Lands Commission v Owusu Comfort
High Court
This case concerned the enforcement of lease covenants relating to development and payment of ground rent. The Lands Commission sought to re-enter and recover possession of Plot No. 1, Block H, Sector 17, Sunyani Abesim Dominase after the Defendant failed to develop the land and pay ground rent as required under a 99-year lease. The Defendant failed to enter appearance or file a defence despite substituted service of the court processes. The Court held that the Plaintiff had established its case on the preponderance of probabilities and granted the reliefs sought including re-entry, recovery of possession, perpetual injunction, and costs.
ELIKPLIM AGBEMAVA VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALFRED TUAH-YEBOAH VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NANA ASANTE BEDIATUO VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC, BENIN, JSC, APPAU, JSC, PWAMANG, JSC
The cases were brought separately by Elikplim Agbemava, Alfred Tuah‑Yeboah and Nana Asante Bediatuo against the Attorney‑General of Ghana, and were later consolidated by the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Presidential (Transition) Act, 2012 (Act 845), particularly provisions relating to end-of-service benefits for the President and Vice-President. They argued that the Act granted benefits beyond what is permitted under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, especially Articles 68 and 71. The Attorney-General contended that the Act was a lawful implementation of constitutional provisions governing presidential transition and benefits. The Supreme Court examined whether Parliament could grant such benefits through legislation. The Court held that some provisions of the Act were unconstitutional to the extent that they granted benefits not authorized by the Constitution.
CHARLES AFFRAN VRS SG-SSB LIMITED
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC (PRESIDING), GBADEGBE, JSC, PWAMANG, JSC, DORDZIE, JSC, KOTEY, JSC
Employment Law — Wrongful Dismissal — Negligence — Verification of Signatures — Bank’s Internal Protocol — Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The appellant, a Deputy Branch Manager of the respondent bank, received two transfer request letters purportedly from a customer (Emefs Construction Ltd.) and, after stamping and signing them, forwarded them to the bank’s International Business Centre (IBC) for processing. The signatures on the letters were later discovered to be forgeries, leading to an unrecovered loss of £114,764 to the bank. After an internal process, the bank terminated the appellant’s employment for gross negligence. The appellant sued for wrongful and unlawful termination. The High Court entered judgment in his favour, finding no negligence and declaring the termination wrongful. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the appellant had failed in his duty to verify the signatures in accordance with the bank’s established protocol. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1. Verification of signatures on transfer request letters is the responsibility of the branch manager under the bank’s internal operating procedure (Exhibit F). The appellant’s attempt to shift the duty to the IBC was inconsistent with the explicit terms of the protocol, which required the branch to verify customer signatures before transmitting documents to the IBC. 2. The appellant was negligent in his performance of this duty. He failed to verify the signatures against those stored in the bank’s Core Banking System (Flexcube), instead relying on signatures appearing on other correspondence from the customer, contrary to established procedure. This constituted a breach of the internal protocol and justified the findings of negligence by the Court of Appeal. 3. The termination of the appellant’s employment was not wrongful. Under the applicable employment contract (Exhibit G), either party may terminate the contract by giving one month’s notice or salary in lieu. The bank complied with this requirement. At common law and under Ghanaian jurisprudence (Kobea & Ors v. TOR), an employer need not assign reasons for termination provided contractual notice obligations are fulfilled. 4. The termination was not “unfair” within the meaning of sections 62–63 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The appellant did not bring a claim for unfair termination, and in any event the statute recognises incompetence and proven misconduct as grounds for fair termination. The High Court erred in invoking section 62 when the claim was for wrongful dismissal, not statutory unfair termination. 5. On the totality of the evidence, the Court of Appeal properly evaluated the record and was justified in reversing the decision of the High Court. The appellant failed to discharge his duty of verification, and his negligence provided valid grounds for the employer to invoke its contractual right of termination. The appeal accordingly lacked merit and was dismissed.
