Nathaniel Morton (suing for and on behalf of the Grandchildren of the Late Samuel Coffie Morton) v Avenida Hotel Limited and Otoo Memorial Clinic
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiff, representing the grandchildren of the late Samuel Coffie Morton, claimed that their grandfather acquired land at Adabraka in 1938 and that the defendants had trespassed onto approximately eight (8) feet of that land. The plaintiff relied on an indenture and evidence from the Lands Commission. The defendants, however, traced their title to a chain of transactions beginning in 1919, through subsequent transfers in 1945 and 1954, and demonstrated continuous possession and use of the land as a hotel property for over 70 years. The court held that although the plaintiff adduced some evidence of title, the claim was fundamentally defective due to the extraordinary delay in asserting rights over the land. The plaintiff’s predecessors had failed to challenge the defendants’ long-standing possession, and no explanation was provided for the delay. Applying the doctrines of laches and estoppel, as well as the Limitation Act, the court held that the plaintiff’s action was statute-barred and that any title the plaintiff may have had was extinguished. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and entered judgment in favour of the defendants on their counterclaim.
Kingsley Kwabena Benjamin v Nii Annang Tetteh and Others
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiff claimed to have acquired land at Kwabenya in 2015 from the Odai Ntow Family and relied on an indenture and acts of possession, including fencing and construction. He alleged that the 2nd defendant repeatedly demolished his structures and took over the land. The 2nd defendant, acting as caretaker for the 9th defendant, contended that the land had been acquired by the 9th defendant through a public auction sanctioned by the High Court in 2014, supported by a certificate of purchase and deed of assignment. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that his grantors had any valid interest in the land, particularly as they failed to appear to justify their title. In contrast, the 9th defendant established title through a valid judicial sale. The court further held that the plaintiff’s grantors knowingly sold land they did not own, and this amounted to fraud. Accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to title to the land but was entitled to damages and refund of monies paid. Judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff against his grantors for fraud, and in favour of the 9th defendant on her counterclaim.
Pacific Solutions & Services Limited and Justice Kwesi Eyison v Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Attorney-General and T. Batoul Construction Co. Limited
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiffs claimed ownership of land at Borteyman which they said they acquired through a court-supervised auction following execution proceedings against Top Kings Enterprise Limited. They relied on the certificate of purchase, a subsequent indenture, and land title registration. They further alleged that officers acting on behalf of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture unlawfully demolished their wall and that the defendants continued to trespass and develop the land. The 1st and 2nd defendants maintained that the demolition exercise targeted encroachers on state land belonging to the Nungua Livestock Breeding Station and that only a boundary wall adjoining plaintiffs’ land was mistakenly demolished and later rebuilt. The 3rd defendant claimed that it had acquired part of the land from Top Kings Enterprise Limited before the auction and later assigned that interest to Electroland Ghana Limited, and on that basis contended that the auction sale was illegal. The court held that the crucial issue was whether Top Kings still had any transferable interest in the land when it purported to sublease it to the 3rd defendant. The court found that by the time the 3rd defendant’s operative indenture was executed on 26 February 2016, the land had already been subjected to the attachment process in execution of the judgment debt. Although the court identified an irregularity in the chronology between the writ and notice of attachment, it held that the attachment still operated as notice to the world and restricted Top Kings’ power of alienation until set aside. Since the 3rd defendant failed to produce receipts or other evidence proving an earlier completed purchase in 2015, its claim of prior acquisition failed. The court further relied on the admission by the 1st and 2nd defendants that the plaintiffs owned the adjoining parcel whose wall had been demolished. It concluded that the plaintiffs had established a better title and that the defendants’ conduct amounted to trespass. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs, and the 3rd defendant’s counterclaim was dismissed.
