GCB BANK LIMITED V. JARVIS ASIEDU, MARIAM ABDULLAH & ROBERT KWEINOO AMAMOO
Poku-Acheampong, JA (Presiding), Adjei-Frimpong, J.A, Dr. E. Owusu-Dapaah, J.A.
Labour Law — Voluntary Arbitration — Appealability — Jurisdiction — Time for Filing Appeals — Effect of Statutory Silence — Distinction Between Compulsory and Voluntary Arbitration — Finality of Awards. Facts The Respondents were originally employees of two defunct banks affected by Ghana’s banking sector crisis. They were later employed by GCB Bank Limited under a Purchase and Assumption Agreement between GCB and the joint receivers of the defunct banks. After about two years with GCB, their employment was terminated without reasons, though they each received three months’ salary in lieu of notice. Aggrieved, they lodged a complaint at the National Labour Commission (NLC) requesting: 1. reinstatement, 2. payment of salaries/allowances until final payment, 3. compensation for trauma, and 4. costs. Mediation failed, and the dispute was referred by consent to voluntary arbitration under the Labour Act and the NLC Regulations. The Sole Arbitrator, Paul Osei Mensah, awarded: Three months’ salary for each year or part year of service, and Salaries from termination date to 31/1/2022 (start of arbitration). GCB appealed to the Court of Appeal. Holdings 1: Voluntary arbitration awards are not appealable: Neither the Labour Act nor L.I. 1822 creates a right of appeal for voluntary arbitration awards. Only compulsory arbitration awards (where the NLC itself acts as arbitrator) are appealable under section 167(2) on questions of law. 2. Even if appealable, the appeal was filed out of time
HILDA SERWA KPO V. CONSTANT DZIGBORDI ANYOMI
BAAYEH, J.
The petitioner, Hilda Serwa Kpo, filed for divorce, claiming that her marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the respondent’s wilful neglect of her and their children, both financially and emotionally. The respondent admitted failing to maintain the family and engaging in extramarital affairs but attempted to justify his behaviour by alleging that the petitioner had refused him sexual relations. The legal issue before the court was whether the marriage had irretrievably broken down, warranting dissolution, and how custody and maintenance for the children should be determined. Under family law, a marriage may be dissolved if evidence establishes an irretrievable breakdown, and courts are guided by the welfare of children when awarding custody and determining financial obligations. On the facts, the court found credible evidence of the respondent’s adultery and neglect, confirming that the marriage could not be salvaged. The court granted a decree dissolving the marriage and awarded custody of the children to the petitioner. The respondent was ordered to pay maintenance for each child, contribute equally to school fees and medical expenses, and ensure the children were registered with the National Health Insurance Scheme.
SAMUEL AKUETTEY ABBEY V. GLADYS ABBEY
CECILIA DON-CHEBE AGBEVEY J.
the case arose from a marriage between Samuel Akuetteh Abbey (the Petitioner) and Gladys Abbey (the Respondent), which had broken down. The Petitioner filed for dissolution of the marriage and custody of their son, Michael Abbey. The Respondent, through an amended answer and cross-petition, sought dissolution of the marriage, custody of the child, maintenance, payment of school fees and medical bills, and financial provision. The legal issues before the court included whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, whether the Respondent was entitled to maintenance for the child, and whether she could claim financial provision from the Petitioner. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had abandoned him and their son while in Italy and denied him conjugal rights, whereas the Respondent alleged maltreatment by the Petitioner and claimed that he brought another woman into their home. The Petitioner’s attorney provided evidence on his behalf, denying the Respondent’s allegations, and the Respondent failed to pursue the suit, effectively abandoning her claims. The court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted the decree of divorce. It found that the issue of child maintenance was moot, as the Petitioner was already providing support for the child. The court declined the Respondent’s request for financial provision and made no order as to costs.