PROFESSOR E. O. ADEKOLU JOHN VRS UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES TAMALE, S. M. KUUIRE
R. C. OWUSU(MS) JSC (PRESIDING), J. V. M. DOTSE JSC, ANIN YEBOAH JSC, P. BAFFOE-BONNIE JSC N.S. GBADEGBE JSC
LABOUR LAW — PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES — CONTRACT RENEWAL — ULTRA VIRES TERMINATION — DEFAMATION — QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE — DAMAGES The Plaintiff, a Professor of Medicine and Head of Department at the University for Development Studies (UDS), challenged a letter issued by the Acting Registrar purporting to terminate his contract on behalf of a non‑existent University Council. He further claimed damages for defamation arising from an internal memorandum authored by the Registrar describing him as having “carried your insanity too far afield for my liking,” which was circulated to senior university officials and placed on his official file. The High Court dismissed the action, but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the termination letter was null and void and that the impugned words were defamatory. It awarded damages for wrongful termination, defamation, and costs. On further appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeal except on the quantum of defamation damages, which it increased from GH¢10,000 to GH¢20,000, holding that imputing insanity to a distinguished academic was plainly defamatory, malicious, and unsupported by any privileged occasion. The Court found that the memorandum had been published to third parties, would remain in the Plaintiff’s official file, and was likely to injure his professional reputation. The defence of qualified privilege was rejected due to lack of evidence and the presence of malice. The Court declined reinstatement, holding that the Court of Appeal had adequately addressed the unlawful termination. It ordered that the judgment be placed on the Plaintiff’s personnel file and directed that the 2nd Defendant be surcharged GH¢10,000 (50% of the defamatory damages) if still in employment, given his reckless and injurious conduct. Held: 1. The Registrar’s termination letter was ultra vires and unlawful. 2. The words “you have carried your insanity too far afield for my liking” are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning. 3. The memorandum was published, carried malice, and was not protected by qualified privilege. 4. Defamation damages enhanced to GH¢20,000; wrongful termination damages (GH¢5,000) and costs (GH¢2,000) affirmed. 5. Order for filing the judgment on the Plaintiff’s record; surcharge imposed on the Registrar.
BENJAMIN ARYEE & 691 ORS. VRS COCOA MARKETING COMPANY
ADINYIRA, JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO, JSC
Employment Law — Casual vs. Permanent Employment — Continuous Work — Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) — Wrongful Termination — Interpretation of Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), s.78 — Requirement of Notice under s.17 — Purposive Interpretation under Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792). The Plaintiffs, employed between 2002 and 2006 as cocoa carriers, loaders, cleaners, and sack‑sewers, claimed that although they worked continuously for over four years, the Defendant treated them as casual workers, paid them as such, and terminated their employment on 31 December 2006 without notice. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiffs were casual workers engaged daily through “gang leaders” and thus not entitled to permanent‑worker benefits. The High Court held that the Plaintiffs were permanent employees and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal reversed this finding, holding that the Plaintiffs were casual workers under s.78 of the Labour Act. Held, allowing the appeal in part (per Adinyira JSC): 1. A worker is a “casual worker” under s.78 of Act 651 only where all three statutory elements co‑exist—seasonal or intermittent work, employment not exceeding six continuous months, and daily remuneration. The Plaintiffs’ work was continuous, non‑seasonal, and always available at Tema port; payment on a daily basis alone cannot classify them as casual workers. 2. Where a worker initially engaged as a casual worker performs continuous work beyond six months, that worker becomes a permanent worker under the Labour Act, with full statutory protections. 3. The CBA executed on behalf of the Plaintiffs provided benefits—annual leave, retirement age, notice requirements—which are incompatible with casual employment, confirming their permanent status. The Court of Appeal erred in its construction of the CBA. 4. Termination of Plaintiffs’ employment without notice violated s.17(1) of Act 651. Having served more than four years, each Plaintiff was entitled to one month’s notice or pay in lieu, rendering the termination wrongful. 5. Relief for breach of economic rights under arts. 17 and 24(1) of the Constitution was dismissed, as payment on a daily rate under the CBA did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination.
