Benjamin Kwabena Nkansah (suing per his lawful attorney Kwabena Owusu Mensah) and Kwabena Owusu Mensah v Nii Kwaku Dartey II and Nii Adam Kwartei Quartey and Mr Seidu
Justice Alexander Graham
The plaintiffs entered into agreements with the 3rd defendant to purchase land in Accra, providing vehicles as consideration. The 3rd defendant represented that he was acting on behalf of stool grantors and facilitated the preparation and execution of indentures. However, the plaintiffs were never granted possession of the land and were forcibly prevented from occupying the purported plots by third parties. The alleged grantors were never identified or produced in court. The court found that the 3rd defendant played a central role in the transaction, directly collected the vehicles and monies, and failed to establish the existence or authority of the supposed grantors. The plaintiffs never obtained possession of the land, and attempts to relocate them to alternative sites were unsuccessful. Applying the principles of burden of proof and the heightened standard required for fraud, the court held that the 3rd defendant made false representations which induced the plaintiffs to part with their property. The court further held that the defendant could not convey any valid interest in land he did not own. Accordingly, the court found that the transaction was fraudulent and entered judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, ordering recovery of the vehicles or their value, refund of monies paid, damages, and costs.
Naa Kuokor Nikoi and Daniel Ashie Kotey v Alex Lovejoy Armah (substituted by Samuel Ayittey Hammond) and Joseph Sedoh (substituted by Alhaji Karimu)
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants seeking a declaration of title, recovery of possession, damages for trespass and a perpetual injunction in respect of land situated at Nikoi Olai Town, Accra. The plaintiffs claimed ownership of the land through a lease granted to the 1st plaintiff by the Nikoi Olai Stool family in 2002 and relied on acts of possession including fencing and depositing building materials, as well as steps taken to register the land. The defendants resisted the claim, contending that the land belonged to the Asere Stool and that the 2nd defendant had lawfully acquired the land from the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant further relied on a search conducted at the Lands Commission and evidence of long possession and development of the land, including the construction of a dwelling house. The central issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs had established a valid title to the land and were entitled to the reliefs sought. In determining this issue, the court considered the burden and standard of proof in civil cases, emphasizing that a plaintiff must prove his claim on a balance of probabilities and succeed on the strength of his own case. The court found that the Lands Commission search report revealed that the land in dispute had been acquired by the State under an Executive Instrument. There was no evidence that the State had divested itself of its interest in the land or that either party had obtained a valid grant from the State. Consequently, the court held that neither party’s grantor had the capacity to convey title to the land. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs failed to establish a valid root of title and therefore failed to discharge the burden of proof required to sustain their claims. The plaintiffs’ action was accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.
THERESAH OWUSU AKO VRS SAMUEL OWUSU AKO
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE MAVIS AKUA ANDOH (MRS)
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Grounds for Divorce – Financial Provision – Property Settlement – Burden of Proof. This case concerns a petition for dissolution of marriage under Ghana’s Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), together with claims for financial and property settlement. The Petitioner sought to end her marriage to the Respondent on the ground that it had broken down beyond reconciliation due to his alleged adultery and unreasonable behaviour. She further sought maintenance, a lump sum payment of GH¢100,000, and a share in certain properties including the matrimonial home and farmland. The parties married both customarily and under the Ordinance on 4th May 1995 and lived together in Accra before relocating to their matrimonial home in Kasoa. The marriage produced no children, though the Respondent had children from previous relationships. Over time, the relationship deteriorated, leading to prolonged separation and eventual legal proceedings. The Respondent denied key allegations and filed a cross-petition, also asserting that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, particularly emphasizing that the parties had lived apart for several years. The central issue before the Court was whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation as required under Act 367. The Court examined the statutory grounds, including adultery, unreasonable behavior, and prolonged separation. On the allegation of adultery, the Court held that the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence. Her claims were largely based on hearsay and suspicion rather than concrete proof such as direct observation, credible circumstantial evidence, or corroboration. Consequently, the Court dismissed the allegation of adultery. However, on the issue of unreasonable behaviour, the Court found in favour of the Petitioner. She presented evidence of persistent misconduct by the Respondent, including neglect, refusal to communicate, denial of financial support, emotional abuse, and physical assaults. The Court held that these actions, taken cumulatively, went beyond the ordinary wear and tear of marriage and made it unreasonable to expect the Petitioner to continue living with the Respondent. Additionally, the Court relied heavily on the undisputed fact that the parties had lived apart as husband and wife for over five years. This satisfied one of the statutory grounds under Section 2(1)(e) of Act 367 and strongly supported the conclusion that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. Efforts at reconciliation had also failed. Accordingly, the Court granted a decree of divorce and ordered the dissolution of the marriage. On the issue of financial relief, the Court declined to grant maintenance, both pending suit and post-dissolution. It reasoned that no application had been made for maintenance during the proceedings and that, following dissolution, it would not be just to impose ongoing financial obligations between the parties. However, exercising its discretion under Section 20 of Act 367, the Court awarded the Petitioner a lump sum of GH¢30,000 instead of the GH¢100,000 requested. In reaching this decision, the Court considered factors such as the duration of the marriage (approximately 22 years), the parties’ financial circumstances, their retirement status, and the Petitioner’s contribution to the marriage despite childlessness. Regarding property settlement, the Court refused the Petitioner’s claims to a half share in both the matrimonial home and the farmland. It held that she failed to provide sufficient evidence that these properties were jointly acquired or that she made substantial contributions toward their acquisition. The documentary evidence indicated that the land for the matrimonial home was acquired by the Respondent, and there was no corroboration of the Petitioner’s alleged contributions. Similarly, the claim to the farmland and associated projects lacked evidentiary support and was inconsistently presented. Finally, the Court declined to award costs, ordering each party to bear their own. In conclusion, the Court found that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation based on unreasonable behaviour and prolonged separation, granted a divorce, awarded a modest lump sum financial settlement to the Petitioner, and dismissed her claims for maintenance and property division due to lack of proof.
