DR. MARK ASSIBEY-YEBOAH VRS ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF GHANA, GHANA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (GNPC) AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Dr. Mark Assibey-Yeboah, filed a writ against the Electricity Company of Ghana, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, and the Attorney-General of Ghana, challenging the legality of certain energy and petroleum sector contracts. He contended that the agreements infringed public law principles and violated constitutional provisions governing state assets and resources. The Defendants argued that the contracts were lawful, properly executed, and in the national interest. The Supreme Court considered issues of public procurement, compliance with statutory mandates, and the protection of state resources. It emphasized that executive actions in the energy and petroleum sectors must align with statutory authority and constitutional norms. The Court dismissed claims unsupported by evidence of illegality, affirming the validity of lawful government contracts executed in accordance with established procedures.
X-TRA GOLD MINING LIMITED VRS ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Xtra-Gold Mining Limited, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Attorney-General of Ghana, challenging governmental actions affecting its mining operations. The Plaintiff contended that certain executive measures and regulatory interventions violated its contractual and property rights under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. It argued that the State’s actions were arbitrary and amounted to unlawful interference with its lawful business. The Defendant maintained that the actions were justified in the public interest and within the scope of regulatory authority over natural resources. The Supreme Court examined the balance between state regulatory power and protection of private rights in the extractive sector. The Court emphasized that while the State retains control over natural resources, such powers must be exercised in accordance with law and constitutional safeguards.
H/L JUSTICE MUSTAPHA HABIB LOGOH, H/L JUSTICE PAUL UUTER DERY AND H/L JUSTICE GILBERT AYISI ADDO VRS TIGER EYE PI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs, Mustapha Habib Logoh, Paul Uuter Dery, and Gilbert Ayisi Addo, all High Court judges, challenged proceedings initiated following an investigative exposé by Tiger Eye PI. They sought to restrain disciplinary processes commenced under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, arguing breaches of due process and judicial independence. The Defendants, including the Chief Justice of Ghana and the Attorney-General of Ghana, maintained that the constitutional procedures for removal of judges were properly invoked. The Supreme Court examined whether the ongoing removal proceedings could be halted by interlocutory injunction. The Court held that Article 146 processes are constitutionally grounded and should not be lightly interfered with. It therefore declined to restrain the proceedings and emphasized the exceptional threshold required to halt such constitutional processes.
KWESI NYAME-TEASE ESHUN VRS ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Kwesi Nyame-Tease Eshun, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Attorney-General of Ghana, challenging aspects of the electoral framework. He contended that certain actions and decisions of the Electoral Commission were inconsistent with provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly regarding electoral processes and eligibility. The Defendants argued that the Commission acted within its constitutional mandate and statutory authority. The Supreme Court examined whether the issues raised disclosed a genuine question of constitutional interpretation or enforcement. The Court emphasized that not every electoral grievance warrants invocation of its original jurisdiction. It accordingly clarified the threshold for constitutional claims and reaffirmed the limits of judicial intervention in electoral administration.
DR. KWAME AMOAKO TUFFUOR, BENJAMIN ARTHUR AND ADREBA ABREFA DAMOAH VRS ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs, Kwame Amoako Tuffuor, Benjamin Arthur, and Adreba Abrefa Damoah, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against the Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Attorney-General of Ghana. They challenged certain electoral processes and decisions undertaken by the Commission as being inconsistent with provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Plaintiffs argued that the actions of the Electoral Commission undermined constitutional principles governing free and fair elections. The Defendants contended that the Commission acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate. The Supreme Court examined the scope of the Electoral Commission’s independence and its constitutional responsibilities. The Court reaffirmed that while the Commission enjoys operational independence, its actions must remain consistent with the Constitution and subject to judicial review where necessary.
MARTIN A. ATUAHENE FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD VRS GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD
Supreme Court
Labour Law – Employment – Severance Pay – Redundancy – Privatisation – Whether employees lost their employment upon privatisation of PBC Ltd – Whether diminution of conditions of service occurred – Whether severance award was justified. Facts: The Appellant, acting on behalf of 683 employees, claimed entitlement to severance pay following the privatisation of Produce Buying Company Ltd (PBC Ltd), a former subsidiary of Cocobod. They argued that Cocobod’s off‑loading of shares and transfer of ownership severed their employment relationship and diminished their conditions of service. The High Court upheld their claims, but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision. Issues: Whether the Appellants’ employment was severed due to the privatisation of PBC Ltd. Whether the Appellants became unemployed or suffered diminution in their conditions of service as required under section 34 of the Labour (Amendment) Act, 1969 (NLCD 342). Whether the Appellants were entitled to severance pay. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the High Court’s decision and awarding costs against the Appellants. Held: No severance of employment occurred. The Appellants were employees of PBC Ltd both before and after privatisation; the shareholder change did not affect the legal identity of their employer. No unemployment or diminution in conditions of service was proven. Evidence showed salary realignment to match Cocobod workers and that scholarships and medical benefits were not rights automatically accruing to all employees. The statutory criteria for severance pay were not met. Under section 34 of NLCD 342, both severance of employment and adverse effect on employment terms must occur. Neither was established. The Court of Appeal was justified in overturning the trial court’s judgment. The appeal lacked merit and was dismissed.