Nene Dokutso Tei Kwabla (Head of Tei Kwabla Family suing for himself and on behalf of Tei Kwabla Family) v Lands Commission & Volta (Gh.) Investment Co. Ltd
APPAU, JSC
This Supreme Court of Ghana decision concerns a dispute over Bundase lands claimed by the Tei Kwabla family. The appellant alleged ancestral ownership and claimed the State had abandoned the land for over 30 years, invoking adverse possession under the Limitation Act, 1972 [Act 54]. The case addressed whether the 1968 Instrument vesting the land in the State violated family land rights and whether the lease to Volta (Gh.) Investment Co. Ltd was lawful. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ findings that the appellant failed to prove ownership on the preponderance of probabilities and held that lands vested in the President before the 1992 Constitution remain under the President’s trusteeship.
Samuel Ayim v. The Lands Commission
Justice Jennifer Anne Myers Ahmed (Mrs.)
Samuel Ayim sued the Lands Commission for outstanding compensation for two properties affected by the Awoshie–Pokuase Road and Urban Development Project. The Defendant had paid partial compensation based on its valuation, while the Plaintiff obtained an independent valuation showing higher amounts due. The Defendant repeatedly failed to appear in court. The High Court held that the Plaintiff was entitled to the full outstanding compensation, interest, and costs, emphasizing that a party who disables itself from being heard cannot later claim a breach of natural justice. Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff.
Mohammed Odartey Lamptey v Lands Commission, Apostolic Faith Mission, Wafa Yaw & Asare K. Boadi,
YEBOAH, JSC
The Supreme Court considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal reversing the High Court’s dismissal of a leaseholder’s claim for possession, damages, and injunctions against alleged trespassers. The High Court had based its decision on Article 20(5) of the 1992 Constitution, which was not raised by any party. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal, holding that courts cannot raise suo motu points of law outside the pleadings and confirmed the statutory duties of state institutions, the principles of leasehold, possession, and trespass in land law.
The Republic v High Court (Lands Division), Accra; Ex parte Lands Commission (8 Interested Parties)
DOTSE JSC: (FOR THE MAJORITY OPINION)
The Lands Commission, a constitutional body established under Article 258 of the 1992 Constitution and the Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767), applied to the Supreme Court for an order of certiorari to quash the judgment of the High Court (Lands Division) delivered on 19th December 2014 by Justice S. H. Ocran. The High Court had declared Executive Instruments (E.I.) 46 and 44 of 1973 impliedly revoked by the conduct of two state institutions, contrary to procedures set out in the Lands (Statutory Wayleaves) Act, 1963 (Act 186) and its Regulations (L.I. 334). The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction, as the revocation of statutory instruments must follow the explicit legal procedures. Certiorari was granted to quash the High Court judgment, restoring the validity of E.I. 46 and 44.
EASTERN ALLOYS COMPANY LTD VRS CHIRANO GOLD MINES
ANIN YEBOAH JSC (PRESIDING), BAFFOE- BONNIE JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, APPAU JSC, PWAMANG JSC
Contract—Haulage Agreement—Termination—Conclusive Presumptions—Waiver—Special Damages—Proof—General Damages The plaintiff and defendant entered into a haulage contract for the transportation of ore. The defendant terminated the contract before expiry, citing the plaintiff’s failure to procure a permanent fleet as required. The plaintiff claimed the termination was wrongful and sought US$1,350,000 as damages together with interest and costs. The High Court and Court of Appeal both found for the plaintiff. On a further appeal, the Supreme Court held that Exhibit F, relied on by the defendant as evidence of waiver of the plaintiff’s right to sue, was not binding, as it was addressed to the managing director but signed by an unauthorized person. Accordingly, no valid waiver arose. Considering Exhibits D and E together, and applying sections 24 and 26 of the Evidence Act (NRCD 323), the Court held that the defendant was bound by its own stated reason for termination—failure to procure permanent equipment—and was precluded from advancing a different justification. The termination was therefore wrongful. However, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to strictly prove the pleaded special damages relating to: (a) loss on equipment, (b) severance of labour, (c) unrefunded deposits on equipment, and (d) administrative expenses. The receipts tendered were unreliable, some were denominated in foreign currency, others bore dates outside the period of the contract, and no credible linkage was established between the expenditures and the haulage agreement. The Court found the evidence insufficient to meet the strict standard for special damages. Although special damages were not proved, the Court held that some loss flowing from severance of labour could reasonably be presumed as a direct consequence of the wrongful termination. In line with settled practice, the Court substituted an award of US$50,000 (cedi equivalent) as general damages for severance of labour and set aside all other awards.
