DAVID APASERA & 42 OTHERS VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of certain statutory and administrative measures adopted by the State. He alleged that the impugned provisions violated specific constitutional guarantees, including principles of accountability and lawful governance. The Attorney-General contended that the action failed to disclose a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation and was speculative in nature. The Supreme Court examined whether the Plaintiff had established a clear inconsistency between the challenged measures and express constitutional provisions. It reiterated that constitutional litigation demands precision and a demonstrable nexus between the impugned act and the alleged constitutional breach. Finding no such inconsistency established, the Court dismissed the action.
ASSOCIATION OF FINANCE HOUSES VRS BANK OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, an association representing finance houses, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge regulatory directives and actions issued by the Bank of Ghana during the financial sector clean-up exercise. It contended that certain measures affecting member institutions were unconstitutional, unlawful, and inconsistent with due process guarantees under the 1992 Constitution. The Defendants argued that the Bank of Ghana acted within its statutory mandate under financial sector legislation to ensure stability and protect depositors. The Supreme Court considered whether the action raised a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation or merely contested administrative and regulatory decisions. The Court held that regulatory supervision and enforcement actions taken pursuant to statute did not, without clear constitutional inconsistency, warrant invocation of its original jurisdiction. The writ was accordingly dismissed.
JUSTICE ABDULAI VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of certain statutory and administrative measures adopted by the State. He alleged that the impugned provisions violated specific constitutional guarantees, including principles of accountability and lawful governance. The Attorney-General contended that the action failed to disclose a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation and was speculative in nature. The Supreme Court examined whether the Plaintiff had established a clear inconsistency between the challenged measures and express constitutional provisions. It reiterated that constitutional litigation demands precision and a demonstrable nexus between the impugned act and the alleged constitutional breach. Finding no such inconsistency established, the Court dismissed the action.
DR. ISAAC ANNAN AND VICTOR JONAH VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the constitutionality of certain executive actions and statutory provisions relating to public administration and governance. They contended that the impugned measures were inconsistent with specific provisions of the 1992 Constitution and offended principles of accountability and separation of powers. The Attorney-General argued that the action failed to disclose a real issue of constitutional interpretation and that the reliefs sought were either speculative or improperly framed. The Supreme Court examined whether the Plaintiffs had precisely identified the constitutional provisions allegedly breached and demonstrated a clear inconsistency. It held that constitutional litigation requires specificity and a direct nexus between the impugned act and the constitutional provision relied upon. Finding no such established inconsistency, the Court dismissed the writ.
STEPHEN KWABENA OPUNI VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE REGISTRAR (HIGH COURT, CRIMINAL DIVISION 1), ACCRA
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, a former public official standing trial in the High Court, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the constitutionality of aspects of his ongoing criminal proceedings. He sought, among other reliefs, to restrain the High Court from proceeding with the trial, contending that certain rulings and procedural steps infringed his right to a fair hearing under Article 19 of the 1992 Constitution. The Attorney-General argued that the application was an improper attempt to invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in a matter essentially concerning criminal procedure and trial management. The Supreme Court examined whether the action raised a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement. It held that the grievances primarily related to alleged procedural errors capable of redress on appeal. The Court therefore declined jurisdiction and dismissed the writ.
KENNETH DEGBOR V. ATLANTIC PORT SERVICES
High Court
Labour Law — Interdiction — Disciplinary Procedure — Managing Director’s Authority — Voluntary Retirement — Burden of Proof — Mutual Termination of Employment — Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) — Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) Facts The Plaintiff, Kenneth Degbor, was an employee of Atlantic Port Services (APS), serving as the Administrative and Human Resource Manager. In January 2008, he was interdicted on allegations of misconduct relating to unauthorized salary increments, manipulation of benefits, and improper use of company resources. The company’s Conditions of Service (Clause 17.10) provided that an interdicted employee is entitled to full salary for the first month and 2/3 salary thereafter until investigations are concluded. Plaintiff petitioned the National Labour Commission (NLC) over unpaid salaries but did not attend disciplinary hearings set by the employer. In September 2011, a letter (Exhibit K) purportedly reinstated him, stating the allegations were unfounded. The company denied authorising the recall, claiming the Managing Director acted without Board approval. In 2012, the Plaintiff notified the company of his intention to retire voluntarily at age 55 and demanded retirement benefits. The Managing Director later revoked the purported reinstatement (Exhibit T) on grounds that the issues surrounding his interdiction were unresolved. The Plaintiff sued for GHS 327,486.47 as arrears of salary and retirement benefits, plus damages for wrongful interdiction. Holding All the Plaintiff’s claims failed. The court held that: 1. The interdiction was not wrongful, as the Defendant eventually complied with the Conditions of Service. 2. The purported reinstatement (Exhibit K) was unauthorised and void, as the Managing Director had no power to reinstate without Board approval. 3. Plaintiff failed to prove entitlement to the amounts claimed. 4. Defendant's continuing disciplinary actions were not an afterthought. 5. Plaintiff’s claim for voluntary retirement benefits was invalid because the company never accepted his retirement request. The Plaintiff was ordered to return company property. No costs were awarded.