ISAAC MENSAH VRS EUEGENIA AMEGAVIE
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE RITA AGYEMAN-BUDU (MRS)
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Equitable Distribution – Presumption of Joint Ownership – Financial Provision – Burden of Proof. This case concerns a petition for divorce brought by the petitioner, Isaac Mensah, against the respondent, Eugenia Amegavie, together with a cross-petition by the respondent seeking, among other reliefs, property distribution and financial provision. The central issues before the court were whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, whether the matrimonial home constituted jointly acquired property, and whether the parties were entitled to their respective reliefs. The parties were married under customary law in 2004 (though the petitioner referenced 2006), following a period of cohabitation. They lived together in a house at Baatsona, Community 18, which the petitioner claimed to have acquired prior to the marriage. Over time, the relationship deteriorated, culminating in separation around 2017. The petitioner alleged unreasonable behavior on the part of the respondent, including acts of aggression and disturbing conduct such as splashing blood in the home, and supported these claims with photographic evidence and a police report. He further asserted that there had been no marital relations for several years. The respondent, while not opposing the divorce, contested the petitioner’s characterization of events and maintained that she contributed significantly to the household, particularly in the reconstruction of the matrimonial home after it was destroyed by fire in 2014. She also claimed entitlement to a share of the matrimonial property and substantial alimony. In determining whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, the court relied on Sections 1 and 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The court found that the parties had lived apart for more than five years and that the respondent’s conduct made it unreasonable for the petitioner to continue cohabiting with her. These findings satisfied the statutory grounds under Section 2(1)(b) and (d). Consequently, the court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted a decree of dissolution. On the issue of property distribution, particularly whether the matrimonial home was jointly acquired, the court carefully examined the evidence. While acknowledging the evolving legal principles on spousal property rights, especially the constitutional presumption that property acquired during marriage is jointly owned, the court emphasized that this presumption is rebuttable. Relying on authorities such as Mensah v. Mensah and Peter Adjei v. Margaret Adjei, the court noted that a party asserting joint ownership must provide evidence of contribution, whether direct or indirect. In this case, the court found that the property at Baatsona had been acquired and constructed by the petitioner prior to the marriage and was already habitable at the time the respondent joined him. Although the respondent claimed to have supported the reconstruction after the fire, she failed to provide sufficient evidence quantifying her contribution. The court therefore held that the property was not jointly acquired and rejected the respondent’s claim to it. Regarding the other reliefs, the court granted several of the petitioner’s requests. The matrimonial home at Baatsona was awarded solely to the petitioner. The Renault Scenic vehicle was awarded to the respondent, while the Toyota Corolla was awarded to the petitioner. Although the petitioner initially proposed a lump sum payment of GH¢10,000.00, the court exercised its discretion under Section 20 of Act 367 and instead ordered him to pay GH¢30,000.00 to the respondent as financial provision, to be paid within twelve months. This award reflects the court’s consideration of fairness and the respondent’s role during the marriage, despite the lack of proof for a larger alimony claim. The respondent’s cross-petition largely failed. Her claims for a share in the matrimonial home, the alleged Oyibi lands, and the request for GH¢100,000.00 alimony were dismissed due to lack of evidence. Similarly, her application for an injunction to restrain the petitioner from dealing with the matrimonial property was denied. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage on the ground of irreconcilable breakdown, awarded the principal immovable property to the petitioner, distributed the vehicles between the parties, and granted a modest financial settlement to the respondent.
ESTHER BOATEY VRS. KOFI OBENG AMPOFO BOATENG
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE OLIVIA OBENG OWUSU (MRS)
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Grounds for Divorce – Alimony – Equitable Distribution – Burden of Proof. This case concerns a petition for divorce brought by a wife under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) on the ground that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. The parties were married under the Marriage Ordinance at the District Magistrate Court, Akim Oda, and the marriage was solemnized at Christ Apostolic Church, New Town, Akim Oda on 9 April 2016. The petitioner, a trader, sought dissolution of the marriage, a declaration of joint ownership of a house at Akwamu-Adoagyire/Nsawam with equal sharing or judicial sale, and alimony of GHC 80,000. The respondent, a self-employed man, denied the allegations and cross-petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, a declaration of sole ownership of the disputed house, recovery of GHC 60,000 allegedly taken by the petitioner, and a declaration that a vehicle was jointly owned property. The petitioner’s case was grounded in allegations of unreasonable behaviour, including adultery, physical abuse, emotional neglect, and humiliating conduct by the respondent. She testified that after the death of their child, the respondent engaged in extramarital affairs, even recording and showing her videos of such acts. She further alleged physical abuse, expulsion from the matrimonial home, refusal to eat her food, and lack of support regarding her health concerns. She contended that these actions caused emotional distress and made it impossible for her to continue in the marriage. Additionally, she claimed to have contributed both financially and through supervision to the construction of the matrimonial home and asserted ownership of a vehicle she allegedly purchased. The respondent denied all allegations of misconduct. He maintained that he treated the petitioner well, supported her financially by setting up a business for her, and accompanied her to seek medical treatment. He asserted that the disputed house was acquired before the marriage and that the petitioner made no contribution toward it. He further claimed that the petitioner unlawfully took GHC 60,000 from his drawer and refused to return it. He also contended that the vehicle in question was purchased during the marriage for their mutual benefit. The court identified four key issues for determination: whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation; whether the petitioner was entitled to alimony; whether the disputed house and vehicle were jointly acquired marital property; and whether the respondent was entitled to recover the alleged GHC 60,000. On the first issue, the court applied Sections 2(1) and 2(3) of Act 367 and held that a petitioner must establish at least one statutory ground, such as unreasonable behaviour or failure of reconciliation efforts. The court emphasized its duty, as affirmed in Danquah v Danquah (1979) GLR 371, to independently assess whether the marriage had indeed broken down. It found uncontroverted evidence that attempts at reconciliation by the families had failed, relying also on the principle in Fori v Ayirebi (1966) GLR 627 that admitted facts need no further proof. Accordingly, the court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted the divorce. On the issue of alimony, the court considered Section 20(1) of Act 367, which grants broad discretion in awarding financial provision, as affirmed in Ribeiro v Ribeiro (1989-90) 2 GLR 109 and Sandra Agyepong v Emmanuel Kyereh (2011) 35 GMJ 134. However, the court found that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence of the respondent’s financial means or justify the quantum claimed. Consequently, she failed to discharge the burden of proof as required under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), and her claim for alimony was denied. With respect to the ownership of the house and vehicle, the court examined whether these properties were jointly acquired. Although the respondent claimed sole ownership of the house, evidence, including admissions made in audio and video recordings, supported the petitioner’s assertion that she contributed to its construction. The court relied on the principle in Asante v Bogyabi (1966) GLR 232 that admissions against interest are strong evidence in favor of the opposing party. Furthermore, applying the modern approach to marital property as articulated in Arthur (No.1) v Arthur (No.1) (2013-2014) 1 SCGLR 543 and Peter Adjei v Margaret Adjei (2021), the court held that property acquired during the subsistence of marriage is presumptively joint property, regardless of the level of contribution. The court thus found both the house and the vehicle to be jointly acquired marital property. On the final issue, the court held that the respondent failed to prove his allegation that the petitioner took GHC 60,000. Applying Section 17 of the Evidence Act, the court emphasized that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting a fact. Since the respondent provided no corroborating evidence, his claim was dismissed. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage on the ground that it had broken down beyond reconciliation. It ordered the judicial sale of the house at Akwamu-Adoagyire/Nsawam and equal division of the proceeds between the parties. Similarly, the vehicle was to be sold and the proceeds shared equally. The petitioner’s claim for alimony and the respondent’s claim for recovery of GHC 60,000 were both dismissed for failure of proof. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.
MICHAEL AYAYEE VRS. ELIZABETH KELVIS
CHARITY A. ASEM (MRS.) J.