AGNES YIRENKYI V. GEORGE ATTA GYIMAH, EVANS OPOKU GYIMAH AND CECILIA KUKUA
MARIAMA OWUSU, J.A
The case arose from a dispute between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant regarding property rights and financial provision following the dissolution of their marriage. The plaintiff claimed that the 1st defendant had offered her the matrimonial home as part of the settlement, while the defendant denied this and presented a different version of events. The legal issue before the court concerned whether the plaintiff was entitled to the property and financial settlement, and whether the trial court’s decision was supported by evidence and in accordance with principles of fairness in matrimonial property distribution. Under family law, courts are guided by equitable considerations, including the protection of the rights of women and the need to ensure fair financial provision post-divorce, while also considering the conduct and resources of the parties. On the facts, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the 1st defendant to convey the property to her and granting a financial settlement. The defendants appealed, arguing that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence and that the court erred in awarding financial provision without fully assessing the parties’ means. The Court of Appeal upon examining the evidence, found the plaintiff’s claim credible, and held that the financial award was fair and just. The court also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim due to lack of evidence. The court emphasized evolving attitudes toward property distribution in divorce cases, noting the importance of protecting women’s rights and promoting equality. It expressed hope that the parties would reconcile their differences where possible and prioritize the welfare of their children. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the trial court’s judgment was upheld, reinforcing equitable principles in post-divorce property and financial settlements.
NEIL LUTTERODT V. GERTRUDE LUTTERODT
CECILIA DON-CHEBE AGBEVEY J.
The case arose from a divorce petition filed by Mr. Neils Lutterodt against Mrs. Getrude Lutterodt. The petitioner sought the dissolution of the marriage and joint custody of their child, alleging that the respondent had refused to interact with him, physically assaulted him with a belt, and caused him to leave the matrimonial home. The respondent denied these allegations and cross-petitioned, seeking dismissal of the petition or, alternatively, financial provision and maintenance, citing the petitioner’s emotional distance, late returns home, and lack of explanation for absences. The legal issue before the court was whether the marriage had broken down irretrievably, warranting dissolution under the relevant family law principles, and whether the respondent had a valid claim for constructive desertion or assault. Under the law, a marriage will only be dissolved where evidence demonstrates a breakdown beyond reconciliation, and normal marital conflicts do not satisfy this threshold. On the facts, both parties provided testimony detailing conflicts, including periods of absence, schooling commitments, and sexual issues. The court evaluated the evidence and found that the differences between the parties reflected typical “wear and tear” of marital life rather than an irretrievable breakdown. Furthermore, neither party nor their families had made significant efforts to reconcile their differences, but the court emphasized that minor disagreements and lapses in communication do not constitute grounds for divorce. The respondent’s claims of constructive desertion and assault were also dismissed due to insufficient evidence. In conclusion, the court held that the marriage had not broken down beyond reconciliation, dismissed the petitioner’s divorce petition, and also dismissed the respondent’s cross-petition.
CECILIA ADU AGYEI V. JOSEPH ADU AGYEI
OWUSU JSC
the dispute arose over the ownership of a property claimed by the Plaintiff to be jointly owned following her divorce from the Defendant. The Plaintiff sought a declaration that the property was joint property and requested a 50% interest. The Defendant denied the claim, asserting that he had purchased the property solely with his own funds. At trial, the High Court held that the property was marital and ordered it to be valued, granting the Defendant the right to buy out the Plaintiff. The Court of Appeal allowed the Defendant’s appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeal found that the Power of Attorney used by the Plaintiff’s attorney to give evidence was invalid, making the evidence inadmissible, and further held that the Plaintiff should have commenced the suit under the Matrimonial Causes Act rather than as a substantive action. The Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal’s judgment was against the weight of the evidence, that the Power of Attorney had been wrongly rejected, and that the suit was substantive and not ancillary. However, the Plaintiff’s counsel did not address all grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court struck out the unargued grounds and considered only the claim that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. The Court agreed that the Power of Attorney was invalid and that the Plaintiff’s pleadings alone did not constitute evidence. It also found that the action was time-barred, as claims relating to matrimonial property must be brought within 12 years of the divorce. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Plaintiff was not entitled to any interest in the property.
HARRIET AKROFI V. FRANK DOKU
AGBEVEY, J.
The parties were married on 3 July 2009 in Accra, Ghana, and later lived together in London from September 2006 until January 2013, when they separated due to persistent misunderstandings. The petitioner subsequently filed for divorce on 31 March 2016, alleging that the respondent’s behaviour made continued cohabitation impossible, and further claimed that the respondent was impotent and unable to have children without medication. The issue before the court was whether the marriage had broken down reconciliation in accordance with the requirements of the Matrimonial Causes Act, and whether the grounds advanced by the petitioner were legally sufficient. The court held that impotence and childlessness are not recognized grounds for divorce under the Act. The court further found that the parties had lived apart for at least two years preceding the filing of the petition and that the respondent consented to the divorce, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement for dissolution. Accordingly, the court concluded that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree dissolving the marriage celebrated on 3 July 2009.