JESSE AMISSAH TURKSON, FLORENCE KOTEY AND HON. MAVIS HAWA KOOMSON VRS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ECONOMIC AND ORGANISED CRIME OFFICE AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs, Jesse Amissah Turkson, Florence Kotey, and Mavis Hawa Koomson, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) and the Attorney-General of Ghana. They challenged investigative and enforcement actions taken by EOCO, alleging violations of their fundamental human rights under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Plaintiffs contended that EOCO acted outside its statutory mandate and without due process. The Defendants argued that the actions were lawful and within EOCO’s investigative powers. The Supreme Court examined the scope of EOCO’s authority and the constitutional protections applicable to persons under investigation. The Court emphasized that while EOCO has broad investigative powers, such powers must be exercised in strict compliance with the Constitution and principles of due process.
FAUSTINA TETTEH VRS T. CHANDIRAM & CO. GH. LTD. DECORPLAST LTD. MR. INDRU MAHBUBANI ARUN MALKANI
Supreme Court
Employment Law — Directors’ Remuneration — Burden of Proof — Corporate Veil — Special Damages — Evidence The appellant, an employee and later director of the 1st and 2nd respondent companies, alleged discrimination, withdrawal of duties, unpaid allowances, and entitlement to various sums including US$400,000 purportedly promised as annual director reward. She also claimed unpaid director allowances, medical refunds, and vehicle maintenance expenses. The High Court granted most of her claims and held the 3rd and 4th respondents jointly and severally liable. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, holding that she failed to prove the claims. She appealed to the Supreme Court on 11 grounds, 10 of which alleged errors of law without furnishing particulars. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1Grounds of appeal alleging error of law must strictly comply with Rule 6(1)(f) of CI 16 by providing particulars. The appellant’s first ten grounds were struck out for non‑compliance. 2 A party relying on a claim capable of positive proof bears the evidential burden under s.11 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). The appellant failed to lead credible evidence to prove the alleged promise of US$50,000 annually totalling US$400,000. No company resolution existed as required under s.194(1), Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179) for director remuneration. 3Director’s fees claimed as arrears (GHC 3,500) were not owed. Payment vouchers tendered by respondents showed both fuel allowance and director fees were paid together. The appellant admitted receipt of fuel allowance, implying she received the director fees as well. No evidence of demand for arrears was produced. 4 Payments described as “Fausty Commission” could not constitute monthly allowance equivalent to Sales Manager’s commission. The appellant led no evidence of the alleged allowance, its basis, or quantum. The Court accepted respondents’ explanation that these were commissions for introducing a customer. 5 Claims for medical bills and vehicle maintenance were in the nature of special damages and had to be pleaded and particularized. Medical claims also breached Article 14 of the Collective Agreement, as receipts lacked prescriptions and the clinic used was not shown to be approved. Reliefs were therefore rightly rejected. 6Injunctions based on discrimination or victimization were improper. The High Court dismissed the substantive claims but still granted injunctions; this was inconsistent. Mere reassignment of duties did not amount to discrimination. 7 Corporate veil could not be lifted in the absence of fraud or improper conduct. The pleadings disclosed no personal liability of the 3rd and 4th respondents. There was no basis to hold them jointly and severally liable with the companies. Salomon v Salomon and Morkor v Kuma applied
Abusuapanin Kwaku Gyekyei (Suing for Himself and on behalf of Odumase Aduana Royal Family, Kumawu) v. Philip Boakye and Maame Nyankomago (Deceased)
Court of Appeal
his was an appeal against the decision of the Circuit Court which dismissed the Plaintiff/Appellant’s claim for declaration of title and recovery of possession of ancestral family land. The Plaintiff, suing as head of the Odumase Aduana Royal Family, alleged that the Defendants had trespassed onto family land. The Defendants, however, contended that the land had been gifted to their ancestress, Amma Dapaah, through her husband Nana Yaw Kwakye, a member of the Plaintiff’s family, and that they had been in continuous occupation for over a century. At trial, evidence, including admissions by the Plaintiff under cross-examination, established that the land had indeed been given to Nana Yaw Kwakye and his wife, and that the Defendants’ family had remained in undisturbed possession even after the cocoa farm on the land became fallow. The trial court found that the Plaintiff failed to prove trespass or establish a superior title and accordingly dismissed the claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence and affirmed the trial court’s findings, holding that the Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof. The Court emphasized that long, undisturbed possession coupled with evidence of a customary gift supported the Defendants’ title, and that the Plaintiff’s own admissions weakened his case. The appeal, which was based on the ground that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, was dismissed as the trial court’s decision was supported by the record
MARTIN KPEBU VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction challenging the powers of the Statute Law Revision Commissioner under the Laws of Ghana (Revised Edition) Act, 1998 (Act 562), particularly the omission of the marital consent exception in section 42(g) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). He argued that the omission amounted to an unconstitutional substantive amendment, usurping Parliament’s legislative power under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Court examined the scope of the Commissioner’s powers, including adaptation and amendment to conform laws to the Constitution. It held that the Commissioner acted within his statutory mandate and exercised lawful discretion under Act 562. The Court further found that Parliament’s adoption of the Revised Edition gave the changes full legislative authority. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims failed and the action was dismissed.