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Custody – Maintenance – Alimony – Financial Provision – Breakdown of Marriage beyond reconciliation. This case concerns a matrimonial dispute culminating in divorce proceedings initiated by the petitioner in 2022 before a trial court in Ghana. The parties, who married under both customary law and the Marriage Ordinance in 2012 at Ho, had one child together. The petitioner sought dissolution of the marriage and custody of the child, while the respondent opposed the petition, cross-petitioned for divorce, custody, maintenance, arrears, and alimony, and attributed the breakdown of the marriage to the petitioner’s alleged misconduct. The petitioner’s case was that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to the respondent’s conduct. He alleged that the respondent was verbally abusive, disrespectful, and had deserted the matrimonial home in 2014, taking their two-year-old child with her. He further claimed that since leaving, the respondent deliberately concealed the child’s whereabouts by frequently changing the child’s schools, thereby denying him access. He denied allegations of drunkenness and abuse and maintained that as a professional teacher with a stable income, he was better placed to care for the child. In response, the respondent denied the petitioner’s allegations and presented a counter-narrative. She contended that the petitioner was irresponsible, abusive, and unfaithful, and that he had neglected his responsibilities toward her and the child. She explained that she left the matrimonial home because she was subjected to hardship, including lack of food and alleged violence. She asserted that she had since struggled to care for the child, earning a modest income as a pupil teacher and relying on family support. She sought custody of the child, monthly maintenance, arrears of maintenance dating back to 2014, and alimony of GH¢50,000. The court identified three key issues for determination: whether the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation, whether the petitioner was entitled to his reliefs (particularly custody), and whether the respondent was entitled to her cross-petition, including maintenance and alimony. On the first issue, the court applied section 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), which establishes that the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The court found that the parties had lived apart for nearly ten years and had exchanged serious allegations in their pleadings and testimony. Although the respondent alleged abuse and hardship, she failed to provide corroborative evidence such as medical reports, police complaints, or third-party testimony. The court therefore rejected her claim that she was forcibly evicted, finding instead that she voluntarily left the matrimonial home. Relying on principles articulated in Knudsen v Knudsen, the court assessed the conduct of both parties objectively and concluded that the marriage had irreconcilably broken down. Accordingly, the court granted a decree of dissolution. On the issue of custody, the court was guided by the welfare principle under the Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560), which mandates that the best interest of the child shall be paramount in any matter concerning a child. The evidence showed that the respondent had maintained custody of the child for over nine years but had struggled financially and had not facilitated the petitioner’s access to the child. The court found that her conduct of moving the child between schools and locations was intended to frustrate the petitioner’s involvement and was not in the child’s best interest. While acknowledging the respondent’s efforts as a mother, the court determined that the petitioner, as a salaried teacher earning approximately GH¢3,000 per month, was in a better position to provide stability, education, and proper care. Consequently, custody was awarded to the petitioner, with structured access granted to the respondent, including visitation during holidays. Regarding the respondent’s claims for maintenance, arrears, and alimony, the court held that such reliefs are not granted as of right but must be supported by evidence. The respondent failed to substantiate her claim for arrears or justify the quantum of alimony sought. The court also considered her conduct, particularly her prolonged absence from the matrimonial home and lack of contribution to the marital relationship. It concluded that there were no compelling grounds to award alimony. However, the court exercised its discretion to grant her a nominal sum of GH¢5,000 as a “parting gift,” rather than as formal alimony. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage on the ground of irreconcilable breakdown, awarded custody of the child to the petitioner in the best interest of the child, denied the respondent’s claims for maintenance and alimony due to lack of evidence, and granted her limited financial relief. Each party was ordered to bear their own legal costs.
GLORIA ODARTEY LAMPTEY VERSUS NII ODARTEY LAMPTEY
PROF. SIR DENNIS ADJEI JA (PRESIDING); A. A. GAISIE (MRS.) JA; G. KOOMSON, JA
Family Law — Divorce — Matrimonial Property — Distribution of assets — “Equality is equity” principle — Scope and application — Whether automatic 50/50 division required — Whether non-financial contributions sufficient to ground equal share — Section 20 of Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) and Article 22 of 1992 Constitution – Non‑Financial Contributions – Corporate Personality – Proof of Adultery – Separate Legal Personality This case is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court (Divorce Division), Accra, delivered on 14 June 2017, concerning the dissolution of a marriage and the equitable distribution of marital property. The dispute arose between a husband and wife who were married under the Marriage Ordinance in 1994 and lived together in several countries during the husband’s career as a professional footballer. The wife (Petitioner/Appellant) initiated divorce proceedings, alleging that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to the husband’s violence, emotional abuse, and infidelity. She further claimed substantial contributions, both direct and indirect, to the acquisition of numerous properties and sought a 50% share of all marital assets, including real estate, vehicles, bank accounts, and interests in a company known as Glow-Lamp International School. She also claimed financial support and alimony. The husband (Respondent) admitted that the marriage had broken down but attributed the cause to the wife’s adultery. He relied on DNA evidence to assert that he was not the biological father of the three children born during the marriage. He further contended that he solely acquired all the properties from his own resources and denied that the wife was entitled to any substantial share. He cross-petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, a declaration of non-paternity, and ownership of certain key properties. The High Court granted the dissolution of the marriage, finding that it had broken down beyond reconciliation on grounds including adultery and an acrimonious marital environment. The court accepted the DNA evidence and declared that the children were not the biological children of the husband. In distributing the property, the court awarded the wife the Dome house, two vehicles, and a lump sum of GH¢200,000, while other major assets, including the matrimonial home and certain vehicles, were awarded to the husband. The court declined to distribute assets of Glow-Lamp International School on the basis that it was a separate legal entity. Dissatisfied, the wife appealed on several grounds, including that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, that the trial judge failed to properly consider her contributions—particularly to the school—and that she was wrongly denied a 50% share of marital assets. She also challenged the finding of adultery. On appeal, the Court of Appeal comprehensively reviewed the legal framework governing matrimonial property distribution, particularly under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) and Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution. The Court traced the evolution of Ghanaian jurisprudence from the restrictive position in earlier cases to the more progressive “equality is equity” principle articulated in cases such as Mensah v Mensah and Boafo v Boafo. However, the Court emphasized that this principle is not to be applied mechanically but flexibly, depending on the equities of each case, as reaffirmed in Quartson v Quartson and Arthur v Arthur (No.1). With respect to Glow-Lamp International School, the Court upheld the trial judge’s position that the company was a separate legal entity, relying on the principle established in Salomon v Salomon. It held that the assets of the company could not be treated as matrimonial property in divorce proceedings unless there were grounds to lift the corporate veil, which were absent in this case. Although shares in a company may constitute personal property, the Court found no sufficient evidence to justify awarding the wife a share in the respondent’s shares. On the issue of adultery, the Court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on DNA evidence, noting that the wife failed to rebut the presumption arising from proof that the children were not biologically related to the husband. Her refusal to explain the alternative method of conception left the court with no basis to reject the inference of adultery. The Court applied the standard of proof in civil cases, proof on a balance of probabilities, and concluded that the finding of adultery was justified. Regarding the distribution of marital property, the Court acknowledged the wife’s role as a homemaker and her emotional and psychological support to the husband, which facilitated his career. However, it agreed with the trial court that the properties were acquired primarily from the husband’s earnings as a professional footballer. The Court stressed that although non-financial contributions are recognized, the ultimate distribution must be just and equitable in the circumstances. It also considered the significant financial resources the husband had expended over the years in maintaining children he believed to be his, which indirectly benefited the wife. In addressing the central ground that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, the Court applied the test in Tuakwa v Bosom and Djin v Musah Baako. It held that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge had ignored relevant evidence, considered irrelevant matters, or reached unreasonable conclusions. The Court reiterated that an appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact unless they are clearly unsupported by the evidence or tainted by legal error. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had carefully evaluated all the evidence, appropriately applied the law, and arrived at a fair and equitable distribution of the marital property. All grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the judgment of the High Court was affirmed in its entirety, with no order as to costs. In conclusion, this case underscores that while Ghanaian law recognizes the principle of equality in the distribution of marital property, such equality is guided by equity and the specific circumstances of each case. It also highlights the continued importance of the doctrine of separate legal personality in limiting claims over corporate assets in matrimonial proceedings, and the high threshold required to overturn findings of fact on appeal.