MAYOR AGBLEZE, DESTINY AWLIMEY AND JEAN-CLAUDE KOKU AMENYAGLO VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, MARFUL-SAU, JSC, DORDZIE (MRS), JSC, AMEGATCHER, JSC, KOTEY, JSC
The Plaintiffs, Mayor Agbleze, Destiny Awlimey and Jean‑Claude Koku Amenyaglo, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seeking interpretation of provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana relating to voter registration and electoral eligibility. They challenged the legality of certain decisions and guidelines issued by the Electoral Commission of Ghana concerning the compilation of the voters’ register. The Plaintiffs contended that the measures adopted were inconsistent with constitutional provisions governing the right to vote and participation in public elections. The Defendants, including the Attorney‑General of Ghana, argued that the Electoral Commission acted within its constitutional mandate to regulate elections. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional powers of the Electoral Commission in managing the electoral process. The Court clarified the scope of the Commission’s authority and the constitutional safeguards applicable to voter registration.
Jeleel Company GH. Limited v Zion Energy Limited & Trassacco Furniture Limited, 2022 Supreme Court Case
DOTSE JSC
The Applicant sought a stay of execution of the Court of Appeal judgment that set aside a High Court Writ of Possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, citing non-compliance with Order 43 r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), which mandates notice to persons in actual possession of land before execution of possession orders.
SAMPSON ESSIAM V. FEMME ARCH CONSULT & ANOR
NOVISI ARYENE JA
Labour Law — Contract — Contract for Service and Contract of Service — Consortium Agreements — Termination of Consultant — Interpretation of Clause on Key Personnel — Burden of Proof — Fee Entitlements. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against a High Court judgment which held that the plaintiff, a structural engineer engaged as part of a consortium for two construction projects, had been wrongfully removed by the defendants without complying with the contractual requirement that no key personnel may be replaced without the client’s prior approval. Construing Clause 4 of the Consultancy Agreement, the Court held that although the lead consultant may replace non-performing key personnel, such replacement must receive the client’s written approval, which was absent in this case. Accordingly, the termination was unlawful. On the issue of fee distribution, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s finding that 3.15% was the correct fee entitlement, relying on documentary evidence (exhibits F and G) prepared by the 2nd defendant, and holding that the defendants failed to rebut the prima facie proof required under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). The Court further upheld the finding that the plaintiff had substantially discharged his contractual obligations, noting admissions during cross‑examination that his drawings were used for tendering and that delays were attributable largely to funding constraints rather than non-performance. Interest awarded at the prevailing bank rate was also affirmed under C.I. 52. Appeal dismissed, save that the Court ordered that the new structural engineer who replaced the plaintiff is entitled to 50% of the last tranche of consultancy fees earned after the plaintiff’s termination.
JAMES KWABENA BOMFEH JNR. VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ADINYIRA (MRS.), JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), JSC, BENIN, JSC, MARFUL-SAU, JSC
The Plaintiff, James Kwabena Bomfeh Jr., invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seeking interpretation and enforcement of provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana concerning the eligibility of persons appointed to public boards. He challenged the legality of certain appointments made by the President to governing boards of state institutions. The Plaintiff contended that the appointments violated constitutional provisions regulating public office and the principles governing the exercise of executive power. The Defendant, the Attorney-General of Ghana, argued that the President acted within the powers granted under the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional provisions regulating appointments to public boards and the scope of presidential discretion. The Court clarified the relevant constitutional principles and determined whether the impugned appointments were consistent with the Constitution.