LAWRENCE Y. A. OSEI V. MECHANICAL LLOYD LTD
Court of Appeal
Labour Law — Interdiction — Conditions of Service — Requirement of Fair Hearing — Dismissal — Retrospective Dismissal — Measure of Damages — Appellate Court’s Power to Amend Reliefs Facts The Plaintiff (Lawrence Osei) was employed as an accountant by Mechanical Lloyd Ltd on 1 November 1989. On 27 October 1997, he was interdicted without pay for alleged anomalies in company accounts. The interdiction letter was issued by the General Manager, Resource and Planning, who was not authorised under Article 13 of the Senior Staff Conditions of Service to interdict staff. Plaintiff was not given a hearing before interdiction, contrary to Article 13(A)(2) of the Conditions of Service. Plaintiff sued on 22 May 1998, claiming his interdiction and removal from payroll were unlawful. On 8 March 2001, while the suit was pending, the defendant issued a summary dismissal letter, purporting to take retrospective effect from 27 October 1997. Plaintiff was later prosecuted criminally but acquitted in 2005. The High Court in 2009 granted all his reliefs and awarded two years’ salary as damages. The employer appealed. Holdings The Court of Appeal held that: 1. Interdiction was a nullity: It was issued by an unauthorised officer. Plaintiff was not given a hearing, violating Article 13(A)(2). 2. Dismissal on 8 March 2001 was unlawful: It could not take retrospective effect. It relied on the void interdiction letter. 3. Plaintiff remained an employee from 1997 until 8 March 2001, hence entitled to all salaries and benefits for that period. 4. Two years’ salary as general damages was excessive, but Plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to substantial compensation. 5. Damages awarded were adjusted to: Salaries/emoluments from 27 Oct 1997 to 8 March 2001 (with interest). 18 months’ salary as general damages for wrongful dismissal (based on highest salary between 1997–2005) Appeal succeeded in part - modifying damages but affirming unlawfulness of interdiction and dismissal.
EZUAME MANNAN VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff challenged the inclusion of Section 43 in the Narcotics Control Commission Act, 2020, arguing it was unconstitutionally added to the Bill without an explanatory memorandum detailing the policy change, in breach of the procedural requirements of Article 106 of the 1992 Constitution. He also contended that Section 43, which permits licencing of low‑THC cannabis cultivation, violated Ghana’s international treaty obligations and Directive Principles of State Policy. The Attorney‑General and Speaker defended the amendment as a valid exercise of Parliament’s legislative powers under Article 106 and consistent with treaty flexibility. The Supreme Court examined whether Parliament complied with the constitutional process for passing legislation. It held that Parliament’s amendment and enactment procedures met constitutional requirements and that Section 43 did not offend international obligations or Directive Principles. The Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s action, upholding the validity of the impugned section.
JAMES MARSHALL BELIEB VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, a private citizen, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the long‑standing practice of including the title “Chief Justice” and the name of the sitting Chief Justice on every writ of summons issued in Ghana. He argued that this practice was inconsistent with the 1992 Constitution because it wrongly suggested that justice emanates from the Chief Justice rather than the people, allegedly violating the Preamble, Article 1 and Article 125. He also challenged Order 2 Rule 3(1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules requiring writs to follow a prescribed form. The Attorney‑General and Chief Justice defended the practice as compliant with constitutional provisions that judicial power is vested in the judiciary and administered in the name of the Republic. The Supreme Court held that the use of the Chief Justice’s name on writs does not elevate the office above the Constitution or conflict with constitutional mandates. The Court dismissed the action, upholding the entrenched practice as lawful and consistent with constitutional framework.