Francis Annan v Universal Oil Ghana Limited and Alhaji Alhassan Yayah
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiff brought an action for declaration of title, annulment of a purported sale, recovery of possession, damages for trespass, and injunction in respect of land at Akweteman. He claimed ownership through a deed of gift executed in 1989 and a Land Title Certificate issued in 1994. The plaintiff led evidence that the 2nd defendant unlawfully entered the land and subsequently purported to transfer the land to the 1st defendant, who constructed and operated a filling station on the land. The plaintiff had earlier initiated proceedings against the 2nd defendant, but the matter was not concluded due to administrative issues. The defendants failed to actively defend the action despite entering appearance, and the case proceeded largely uncontested. The court held that the plaintiff had established his title through documentary evidence, including the deed of gift and Land Title Certificate. The court further held that the 2nd defendant had no interest in the land and could not validly transfer same to the 1st defendant, applying the nemo dat principle. The court found that the defendants’ actions constituted fraudulent dealing and trespass. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to the reliefs sought, including declaration of title, annulment of the purported sale, recovery of possession, and damages. However, the court declined to grant the order for demolition of the filling station but awarded damages of GH₵30,000 and costs of GH₵20,000 in favour of the plaintiff.
Adwoa Nyarkowa v Ofosu Yeboah (alias Yaw Badu), Christian Eghan, Michael Appiah and Isaac Ofosu Marfo
Justice Kwame Polley
This was an appeal by the 1st and 4th defendants against a District Court judgment which declared title in favour of the plaintiffs over land adjoining House No. AP 30 at Apagya. The plaintiffs contended that the disputed land formed part of property gifted to them by their father, Kofi Donkor, who had acquired the land and built the house with his own resources. They relied on a deed of gift and acts of ownership. The appellants argued that the land was family property belonging to the Nana Ansela family and that the trial court erred in rejecting their claim. They further contended that the plaintiffs’ father could not validly gift the property. The High Court held that the appellants failed to prove their claim of family ownership, noting inconsistencies in their evidence and failure to establish the root of title of their alleged ancestor. The court also found that the appellants’ predecessors had, by their conduct, allowed the plaintiffs’ father to deal with the property as his own, thereby giving rise to estoppel. The court further held that the appellants’ counterclaim was defective, as it was brought in an individual capacity rather than in a proper representative capacity for the family. On the totality of the evidence, the court affirmed that the property was the self-acquired property of the plaintiffs’ father and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the adjoining land. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and costs were awarded against the appellants.
Amankona Kennedy Robert v Nana Yaw Ankwaa
Justice Joyce Boahen
The plaintiff brought an action for declaration of title, recovery of possession, injunction, and damages for trespass in respect of farmland measuring approximately four acres at Berekumfour Akuraamu on Tekese stool land. The plaintiff traced title to his father, Kwaku Tabiri, who acquired the land in its virgin state almost a century ago from the chief of Tekese and exercised acts of ownership, including cultivation and construction. The plaintiff further led evidence that after his father’s death, he and his siblings continued to possess and cultivate the land without interference. The defendant failed to file a defence or participate in the proceedings despite being served. The court therefore allowed the plaintiff to prove his case. The court held that although the plaintiff did not tender documentary evidence, he established his root of title through credible traditional evidence supported by long and undisturbed acts of possession spanning several decades. The court emphasized that overt acts of ownership in recent memory take precedence over traditional history. The court further held that possession alone is sufficient to maintain an action in trespass against a party who cannot show a better title. The defendant’s entry onto the land in 2022 constituted trespass. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff, granting declaration of title, recovery of possession, perpetual injunction, damages of GH₵10,000, and costs of GH₵20,000.
Dr. Agbodah Kobina v Michael Baafi Boateng and Victoria Ahiagbenyoh
Justice Jennifer Annemeyers Ahmed (Mrs)
The plaintiff brought an action for declaration of title, recovery of possession, injunction, and damages for trespass in respect of land at Monrovia, Koforidua. He claimed to have purchased the land in 2013 from one Ama Adutwumwaa after conducting due diligence, and was issued with a receipt and site plan. The plaintiff led evidence that after acquiring the land, he took possession by placing a caretaker on the land, cultivating crops, and constructing a dwarf wall on three sides of the property. These acts were done without interference. In 2023, during attempts to register the land, he discovered that the land had been “noted” in favour of the defendants. Upon confronting the 1st defendant, the latter denied any interest in the land and failed to produce any documentation. The 2nd defendant also failed to appear or defend the action despite being served. The court held that notwithstanding the absence of the defendants, the plaintiff was required to prove his case on a balance of probabilities. The court found that the plaintiff had established his title through documentary evidence and acts of possession. The court further noted that the 1st defendant expressly denied any interest in the land, and the 2nd defendant failed to defend the action. In the absence of any contrary evidence, the plaintiff’s case was unchallenged. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff, granting all reliefs including declaration of title, recovery of possession, perpetual injunction, damages for trespass, and costs of GH₵30,000.00.