JULIUS SYLVESTER BORTEY ALABI VRS PARESH DEE JAY B5 PLUS COMPANY LIMITED
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Negligence — Workmen’s Compensation — Service of Court Processes — Jurisdiction — Exercise of Judicial Discretion — Stay of Execution Facts Plaintiff, a casual worker at B5 Plus, suffered severe injury when instructed to remove a metal sheet stuck in a roofing‑sheet machine. The machine mashed his hands, causing amputation of all 10 fingers, with 80% disability and 20% disfigurement. Plaintiff asserted negligence; Defendants denied negligence but admitted they paid initial medical bills and wages. High Court entered judgment for Plaintiff for GH¢4,417,600 + US$30,000 plus costs after Defendants repeatedly failed to attend proceedings despite EMS‑confirmed service of hearing notices. Defendants appealed and sought stay of execution. Single Justice of the Court of Appeal ordered payment of half the judgment debt as condition for stay. Full Court of Appeal varied this and ordered payment of GH¢30,000 instead, citing alleged lack of service and jurisdiction concerns. Holding No genuine ground of appeal existed. Defendants were properly served and knowingly failed to attend trial; thus, no jurisdictional issue arose. Discretion was wrongly exercised. The GH¢30,000 award was neither supported by evidence nor adequate to minimize Plaintiff’s extreme hardship.
FRANK OTAH ENYEREM VRS LOGISTICS INC. LIMITED, MR. DOMPREH, P. S. C. TEMA SHIPYARD LTD, MAXWELL FORSON, SETH KUBLENU AND THE REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT, TEMA
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Frank Otah Enyerem, initiated proceedings against Logistics Inc. Limited and several individuals, including company directors and the Registrar of the High Court, Tema, seeking enforcement of contractual and corporate obligations. The dispute arose from alleged breaches in commercial agreements and corporate governance at the Tema Shipyard Ltd. The Plaintiff claimed entitlement to certain corporate benefits and remedies for wrongs suffered due to mismanagement. The Defendants denied liability and challenged the procedural propriety of the Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court analyzed the principles of corporate governance, contractual obligations, and the powers of company directors vis-à-vis shareholders. The Court emphasized adherence to corporate law, proper statutory procedures, and protection of shareholder rights in resolving the dispute.
OCCUPY GHANA VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Occupy Ghana, filed a writ against the Attorney-General of Ghana seeking a declaration on the constitutionality of certain government policies and actions alleged to infringe on citizens’ rights. The dispute centered on transparency, accountability, and public participation in governance, particularly concerning resource management and policy implementation. The Plaintiff argued that these actions violated fundamental rights under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Defendant contended that the actions were lawful exercises of executive authority and consistent with statutory mandates. The Supreme Court examined the balance between executive discretion and constitutional guarantees of accountability, transparency, and citizen participation. The Court emphasized the obligation of government officials to act within constitutional bounds and uphold citizens’ rights in governance matters.
CIVIL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT STAFF ASSOCIATION OF GHANA (CLOSSAG) VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE OFFICE OF THE HEAD OF CIVIL SERVICE AND THE OFFICE OF THE HEAD OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana (CLOSSAG), invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against the Attorney-General of Ghana, the Office of the Head of Civil Service (Ghana), and the Office of the Head of Local Government Service (Ghana). The dispute concerned the constitutional propriety of administrative directives affecting the transfer, posting, and control of staff between the Civil Service and Local Government Service. CLOSSAG argued that the directives violated provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana governing the autonomy and structure of the respective services. The Defendants maintained that the actions were lawful and within administrative competence. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional framework regulating public services and the separation of authority between these institutions. The Court clarified the limits of administrative control and emphasized adherence to constitutional provisions governing public service management.
