MRS. ABENA POKUA VRS YAW KWAKYE
LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS) JSC PRESIDING PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS) JSC KULENDI JSC ASIEDU JSC GAEWU JSC
Family law — Distribution of matrimonial property — Presumption that property acquired during marriage is joint but rebuttable by cogent evidence — Article 22(3): equal access vs equitable distribution — Appellate rehearing and evaluation of evidence — CI.19 Court of Appeal Rules and procedural objections — Polygamous marriage considerations — Court’s discretion under Matrimonial Causes Act s20 to make equitable settlements. This case concerns the distribution of marital property following the dissolution of a customary polygamous marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent, contracted in 1998. The Respondent had other wives and children at the time of the marriage, a fact known to the Petitioner. Upon the breakdown of the marriage, the Petitioner petitioned the High Court for dissolution and sought an order for all properties acquired during the marriage to be shared. She listed numerous assets, including houses, commercial properties, plantations, and equipment, claiming they were jointly acquired. The Respondent denied these claims and asserted that most of the properties were self-acquired, proposing instead that a single house be given to the Petitioner. The High Court found that some properties were acquired during the marriage and ordered a partial distribution, including sharing the Dabi Asem Hotel and awarding certain properties and GH₵150,000 to the Petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed much of this decision. It held that the parties operated separate businesses and kept their incomes independently, thereby rebutting the presumption of joint acquisition. The court found that the Petitioner failed to prove contribution to the acquisition of most properties and reduced the financial award to GH₵100,000, while affirming other provisions relating to the children. On further appeal, the Supreme Court considered several issues, including whether the Court of Appeal erred in allowing certain grounds of appeal, whether it exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating evidence, whether it failed to address objections, and whether it wrongly concluded that the parties independently acquired property. On the procedural issues, the Court held that there was no breach of the rules of natural justice. It found that although one ground of appeal was not separately argued, it was subsumed under another ground, and the Petitioner had sufficient opportunity to respond. The Court further emphasized that an appeal is by way of rehearing, and therefore the Court of Appeal was entitled to re-evaluate the entire evidence and make its own findings. On the substantive issue of property distribution, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that although there is a presumption that property acquired during marriage is marital property, this presumption is rebuttable. It stressed that Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution requires equitable, not equal, distribution of jointly acquired property. The Court rejected the notion of automatic 50-50 sharing and clarified that equality applies only where evidence of contribution is lacking. Where evidence is available, distribution must reflect the actual contributions and circumstances of the parties. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the Respondent successfully rebutted the presumption of joint acquisition by showing that the parties operated independent businesses and that many properties were acquired solely by him or even before the marriage. The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence of either financial or non-financial contribution to the acquisition of the disputed properties. Additionally, the Court took into account the polygamous nature of the marriage, noting that the Respondent had obligations to other wives and children, which made equal sharing inequitable. Furthermore, the Court considered evidence that the Respondent had already made substantial provisions for the Petitioner during the marriage, including gifting her a house, providing her with a vehicle, money for business (GH₵100,000), a shop with goods, and renovating her family home. In light of these factors, the Court held that the settlement made by the Court of Appeal, namely, awarding the Petitioner the uncompleted house at Achiase, the self-contained house at Ajara, and GH₵100,000, was fair and reasonable. In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was supported by the evidence and consistent with the law. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the reduced monetary award and property settlement was upheld. The case reinforces the principle that distribution of marital property in Ghana is based on equity, not equality, and must be determined on the peculiar facts of each case.