JANET OWUSUA VRS THEOPHILUS AKOTUA
OWUSU ANSAH [PRESIDING]; PIESARE, JA; APALOO, JA
This case concerns an appeal and cross-appeal arising from a divorce judgment delivered by the High Court in Koforidua on 30th July 2004. The parties had been married under customary law since 1984 and had one child. The marriage eventually broke down, with the petitioner alleging adultery on the part of the respondent. The trial court granted the divorce but declined to recognize the petitioner’s claim to an interest in the matrimonial home, despite her contributions during its construction. Instead, the court awarded her a vacant piece of land and a lump sum of ¢10 million as financial provision. Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed on the ground that the monetary award was inadequate, while the respondent cross-appealed, challenging the award of the land. On appeal, the court began by restating the well-established principle that an appellant who claims that a judgment is against the weight of evidence bears the burden of proving that assertion. It emphasized that appellate courts are generally slow to interfere with findings of fact made by trial courts, particularly where those findings are based on the trial judge’s assessment of witnesses. Intervention is only justified where the trial court has erred in law, misapprehended the evidence, or reached conclusions unsupported by the record. With respect to the matrimonial home, the appellate court upheld the trial judge’s findings. Although the petitioner had played significant roles, such as organizing documentation for the land, supervising construction activities, cooking for workers, and assisting in litigation concerning the land, these contributions were held not to confer any legal, equitable, or beneficial interest in the property. The court reaffirmed the prevailing legal position that domestic services and supportive spousal activities, however valuable, do not automatically translate into proprietary rights in property acquired solely by the other spouse. It acknowledged the gap in the law regarding recognition of such contributions, noting that although the Constitution envisages equitable distribution of jointly acquired property, the absence of specific legislation limits the courts’ ability to assign monetary value to domestic services in determining ownership. The court further clarified the distinction between claims for declaration of property interest and claims for financial provision under section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act. It endorsed the principle that while proof of substantial contribution is necessary to establish a proprietary interest in property, such contribution is not a prerequisite where the court is exercising its discretion to grant financial provision. In the latter case, the court may order the payment of money, the transfer of property, or both, based on what is just and equitable in the circumstances. Consequently, the trial judge acted within the law in awarding both the parcel of land and the lump sum to the petitioner as part of her financial provision. However, on the issue of the adequacy of the monetary award, the appellate court found merit in the petitioner’s appeal. Taking into account the length of the marriage (over 18 years), the petitioner’s substantial domestic and supportive contributions, and prevailing economic conditions, the court held that the sum of ¢10 million was insufficient. Exercising its power to rehear the matter, the court increased the award to ¢15 million to better reflect the equities of the case and to enable the petitioner to resettle. In conclusion, the appeal succeeded in part, leading to an upward variation of the financial award, while the cross-appeal failed. All other aspects of the trial court’s judgment, including the refusal to grant the petitioner an interest in the matrimonial home and the award of the parcel of land, were affirmed.
CHARLES ADAMU FRIMPONG VRS. MARGARET ADDO
SENYO DZAMAFE, J.A. (PRESIDING); MERLEY A. WOOD, J.A.; OBENG-MANU JNR. , J.A
Matrimonial Causes – Nullity of Marriage – Property Rights – Compensation – Child Custody and Maintenance – Best Interest Principle. This appeal arose from a decision of the Circuit Court, Accra, which had annulled a marriage between the Petitioner/Appellant and the Respondent, while also granting the Respondent significant financial and property reliefs. Dissatisfied with that outcome, the Appellant sought to have portions of the judgment, particularly those relating to property distribution, compensation, and child maintenance, set aside on the grounds that the trial court’s decision was against the weight of evidence and legally flawed. The background to the dispute reveals that the Appellant, who was already married under the Ordinance to another woman in 2004, subsequently entered into a relationship with the Respondent and went through both customary and Ordinance marriages with her in 2012. This second marriage, however, was contracted while the first subsisted, rendering it legally void for bigamy. The Respondent maintained that she was unaware of the Appellant’s prior marriage and had consented to the union based on his misrepresentation that he was divorced. The relationship produced one child, and the parties lived together for some time in a house acquired by the Appellant. At trial, the court found that the Appellant had indeed misrepresented his marital status to the Respondent and consequently declared the marriage a nullity. Despite this, the trial judge awarded the Respondent 50% of the matrimonial home, GH¢50,000 as compensation, custody of the child, and maintenance for the child. The Appellant challenged these orders, arguing that once the marriage was declared void, the Respondent ceased to be a wife in the eyes of the law and therefore was not entitled to matrimonial property or financial benefits akin to those granted upon divorce. On appeal, the court reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact by a trial court unless they are unsupported by evidence or are perverse. After reviewing the record, the appellate court agreed with the trial judge’s assessment that the Appellant was not a credible witness, noting numerous inconsistencies in his testimony. It also upheld the finding that the Appellant knowingly entered into a second Ordinance marriage despite the subsistence of the first, rejecting his claim of ignorance of the legal consequences. However, the appellate court drew a clear distinction between the legal consequences of divorce and those of nullity. It held that since the marriage was void ab initio, there was in law no valid marriage upon which principles of matrimonial property distribution, such as those in cases like Mensah v Mensah, could be applied. The court emphasized that in cases of nullity, a party seeking a share in property must demonstrate substantial contribution, whether financial or otherwise, to its acquisition. In this case, the Respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence of such contribution, as the property had been acquired solely by the Appellant prior to the Ordinance marriage. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the award granting the Respondent 50% of the house. Nonetheless, the court upheld the award of GH¢50,000 as compensation, reasoning that it was justified by the Appellant’s fraudulent misrepresentation, which induced the Respondent into the void marriage. The court considered this amount fair and equitable in light of the circumstances. With respect to the child, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant custody to the Respondent, guided by the paramount principle of the best interest of the child under the Children’s Act. The court noted that the Respondent had been the primary caregiver and that the Appellant had shown limited involvement in the child’s life. The maintenance order of GH¢400 per month, as well as responsibility for school fees and medical expenses, was also upheld, with the court describing the Appellant’s previous contribution as inadequate. Additionally, the court granted the Appellant visitation rights when in Ghana, while postponing any decision of the child traveling abroad until she is older. In conclusion, the appeal succeeded only in part. The appellate court set aside the award of 50% interest in the matrimonial home but affirmed the compensation, custody, and maintenance orders. No order was made as to costs.