ELORM KWAMI GORNI VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of actions involving the National House of Chiefs. He contended that certain decisions and processes relating to chieftaincy matters were inconsistent with constitutional provisions governing traditional authority. The Defendants argued that the issues raised concerned chieftaincy disputes reserved for adjudication by judicial committees established under the Constitution and the Chieftaincy Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the action properly raised a genuine constitutional interpretation question. It held that where a matter substantially concerns chieftaincy disputes, the Constitution vests jurisdiction in the appropriate chieftaincy institutions and not in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The writ was accordingly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
EXPORT FINANCE COMPANY LTD. VRS GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Export Finance Company Ltd, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution to challenge the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Ghana Revenue Authority’s enforcement regime in the Revenue Administration Act, 2016. It contended that the statutory framework, including pre-payment requirements and enforcement powers, violated fundamental rights and the judicial authority vested in the courts under Article 125 of the Constitution. The Defendants maintained that Act 915’s objection, appeal, and enforcement mechanisms were lawful and subject to judicial oversight. The Supreme Court held that constitutional litigation must clearly identify the specific statutory provisions and corresponding constitutional breaches. It further ruled that many of the Plaintiff’s claimed grounds were vague and did not properly invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ was dismissed for failing to establish a clear constitutional inconsistency with the impugned provisions.
ORICA GHANA LIMITED VRS THE COMMISSIONER--GENERAL
THE HIGH COURT
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE 19TH OF JULY2022 GAVE A RULING ON ORICA GHANA LIMITED VRS THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL HISTORY This is an appeal against the Commissioner-General on its tax assessment of Orica Ghana Limited. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE In the year, 2017, the Commissioner-General of the Ghana Revenue Authority (RESPONDENT) conducted a tax assessment on the activities of Orica Ghana Limited (APPELLANT) for the period of 2010-2016. The tax audit assessed the tax liabilities of Orica Ghana Limited into direct tax liability and indirect tax liability. The initial direct tax liability was assessed at USD 3, 065,131.67 which was later reassessed to USD1, 772, 069.22. The initial indirect tax liability was assessed at USD 11,412,075.64 which was later reassessed to USD 9,897,621.59. The appellant was dissatisfied and aggrieved by this tax decision and objected to it and raised several issues which the Respondent rejected and thus the appellant initiated this appeal at the High Court of Ghana. ISSUES 1. Whether the income from the activities of the Appellant being the manufacturing of explosives and their transportation and installation for its customers should be treated as being conducted in the course of a single business (manufacturing business) or divided into two different businesses of manufacturing and management service. . 2. Whether the three year limitation applied to the Appellant’s tax credit for the 2010-2012 year of assessment. 3. Whether the photocopies of the original VAT Relief Purchase Orders (VRPO)’s should be accepted in the assessment of the tax liability of the Appellant. THE APPELLANT’S CASE The Appellant is engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, and selling of bulk commercial explosives. The Appellant objected to the Respondent’s tax assessment and raised the issue as to the statutory limitation against raising an assessment on a taxpayer after three years of filing a VAT return. Subsequently, the appellant reiterated its objection to the Respondent’s position on location incentives. The Respondent rejected the contention of the Appellant and the Appellant being dissatisfied appealed against the Respondent’s decision. THE RESPONDENT’S CASE The Respondent audited the affairs of the Appellant and came up with its audit report which assessed the direct and indirect tax liability of the Appellant. The Respondent denied the Appellant’s direct tax overpayment in the year 2010 due to the limitation regarding the assessment of a taxpayer. GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1. The Respondent erred in law by denying the Appellant its full entitlement to the location incentive under paragraph 3(6) of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act,2015(ACT 896). 2. The Respondent erred in law by apportioning the Appellant’s business income into manufacturing and management service contrary to Article 296(c) of the 1992 constitution of the Republic of Ghana. 3. The Respondent erred in law by denying the Appellant the use of Value Added Tax(VAT) credits which had accrued prior to the 2013 year of assessment 4. The Respondent erred in law by denying the Appellant the use of its legitimate income tax credits. 