Grace Susu Wetsi v Yussif Iddrisu (alias Alhaji Mandigo) and Trespassers
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiff brought an action for declaration of title, recovery of possession, injunction, and damages for trespass in respect of land at Adjiringanor (Otano). She traced her title to an initial purchase in 1996 from the Djan Ayoor family of Teshie and subsequently took possession by fencing the land, constructing a structure, and placing a caretaker. Over time, competing claims emerged from other families, including the Ashong Mlitse family and later the Nii Akwra Boye-Doku family, each asserting ownership based on court judgments. In response to these competing claims and to secure her interest, the plaintiff regularised her title by entering into further transactions and obtaining additional indentures from these families. The plaintiff maintained continuous possession of the land from 1996 and led evidence of acts of ownership. The defendants, despite being served, failed to appear or defend the action. The court held that notwithstanding the absence of a defence, the plaintiff was required to prove her case. The court found that the plaintiff had established her title through documentary evidence and consistent acts of possession. The court also accepted that her steps to regularise title in the face of competing claims strengthened her position. The court further found that the defendants had unlawfully entered the land with armed persons and commenced construction in defiance of police instructions and court orders, thereby committing trespass. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff, granted declaration of title, recovery of possession, perpetual injunction, and awarded damages of GH₵50,000 and costs of GH₵15,000.
George Narteh Owodo v Nii Awuah Amanfro II
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The plaintiff brought an action for declaration of title, recovery of possession, injunction, and damages for trespass in respect of land at Otinshie. He claimed to have acquired the land in 2013 and subsequently received a lease in 2015 from the head of the Kle Musum Quarter/Tsie We family, acting with the consent and concurrence of principal members. The plaintiff led evidence of acts of possession, including the erection of boundary pillars, construction of a short wall, deposition of building materials, and engagement of a caretaker. He further tendered documentary evidence, including the indenture, title deed, land title certificate, and prior judgments establishing the authority of his grantor. The defendant failed to enter appearance or defend the action despite service, and the matter proceeded under Order 36 of C.I. 47. The court held that notwithstanding the absence of a defence, the plaintiff was still required to prove his case on a balance of probabilities. The court found that the plaintiff had discharged this burden through credible documentary evidence and acts of possession. However, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove damages for trespass, as no sufficient evidence was led to support that claim. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff granting declaration of title, recovery of possession, and injunction, but refusing damages. Costs of GH₵5,000 were awarded in favour of the plaintiff.
Dorothy Eboe Arthur and Naa Ohimea Eboe Arthur (suing as Administrators of the Estate of the Late Ahia Eboe-Arthur) v International Central Gospel Church
Justice Barbara Tetteh-Charway (Mrs)
The plaintiffs, as administrators of the estate of the late Ahia Eboe-Arthur, brought an action for declaration of title, possession, and injunction in respect of land at Weija. They relied on a lease granted in 1978 by the Weija Stool and claimed acts of possession, including the erection of boundary pillars. The defendant church claimed title through a purchase from a third party in 2008 and a subsequent lease from the Weija Stool in 2012. The defendant contended that only a portion of the land claimed by the plaintiffs had been previously granted to the deceased. A court-appointed surveyor prepared a composite plan which revealed that only a small portion of the plaintiffs’ land overlapped with the land in dispute, while the remainder corresponded with the defendant’s land. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the entirety of the land claimed corresponded with the land in dispute due to inconsistencies between their site plan and the actual land. The court also found insufficient evidence of continuous possession, noting the absence of corroborative evidence such as photographs or development. Applying the nemo dat principle, the court held that the Weija Stool could not validly resell the portion already granted to the deceased, but could validly grant the remaining portion of the land. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled only to the overlapping portion, while the defendant was entitled to the remainder. Judgment was entered in favour of the defendant, subject to the plaintiffs’ limited interest, and no order as to costs was made.