BERNARD MENSAH-QUARM V. GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY
AYEBI, JA
Employment Law — Interdiction — Half‑Salary — Limitation — Continuing Injury — Exercise of Administrative Discretion — Reinstatement. The appellant, a CEPS officer interdicted in 1999 after being charged before the Regional Tribunal, remained on interdiction for over a decade due to a stalled criminal prosecution. Under the 1998 Conditions of Service, he received half salary, but payment ceased in 2005 following the introduction of the 2003 Conditions, which limited half‑salary payment during interdiction to one year. The High Court dismissed his claims for reinstatement but ordered payment of arrears of half salary from 2005. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that although the employment relationship was governed by simple contract, the appellant’s action was not statute‑barred, as the cause of action was continuing, arising from an ongoing interdiction and an abandoned prosecution acknowledged by the employer. The Court held that the respondent's literal application of the one‑year salary limitation under Article 17 of the 2003 Conditions, in circumstances where the prosecution had stalled through no fault of the appellant, amounted to an unfair and unreasonable exercise of administrative discretion, contrary to Articles 23 and 296 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that reinstatement could only follow acquittal or discharge, which had not occurred, and thus reinstatement was properly refused. However, cessation of half salary was unjustified, and arrears were rightly awarded. The Court restored the struck‑out Entry of Judgment directing payment of half salary and dismissed the respondent’s cross‑appeal on limitation. Held: 1. Employment relationship governed by simple contract, but limitation does not apply where the wrong is continuing. 2. Stoppage of half salary in 2005 amounted to unfair exercise of discretion; arrears payable with interest. 3. Plaintiff not entitled to reinstatement absent acquittal or discharge. 4. Entry of Judgment restoring half salary properly allowed. 5. Plaintiff’s appeal allowed in part; defendant’s cross‑appeal dismissed.
Nana Yaw Owusu (Suing per his lawful Attorney Michael Nii Okine), Paul Nyantakyi and Madam Ellen Mensah v Hydraform Estates Ltd
Anin Yeboah JSC
The respondents purchased plots of land from Ranas Odoi Freeman relying primarily on a subsisting default judgment which appeared to affirm their vendor’s title. They subsequently developed the land but were stopped by the appellant company, which claimed ownership of a larger tract of land including the disputed plots. The High Court dismissed the respondents’ claim and granted the appellant’s counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeal granted the respondents possession of the land. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the respondents had failed to prove title and that the Court of Appeal erred by granting a relief (possession) that had not been pleaded or properly supported by evidence. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the order for possession and affirmed the dismissal of the counterclaim.
Maakye Korkor Akunsah v. Nai Ashalley Botchway (Chief of Awutu of Ofaadaa Family Stool) & Jei River Farm Limited
ARYEETEY, JSC
The plaintiff/appellant claimed ownership of 212.06 acres of Awutu Ofaadaa stool land allegedly gifted to her in 1947 by the then Chief of Ofaadaa, Nai Otabil Ashalley II. The High Court and Court of Appeal dismissed her claim, holding that a valid grant of stool land requires consent of the stool elders or principal family members, which was not proven. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts’ findings.
JOHN TENMOTTEY AFFUAH, CHARLES OKPATTAH VRS GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS COMPANY LIMITED
ADINYIRA JSC (PRESIDING), YEBOAH JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO JSC, BENIN JSC
Contract — Employment — Conditions of Service — Whether unsigned document can constitute binding contract — Acceptance by conduct — Estoppel — Terminal benefits. The plaintiffs, long‑serving employees of the defendant company, challenged the adequacy of terminal benefits paid to them upon cessation of their employment. They contended that their entitlements were governed by the Conditions of Service for Senior Staff (Exhibit F), a document dated 1 August 1988 but not signed by either party. The defendant denied its enforceability, arguing it was unexecuted and therefore not binding. The High Court rejected Exhibit F as non‑contractual. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that Exhibit F was operative based on parties’ conduct. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that a contract may arise from conduct even in the absence of signatures, where actions of the parties objectively demonstrate acceptance of the terms. The evidence showed that the defendant consistently operated under Exhibit F — including referencing it in appointment letters and making payments (e.g., funeral grants) strictly pursuant to its clauses — and maintained custody of the document in its Personnel Office. These constituted clear and unequivocal acts of acceptance. The Court further rejected the defendant’s estoppel argument based on plaintiffs’ earlier acceptance of calculated benefits, holding that acceptance of part payment does not bar employees from claiming full statutory or contractual entitlements, especially where the employer itself computed and presented the initial figures. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Exhibit F was binding and enforceable. The appeal was dismissed, and the Court awarded the plaintiffs full benefits under Exhibit F, together with interest from the date of demand, less amounts already paid.