DANIEL OFOSU ADJEI V. EDITH AKWERTER
RITA AGYEMAN-BUDU (MRS), J
The case concerned a petition by the petitioner to dissolve his marriage to the respondent, alongside a cross-petition by the respondent seeking similar reliefs, including maintenance, custody access, financial provision, and a share in an uncompleted house. The petitioner alleged adultery on the part of the respondent, while the respondent blamed the petitioner for the breakdown of the marriage due to his conduct and disrespect. The issue before the court was whether the marriage had irretrievably broken down and whether the respondent was entitled to the ancillary reliefs sought. The court applied the principle that a marriage may be dissolved where it has broken down beyond reconciliation, and that claims for maintenance and property division must be supported by sufficient evidence. On the facts, the court found that the marriage had indeed broken down irretrievably. It granted a decree of dissolution and awarded custody of the children to the petitioner, with access to the respondent. The respondent’s claims for maintenance pending suit, financial provision, and a share in the uncompleted house were dismissed due to lack of evidence. However, the court awarded the respondent a lump sum of GH¢10,000 as financial settlement. No order was made as to costs.
MARTIN KPEBU VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
WOOD CJ (MRS) PRESIDING, ADINYIRA (MRS) JSC, DOTSE JSC, YEBOAH JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, BENIN JSC, AKAMBA JSC
The Plaintiff, Martin Kpebu, challenged the constitutionality of Section 96 of Act 30, which imposed restrictions on the grant of bail in certain offences. He contended that the provision violated the fundamental right to personal liberty under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly the right to be admitted to bail. The Defendant, Attorney-General of Ghana, argued that the restriction was justified in the public interest and within legislative competence. The Supreme Court examined whether Parliament could lawfully limit judicial discretion in granting bail. The Court held that an absolute prohibition on bail was unconstitutional as it fettered judicial discretion and infringed personal liberty. Accordingly, the impugned provision was declared unconstitutional to the extent of its inconsistency.
STEPHEN A. ADZIMAH AND SELASSIE M.K ANYOMITSE V ANTRAK AIR GHANA LIMITED
High Court
Labour Law — Termination of Employment — Suspension of Operations — Entitlement to Salaries — Notice of Termination Facts The plaintiffs, employees of the defendant airline, were affected by a memo dated 10 June 2015, announcing a three‑month suspension of operations for restructuring. The defendant never resumed business thereafter, never recalled the plaintiffs to work, and ceased payment of salaries and benefits from June 2015. A complaint to the National Labour Commission yielded no remedy. They sued for outstanding salaries, interest, and other reliefs. The defendant filed a defence asserting it was defunct since 2015, denied liability for 78 months of salaries, and withdrew legal representation before trial. It filed no witness statement, did not attend trial, and did not cross‑examine the plaintiffs. Held 1. Suspension of operations was proved by Exhibit A. 2. The defendant never resumed operations and took no steps to lawfully terminate the plaintiffs’ employment. 3. The plaintiffs could not claim salaries for 78 months of no work performed, but the defendant’s failure to give proper notice constituted an abrupt and unlawful termination under s.17 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). 4. Plaintiffs were entitled to: Three (3) months’ salary and allowances for the suspension period (10 June–10 Sept 2015), One month’s salary in lieu of notice, Interest at the applicable Bank of Ghana rate from September 2015 to December 2015, Costs of GHS 3,000 each.