JULIAN ERIC APPIAH V. COCOA PROCESSING COMPANY LTD
JUSTICE KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU
Labour Law – Termination of employment – Termination distinguished from dismissal – Effect– Wrongful termination – Burden of proof – Employee – Collective Bargaining Agreement – Binding effect – Grievance procedure – Termination simpliciter – Employer’s duty to give reasons – Unfair termination – Jurisdiction – Labour Commission – Trade Union – Housing scheme – Union‑controlled scheme – Employer not liable FACTS The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company as a Senior Security Guard from January 1992. By a letter dated 8 November 2004, his appointment was terminated with one month’s salary in lieu of notice after a disciplinary committee found that he had breached the grievance procedure in the Collective Bargaining Agreement by sending a text message to a radio station alleging corruption against a senior officer. Aggrieved, the plaintiff sued for declarations that the termination was wrongful and unlawful, reinstatement or damages, payment of entitlements, and an order compelling the defendant to allocate to him a plot of land under a house ownership scheme. The defendant contended that the employment was lawfully terminated under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and that the housing scheme relied on by the plaintiff was a union initiative, not a company scheme. HELD 1. The plaintiff’s appointment was terminated, not dismissed. 2. The termination was effected in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement and was neither wrongful nor unlawful. 3. Claims of unfair termination fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labour Commission. 4. The house ownership scheme was managed by the union, and the defendant bore no responsibility for it.
SUSANA AZOKO VRS. ROLANDADABRE AWINE
H/W MAWUKOENYA NUTEKPOR
Family Law – Divorce – Irretrievable breakdown – Custody and maintenance arrangements – Welfare Principle – Best Interest of the Child – Compensation for marital contributions. This judgment concerns the dissolution of a marriage between two teachers whose relationship deteriorated over time, leading both parties to seek the intervention of the court to resolve issues relating to divorce, custody of their children, and financial reliefs. The court began by emphasizing that although love is often said to conquer all, the realities of matrimonial disputes frequently demonstrate otherwise. In this case, the parties were unable to resolve their differences despite several attempts at reconciliation. The petitioner initiated the action seeking, among other reliefs, dissolution of the marriage, custody of the three children, maintenance for the children, and financial compensation for the sacrifices she made during the marriage. The respondent, on the other hand, also sought dissolution of the marriage but prayed for custody of the children, reimbursement for expenses incurred in respect of one of the children, and compensation for money allegedly spent on the petitioner’s education. In determining the matter, the court reiterated that under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The court examined whether this ground had been established through any of the statutory facts. Although the petitioner alleged that the respondent had behaved unreasonably, including acts of violence and defamation, the court found that these allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence. Relying on established legal principles, the court held that mere repetition of allegations without corroborative evidence does not amount to proof. Notwithstanding the failure to prove unreasonable behaviour, the court found that the marriage had indeed broken down irretrievably on other grounds. It was established that the parties had lived apart since 2015, well beyond the statutory period of two years, and that numerous attempts at reconciliation by family members and even the court had failed. The absence of communication between the parties further reinforced the conclusion that the marriage could not be salvaged. Consequently, the court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and granted the decree of dissolution. With regard to custody of the children, the court applied the principle that the best interest of the child is paramount, as provided under the Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560). After evaluating the evidence and interacting with the children, the court decided to maintain the existing living arrangements. The two older children, who had been living with the respondent and were found to be stable and progressing well, were placed in his custody. The youngest child, who had always lived with the petitioner, was left in her care. The court also granted reciprocal access rights to both parents during school vacations, emphasizing the importance of maintaining parental relationships. On the issue of maintenance and financial responsibility, the court observed that both parties were employed and therefore shared responsibility for the welfare of the children. However, it placed primary responsibility for educational and medical expenses on the respondent, with the petitioner expected to provide support. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay a monthly sum of GHC 500 to the petitioner for the upkeep of the child in her custody. The court then addressed the competing financial claims made by the parties. The respondent’s claim for GHC 100,000 as reimbursement for the petitioner’s university education was dismissed on the grounds that it constituted special damages, which must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the amount claimed. On the other hand, the petitioner’s claim for GHC 100,000 as compensation for her contributions to the marriage was only partially granted. While the court acknowledged her role in maintaining the household and raising the children, it also considered the respondent’s contribution to her education. In balancing these factors, the court awarded her a reduced sum of GHC 30,000 as financial provision. In conclusion, the court dissolved the marriage, made a split custody arrangement based on the best interests of the children, and issued financial orders aimed at ensuring their welfare while providing a modest level of support to the petitioner. All other claims were dismissed, and each party was ordered to bear their own costs.
AUGUSTIN BOGOLOH V INTERTEK GHANA LIMITED
JUSTICE GIFTY DEKYEM
Labour Law — Termination of Employment — Redundancy — Burden of Proof — Interpretation of Employment Contracts Facts: The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant and its associated entities from 1986 until his employment was terminated in June 2016. Under an expatriate employment contract effective from 1 July 2011, the Plaintiff served as Regional Manager for French West Africa. The contract did not specify a fixed term. Upon termination, the Defendant paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice together with other sums described as redundancy, leave, and relocation payments. The Plaintiff contended that his termination and alleged redundancy were unlawful under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) and contrary to the terms of his contract, asserting further that his employment was intended to subsist until retirement. Held: (1) In an action for wrongful termination of employment, the burden lies on the employee to prove the terms of the employment contract and to demonstrate that the termination breached those terms or contravened statutory provisions governing employment. (2) An employment contract which specifies a commencement date but no termination date is a contract for an indefinite period and does not constitute employment until retirement or life employment. (3) For a termination to amount to redundancy under section 65 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), it must arise from the employer’s closure, arrangement, or amalgamation; economic or operational difficulties alone do not, without more, constitute redundancy within the meaning of the Act. (4) Payment of a sum described as redundancy does not, by itself, establish that an employee was declared redundant where the statutory conditions for redundancy are absent. (5) Where an employment contract incorporates Ghanaian labour legislation, section 17(1)(a) of the Labour Act permits either party to terminate a contract of employment of three years or more by giving one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice. (6) The Defendant having terminated the Plaintiff’s employment by payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice, the termination was lawful. Conclusion: The Plaintiff failed to establish that his termination was wrongful, unlawful, or amounted to redundancy under the Labour Act. The claims were accordingly dismissed, and costs were awarded to the Defendant.