UNILEVER GHANA LIMITED VRS THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL, GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY (GRA)
FRANCIS OBIRI (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT)
On 17th March 2021, Unilever Ghana Limited filed an appeal against the Commissioner-General, Ghana Revenue Authority before the High Court of Appeal. The appeal was in respect of a tax assessment made by the Ghana Revenue Authority against Unilever Ghana Limited on 21st February,2019. Per Unilever’s Transfer Pricing Returns and Financial Statement submitted for 2012 – 2016 years of assessment, its tax liability was six million, two hundred and thirty-six thousand, two hundred cedis (GHS 6,236,200.00). Unilever Ghana Limited was required to pay the tax liability within fourteen (14) days from 21st February,2019. Unilever Ghana objected to the assessment by the Ghana Revenue Authority in a letter dated 20th May,2019. The Ghana Revenue Authority’s opinion on the objection was dated 19th September ,2019 which was attached to the Notice of Appeal . There were some subsequent letters which were written between the parties in respect of the tax liability. Unilever Ghana Limited being dissatisfied with the objection decision on its tax liability filed an instant appeal before the High Court of Appeal. GROUNDS OF APPEAL. 1. The Ghana Revenue Authority did not use a transfer pricing method as required by the Transfer Pricing Regulations, 2012 (LI 2188) in examining the Transfer Pricing Returns of Unilever Ghana Limited. 2. The Ghana Revenue Authority misinterpreted, misunderstood and misapplied the OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines to arrive at a liability of six million, two hundred and thirty- -six thousand, two hundred Ghana cedis on the advertising, marketing and promotion expenses incurred by Unilever Ghana Limited. 3. That had the Ghana Revenue Authority properly applied the OECD guidelines, Unilever Ghana Limited would not have been liable to pay tax on the advertising, marketing, and promotion expenses. DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF APPEAL The High Court affirmed that the objection decision of Unilever Ghana Limited dated 19th September 2019 will continue to hold. Under the Revenue Administration Act, a person who has been served with a tax decision has the right to object to the decision under section 42 within thirty days or upon extension of the time granted by the Commissioner-General. After an objection has been made against a tax decision, the Commissioner-General is to give a decision on the objection with reasons for the decision within sixty days upon receipt of the objection. The Court of Appeal added that the Revenue Administration Act makes provision for objection to be made against a tax decision only once under Section 42. Moreover, under section 43(2) of Act 915, there is no power to review of a decision made on tax objection in respect of tax decision by the Commissioner-General. However, under Order 54 Rule 2 (1) and (2) of CI. 47, if a person aggrieved by an objection decision by the Commissioner-General is unable to appeal within thirty days upon receipt of the notice or decision, then the aggrieved party has the right to ask for an extension of time after the expiration of the one month within three months upon reasonable grounds. This means, after a decision has been made on tax objection by the Commissioner-General, the objector has a total four months to file an appeal against the decision. In this case, a tax decision was made by the Commissioner-General on 21st February 2019. The decision was received by Unilever Ghana Limited on 8th May,2019 which it made an objection to the tax decision on 20th May 2019. An objection decision with reasons attached was made by the Ghana Revenue Authority on 19th September 2019. The Commissioner-General had the right to vary the tax decision in whole or in part or disallow the objection under Section 43(1) of Act 915. In this case, the objection to the tax decision was disallowed. Unilever Ghana Limited wrote a letter to the Ghana Revenue Authority on 23rd October 2019 and referred to the objection decision dated 19th September ,2019, this means Unilever Ghana Limited received the objection decision on or before 23rd October 2019 and without sounding repetitive, Unilever Ghana had no further right of objection after the Ghana Revenue Authority’s letter dated 19th September 2019 had been received. Therefore, the four month duration allowed by statutes for Unilever Ghana to appeal to the Court as of right or upon extension of time by the Court expired on or before 24th February 