5. The Respondent erred in law by rejecting photocopies of the VAT Relief Purchase (VRPOs) contrary to Section 91 of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016(ACT 915) and Section 166 of the Evidence Act, 1975(NRCD 323). DECISION OF THE COURT The High Court upheld the appeal and held that: 1. Order 54 Rule (1) and (2) of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules,2004, CI 47) is to the effect that it was mandatory for the taxpayer to pay 25% of the tax liability as contained in the notice of assessment before an appeal to the tax assessment could be entertained in Court. 2. Since the Respondent in its correspondences to the Appellant admitted or concluded that the Appellant had a total tax credit of USD 755,411.32, an assessment has already been done and the Appellant has credits to its account with zero liability. Thus, the statutory precondition has not been violated and the appeal is properly before this Court. 3. The Respondent’s conduct of dividing the Appellant’s manufacturing business into manufacturing and service management amounts to exercising its discretion to re-characterize the Appellant’s business. Having exercised such use of discretionary powers without following due process of law as required, the Respondent acted contrary to the provisions of Article 296 of the 1992 Constitution 4. The Respondent from all the facts has admitted the status of the Appellant as a manufacturing business. The Court has found that the Appellant’s business is a whole which includes Manufacturing and management services, if so by law the Respondent is entitled to the full location tax incentives as provided by the First Schedule of ACT 896 5. If it is clear that fraud has not been determined by law; the Commissioner shall not raise an assessment after a period of three years. This limitation is provided only on the Commissioner and not on the taxpayer. If the Commissioner should fail to raise an assessment after three years and no fraud charges has been brought or found against a taxpayer, the three year limitation is on the Commissioner General and not the taxpayer, so it is wrong for the Respondent to ask Appellant to forfeit its tax credit forn2010 to 2012 as there is no limitation to the application of tax credit and the Appellant is entitled to same. 6. When sections 50(2) and (13) of the Value Added Tax, 2013(ACT 870) are read together, it means that a taxpayer who pays taxes in excess of their liability may either request for a refund or request for the excess tax to be applied against the taxpayer’s liabilities as and when they occur. Thus, the Appellant’s tax credits of the 2011 and 2012 years of assessment can be applied to reduce its tax liabilities. 7. The photocopied VAT Relief Purchase Orders (VRPOS) having met the threshold requirements in the Evidence Act, and the Respondents having not disputed that they had earlier authenticated the originals, nothing stands in the way of this Court in holding that the Respondent should accept the said VRPO’s in its assessment of the Appellant’s tax liability. IMPLICATION AND KEY TAKEAWAYS OF THE HIGH COURT’S DECISION • It is the taxpayer that bears the burden of proof when making an objection and must show compliance with the provisions of the tax laws of the Republic of Ghana • The burden of proof is on the Commissioner General to show non-compliance with theprovisions of the tax by the taxpayer, when imposing a penalty and this includes proceedings on appeal under or for recovery of penalty. • Tax Laws are interpreted strictly. This means that nothing is to be read in and nothing is to be implied. • Where a Person files an appeal on a tax decision, that person is required to pay 25% of the tax liability as contained in the notice of assessment. Absence of this, the appeal shall not be entertained by the court. • The three years limitation is on the Commissioner-General on tax credits due a taxpayer and not on the taxpayer save that fraud has been determined by law. • There is no time limit with which a tax credit may be applied and even a tax credit can be carried forward by the taxpayer. • A photocopy of a VAT Relief Purchase Orders (VRPO)’s is acceptable in assessing the tax liability of a taxpayer. CONCLUSION The High Court upheld the appeal of the Appellant and rejected the view taken by the Respondent in their assessment of the tax liability of the Appellant.
RICHARD AMO-HENE VRS GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND JUDICIAL SERVICE
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution to challenge aspects of the Ghana Revenue Authority’s enforcement of tax laws and related procedures on the basis that they were unconstitutional. He alleged that the tax regime and procedural powers vested in the Authority undermined constitutional rights and improperly interfered with judicial authority. The Attorney‑General and the Judicial Service of Ghana responded that the challenge failed to identify clear constitutional breaches and that the disputed powers were subject to statutory safeguards and judicial review. The Supreme Court held that a constitutional challenge must precisely link impugned statutory provisions with specific constitutional rights or mandates. It further found that many of the Plaintiff’s claims failed to properly invoke the Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ was dismissed for lack of substantive constitutional grounds.