AYISHETU ABDUL KADIRI VRS. ABDUL DWAMENAH
LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS) JSC (PRESIDING) AMADU, JSC ASIEDU, JSC KWOFIE, JSC DARKO ASARE, JSC
Family law – Distribution of marital property – Article 22(3) Constitution – ‘Equality is equity’ presumption rebuttable by evidence – Non-financial contributions relevant – Polygamy a factor but not determinative – Section 20 Matrimonial Causes Act: monetary settlement permissible. The case concerns the distribution of marital property following the dissolution of a customary (potentially polygamous) marriage contracted in 1987. The Respondent had two other wives and several children. Upon the breakdown of the marriage, the Petitioner sought, among other reliefs, ownership of the second plot of land and a share in the matrimonial home based on her alleged contributions, including taking a loan and supervising construction. The Respondent, on the other hand, contended that he solely financed the acquisition of the properties while working abroad and denied that the Petitioner was entitled to any share. He further alleged that the Petitioner used his funds to acquire a separate property at Ashalley Botwe, which was in her name. At the trial court, the marriage was dissolved and the court held that both parties had equal interests in the matrimonial properties. It awarded the second house to the Petitioner and allowed the Respondent to retain the matrimonial home. Dissatisfied, the Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial court’s order, holding that the distribution was inequitable, particularly in light of the Respondent’s polygamous family responsibilities. It instead awarded the Petitioner a lump sum of GH¢50,000 and allowed her to retain the Ashalley Botwe property. The Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court. The main issues before the Supreme Court were whether all the properties constituted marital property, whether the principle of “equality is equity” required equal distribution in the circumstances, whether the Court of Appeal was justified in substituting a property settlement with a monetary award, and whether the Petitioner was entitled to a share in the matrimonial home and adjoining land. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that all three properties were indeed marital property since they were acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. However, it emphasized that under Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution, marital property is to be distributed equitably and not necessarily equally. The Court reiterated that the “equality is equity” principle is not a rigid rule and must be applied on a case-by-case basis, depending on the peculiar facts and evidence. On the evidence, the Court found that the Respondent substantially financed the acquisition and construction of the matrimonial home, while the Petitioner’s contribution, mainly supervisory, was not substantial enough to justify an equal share. Although the Ashalley Botwe property was in the Petitioner’s name, the Court noted that her acquisition of it was facilitated by the Respondent’s indirect support, including funding her education and maintenance. Nevertheless, allowing her to retain that property, together with the monetary award, was considered equitable. The Court further affirmed that under Section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), courts have discretion to order monetary compensation in lieu of property distribution where appropriate. It also clarified that while the polygamous nature of the marriage may be a relevant factor in assessing what is equitable, it is not determinative and does not automatically preclude equal distribution. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the award of GH¢50,000 to the Petitioner, together with her retention of the Ashalley Botwe property, constituted a just and equitable settlement in the circumstances. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed.
MUSAH MUSTAPHA VRS UNIVERSITY OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL & MINISTER FOR JUSTICE
ANSAH JSC (PRESIDING), ANIN YEBOAH JSC,BAFFOE BONNIE JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, AKOTO BAMFO (MRS) JSC, BENIN JSC, AKAMBA JSC
The Plaintiff, Musah Mustapha, challenged road user charges announced by University of Ghana on campus access roads, claiming they constituted a tax imposed without Parliamentary authority and thus violated Article 174(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Defendants (University and Attorney‑General of Ghana) argued that the matter did not disclose a genuine constitutional issue requiring the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Upon review, the Court held that the Plaintiff’s claim did not require interpretation or enforcement of the Constitution because Article 174(1) was plain and undisputed in meaning. The Court emphasized that ordinary courts, not the Supreme Court in its exclusive jurisdiction, can determine such disputes. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction without addressing the substantive merits.
JOHN EPHRAIM BAIDEN (DR.) VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE BANK OF GHANA
ADINYIRA (Mrs.), JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO BAMFO (Mrs.), JSC, BENIN JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction seeking interpretation of Article 183 of the 1992 Constitution, which defines the functions of the Bank of Ghana. He challenged certain actions of the Bank relating to its role in financial and monetary operations, arguing they were unconstitutional. The claim questioned whether the Bank had acted beyond its constitutional mandate, particularly in dealings affecting public funds. The Defendants contended that the Bank acted within its statutory and constitutional authority. The Supreme Court examined the scope of the Bank of Ghana’s functions under Article 183. The Court held that the Bank’s actions were within its constitutional mandate and dismissed the claim.
JOHN TAGOE V. ACCRA BREWERY LTD.