RITA YAWO NNAEMEKA VRS. CHARLES OBUZULU NNAEMEKA
DZAMEFE, J.A (Presiding); DODOO, J.A.; BARTELS-KODWO, J.A
Matrimonial Property – Equitable Distribution – Presumption of Joint Ownership – Non‑Financial Contributions – Financial Provision – Judicial Discretion. This case concerns the dissolution of a marriage and the equitable distribution of matrimonial property between the parties. The facts disclose that the Petitioner and the Respondent were married on 13 April 2002, and their marriage lasted for approximately fifteen years without any children. During the subsistence of the marriage, the parties were engaged in business activities, particularly in the electrical goods trade, and acquired several properties, including houses at Ashiaman, business premises and warehouses at Cow Lane, and certain vehicles. The Petitioner alleged that she actively assisted the Respondent in running the business and contributed significantly to the acquisition of these assets. The Respondent, however, denied this and contended that the properties belonged to his alleged principals in China and that the Petitioner made no financial contribution to their acquisition. He further claimed that some vehicles were acquired prior to the marriage. The trial High Court found that the properties in dispute, including the houses at Ashiaman and the vehicles, were acquired during the course of the marriage and that the Respondent had failed to prove that he was acting as an agent for any foreign principals. The court also found that the Petitioner had made substantial contributions to the business and, by extension, to the acquisition of the properties. Despite these findings, the trial court awarded the Petitioner only the top floor of one of the houses (or alternatively a four-bedroom house to be provided by the Respondent), two vehicles, and a financial settlement of GH¢300,000. Dissatisfied with the distribution, the Petitioner appealed, arguing that she was entitled to an equal share of all jointly acquired matrimonial property. The Respondent cross-appealed, contending that the Petitioner was not entitled to any share due to lack of financial contribution and that the financial award was excessive. The issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the trial court erred in failing to equitably distribute all matrimonial properties despite finding that they were jointly acquired, whether the Petitioner was entitled to a share in the business-related assets, and whether the financial award of GH¢300,000 was justified in the circumstances. In its decision, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s findings that the properties were acquired during the marriage and that the Petitioner made substantial contributions through her active involvement in the business, even though she did not contribute financially. The court reaffirmed the legal principle that non-financial contributions, including services rendered in support of a spouse’s business, are sufficient to ground entitlement to matrimonial property. It also agreed that the Respondent failed to establish that the properties belonged to any foreign principals. However, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in its distribution of the properties. Having determined that the properties were jointly acquired, the trial judge ought to have considered all such properties in making an equitable distribution. The appellate court therefore varied the order and held that both the fully completed house and the uncompleted two-storey building at Ashiaman were jointly owned and should be shared equally between the parties based on their value. With respect to the financial award of GH¢300,000, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere. It held that although the record did not explicitly show a detailed assessment of the parties’ means, the evidence suggested that the Respondent operated a successful business and that the Petitioner had devoted fifteen years of effort to its growth. The court considered the award reasonable and appropriate to prevent injustice to the Petitioner, particularly given that the marriage was childless and she would be leaving without independent assets. In conclusion, the appeal succeeded in part. The Court of Appeal affirmed the findings of joint acquisition and the entitlement of the Petitioner to matrimonial property but varied the distribution by ordering equal sharing of both properties at Ashiaman. The financial award of GH¢300,000 was upheld, and the Respondent’s cross-appeal was dismissed.
ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI V. EDWARD ARHIN AND RICHARD DANKWA
ANGELINA M. DOMAKYAAREH (MRS.) JA. (PRESIDING), A. B. POKU- ACHEAMPONG JA., SAMUEL K.A. ASIEDU JA.
Labour Law – Dismissal from Employment – Wrongful and Unlawful Dismissal – Standard of Proof – Allegation of Crime – Private Sector Employment – Measure of Damages – Reinstatement – Administrative Justice – Costs The Respondents, employees of the Appellant company, were dismissed following internal disciplinary proceedings based on allegations of theft of gold-bearing material and negligence of duty. The High Court held that the dismissal was unlawful and awarded the Respondents seven years’ salary arrears and additional compensation. The Appellant appealed. Held: 1. Where an employer alleges the commission of a crime against an employee in civil proceedings, the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in accordance with section 13(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). 2.Administrative and disciplinary bodies are bound to act fairly, reasonably, and in compliance with the principles of natural justice under article 23 of the 1992 Constitution. Procedural breaches of a disciplinary code and collective agreement render dismissal unlawful. 3.An appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact by a trial court unless those findings are wholly unsupported by evidence or clearly perverse. 4.In private sector employment, wrongful dismissal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement or payment of salaries for periods not worked, as such remedies apply only to public officers whose employment enjoys constitutional or statutory protection. 5. The proper measure of damages for wrongful dismissal in private employment is reasonable compensation, having regard to mitigation of loss, and not extended salary arrears calculated up to the date of judgment. 6. Costs are awarded at the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not interfere unless the discretion was exercised on wrong principles or irrelevant considerations.
OBED HOYAH VRS NAA KWARLEY QUARTEY
DENNIS DOMINIC ADJEI, JA (PRESIDING); ERIC KYEI BAFFOUR, JA; OBENG – MANU JNR, JA
Matrimonial Property – Equitable Distribution – Presumption of Joint Ownership – Rebuttal by Evidence – Financial Provision – Judicial Discretion – Customary Marriage in Polygamous Context. This case concerns a dispute arising from the dissolution of a customary law marriage and the consequent distribution of matrimonial property and financial provision between the parties. The facts reveal that the Petitioner and the Appellant, both previously married, contracted a Ga customary marriage on 25 June 2005 in Teshie, Accra. Prior to the marriage, the Appellant had already acquired a plot of land at Okpoi Gonno and commenced construction of a house on it, for which the Petitioner, then still married to another man, assisted by preparing architectural drawings without charge. After their marriage, the couple lived in this house and jointly managed household expenses while both remained gainfully employed. During the marriage, they also established a construction company and acquired additional properties, including two houses at Nmai Djor through NTHC Estates, four plots of land at Odumase, and shares in CAL Bank and Benso Oil Palm Plantation. Although the Appellant financed most of these acquisitions, the Petitioner contributed indirectly through her professional services and her father’s influence in facilitating access to some of the properties. The marriage later deteriorated, leading to separation and eventual conflict, particularly after the Appellant contracted a second customary marriage and attempted to introduce his second wife into the matrimonial home. The Petitioner subsequently filed for divorce, seeking dissolution of the marriage, a half share in all marital property, and financial provision. The High Court granted the divorce, excluded the Okpoi Gonno house from distribution on the basis that it was acquired before the marriage, ordered equal distribution of the NTHC properties, Odumase plots, and shares, and awarded the Petitioner GH¢150,000 as financial provision. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed, challenging both the financial award as excessive and the distribution of property as inequitable. The central issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the High Court’s award of GH¢150,000 as financial provision was reasonable in the circumstances, and whether the equal distribution of the matrimonial properties was just and supported by law, particularly in the context of a polygamous customary marriage. In its decision, the Court of Appeal upheld most aspects of the High Court’s judgment but varied the financial award. On the first issue, the court found that the award of GH¢150,000 was excessive and unsupported by the evidence, especially considering the relatively short duration of the marriage, the absence of children between the parties, the Petitioner’s independent financial stability, and the Appellant’s ongoing obligations to another wife and four children. The court held that the trial judge failed to adequately consider these factors and substituted the award with a reduced sum of GH¢40,000 as a fair and reasonable financial provision. On the second issue, the court affirmed the equal distribution of properties acquired during the marriage, including the NTHC houses, the Odumase plots, and the shares, emphasizing that property acquired during marriage is presumed to be jointly owned, regardless of who financed it. The court also took into account the Petitioner’s indirect contributions and the need to prevent unjust enrichment of a subsequent spouse in a polygamous setting. However, it agreed with the trial court that the Okpoi Gonno house was not matrimonial property since it had been acquired before the marriage, and thus the Petitioner had no entitlement to it. In conclusion, the appeal succeeded only in part. The Court of Appeal set aside the financial award of GH¢150,000 and replaced it with GH¢40,000 but affirmed all other aspects of the High Court’s decision, including the equal distribution of properties acquired during the marriage and the exclusion of the pre-marital property from the matrimonial pool.