Salim Traore (acting per his lawful attorney Adama Traore) v Frimpong Company Limited
Justice Charles Kwesi Bentum
The plaintiff, a Malian national acting through his lawful attorney, brought an action against the defendant company seeking specific performance, declarations, recovery of possession, and damages arising from a contract of sale executed on 24th September 2020 for the purchase of a filling station at Boankra. The parties agreed on a purchase price of GH₡2,400,000, with 70% payable upon execution and the remaining 30% upon completion of documentation. The plaintiff paid the 70% as agreed. However, the defendant failed to grant possession and attempted to repudiate the contract by refunding the purchase price, which the plaintiff rejected. The defendant challenged the validity of the contract, alleging that it was induced to sign without the document being read over. The court held that no evidence was led to establish illiteracy or incapacity, and therefore the defendant could not rely on such a defence. The court further found that documentary evidence clearly established the existence of a valid contract and that the plaintiff had performed his obligations under it. The defendant’s attempt to refund the purchase price amounted to a breach of contract. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the property had been sold to a third party, noting that no evidence was adduced to support this assertion. Accordingly, the court held that the contract was valid, that the defendant had breached its terms, and that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance. The court ordered the defendant to transfer the leasehold interest in the property to the plaintiff, granted recovery of possession, restrained interference with the property, and awarded damages and costs.
SERWAA ALLOTEY-PAPPOE VS. JONATHAN ALLOTEY-PAPPOE
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA DANKYI (MRS)
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Grounds for Divorce – Unreasonable Behaviour – Failed Reconciliation – Consent Judgment. This is a wife’s petition for divorce brought under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The parties, both Ghanaian citizens, were married on 9th August 2014 under the Marriage Ordinance at Mount Zion Methodist Church, Accra, and cohabited at Kokomlemle and Amrahia. There were no children of the marriage. The Petitioner sought dissolution on the ground that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation due to the Respondent’s unreasonable behaviour. She alleged, among other things, denial of access to the matrimonial home, communication breakdown, and incidents of physical assault, which led her to leave the home and reside with her parents. She further stated that all attempts at reconciliation by family and church elders failed. The Respondent denied the allegations, describing the Petitioner as abusive, temperamental, and frequently absent from the matrimonial home without explanation. He also alleged that she made false accusations against him and failed to attend reconciliation meetings. The court found that, notwithstanding the conflicting accounts, it was clear the parties had experienced serious and irreconcilable differences, and all efforts at reconciliation had failed. Applying sections 1(2) and 2(1)(f) of Act 367, the court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. Accordingly, the marriage was dissolved and the marriage certificate cancelled.
Nii Otu Commey (suing as Head and Lawful Representative of Nuumo Kwaofio Family of Sakumotsoshishi) v Samuel Kofi Ardey, Daniel Obli, Nii Ayitey and Nii Ardey
Justice Comfort K. Tasiame
The plaintiff, as head of the Nuumo Kwaofio family, brought an action for declaration of title, injunction, and damages for trespass in respect of land at Kaankafionaa. He relied on long possession, acts of ownership such as farming and leasing, and traditional evidence of migration and settlement. The defendants denied the claim and counterclaimed, asserting title through traditional evidence tracing ownership to their ancestor, Nii Kofi Addey, and supported their claim with prior court judgments and a site plan. They contended that the plaintiff’s land merely shared a boundary with theirs. A court-appointed surveyor prepared a composite plan which revealed that portions of the plaintiff’s land fell within the defendants’ land, creating an area of overlap. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish the identity and boundaries of his land due to inconsistencies in his evidence. In contrast, the defendants’ evidence of title, supported by prior judgments and consistent traditional evidence, was more credible. However, the court further found that the plaintiff had been in open, continuous, and undisturbed possession of part of the land for over fifteen years, thereby acquiring a valid possessory title under the Limitation Act. Accordingly, the court held that while the defendants were the true owners of the land, the plaintiff was entitled to retain possession of the portions already occupied. Judgment was entered for the defendants on title, subject to the plaintiff’s possessory rights, and costs were awarded in favour of the defendants.