AYENSU V. ASAMOAH BOADI & ANOR
Supreme Court
LABOUR LAW - EMPLOYMENT - FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - REPATRIATION - ASSESSMENT OF REPATRIATION EXPENSES Facts The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants to work in Liberia on an electrical project. During the assignment, he suffered a serious work‑related injury, underwent surgery, and required further medical attention. Upon termination of his one‑year contract in July 2013, the Defendants failed to repatriate him to Ghana. The Plaintiff claimed damages including medical care, personal injury compensation, and transport and repatriation expenses. The High Court held that the action was statute‑barred and dismissed all claims. The Court of Appeal partly allowed the Plaintiff’s appeal, holding that although other claims were statute‑barred, the claim for repatriation was not. It awarded GHS 200,000 as repatriation damages. The Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues 1. Whether the Plaintiff voluntarily failed to exercise his right to repatriation within the meaning of Regulation 37 of the Labour Regulations, 2007 (L.I. 1833). 2. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in awarding GHS 200,000 as damages for repatriation. Held Appeal dismissed. Judgment of the Court of Appeal affirmed. Ratio Decidendi 1. Employer’s duty to repatriate under Ghanaian law is mandatory and statutory. Under s.18(1)(d) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) and Regulation 36 of L.I. 1833, an employer must repatriate a worker engaged under a foreign contract upon termination, expiration of contract, or incapacity. 2. Waiver of repatriation rights can only be recognised by the Chief Labour Officer or Labour Officer. Regulation 37 permits exemption only when certified by the Labour Officer. An employer cannot unilaterally infer waiver from an employee’s conduct. The Plaintiff’s refusal to submit a written repatriation request did not constitute waiver, as the law does not require a written request. 3. The Defendants’ failure to repatriate the Plaintiff after his initial request amounted to an immediate breach. Once the Plaintiff requested repatriation post‑injury and the Defendants refused unless he made a written request, the statutory breach occurred. Any later conduct (such as staying elsewhere or being unreachable) could not erase that breach. 4. Repatriation expenses include more than airfare. Repatriation covers travel, necessary subsistence, and reasonable related costs, not merely the ticket price. The Court of Appeal therefore acted within the law in assessing a broader range of consequences from the Defendants’ breach. 5. No basis to disturb the GHS 200,000 award. The Supreme Court found no error of principle or reliance on irrelevant factors. The award was not “extremely high” or erroneous to warrant appellate interference
FRANCIS KENNEDY AMONI V. FOOD AND DRUGS AUTHORITY
High Court
Employment Law — Disciplinary Procedure — Natural Justice — Investigative vs. Disciplinary Committees — Bias — Employer’s Right to Discipline — Public Service HR Manual — Pecuniary Penalties — Demotion The plaintiff, a Principal Regulatory Officer of the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA), challenged a series of disciplinary sanctions imposed on him after an internal Investigative Committee found that he had engaged in unethical dealings with a client, including receipt of money to facilitate product registration. He alleged that (i) he was entitled to appear before a Disciplinary Committee rather than an Investigative Committee, (ii) he was not informed of specific charges, (iii) the presence of the FDA’s legal officer on the committee created bias, (iv) the sanctions imposed were unlawful, particularly because they relied on the Civil Service Act, and (v) the sanctions amounted to prohibited pecuniary penalties under section 69 of the Labour Act. Held: 1. Fair Hearing: The plaintiff received adequate notice of the allegations through a query letter and was given the opportunity to be heard before the Investigative Committee; the absence of a formal Disciplinary Committee did not negate compliance with natural justice. 2. Knowledge of Charges: The plaintiff’s own admission under cross‑examination confirmed that he knew the misconduct under investigation and had responded accordingly. 3. Alleged Bias: The objection to the legal officer’s presence was raised and resolved at the preliminary stage. No evidence of actual or imputed bias was proven. Mere suspicion did not meet the legal standard. 4. Legal Basis for Sanctions: The FDA, as an agency under the Ministry of Health within the Public Service, was entitled to rely on the Civil Service Act and the Public Service HR Manual. The relevant misconduct provisions in both instruments were materially identical; reliance on either occasioned no miscarriage of justice. 5. Pecuniary Penalty Argument: Section 69(2) of the Labour Act does not prevent an employer from demoting an employee; any corresponding reduction in salary is a natural consequence of demotion and does not constitute an unlawful pecuniary penalty. 6. Misconduct Proven: The evidence, including communications with the FDA’s client and plaintiff’s own conduct during the hearing, established misconduct. Claim dismissed; costs of GHS 5,000 awarded against the plaintiff.
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE PAUL UUTER DERY AND HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE GILBERT AYISI ADDO VRS THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
Two High Court judges, Paul Uuter Dery and Gilbert Ayisi Addo, challenged the Judicial Council, the Chief Justice of Ghana, and the Attorney-General over administrative decisions affecting their employment and judicial duties. The judges alleged unfair treatment and breach of procedural fairness in disciplinary and administrative matters. The Supreme Court considered whether the Judicial Council and Chief Justice acted within constitutional and statutory powers. It held that the authorities acted lawfully under the Constitution and Judicial Service regulations. The Court emphasized that internal judicial administrative decisions, if within legal bounds, are not subject to interference. Consequently, the judges’ writ was dismissed.