AKUFO AND OTHERS V. VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD
Court of Appeal
Labour Law — Redundancy — Payment in lieu of notice — Collective agreement — Whether redundancy benefits to be computed based on salary at date of termination or salary that would accrue during notice period — Whether Articles 13 and 15 of labour agreement to be read together — Whether union can waive statutory or contractual rights of employees — Discretion of employer — Fairness. FACTS The appellants, employees of the respondent company, were declared redundant on 16 May 1994 and were paid two months’ salary in lieu of notice under Article 15(e) of the governing Labour Agreement. A wage re‑opening scheduled to take effect on 1 July 1994 resulted in a 71.25% salary increase. The respondent calculated redundancy benefits based solely on salaries as at 16 May 1994 and paid an additional “goodwill” sum to mitigate anticipated losses. The appellants sued, contending that their end‑of‑service benefits ought to have been calculated on the remuneration that would have accrued had two months’ notice been given, i.e., by 15 July 1994. The High Court dismissed the claim. Held, allowing the appeal: 1. Articles 13 and 15 of the Labour Agreement must be construed together, as a collective agreement must be read as a whole to give effect to the parties’ intentions. Redundancy is a mode of leaving the service, and Article 13(a) governs the quantum payable upon payment in lieu of notice. 2. Payment in lieu of notice must equal the remuneration that would have accrued during the notice period, not merely the salary at the date of termination. Statutory support exists in s.33(9) of the Labour Decree, 1969 (NLCD 57). Since wage reopening took effect during the notice period (1–15 July 1994), the appellants were entitled to the 71.25% increase. 3. Under s.10(4) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299), rights conferred by a collective agreement are non‑waivable. Union‑negotiated arrangements that purport to diminish contractual rights—such as excluding wage increments—are void to the extent of inconsistency. 4. Employer discretion must be exercised fairly. Choosing a method of computation that resulted in an unjustified diminution of employees’ earnings was inequitable, especially where the employer acknowledged the loss by making a “goodwill payment.” 5. The appellants’ entitlements should be computed on the basis of remuneration that would have accrued up to 15 July 1994, less any goodwill payments already made, with interest from 1 July 1994 at prevailing bank rates (simple interest) and post‑judgment interest at 4%.
KWASI AFRIFA VRS GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution, challenging numerous provisions of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915) as unconstitutional. He alleged that the Act conferred excessive quasi-judicial powers on the Ghana Revenue Authority, undermining judicial authority under Article 125 and violating fundamental rights. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff failed to identify with precision the specific constitutional provisions allegedly breached. The Court held that constitutional litigation requires clear identification of both the impugned statutory provisions and the exact constitutional provisions said to be violated. It found that most reliefs were vague, argumentative, and failed to properly invoke its jurisdiction, while the few examined on the merits disclosed no constitutional inconsistency. The writ was dismissed in its entirety.
VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD V. AKUFFO AND OTHERS
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Collective Agreement — Redundancy — Pay in lieu of notice — Interpretation of Articles 13 and 15 of Collective Agreement — Whether redundancy pay is based on salary at date of termination or on remuneration that would accrue during notice period — Whether union negotiations were void for violating s.10(4) Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299) — Applicability of s.33 Labour Decree, 1967 (NLCD 157). Facts The plaintiffs, employees of VALCO and members of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), were declared redundant on 16 May 1994 under Article 15(e) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and were paid two months’ salary in lieu of notice calculated on their salaries as of the date of termination. A wage‑reopener under Article 52 later produced a 71.52% across‑the‑board increase effective 1 July 1994, which the plaintiffs claimed should have been factored into their end‑of‑service benefits on the basis that Article 15(e)’s “paid in lieu” must be interpreted consistently with Article 13(a)’s requirement to pay remuneration that “would have accrued during the period of notice.” The High Court dismissed the claim, but the Court of Appeal (majority) reversed the decision, holding that Articles 13 and 15 should be read together and that the redundancy package should reflect the July wage increase. It further held that the union acted unfairly and unlawfully waived employee rights. Held, allowing the appeal and restoring the High Court’s decision: 1. Articles 13 and 15 deal with distinct modes of separation and cannot be read together. Redundancy under Article 15 is a separate regime with its own notice requirements and cannot be supplemented by Article 13(a)’s formula for calculating remuneration in lieu of notice. 2. Pay in lieu of notice under Article 15(e) must be calculated with reference to salary at the date of termination. Employment ended on 16 May 1994 when the employer exercised its contractual option; therefore, plaintiffs had no contractual right to benefit from the subsequent July wage increase. 3.Union negotiations were not void under s.10(4) of Act 299. Section 10(4) restricts waiver of rights by individual employees; it does not prevent unions from negotiating adjustments to collective agreement rights. There was no legal basis to impugn the fairness of the ICU’s negotiations. 4. Section 33 of NLCD 157 was inapplicable, as it governs only oral employment contracts. The governing contract was a written collective agreement, expressly incorporated into individual contracts under s.10(2) of Act 299. 5. Courts will not rewrite or invalidate clear contractual terms merely on grounds of fairness. The employer’s exercise of its contractual option could not be displaced by equitable considerations or employee expectations of an impending wage increase.
KWASI AFRIFA VRS GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY
Supreme Court
The matter arose by way of reference to the Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of certain enforcement measures adopted by the Ghana Revenue Authority in the collection of tax liabilities. The Plaintiff contended that the impugned actions violated his constitutional rights to property and fair hearing under Articles 18 and 23 of the 1992 Constitution. It was argued that the administrative process employed by the Authority lacked due process safeguards. The Court examined the statutory framework governing tax assessments and enforcement. It held that tax collection measures undertaken pursuant to valid statutory authority do not offend the Constitution where procedural safeguards exist. The reference was accordingly resolved in favour of the Revenue Authority.
EVANS CUDJOE & 70 OTHERS V. GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY
High Court
Labour Law — Collective Bargaining Agreements — Amendment of CBA — Effective Date of Collective Agreements — Notional vs. Financial Effective Dates — Authority of Union Representatives — Entitlement to End-of-Service Benefits — Binding Effect Contract — Sanctity of Contract — Parties Bound by Terms of Agreement — Evidence — Burden and Standard of Proof in Civil Cases The plaintiffs, retired staff of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), sued the GRA over: 1. Unpaid end-of-service/retirement benefits 2. Underpayment of their long service awards 3. A declaration that a 2011 communiqué altering the effective date of financial benefits under the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was null and void. The core dispute centred on whether a communiqué issued on 22 December 2011 validly changed the financial effective date of the CBA from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2012. HELD: 1. The 2011 communiqué is null and void 2. The GRA’s argument on “notional” and “financial” dates is untenable 3. GRA to pay: All end-of-service/retirement benefits due Differences in long service awards Interest on all such payments General damages: GH¢10,000 Costs: GH¢1,000 per successful plaintiff
DANIEL AXIM VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, challenging the constitutionality of the Electronic Transfer Levy Act, 2022 (E-Levy). He contended that the passage of the Act violated Articles 104(1) and 106 of the 1992 Constitution, arguing that the required quorum and voting procedures were not properly complied with during its enactment. The Attorney-General maintained that the legislative process was constitutionally valid and that Parliament had complied with all procedural requirements. The Court examined the parliamentary record and the meaning of “majority of members present and voting.” It held that the constitutional threshold had been satisfied at the material time. The action was therefore dismissed, and the validity of the Act upheld.
DAFEAMEKPOR ROCKSON-NELSON VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, a Member of Parliament, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the constitutionality of the Criminal Offences (Amendment) Act, 2022, which amended provisions on unlawful assembly and related public order offences. He contended that the impugned provisions infringed Articles 21(1)(d) and (f) of the 1992 Constitution guaranteeing freedom of assembly and association. The Attorney-General argued that the amendments were reasonable restrictions justified in the interest of public order and safety. The Court examined whether the statutory limitations satisfied the constitutional test of necessity and proportionality. It held that Parliament may regulate the exercise of fundamental freedoms, provided the restrictions are reasonably required in a democratic society. The action was accordingly dismissed, the Court finding no constitutional inconsistency.