Caroline Randolph and Augustina Randolph v Outboard Marine Services Ltd, Administrators of the Estate of Captain Quist Yeboah (Deceased) and OJK Oil Limited; and Mrs. Balbir Alan v Obiba J. K. Company
Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
This consolidated action involved competing claims to a parcel of land at James Town, Accra. The plaintiffs in the first suit claimed ownership through inheritance from their ancestor, Madam Barbara Meyer, whose will was admitted to probate in 1936. They relied on vesting assent, letters of administration, and subsequent lease arrangements to establish their title. The opposing claimant traced ownership to Thomas Hutton-Mills Sr., alleging that portions of the disputed land had been acquired from various individuals, including Ann Barbara Meyer. The claimant, however, failed to tender documentary evidence, particularly the indenture evidencing such acquisition. Both parties relied on a 1956 lease to BP (Ghana) Ltd, executed by Violet Whitaker and Ruby Quartey-Papafio as joint lessors. The court found that this lease and its accompanying site plan clearly demonstrated that the parties held separate and identifiable interests in the land. The court held that the failure by one party to produce documentary evidence of acquisition was fatal to her claim of exclusive ownership. However, the documentary evidence before the court established that both families had interests in the land. Accordingly, the court declined to grant exclusive ownership to either party and instead recognised the respective interests of the parties as delineated in the site plan attached to the lease. No order was made as to costs
SAM WOOD LTD. V. LUKE BEYUO DERY
F.G. KORBIEH J.A. (PRESIDING), AGNES M. A. DORDZIE (MRS) J.A., CECILIA HANZY-SOWAH (MRS.) J.A.
Employment Law – Termination of Employment – Wrongful Dismissal – Disciplinary Procedure – Natural Justice – Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) – Measure of Damages The respondent was employed by the appellant company as Marketing Manager. He received a letter accusing him of poor performance and granting him three months to improve. Three days later, his appointment was terminated on the basis of the same allegation. The respondent petitioned the Board of Directors for redress, but the Board confirmed the termination without granting him a hearing. He sued for wrongful dismissal. The High Court entered judgment in his favour. The appellant appealed. Held: 1. Wrongful Dismissal – Disciplinary Procedure Where an employer terminates an employee’s appointment on grounds amounting to inefficiency or misconduct, the employer is bound to comply with the disciplinary procedure stipulated in the conditions of service. Termination founded on allegations of poor performance is disciplinary in nature and cannot be treated as termination simpliciter. 2. Natural Justice – Right to Be Heard An employee accused of misconduct or inefficiency is entitled to a hearing before disciplinary action is taken. Failure by the employer and its Board of Directors to afford the employee a hearing constitutes a breach of the rules of natural justice and renders the termination wrongful. 3. Termination vs Dismissal Although an employer may ordinarily choose between termination and dismissal where permitted by contract, once the employer assigns reasons amounting to misconduct or inefficiency, it loses the right to rely on termination simpliciter and must follow the disciplinary procedure. 4. Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) – Labour Commission Resort to the National Labour Commission under section 64 of Act 651 is discretionary. It is not a condition precedent to the institution of an action in court for wrongful dismissal. 5. Measure of Damages for Wrongful Dismissal Where termination is wrongful, the employee remains a de jure employee until lawfully brought to an end and is entitled to salaries, allowances and benefits accruing during the relevant period. The measure of damages is not confined to salary alone but includes contractual benefits. 6. Computation of Damages A court should not rely on computations based on extrinsic material supplied after trial and not tested by cross‑examination. However, an appellate court may itself compute and vary the amount of damages based on evidence properly on record.