WOOD CJ (PRESIDING), ADINYIRA (MRS) JSC, DOTSE JSC, BAFFOE BONNIE JSC, BENIN JSC
LABOUR LAW — WRONGFUL TERMINATION — BURDEN OF PROOF — ALLEGATION OF ASSAULT AS MISCONDUCT — STANDARD OF PROOF WHERE CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT IS ALLEGED IN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT PROCEEDINGS The appellant, an employee of the respondent for 36 years, was dismissed following a disciplinary finding that he had assaulted a co‑worker during a dispute over fuel allocation. Both the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeals Committee, constituted under the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), upheld the allegation. The High Court held the termination wrongful, finding that the respondent failed to prove the alleged assault beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal reversed this, holding that the struggle between the parties constituted assault. On further appeal, the Supreme Court restored the High Court’s decision, holding that where an employer justifies termination on grounds of criminal misconduct—specifically assault—the employer bears the burden to prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt, even in a civil action. Evidence from all eyewitnesses confirmed that although a struggle occurred, the appellant did not slap or hit the complainant, and no physical contact amounting to battery under sections 85–86 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) was established. A mere struggle over the fuel pump could not, in the circumstances, constitute assault. Consequently, the employer had no lawful basis under the CBA or section 62(b) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) to terminate the appellant’s employment. The termination was therefore wrongful and illegal, entitling the appellant to all benefits under the CBA, including accrued and retirement benefits, as he would have retired two years after the date of termination. Appeal allowed; High Court’s award restored.
PROGRESSIVE PEOPLES PARTY (PPP) VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANSAH, JSC (PRESIDING), ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO BAMFO (Mrs.), JSC, BENIN JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiff, Progressive People’s Party (PPP), invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Attorney-General of Ghana, seeking interpretation of Article 25 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The issue concerned whether the State had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide equal access to education, particularly at the secondary level. The Plaintiff argued that the failure to progressively make secondary education free violated Article 25. The Defendant contended that the provision was directive and subject to available resources and policy implementation. The Supreme Court examined the nature and enforceability of Article 25 obligations. The Court held that while Article 25 imposes a duty on the State, its realization is progressive and dependent on policy and resources.
KWABENA OTENG ASIAMAH AND KINGSLEY ATTA-YEBOAH V. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK GHANA LTD
AKUA SARPOMAA AMOAH (MRS.), J
Labour Law — Wrongful Termination — Employer’s Burden of Proof — CBA Compliance — Negligence — Documentary Evidence The Plaintiffs, senior employees of the Defendant bank, challenged the termination of their employment on grounds of alleged negligence facilitating a large‑scale fraud at the Tamale branch. The Defendant relied primarily on internal investigative reports but produced no primary documentary evidence of the alleged fictitious transactions, despite claiming the Plaintiffs authorized them. The Plaintiffs consistently denied all allegations and maintained that they were never provided with proof of any improper authorization. Held: 1. Termination Wrongful/Unlawful — The Defendant failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Plaintiffs were negligent. Suspicion arising from internal reports, without supporting evidence, is insufficient to establish negligence. 2. No Admissions Made — Plaintiffs’ confirmations of what appeared in the bank’s reports during cross‑examination did not amount to admissions of culpability. 3. CBA Violated — The Defendant, having chosen to assign reasons for the termination, bore the burden of proving those reasons but failed. The Disciplinary Committee’s minutes were unreliable and inconsistent with CBA requirements. 4. Relief — Plaintiffs not entitled to reinstatement or severance pay. Each was awarded damages equivalent to 18 months’ salary plus all benefits and allowances due as of the termination date. Costs of GH¢10,000 each granted.
PROFESSOR STEPHEN KWAKU ASARE VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
WOOD (MRS), CJ PRESIDING, DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, BENIN, JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiff, Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare, challenged the constitutionality of the Constitution Review Commission of Inquiry Instrument, 2010 (C.I. 64), enacted by the Attorney-General of Ghana. He contended that the Instrument, which established a Commission of Inquiry to review the Constitution, was inconsistent with the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Plaintiff argued that the President lacked authority to initiate a constitutional review process through a Commission of Inquiry under Article 278. The Defendant maintained that the President acted within constitutional powers to establish commissions of inquiry into matters of public interest. The Supreme Court examined whether constitutional review fell within the scope of a Commission of Inquiry. The Court held that C.I. 64 was constitutional and valid, as the President could lawfully constitute such a body to gather views for possible reforms.
