation. Accordingly, the Court granted the dissolution, though it expressed reluctance given the parties’ advanced age and long history together. On the issue of property, the Court relied on Article 22(3)(b) of the 1992 Constitution, which mandates equitable distribution of jointly acquired marital property. However, it emphasized that not all property acquired during marriage is automatically joint; there must be proof of contribution. Citing recent Supreme Court authorities, the Court held that the Petitioner failed to provide credible evidence of financial or substantial non-financial contribution. Her claims of monetary contributions were unsupported by documentation or witness corroboration. While she asserted that she supervised construction and provided food for workers, the Court found these contributions insufficiently substantial, describing them as ordinary or replaceable efforts that did not meet the legal threshold for joint ownership. Consequently, the Court held that the disputed properties were the self-acquired assets of the Respondent. Regarding property settlement, the Court exercised its discretion under Section 20 of Act 367 and concluded that it would not be just and equitable to award any portion of the Respondent’s property to the Petitioner. It also declined to enforce the Respondent’s voluntary indication of gifting a property, noting that such a decision remained entirely within his discretion. Additionally, any informal benefits previously enjoyed by the Petitioner, such as occupation of a store, were ordered to revert to the Respondent. Nonetheless, the Court recognized the Petitioner’s position and awarded her alimony in the sum of GH₵30,000. This reflects the Court’s attempt to balance fairness without granting proprietary rights unsupported by evidence. In conclusion, the Court dissolved the marriage on the basis of prolonged separation, rejected claims of adultery and unreasonable behaviour due to insufficient proof, denied the Petitioner any share in the disputed properties for lack of demonstrated contribution, and awarded a lump sum alimony.
EDITH ABA HUGHES VS. ROBERT G. THOMPSON
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS)
The Petitioner sought the dissolution of a marriage celebrated on 5th June 2008 in Accra under the Marriages Act (Cap 127). Although both parties are Ghanaian citizens, the Petitioner is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. During the subsistence of the marriage, the parties lived together in both the Greater Accra Region and the United Kingdom. Notably, there were no children born of the marriage. The Petitioner’s primary relief was a decree dissolving the marriage, along with an order that each party bear their own costs. The Respondent, despite being duly served with the petition, failed to enter an appearance, file a response, or participate in the proceedings at any stage, including the trial. As a result, the case proceeded uncontested, relying solely on the Petitioner’s evidence, which was presented through her lawful attorney. The central issue before the Court was whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, which is the sole ground for divorce under Section 1(2) of Act 367. The law requires that this ground be established by proof of at least one of the specific facts listed under Section 2(1), such as adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, prolonged separation, or inability to reconcile differences. In this case, the Petitioner relied on evidence that the parties had lived apart and had not maintained a marital relationship for approximately eight years preceding the filing of the petition. The lawful attorney testified that the parties had neither cohabited nor been intimate during this period, and that all attempts at reconciliation had failed. This evidence was unchallenged due to the Respondent’s absence. The Court emphasized its duty under Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of Act 367 to independently assess the evidence and be satisfied that the marriage had indeed irreconcilably broken down, even in the absence of opposition. Relying on established legal principles, held that uncontroverted evidence on oath may be accepted as proof of the facts asserted. Upon evaluating the evidence, the Court found that the parties had lived separately for well over the statutory minimum period and had been unable to reconcile their differences. It also inferred from the Respondent’s consistent failure to participate in the proceedings an intention not to contest the divorce. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation within the meaning of Sections 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(f) of Act 367. In its final orders, the Court granted the petition and dissolved the marriage with immediate effect. The marriage certificate was cancelled, and the Petitioner was granted all the reliefs sought, including the order as to costs.