KOFI KUTU GYAN VRS HARRIET BOAKYE-AGYEMANG
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE BERNARD BENTIL
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Grounds for Divorce – Desertion – Burden of Proof – Unchallenged Evidence. This case concerns a divorce petition instituted by the Petitioner, who resides outside Ghana and acted through his appointed attorney, Emmanuel Essuman. The marriage in question was contracted under the Marriage Ordinance on 21st November 2016 at the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. At the time of the marriage, the Petitioner was a medical researcher, while the Respondent was a civil servant. Notably, the marriage produced no children. The Petitioner’s case was that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. He explained that immediately after the marriage, he relocated to the United States, making cohabitation initially impossible, although the Respondent later joined him after about a year. However, during their brief period of living together, the Respondent allegedly behaved in a manner that made it unreasonable for him to continue the marital relationship. More significantly, the Petitioner claimed that the Respondent had deserted the matrimonial home for a continuous period of seven years and had failed to perform her marital obligations. Attempts to resolve the issues through family intervention proved unsuccessful, leading the Petitioner to conclude that the marriage was effectively non-existent. He therefore sought only the dissolution of the marriage. Procedurally, the Respondent did not participate in the proceedings. The court, however, satisfied itself that the Respondent had been duly served in accordance with Order 65 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47). Relying on established authority, the court held that it was competent to proceed with the hearing despite the Respondent’s absence, as proper service had been effected. The court emphasized that the absence of a defence does not entitle a petitioner to automatic judgment. The Petitioner still bore the burden of proving his case on the balance of probabilities, in line with principles articulated in cases. The court reiterated that allegations must be supported by credible evidence, and the standard of proof remains unchanged even where the opposing party fails to appear. Substantively, the court applied the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), which provides that the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The Petitioner relied primarily on desertion as a factual basis under section 2(1)(c) of the Act, which requires proof that the Respondent deserted the Petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the petition. On the evidence, the court found that the Respondent had indeed been absent from the matrimonial home for approximately seven years. This clearly exceeded the statutory minimum requirement of two years, and the court was entitled to infer desertion from this prolonged absence. Additionally, the Respondent’s failure to participate in the proceedings or demonstrate any interest in the marriage further supported the conclusion that she had effectively abandoned the relationship. The court also considered the broader requirement under section 2(3) of Act 367, which mandates that even where a specific fact is proved, the court must be satisfied on the totality of the evidence that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. In this regard, the court concluded that the Respondent’s conduct demonstrated a clear lack of interest in the marriage, and that the union had, in reality, ceased to exist. In a notable observation, the court remarked that where a marriage has truly broken down, it would be unjust to compel the parties to remain bound in a union devoid of substance, likening such insistence to transforming marriage into a form of “slavery,” with adverse psychological consequences. Accordingly, the court held that the Petitioner had successfully discharged the burden of proof and established that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. A decree of divorce was therefore granted, dissolving the marriage. No orders were made with respect to alimony or costs.
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS’ UNION OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS V. BANK OF GHANA
CECILIA SOWAH J
Labour Law – Collective Agreement – Redundancy – Voluntary Early Retirement – Severance Pay – Negotiation – Effect of Repeal of Enactment – Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299) – Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) – NLCD 342 – Interpretation Act, 1960 (CA 4). The plaintiff trade union, which held a collective bargaining certificate in respect of certain employees of the defendant, brought an action seeking declarations and injunctions to restrain the defendant from carrying out a restructuring exercise unless and until the severance package had been negotiated with the union through the standing joint negotiating committee. The defendant contended that the first phase of the exercise involved voluntary early retirement and was therefore non‑negotiable. During the pendency of the action, Act 299 was repealed and replaced by Act 651. Held: 1. On capacity to sue: A registered trade union is a body corporate and may bring an action in its own right without obtaining the consent of individual members. The plaintiff’s action was therefore properly constituted. 2. On effect of repeal of Act 299: The repeal of an enactment does not affect accrued rights, obligations, or pending proceedings unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. Accordingly, the repeal of Act 299 by Act 651 did not render the plaintiff’s action unsustainable. 3. On redundancy: An exercise which results in the severance of the employer‑employee relationship constitutes a redundancy within the meaning of labour law, irrespective of the terminology used by the employer. The restructuring exercise embarked upon by the defendant therefore amounted to a redundancy. 4. On voluntary redundancy: The law recognises voluntary redundancy or voluntary early retirement. Where termination is by mutual consent and does not amount to wrongful dismissal, it remains subject to the applicable statutory and contractual framework. 5. On negotiation of severance pay: Although the collective bargaining agreement provided that redundancy awards were to be determined under NLCD 342, section 35 of NLCD 342 permits negotiations to be conducted either by the employee personally or through a representative. Accordingly, the defendant was not mandatorily required to negotiate severance pay exclusively with the plaintiff union. 6. On collective bargaining obligations: Section 6 of Act 299 relates primarily to negotiations leading to the conclusion or renewal of a collective bargaining agreement. Where there is a valid and subsisting collective agreement governing the matter in issue, a party cannot invoke section 6 to compel fresh negotiations except in accordance with the statutory procedure. 7. On injunction: An injunction will not be granted where the injury complained of is compensable by money.