JUDICIAL SERVICE STAFF ASSOCIATION OF GHANA (JUSAG) VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, THE NATIONAL PENSION REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND FAIR WAGES AND SALARIES COMMISSION
Supreme Court
The Judicial Service Staff Association of Ghana (JUSAG) filed a writ challenging the decisions of the Attorney-General, National Pension Regulatory Authority, and the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission concerning staff pensions and remuneration. JUSAG contended that the respondents had failed to properly implement pension reforms and salary adjustments for judicial staff. The Supreme Court examined whether the authorities acted within their statutory powers under the relevant pension and salary laws. It held that the respondents had acted lawfully in accordance with the enabling legislation and existing regulations. The Court emphasized that administrative bodies must act within the scope of their statutory mandates. Consequently, the writ was dismissed for lack of merit.
THE REPUBLIC VRS THE HIGH COURT, GENERAL JURISDICTION 6, ACCRA; EX-PARTE DR. ZENATOR A. RAWLINGS, HON. NII ARMAH ASHITTEY AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS (INTERESTED PARTIES)
Supreme Court
The Republic challenged the actions of the High Court, General Jurisdiction 6, Accra, in a matter involving Dr. Zenator A. Rawlings, Hon. Nii Armah Ashittey, and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) as interested parties. The motion questioned whether the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction or acted contrary to the law in handling a dispute arising from electoral or political processes. The Supreme Court examined the threshold for judicial interference with ongoing High Court proceedings. It held that the High Court had acted within its powers and no urgent constitutional question arose that warranted intervention. The application was dismissed as the Republic failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or legal error. The judgment emphasized the need to respect the independence and proper jurisdiction of subordinate courts.
LICENSED SURVEYORS ASSOCIATION OF GHANA AND KWAME TENADU, SNR VRS ATTORNEY-GENERAL, THE MINISTER, LANDS & NATURAL RESOURCES AND LANDS COMMISSION
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs, Licensed Surveyors Association of Ghana and Kwame Tenadu, challenged actions and regulatory measures of the Attorney-General of Ghana, the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (Ghana), and the Lands Commission of Ghana. They contended that certain directives and practices relating to land surveying and mapping were unconstitutional and infringed on their professional rights. The Defendants argued that the measures were lawful and within the statutory mandate of the Lands Commission to regulate land administration. The Supreme Court examined whether the issues raised disclosed a genuine constitutional question or merely administrative grievances. It held that not every regulatory or professional dispute warrants invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The action was accordingly dismissed for failing to establish a real issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement.
GHANA BAR ASSOCIATION, NENE AMEGATCHER, JUSTIN AMENUVOR AND FRANK BEECHAM VRS THE ATTORNEY - GENERAL AND JUDICIAL COUNCIL, RICHARD SKY VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, KWASI DANSO-ACHEAMPONG VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Supreme Court
The plaintiffs, including the Ghana Bar Association, challenged the constitutionality of the process adopted by the Judicial Council for the appointment and elevation of judges. They contended that the procedure—particularly the role of committees and absence of clear criteria—violated provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana on judicial appointments. The Attorney-General argued that the process was consistent with constitutional mandates and long-standing practice. The Supreme Court of Ghana examined whether the Judicial Council had acted within its constitutional remit. The Court held that the Constitution grants the Judicial Council discretion in devising procedures for selecting and recommending judges. Accordingly, the challenges failed, and the existing appointment processes were upheld as constitutional.