AARON DZOTSE V. UBI PETROLEUM LTD
JUSTICE LAURENDA OWUSU
Labour Law — Wrongful Dismissal — Constructive Dismissal — Fraud — Burden of Proof — Wrongful Arrest — Counterclaim. The Plaintiff, manager of the Defendant’s Kasoa filling station, was arrested on the Defendant’s instructions following alleged discrepancies in stock records and was detained for two days. Upon release, he found that a new manager had been appointed and his personal belongings destroyed. No written contract governed the employment relationship, contrary to section 12 of the Labour Act 2003 (Act 651). Held: 1. The Defendant failed to prove that the Plaintiff abandoned his post; the immediate replacement of the Plaintiff and destruction of his property constituted constructive dismissal, rendering the termination wrongful. 2. Allegations of fraud were not proved to the strict standard required; Defendant provided no audit report and Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to explain alleged shortages. 3. Plaintiff’s arrest and detention were wrongful, as they arose from unproven allegations. 4. Defendant failed to discharge the burden of proof on its counterclaim for the value of alleged missing stock and damages for fraud. Judgment for the Plaintiff: declaration of wrongful termination; salary arrears from September 2013 to judgment; GH₵4,000 general damages for wrongful termination; GH₵2,000 damages for wrongful arrest and detention; and GH₵1,000 costs. Counterclaim dismissed.
EDMUND SIAW AKUGBEY V. CARE INTERNATIONAL GHANA
JUSTICE KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU
Labour Law — Wrongful dismissal — Probation — Misconduct — Burden of proof — Effect of unchallenged evidence. Facts The plaintiff was employed as Administrator/Accountant of the defendant’s Takoradi sub-office from 1 August 2007. He was summarily dismissed by letter dated 20 December 2007 on allegations that he demanded a 10% kickback from preferred vendors in exchange for procurement contracts. Plaintiff denied the allegation through letters (Exhs. B & C), stating he was never given a hearing and that the dismissal caused hardship to his family. Defendant asserted that: 1. Plaintiff was still on probation, which had been extended due to unsatisfactory performance. 2. Plaintiff admitted the allegation to his supervisor and again failed to deny it when confronted with the vendor. 3. Under the HR Manual, such conduct amounted to major misconduct, justifying summary termination. Vendor witness (DW1) confirmed a request by the plaintiff for a proportion of the cheque value, though not the specific 10% alleged. Held: 1. The plaintiff failed to establish the terms of his employment or demonstrate breach by the defendant; his action for wrongful dismissal therefore failed. 2. Evidence showed the plaintiff remained on probation, during which termination without notice was contractually permissible. 3. Although the defendant did not prove that the plaintiff demanded a specific 10% cut, unchallenged evidence established that he requested a proportion of cheque proceeds, contrary to the employer’s HR Manual; this amounted to misconduct. 4. The plaintiff had been afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegation when confronted with the vendor and supervisor but failed to deny it. 5. The dismissal was justified. Claim dismissed. No order as to costs.
AIRTEL GHANA LTD. V. NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION
V. D. OFOE, JA (PRESIDING). ACKAH-YENSU, JA. POKU-ACHEAMPONG, JA
Labour Law — Redundancy — Unfair Termination — Employer’s Burden — Fair Procedure Facts Daniel was employed in 2000 as a Satellite Technician. In June 2013, Airtel created a new business unit “TOWERCO” and reassigned him as Zonal Operations Manager for three regions. Daniel questioned the suitability of the new role, stating it was a complete switch from his core technical area and required training, a vehicle, and a driver due to geography of the region. Internal email communication from Airtel’s HR explicitly stated Daniel’s current role had become redundant. Before discussions on training and logistics concluded, Airtel abruptly terminated his employment on 25 September 2013, paying one month salary in lieu of notice. Held 1. The employee’s original role had become redundant, and the new role was a complete switch, requiring training. 2. Airtel failed to follow fair procedure in terminating employment. 3. The termination was unfair within the meaning of section 63 of Act 651. 4. Appeal dismissed. 5. High Court judgment and National Labour Commission decision affirmed.
DAVID AGBELI VRS MERCHANT BANK GHANA LTD
APPAU, JSC (PRESIDING), DORDZIE (MRS.), JSC, PROF. KOTEY, JSC, AMADU, JSC, PROF. MENSA- BONSU (MRS.), JSC
Labour Law — Employment — Wrongful Dismissal — Credit Policy Compliance — Ratification of Credit Approvals Facts The appellant, Acting Head of Credit Risk Management at Merchant Bank, was queried for allegedly approving credit facilities beyond his limit. Although he defended the approvals as compliant with the bank’s policy exception clauses and ratified by higher authorities, he was summarily dismissed. He lost at both the High Court and Court of Appeal before appealing to the Supreme Court. Held Appeal allowed. 1. The appellant did not breach the credit policy; policy exceptions (clauses 2.3.1 & 2.3.5) permitted approvals subject to later ratification, which occurred. 2. There was no evidence of misconduct, dishonesty, or negligence causing loss to the bank. 3. Liquidity issues pre‑dated his employment and were not attributable to him. 4. His dismissal was wrongful. 5. However, the Board was competent to delegate the signing of the dismissal letter; thus that procedural ground failed.