MERCHANT BANK LTD V. NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION
MARIAMA OWUSU J. A [PRESIDING], OFOE J. A, TORKORNOOJ.A
Labour law — Industrial dispute — Unfair termination — Jurisdiction of National Labour Commission — Disciplinary proceedings — Fair hearing — Misconduct — Refusal to attend disciplinary hearing — Effect — Collective bargaining agreement. The respondent employee, who was also a union chairman, was alleged to have circulated false and unauthorised information on the employer’s intranet following an annual general meeting. After responding to queries from management, he was invited to appear before a disciplinary committee but, acting on union advice, refused to attend. His appointment was subsequently terminated. Upon a notice of intended strike by the union, the National Labour Commission assumed jurisdiction and declared the termination void, ordering reinstatement. On appeal, the employer contended that the Commission lacked jurisdiction and that the dismissal was justified. Held, dismissing the appeal, that termination of employment constitutes an industrial dispute under section 175 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), and the National Labour Commission was competent under Regulation 33 of LI 1822 to settle the matter summarily after hearing the parties. The employer bore the burden of proving misconduct justifying termination and failed to do so. A worker cannot be compelled to appear before a disciplinary committee, and mere refusal to attend does not amount to misconduct. Further, failure to disclose specific charges to an employee summoned to disciplinary proceedings breaches the rules of natural justice. The decision of the National Labour Commission ordering reinstatement was therefore affirmed.
AUGUSTINE BOGOLOH V INTERTEK GHANA LIMITED
YEBOAH CJ (PRESIDING), PWAMANG JSC, OWUSU (MS.) JSC, AMADU JSC, PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
Employment Law – Termination of Employment – Expatriate Contract – Redundancy – Severance Pay – Mutuality of Contract HEADNOTE The appellant was employed by the respondent under an expatriate agreement effective from 2011, although he had earlier worked for related companies from 1998. His employment was terminated by the respondent in 2016 without reasons, and he was paid severance/terminal benefits calculated from 2011, which he accepted. He later initiated an action challenging the termination as wrongful, alleging improper redundancy under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), and claiming entitlement to benefits up to retirement as well as recalculation of severance benefits from 1998. The High Court dismissed the action, holding that the employment was lawfully terminated pursuant to section 17(1)(a) of the Labour Act. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant argued, inter alia, that the Labour Act did not apply to the expatriate agreement and that the respondent was bound to employ him until retirement. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1. A contract of employment is not a contract for life. Even where an employee alleges an assurance of employment until retirement, such assurance is unenforceable as it offends the principle of mutuality of contract, since neither party can be compelled to continue an employment relationship against their will. 2. Termination of employment under the Labour Act is lawful upon compliance with statutory notice provisions. Section 17(1)(a) of Act 651 is implied into contracts of employment and permits termination upon notice or payment in lieu thereof, notwithstanding the absence of misconduct or financial difficulty. 3. An employee cannot approbate and reprobate. A claimant who seeks reliefs under the Labour Act cannot simultaneously deny its applicability and insist solely on the application of the written contract. 4. Acceptance of severance or terminal benefits constitutes a compromise agreement. By accepting the termination benefits without clear protest or reservation, the appellant extinguished any subsequent claim for wrongful termination or unlawful redundancy. 5. Termination is legally distinct from retirement. An employee whose employment is terminated cannot claim benefits reserved for employees who remain in service until retirement, including gratuities or free allocation of service vehicles. 6. Concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances, particularly where the appellant fails to demonstrate clear errors affecting the findings.
VIDA YEBOAH VRS. DR. STEPHEN YEBOAH & MERCY AGYEIWAA
POKU-ACHEAMPONG JA (PRESIDING); ASARE-BOTWE (MRS.) JA; STEPHEN OPPONG JA.
Matrimonial Causes – Joinder of Parties – Alleged Adulterer – Section 12 of Act 367 – Order 65 rule 7 of C.I. 47 – Judicial Discretion – Relevance and Necessity. This interlocutory appeal arose from a ruling of the High Court, Agona Swedru, delivered on 1st July 2021, in which the court granted an application for joinder brought by Mercy Agyeiwaa. Dissatisfied with that decision, the Petitioner/Appellant, Vida Yeboah, filed an appeal on 15th July 2023 seeking to set aside the order joining Mercy Agyeiwaa as a co-respondent in the divorce proceedings between herself and her husband, Dr. Stephen. The background to the case reveals a long-standing marital relationship between the Petitioner/Appellant and the Respondent/Respondent, initially contracted under customary law in 1990 and later converted into an ordinance marriage in January 2014. The marriage produced six children and, according to the Petitioner/Appellant, involved the joint acquisition of numerous properties and financial assets. However, the marriage deteriorated, leading to the filing of a divorce petition in which the Petitioner/Appellant alleged, among other things, adultery on the part of the Respondent/Respondent, specifically implicating Mercy Agyeiwaa. In response to the ongoing divorce proceedings, Mercy Agyeiwaa applied to be joined as a co-respondent. Her application was premised on the assertion that she was not an adulterer but rather a lawful second wife who had married the Respondent/Respondent under customary law in 2012, prior to the ordinance marriage between the parties. She further claimed an interest in the properties listed in the petition, arguing that she had contributed to their acquisition and that the Petitioner/Appellant was not entitled to a half share of those assets. The High Court granted her application on the basis that she had been named as an alleged adulterer in the petition and that the law permitted such a person to be joined as a co-respondent. On appeal, the central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in joining Mercy Agyeiwaa as a party to the divorce proceedings. In resolving this issue, the court considered the applicable legal framework, particularly section 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) and Order 65 rule 7 of C.I. 47. These provisions make it clear that an alleged adulterer may be joined as a co-respondent in divorce proceedings, but such joinder is not mandatory and remains subject to the discretion of the court. Delivering the judgment, Asare-Botwe (JA) emphasized that the guiding principle in determining applications for joinder is whether the presence of the proposed party is necessary to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the matters in dispute. The court reiterated that in divorce proceedings, the primary issue for determination is whether the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, as provided under section 1(2) and section 2(1) of Act 367. All other matters, including property distribution and questions relating to third parties, are ancillary and arise only after the court has determined that the marriage has indeed broken down. Upon examining the affidavit evidence and the pleadings, the Court of Appeal found that the grounds advanced by Mercy Agyeiwaa for her joinder did not relate to the central issue of the breakdown of the marriage. Instead, her claims were directed at asserting her status as a wife, challenging the validity of the ordinance marriage, and establishing an interest in the marital properties. The court held that these issues were not relevant to the determination of whether the marriage between the Petitioner/Appellant and the Respondent/Respondent had broken down beyond reconciliation. Consequently, her presence was not necessary for the resolution of the core issue before the court. The court further observed that although the law permits the joinder of an alleged adulterer, such joinder is not automatic and must be justified by the circumstances of the case. In this instance, joining Mercy Agyeiwaa would not assist the court in determining the essential question but would rather complicate the proceedings by introducing extraneous matters. The court described such a joinder as likely to “murky the waters,” thereby undermining the efficient and focused adjudication of the case. In light of these considerations, the Court of Appeal concluded that the High Court erred in granting the application for joinder. The decision was found to be against the weight of evidence, as the applicant had failed to demonstrate that her participation was necessary or relevant to the determination of the divorce petition. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in its entirety. The order joining Mercy Agyeiwaa as a co-respondent was set aside, and the court directed that the divorce proceedings should continue in the normal course between the original parties. Costs in the sum of GH¢20,000 were awarded in favour of the Petitioner/Appellant.