FRANK ODURO V FRANK ODURO
Supreme Court
LABOUR LAW - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - WRONGFUL DISMISSAL - CIVIL PROCEDURE - PLEADINGS - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY - BURDEN OF PROOF - CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT- EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO SURCHARGE EMPLOYEE Facts The appellant (Plaintiff at the trial court) was employed by the respondent company from 2005 until his dismissal in April 2013 for alleged negligence of duty and causing financial loss in relation to advertisements placed for the Electoral Commission (EC). He was surcharged GH₵41,195.66 and part of this amount (GH₵23,507.27) was deducted from his provident fund. The dispute arose from whether the EC adverts were placed directly with the Defendant or through Driwald Advertising Agency, which the appellant claimed acted as an agent entitled to a 10% discount he approved. Documentary evidence tendered at the trial—including letters from the EC—showed that the EC had not appointed any agent to place the adverts. 1 The High Court rejected the appellant’s justification on the facts and found him negligent and dishonest, but nonetheless held that the dismissal was procedurally flawed under clause 17.5 of the Management Conditions of Service (MCS), which it interpreted to require the Board itself—not a committee—to hear disciplinary cases involving an Executive Manager. Judgment was therefore entered for the appellant. The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court, holding that there was no pleading of breach of clause 17.5 and that under section 138 of the Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179), the Board could act through a committee. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Held 1. Concurrent findings of negligence affirmed The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s findings—based on clear documentary evidence—were fully justified. The evidence showed that the adverts were placed directly by the EC, invoices were issued directly to the EC, and payments were received directly by the Defendant’s officers, including the appellant. The appellant’s reliance on a supposed “work order” from Driwald was unsupported, and his conduct amounted to negligence and dishonesty. The Court found no basis to disturb the concurrent findings. 2. No breach of clause 17.5 of MCS proven The appellant did not plead that his dismissal breached clause 17.5. The Supreme Court reiterated that material facts must be pleaded, and a party assumes no evidential burden on unpleaded matters. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that: Section 138(a) of Act 179 permits the Board to act through a committee of its members. The phrase “committee of the Board” in the evidence indicated that the committee was part of the Board. The appellant failed to challenge the composition of the committee at trial. Accordingly, there was no procedural impropriety in the disciplinary process. 3. Appeal dismissed The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision and the validity of the dismissal
ERIC ASAE V GHANA GROWTH FUND COMPANY
High Court
Labour Law — Termination of Employment — Pay in Lieu of Notice — Whether HR Manual Forms Part of Contract — Burden of Proof in Claims for Unpaid Allowances and Bonuses. Facts The Applicant challenged the termination of his employment by the Respondent company, alleging unlawful dismissal and claiming various unpaid allowances and bonuses. He further contended that the Respondent failed to follow procedures outlined in its Human Resource (HR) Manual, arguing that these procedures formed part of his contractual rights. Held 1. Dismissal lawful: The Court held that the Respondent lawfully terminated the Applicant’s employment in accordance with section 17 of the Labour Act. 2. HR Manual not contractual: The HR Manual constituted policy guidelines and did not form part of the Applicant’s employment contract. 3. Burden of proof not met: The Applicant failed to discharge the burden under section 63(4) to establish unfair termination. 4. Claims for unpaid entitlements not proven: The Applicant did not produce evidence such as bank statements, contract terms, or other documentation to establish his entitlement to the alleged unpaid allowances and bonuses.
JOHN TAGOE VRS ACCRA BREWERY
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Wrongful Termination — Disciplinary Procedures — Burden of Proof — Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Facts The appellant had worked with the respondent from about 1971 until his dismissal in August 2007. His employment was terminated after a disciplinary committee found that he had assaulted a staff member, Maxwell Nkansah, during an argument over 10 litres of fuel meant for a company vehicle. An internal appeal failed, and the appellant sued in the High Court for damages for wrongful termination. The High Court held the assault allegation unproven and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the allegation of assault was established. Issues Whether the Court of Appeal’s judgment was against the weight of evidence. Whether the allegation of assault was proven to justify termination under the CBA and Labour Act. Whether the appellant was entitled to damages and retirement benefits. Held (Supreme Court) Appeal allowed. High Court judgment restored. 1. Assault Not Proven No witness at the disciplinary hearing confirmed that the appellant physically assaulted Nkansah. Mere struggle over a fuel pump did not constitute assault or battery under Act 29. When physical contact is alleged as the act constituting assault, it must be proven — and it was not. 2. Termination Was Wrongful Under s.62(b) of the Labour Act, termination must be based on proven misconduct. Since the allegation of assault failed, the employer had no lawful basis for termination. 3. Entitlement to Benefits Appellant was 58 at termination and had two years left to reach retirement age. As a de jure employee wrongfully terminated, he was entitled to all salary, benefits, and full retirement entitlements under the CBA, including leave entitlements.