AFUA OFORIWAAH V. PAUL K. ADU
ESSILFIE-BONDZIE J.A (PRESIDING), FARKYE J.A, AKOTO-BAMFOR J.A.
Family Law — Customary marriage — Matrimonial property — Joint acquisition — Equitable distribution — Constructive trust — Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution The case concerned an appeal and cross-appeal arising from the division of matrimonial property following the breakdown of a customary marriage between Afua Oforiwaa (petitioner/appellant) and Paul Adu (respondent/cross-appellant). The dispute centered on the ownership and distribution of house No. D40 Abeka Lapaz and other household chattels acquired during the marriage. Evidence before the court showed that the parties lived and worked together both in the United Kingdom and Ghana, pooling their earnings into a joint account and jointly acquiring assets. Proceeds from the sale of a house in the United Kingdom were used to fund joint business ventures and to acquire property in Ghana. The respondent contended that the Ghana property was his sole property, relying on a deed of gift, and further argued that the marriage had been dissolved prior to the acquisition. However, the court found that the marriage subsisted at all material times and that the properties were acquired through joint efforts and a common fund. The petitioner, though illiterate, gave credible evidence that she contributed substantially by surrendering her earnings for joint use. The court emphasized that the mere fact that property is documented in one spouse’s name, particularly where the other spouse is illiterate, does not negate the existence of a joint beneficial interest. On appeal, the court applied Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution and relevant case law on equitable distribution and constructive trust principles, holding that property acquired during marriage through joint contributions ought to be shared equitably. The court found that the trial court erred in awarding the petitioner only a one-third interest and instead held that she was entitled to an equal half share in the Abeka Lapaz house and other jointly acquired matrimonial property. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
EBENEZER AYENSU V MR DAVID ASAMOAH BOADI & MR MICHAEL EDWIN BREFO
SUURBAAREH, J. A (PRESIDING), M. WOOD (MRS), J.A, BARTELS-KODWO (MRS), J.A
Employment Law — Foreign Contract — Repatriation — Limitation — Personal Injury — Employer’s Obligations — Labour Regulations LI 1833 — Labour Act 651 — Limitation Act NRCD 54 The Plaintiff/Appellant, an electrician recruited by Neutral Link Engineering (NLE) to work in Liberia, suffered two fractures of his left femur while performing his duties in February and July 2013. He alleged abandonment by the employer, failure to provide medical care including removal of a metal implant, and refusal to repatriate him during the Ebola outbreak. He commenced an action in April 2016 seeking medical expenses, damages of USD 1,000,000, and repatriation‑related reliefs. The High Court dismissed the action as statute‑barred under the Limitation Act (NRCD 54). On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that all claims relating to personal injuries, negligence, and breach of duty were statute‑barred, having been brought more than three years after the cause of action accrued. However, the Court held that the claim for repatriation was not time‑barred, as an employer bears a statutory duty to repatriate an employee engaged on a foreign contract under Regulation 36 of the Labour Regulations, 2007 (L.I. 1833) and Section 18 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The Defendants’ failure to provide the Plaintiff’s passport and ticket, or to make them accessible through the LEC office, constituted a breach of their repatriation obligations. The Court rejected arguments that the Plaintiff voluntarily refused repatriation within the meaning of Regulation 37. The Court therefore allowed the appeal in part, awarding the Plaintiff GHS 200,000 as compensation for transportation and repatriation, considering his disability, the hardship of travelling by land, and the outstanding implant removal. Costs of GHS 20,000 were also awarded in his favour
DANIEL MCCARTHY V GHANA BAUXITE COMPANY LTD
YEBOAH CJ (PRESIDING), PWAMANG JSC, AMEGACTCHER JSC, TORKORNOO (MRS.) JSC, KULENDI JSC
Labour Law — Employment Termination — Fair Hearing — Natural Justice Facts The appellant employer summarily dismissed the respondent, a bulldozer operator, on allegations of complicity in a fuel theft incident. The Respondent denied involvement. Police investigations found evidence against him “weak and porous”. Despite this, the employer dismissed him after an alleged disciplinary hearing, which the Respondent denied attending. No written notice, charges, or formal records were produced. The CBA required that misconduct be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the worker be given full rights of defence. The High Court upheld the dismissal, but the Court of Appeal reversed and awarded 18 months’ salary as damages. Held 1. Dismissal was wrongful. The employer failed to prove that the Respondent was ever invited to or heard at a disciplinary hearing. No formal notice of charges or proceedings was given. Mere assertion of a verbal invitation was insufficient. This breached natural justice and Article 19 fair hearing requirements. 2. Standard of proof not met. The employer adopted the criminal standard (“beyond reasonable doubt”) in its own CBA but produced no direct or indirect evidence establishing complicity. Witness testimony did not show the Respondent engaged in or knew of the theft. The police report further undermined the allegations. 3. Damages upheld. The award of 18 months' salary was not excessive. The employer failed to lead evidence that alternative employment was readily available or that Respondent failed to mitigate loss. Judicial notice could not be taken of abundant jobs in a mining town.