CLAUDE OPPON VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO PAYMENTS FROM PUBLIC FUNDS ARISING FROM JUDGMENT DEBTS AND RELATED PROCESSES
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Claude Oppon, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the Commission of Inquiry into Judgment Debts established by the President. He contended that aspects of the Commission’s mandate, procedures, and findings were inconsistent with the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly regarding due process and the scope of inquiry powers. The action was brought against the Attorney-General of Ghana as the State’s legal representative. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional basis for the establishment of commissions of inquiry under Article 278 and their powers. The Court held that such commissions are constitutionally recognized bodies with defined investigative functions, subject to constitutional safeguards. It clarified the limits of their authority and affirmed that their work must conform to principles of fairness and legality.
Sloateng & Company Ltd v National Sports Authority
Court of Appeal
This was an appeal against a High Court decision which dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim to title and upheld the Defendant’s counterclaim over House No. 156, Ringway Estate, Osu. The Plaintiff relied on a chain of registered instruments culminating in a Land Title Certificate, while the Defendant relied on prior purchase, long possession since 1960, and continuous recognition by the State Housing Company. The Court of Appeal held that the Defendant had established a better title based on prior grant, possession, and statutory recognition, and that the Plaintiff’s registration, done with notice and during litigation, could not defeat that interest. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Opanin Kwaku Asare v. Oheneyere Abena Akyaa Panin
Court of Appeal
The plaintiff claimed title to three plots of land allegedly acquired from the Takyiaw Stool and sought recovery of possession, damages for trespass, and injunction. The defendant denied the claim and alleged fraud in the acquisition, counterclaiming ownership of other plots said to belong to the stool. The trial Circuit Court found for the plaintiff, holding that he had proved his title and that the defendant failed to establish fraud. On appeal, the defendant challenged the findings on fraud, admissibility of documents, rejection of her layout plan, failure to consider her counterclaim, and the award of damages for trespass. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant failed to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt despite properly pleading it. The court further held that certain documents relied upon by the plaintiff were inadmissible but their admission did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. The court also found that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defendant’s planning scheme. Ultimately, the Court upheld the plaintiff’s title but set aside the award of damages for trespass and substituted it with general damages for interference with possessory rights.
J. K. AGYARBENG & 62 ORS VRS SG/SSB BANK
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Termination — Redundancy — Severance Pay — Interpretation of NLCD 157 — Whether employer was obliged to negotiate severance pay with senior staff — Voluntary separation — Damages. The respondents, senior staff of the appellant bank, challenged the termination of their employment following a re‑organisation and redundancy exercise. They contended that the bank was statutorily required, under sections 34 and 35 of the Labour Decree 1967 (NLCD 157), to negotiate severance benefits with them through the Standing Joint Negotiation Committee, and that the severance packages they accepted were unilaterally imposed. The High Court entered judgment for the respondents, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the award of damages. Held, allowing the appeal: 1. Sections 34 and 35 of NLCD 157 apply only where termination results from close‑down, arrangement, or amalgamation, and not from redundancy; the provisions therefore did not impose any duty on the employer to negotiate severance with the respondents. 2. The termination was lawful, as the respondents voluntarily opted for redundancy and accepted severance payments without making negotiation a condition precedent. 3. Damages were unwarranted, as the respondents provided no evidence of any specific severance entitlement beyond what they received, and no legal or contractual basis existed for a higher award. The decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal were set aside.
Emmanuel Andema v Kuribire Amogre & Anipoka Amogrea; and Abokutum Abongo & 2 Others
Court of Appeal
This case concerns a dispute over title to land at Akunkongo-Doba, where the Plaintiff claimed ownership through a customary grant from the Tindana of Doba and long possession, while the Defendants asserted title based on first settlement and historical occupation. The trial court found that the Plaintiff had established a valid root of title and acts of ownership, and dismissed the Defendants’ counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the Plaintiff’s evidence was more credible and that the Defendants failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish their claim.
Cletus Babron Kufia & Abena Chonga Kufia v. Mr. Aikins, Sister Ama & Uncle Brown
Court of Appeal
This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court in a land dispute at Adenta. The Plaintiffs relied on a registered lease and land title certificate issued by the State Housing Company as proof of ownership. The Defendants, however, asserted long possession, allocation under a housing scheme, and continuous occupation since 1989. The Court of Appeal held that a land title certificate is not conclusive proof of title and may be defeated by prior equitable interests and adverse possession. The Court further held that occupation constitutes constructive notice to a purchaser and that failure to investigate such possession is fatal. The defence of adverse possession was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.