BENJAMINN AWUKU MARTINSON VRS SARAH MARTINSON
DENNIS ADJEI JA PRESIDING, P. BRIGHT MENSAH JA, GEORGE KOOMSON JA
This case is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court, Accra, delivered on 24 May 2018, in a matrimonial dispute involving dissolution of marriage and the distribution of properties between the parties. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the property settlement ordered by the trial court was fair and equitable in the circumstances of the case. The facts reveal that the petitioner, a retired Ghana Air Force officer and former employee of the United Nations World Food Programme, met the respondent in Uganda in 1989. Their relationship led to the birth of a child in 1990, after which they contracted both a customary and church marriage in 1991/1992. Due to the nature of the petitioner’s international work, he frequently moved across countries, leaving the respondent largely responsible for managing the home and caring for the children. The petitioner claimed that he acquired several properties in Uganda and Ghana through his own financial resources and that the respondent, who stopped working upon marriage at his request, had no financial contribution to their acquisition. He further alleged that the respondent registered the Ugandan properties in her sole name and collected rents without accounting to him. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that she had been economically active prior to the marriage and had acquired or co-acquired some properties in Uganda with her family. She also asserted that she contributed significantly to the acquisition of properties in Ghana through non-financial means such as supervising construction, purchasing materials, and managing tenancy arrangements. She therefore claimed an interest in the Ghanaian properties and sought, by cross-petition, that certain properties—including the matrimonial home—be settled on her, along with financial provision. The High Court dissolved the marriage and made orders distributing the properties. It found that the petitioner funded the acquisition of the Ugandan properties but nevertheless awarded those properties largely to the respondent, with a limited option for the petitioner to take some if he so desired. Additionally, the court awarded the matrimonial home and other properties in Ghana to the respondent, citing her residence in Ghana and the need not to uproot her. A financial provision of GHS 80,000 was also awarded to her. However, there was controversy regarding two versions of the judgment, with the second containing additional and modified orders. The Court of Appeal found that the second judgment went beyond permissible corrections under the “slip rule,” as it introduced substantive changes, and was therefore null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion under section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act and in accordance with Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution. The appellate court reaffirmed the modern legal position that while property acquired during marriage may be presumed to be jointly owned, that presumption is rebuttable where evidence shows that the property was acquired solely by one spouse. It emphasized that equitable distribution depends on the specific facts of each case. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s finding that the petitioner solely funded the acquisition of both the Ghanaian and Ugandan properties. It further found that the matrimonial home in Ghana had been acquired by the petitioner before the marriage and that there was no evidence of any agreement or intention to treat it as jointly owned property. Consequently, the respondent had no legal interest in that property. The appellate court therefore held that the trial court erred in awarding the matrimonial home and other Ghanaian properties to the respondent based merely on her residence there. At the same time, the court considered the overall circumstances, including the respondent’s long management and enjoyment of the Ugandan properties and her retention of rental income without accounting to the petitioner. In the interest of fairness and equity, the Court of Appeal set aside the trial court’s property distribution and instead ordered that all properties in Ghana be settled on the petitioner, while all properties in Uganda be settled on the respondent. The court considered this distribution just and equitable given the peculiar facts of the case. On the issue of fraud, the court held that the petitioner failed to properly plead and prove it, and therefore dismissed that ground of appeal. Regarding the financial provision of GHS 80,000 awarded to the respondent, the court found it reasonable given the petitioner’s financial capacity and declined to interfere with it. In conclusion, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. It set aside the trial court’s distribution of the Ghanaian properties and reallocated the assets by awarding the Ghana properties to the petitioner and the Uganda properties to the respondent, while affirming the financial award.
KATE AFFRAM MENSAH VS CHARLES AFFRAM MENSAH
HENRY KWOFIE JA (PRESIDING) ANTHONY OPPONG JA RICHARD ADJEI-FRIMPONG JA
This case arose from matrimonial proceedings in which the trial Circuit Court was called upon to determine the dissolution of a marriage, the custody of a minor child, and the settlement of properties acquired during the marriage. The parties contracted a customary marriage in 1980, which was later converted into an ordinance marriage in 1999. The marriage produced four children, three of whom had attained majority by the time of the appeal, leaving only one minor at the time the action was initiated. Over time, the relationship deteriorated, and the parties began living apart, with the petitioner (wife), a trader, residing in the matrimonial home with the children, while the respondent (husband), an accountant, lived elsewhere. At the trial, both parties agreed that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and should be dissolved. The central dispute concerned the ownership and distribution of certain properties, namely the matrimonial home at Santa Maria, a block of seven shops at Santa Maria, and another property at Sowutuom consisting of four shops and a one-bedroom apartment. The petitioner claimed that these properties were jointly acquired during the marriage and sought a declaration to that effect, as well as custody of the youngest child. The respondent, while also seeking dissolution and custody, denied that the petitioner contributed to the acquisition of the properties and therefore contested her claim to joint ownership. The trial court dissolved the marriage and proceeded to distribute the properties. It awarded the matrimonial home to the respondent, the Sowutuom property to the petitioner, and divided the block of seven shops between the parties, allocating four to the respondent and three to the petitioner. Custody of the minor child was granted to the respondent. Dissatisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to declare her a joint owner of the properties, wrongly settled the matrimonial home on the respondent, and improperly granted custody of the child to the respondent. By the time the appeal was heard, the issue of custody had become moot, as the child had attained the age of majority. The Court of Appeal was therefore left to determine whether the trial judge erred in failing to declare the matrimonial home as jointly owned property and in awarding it solely to the respondent. Central to this determination was whether the matrimonial home, having been acquired during the subsistence of the marriage and used as such, constituted joint property under Ghanaian law, and whether the petitioner’s contributions, both direct and indirect, entitled her to a share. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court of Appeal found that the matrimonial home was indeed acquired during the marriage and was uncompleted at the time the parties moved in. The petitioner provided evidence that she contributed to the completion of the house by purchasing building materials, maintaining the home, paying utility bills, and supporting the household financially, including paying school fees for the children and even supporting the respondent during his period of study. Although the respondent denied these contributions, he did not dispute that the property was acquired during the marriage and completed while both parties lived in it. The court held that, in line with established Ghanaian legal principles, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be joint property, regardless of the extent of each party’s financial contribution. It further emphasized that the matrimonial home, by its very nature and use, represents the clearest example of joint marital property. The trial judge’s failure to declare the petitioner a joint owner, despite her specific claim and the supporting evidence, was therefore an error. Additionally, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to provide any justification for awarding the matrimonial home solely to the respondent and did not properly exercise his discretion by considering relevant factors such as the petitioner’s long occupation of the property, her role in maintaining it, and the fact that the children were raised there. The court concluded that these were material considerations that ought to have influenced the distribution of the property. In its decision, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It declared the matrimonial home to be joint property and set aside the trial court’s order awarding it to the respondent. Instead, the court awarded the matrimonial home to the petitioner as part of her share of the marital assets, taking into account her long occupation, contributions, and the interests of fairness and equity. The respondent was awarded the Sowutuom property as part of his share, while the earlier distribution of the block of seven shops remained unchanged. The respondent was further ordered to convey his interest in the matrimonial home to the petitioner within ninety days. In conclusion, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle that property acquired during marriage is subject to equitable distribution and that courts must carefully assess both financial and non-financial contributions of spouses. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the decision of the trial court varied to achieve a just and equitable outcome.