2020. However, Unilever Ghana Limited filed a motion on notice for an extension of time to appeal against the decision of the Ghana Revenue Authority on 27th June 2020 which was clearly beyond what the law prescribes. It was therefore the view of the Court that the High Court’s order granting Unilever Ghana Limited leave to appeal which was made on 15th February,2021 was void and set aside. In contrast, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the order granting leave to Unilever Ghana Limited against the objection decision was void. The effect was that the appeal filed on 17th March 2021 failed and was dismissed but the objection decision dated 19th September 2019 continued to stand. IMPLICATIONS AND KEY TAKEAWAYS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION • The importance of time limits in Court proceedings or processes cannot be over-emphasized. It brings sanctity to the administration of Justice. • When a Court itself notices an invalid order by another Court, no rule of law or constitution can prevent that Court from setting aside such an order. • If an appellant fails to satisfy all the statutory requirements of an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Appellant Court has not been properly invoked to determine the merits of the appeal even if the Appellant has a concrete case. • After a decision has been made on a tax objection by the Commissioner-General, the aggrieved person has a total four months to file an appeal against the decision, first, as of right within thirty days, and with the leave of the Court within three months after the expiration of the thirty days. • After an objection has been made or lodged against a tax decision, the Commissioner-General is to give a decision on the objection with reasons for the decision within sixty days of receipt of the objection. • Letters, correspondence etc., from an objector after the Commissioner-General has given a decision under section 43(2) of Act 915 become surplus and legally worthless. Conclusion. In summary, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the order granting leave to Unilever Ghana Limited against the objection decision was void. The effect was that the appeal filed on 17th March 2021 failed and was dismissed but the objection decision dated 19th September 2019 continued to stand.
JOHN MICOCK V. RED SEA HOUSING SERVICE GH. LTD
DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC
Employment Law — Fixed-Term Contract — Unfair Termination — Redundancy — Release and Quitclaim — Estoppel — Jurisdiction — Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) — Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The appellant, an expatriate employee engaged on a two-year fixed-term contract, had his employment terminated eight months into the contract. After negotiations, he signed a Final Settlement Agreement and a Release and Quitclaim acknowledging full satisfaction of all entitlements and discharging the employer from all present and future claims. Ten months later, he initiated an action in the High Court claiming unfair termination, redundancy pay, various monetary entitlements, and libel. The High Court dismissed the libel claim but granted the remaining reliefs. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment on the ground that the High Court lacked jurisdiction over unfair termination matters, relying on Bani v. Maersk. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that although subsequent authority (Ex parte Peter Sangber‑Dery) restored the courts’ jurisdiction to hear unfair termination claims, the Court of Appeal was correct—based on the prevailing law at the time—to consider Bani v. Maersk binding. The Court nevertheless examined the merits and held that the appellant had no cause of action. Held: 1. The Release and Quitclaim executed by the appellant constituted a conclusive presumption under sections 24–26 of the Evidence Act, binding the appellant to the facts stated therein and estopping him from denying that he had received full and final settlement of all claims. 2. A fixed-term contract employee is excluded from remedies for unfair termination and redundancy under Part VII of the Labour Act by virtue of section 66, and cannot maintain an action based on unfair termination or redundancy. 3. The appellant failed to prove his additional monetary claims (airfare, medical bills, vehicle repairs, and deducted funds), and any claim for salary in lieu of notice was extinguished by the settlement agreement. 4. The dismissal of the libel claim by the High Court was affirmed. 5. The appeal was dismissed; the judgment of the Court of Appeal was upheld, though for different reasons.