JORDAN QUARSHIE V RADIANCE PETROLEUM
JUSTICE NICHOLAS M. C. ABODAKPI
Employment Law — Wrongful Dismissal — Operational Losses — Burden of Proof — Constructive Dismissal — Effect of Employer’s Failure to Provide Written Contract — Counterclaim The Plaintiff, a station manager employed by the Defendant, was verbally dismissed after the Defendant alleged that he had incurred a GH¢10,000 shortfall and had mishandled adulterated fuel complaints. The Plaintiff denied misappropriation and contended that the alleged shortfall constituted normal operational losses, supported by Loss Control Books and monthly variance reports. Held, (1) the Defendant failed to prove that the GH¢10,000 shortfall was the result of misappropriation or incompetence; evidence showed it was an operational loss arising from underground tank variances and Bulk Road Vehicle delivery shortages. (2) Plaintiff failed to establish that adulterated fuel had been delivered with the Defendant’s approval, there being no corroboration from the National Petroleum Authority or affected motorists. (3) Defendant’s failure to provide a written contract of employment as required under the Labour Act, and the subsequent verbal termination coupled with cessation of salary, amounted to constructive and wrongful dismissal. (4) Defendant’s counterclaims for the shortfall, rent, and return of property were unproven and dismissed. Result: Judgment for the Plaintiff. Award of six months’ salary as damages for wrongful termination, GH¢300,000 general damages, and GH¢10,000 costs. Counterclaim dismissed.
YAKUBU MAHAMA V. BUKARI AWUNI
CORAM: ESSILFIE-BONDZIE [PRESIDING], GBADEGBE J.A., ANIN-YEBOAH J.A.
Family Law — Marriage — Mohammedan marriage — Proof of marriage — Estoppel — Intestate succession — Distribution of estate The case concerned a dispute over the validity of an alleged Muslim marriage and the consequent distribution of the deceased’s estate. The plaintiff contended that she was lawfully married to the deceased under the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance and was therefore entitled to a share of his estate. The defendant, however, denied the existence of any valid marriage, asserting that the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased was merely one of cohabitation as concubines. At trial, the court found in favour of the plaintiff, holding that sufficient evidence had been adduced to establish a valid Muslim marriage between the parties. On that basis, the court recognized the plaintiff as the lawful surviving spouse and granted her reliefs, including priority in the selection of immovable properties and a share in the estate. The defendant’s counterclaim was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the decision, the defendant appealed, challenging both the finding of a valid marriage and the dismissal of the counterclaim. The appellate court, upon reviewing the evidence, affirmed the trial court’s findings, holding that the plaintiff had successfully proved the existence of a valid marriage under the applicable law. The court further held that the defendant was estopped from denying the plaintiff’s status as the surviving spouse, having previously acknowledged that status. Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the distribution of the estate as ordered by the trial court and dismissed the appeal in its entirety.
NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION V FIRST ATLANTIC BANK
GBADEGBE, JSC (PRESIDING), AMEGATCHER, JSC, OWUSU (MS), JSC, LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS), JSC, KULENDI, JSC
Labour Law — Redundancy — Interpretation of s.65 of Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) — Whether redundancy pay applies only to close‑down, arrangement, or amalgamation — Jurisdiction of the National Labour Commission — Weight of evidence FACTS On 27 August 2015, the Bank declared two employees redundant, citing major changes in required skills and inability to deploy them. The Bank promised to negotiate a redundancy package under s.65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). Negotiations between the Bank and the workers' union (UNICOF) stalled, prompting a complaint to the NLC. NLC conducted hearings and ruled that each worker be paid three months' salary for each year of service (in addition to previously agreed items). The Bank argued it had “internal issues” delaying negotiations Held: 1. Section 65 must be read as a whole. Redundancy under s.65(1) (major changes in production, programme, organisation, structure or technology leading to termination) and redundancy under s.65(2) (close‑down, arrangement, amalgamation) are both forms of redundancy envisaged by Act 651. The Act does not restrict redundancy pay to situations under s.65(2). Monetary compensation (“redundancy pay”) may lawfully arise under s.65(1) subject to negotiation. 2. National Labour Commission’s jurisdiction properly invoked. Section 65(5) empowers the NLC to settle disputes concerning redundancy pay. The parties themselves acknowledged redundancy, invoked s.65, and submitted unresolved aspects of the redundancy package—specifically the multiplier for severance—to the NLC. The Commission therefore acted within its statutory mandate. 3. Appeal not a nullity. The case originated from a High Court ruling refusing enforcement of the NLC’s award. Under Art. 131(1)(a) of the Constitution, an appeal from a Court of Appeal judgment that itself arose from a High Court decision lies to the Supreme Court as of right, without the need for leave. 4. Grounds of appeal — Argumentative grounds struck out. Grounds (a), (c), and (d) of the Bank’s appeal were struck out for violating Rule 6(4)–(5) of C.I. 16, being argumentative and lacking particulars. Ground (b) (statutory interpretation) and ground (e) (weight of evidence) were considered on the merits. 5. Redundancy pay — Application of law. The Court affirmed that redundancy pay is payable where termination results from organisational changes under s.65(1), even absent a close‑down, arrangement, or amalgamation. The Bank itself expressly declared the employees redundant under s.65 and initiated negotiations. 6. Appeal against weight of evidence dismissed. No misapplication or omission of evidence was shown. The record established that: a. Employees were declared redundant; b. Negotiations occurred; c. Only the multiplier (1 month vs. 4 months) was unresolved; d. The NLC properly determined the multiplier (3 months per year).
DARKWAH V KPENETEY
ODURO KWARTENG, PM
Family law – Divorce of ordinance marriage – adultery, desertion and unreasonable behaviour as grounds for decree – custody awarded to respondent (petitioner conceded) – child maintenance and education orders – burden of proof for ancillary financial claims – refund of proven shop provisions. The petitioner sued for divorce and sought custody of three children; the respondent filed a cross-petition including multiple financial claims. The parties married in 2006, separated in 2013, and returned customary drinks in 2018. Both parties filed witness statements and gave evidence. The court analysed the evidence against the statutory grounds in Section 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (Act 367). It found adultery by the respondent proved on largely unchallenged eyewitness testimony, that the respondent deserted the petitioner, and that both parties exhibited unreasonable behaviour. Given the evidence and prolonged separation, the court concluded the marriage had irretrievably broken down and granted a decree of dissolution. Custody was awarded to the respondent after the petitioner conceded; the petitioner was ordered to pay GH¢1,500 monthly maintenance, to fund education and uncovered medical costs, and to pay via mobile money. The respondent must provide accommodation and register the children on NHIS. The court rejected most financial claims for lack of proof but ordered repayment of GH¢3,500 for provisions left in the shop, with interest if unpaid by the deadline. No order as to costs was made.
JUSTICE FRANK KWADWO AMOAH VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANSAH, JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE - BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO - BAMFO (Mrs.), JSC, BENIN JSC
The Plaintiff, Justice Frank Kwadwo Amoah, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Attorney-General of Ghana, challenging issues relating to his removal/suspension from judicial office under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. He alleged breaches of due process and irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings. The Defendant argued that the constitutional procedure for removal of judges had been properly followed. The Supreme Court examined the scope and exclusivity of the Article 146 procedure. The Court held that the process was constitutionally grounded and not subject to interruption except in exceptional circumstances. The action was dismissed.