CHARLES AFFAM ADJEI V. STANBIC BANK
GIFTY AGYEI ADDO, J
Labour Law – Employment – Constructive termination – Restructuring – Demotion – Inducement to leave previous employment – Burden of proof The Plaintiff, an employee of the Defendant bank, resigned from his employment following a series of internal restructurings that resulted in changes to the positions he occupied, though his salary and grade remained unchanged. He alleged that the Defendant had induced him to leave his former employment, guaranteed him certain positions and benefits, and subsequently demoted him, thereby constructively terminating his employment in repudiatory breach of contract. Held: (1) Constructive termination occurs only where the employer’s conduct is such as to induce the employee to resign; mere restructuring or re-designation of roles without loss of salary, grade, or conditions of service does not amount to constructive termination. (2) An employer has the right to restructure and reorganise its operations, and such actions do not constitute demotion where the employee suffers no diminution in rank, salary, or benefits. (3) A claim of inducement or guaranteed tenure must be strictly proved; in the absence of express contractual terms or supporting evidence, such claims cannot be sustained. (4) Where an employee voluntarily resigns without proving repudiatory conduct on the part of the employer, the resignation cannot be treated as a dismissal. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, and judgment was entered for the Defendant on its counterclaim for recovery of outstanding staff loans and unearned allowances
GIFTSON KWEKU ADZIGBO VS. BEATRICE QUANSIMAA ADZIGBO
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ELFREDA AMY DANKYI (MRS),
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Grounds for Divorce – Failed Reconciliation – Consent Judgment – Custody – Maintenance – Alimony. This case concerns a petition for the dissolution of marriage brought by the husband under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), on the ground that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. The parties, both Ghanaian citizens domiciled in Ghana, were married on 9th June 2007 under the Marriage Ordinance at the Restoration Church, Lapaz, Accra. The union produced three children, all minors at the time the petition was filed. The Petitioner initiated proceedings on 19th May 2023, attributing the breakdown of the marriage primarily to the Respondent’s alleged unreasonable behaviour. He alleged acts of adultery, lack of concern for the welfare of the family, and engagement with fetish priests, which he claimed caused him significant psychological distress and negatively affected his personal and professional life. According to him, these circumstances made it intolerable to continue living with the Respondent. He further asserted that all attempts at reconciliation had failed. In response, the Respondent entered appearance and filed both an Answer and a cross-petition. She denied most of the allegations, particularly disputing any malicious intent behind her visit to a fetish priest, explaining that it was for medical purposes rather than to harm the Petitioner. She also indicated that discussions of divorce had originated during family meetings, which caused her emotional distress. Notwithstanding her denials, she acknowledged that efforts by family and friends to reconcile the marriage had been unsuccessful. Despite the adversarial pleadings, the parties subsequently filed Terms of Settlement, effectively narrowing the issue before the court to whether the marriage had indeed broken down beyond reconciliation. The court emphasized its statutory duty under sections 2(2) and 2(3) of Act 367 to independently assess the state of the marriage, regardless of any agreement between the parties. In its analysis, the court reiterated that under section 1(2) of Act 367, the sole ground for divorce is breakdown of the marriage beyond reconciliation, which must be established by proving one or more of the facts listed under section 2(1). While the Petitioner relied on allegations of adultery and unreasonable behaviour, the court found it unnecessary to conclusively determine those claims. Instead, it focused on section 2(1)(f), which permits dissolution where the parties, after diligent efforts, have been unable to reconcile their differences. The evidence before the court clearly demonstrated persistent marital discord and the failure of reconciliation efforts. Both parties admitted to longstanding differences and confirmed that attempts by family and friends to resolve their disputes had been unsuccessful. On this basis, the court was satisfied that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. Consequently, the court granted a decree of divorce, formally dissolving the marriage celebrated under the Marriage Ordinance and cancelling the marriage certificate. With respect to ancillary matters, the court adopted the Terms of Settlement filed by the parties as a consent judgment. Under this arrangement, custody of the three children was awarded to the Petitioner, with reasonable access granted to the Respondent. The Petitioner was also required to hand over a Canadian visa he had procured for the Respondent. The Respondent waived any claim to alimony, and both parties agreed that the terms would be binding, with liberty to apply to the court in case of any disputes arising from the settlement.
AZONG CHARITY VERSUS AKELISIYINE STEPHENSON AKOLOGO
HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ENYONAM ADINYIRA
Matrimonial Causes – Dissolution of Marriage – Grounds for Divorce – Separation – Consent – Custody – Maintenance – Property Distribution. The case concerns a petition for divorce brought by the Petitioner following the breakdown of a marriage contracted under the Marriages Act, 1884–1985 (Cap 127). The parties were initially married under customary law and later formalized their union on 23rd July 2005 at St. Kizito Catholic Church in Nima, Accra. The marriage produced five children, three of whom were minors at the time of the proceedings. The Petitioner’s case was grounded in the assertion that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. She recounted that after years of peaceful cohabitation, the Respondent’s behaviour changed significantly following the birth of their last child. Communication between the parties deteriorated, and the Respondent withdrew from marital relations, including intimacy and basic companionship. The Petitioner further discovered that the Respondent had lost his job but concealed this fact, leading to financial strain and shifting the burden of maintaining the household entirely onto her. Despite attempts at reconciliation, including family intervention, the issues remained unresolved. Consequently, she sought dissolution of the marriage and custody of the children. The Respondent did not contest the petition. Instead, he filed an affidavit consenting to the divorce, acknowledging that the marriage had already been dissolved under customary law. He admitted his inability to fulfil financial responsibilities due to unemployment and confirmed that the Petitioner had assumed care of the children. He further indicated his intention to relocate for farming and accepted the Petitioner’s position that the Ordinance marriage required formal dissolution by the court. Importantly, he gave unconditional consent to the divorce. In its analysis, the court applied the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), which establishes that the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The court referred to established case law emphasizing that the determination of breakdown depends on the totality of the circumstances and must meet an objective standard. The court also reiterated the evidentiary requirement of proof on a balance of probabilities under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). Upon evaluating the evidence, the court found that the parties had not lived as husband and wife for over three years and had made unsuccessful efforts to reconcile. Additionally, both parties confirmed in court that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. These facts satisfied sections 1(2) and 2(1)(d) and (f) of Act 367, which relate to prolonged separation with consent and failure of reconciliation efforts. Accordingly, the court held that the Petitioner had discharged the burden of proof required to establish irreconcilable breakdown of marriage. It therefore granted a decree of divorce, formally dissolving the Ordinance marriage and ordering the cancellation of the marriage certificate. On ancillary matters, the court granted joint custody of the three minor children to both parties, with primary residence vested in the Petitioner. The Respondent was granted visitation rights every two weeks. Financially, the court ordered that both parties share responsibility for the children’s educational and medical expenses equally. Additionally, the Respondent was directed to pay monthly maintenance of GH¢2,500 to support the children. In conclusion, the court’s decision reflects a careful application of statutory provisions and judicial precedents to ensure that the dissolution of the marriage was conducted fairly, with due consideration for the welfare of the children and the realities of the parties’ circumstances.