ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT VRS SWEATER AND SOCKS FACTORY LIMITED
WOOD (MRS.) C.J. PRESIDING, ANSAH, J.S.C, DOTSE, J.S.C, ANIN YEBOAH, J.S.C, GBADEGBE, J.S.C, AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), J.S.C, AKAMBA, J.S.C
The case arose from the 1979 confiscation of the Defendant’s assets (Sweater & Socks Factory Ltd) by the AFRC under AFRCD 38. The Defendant challenged the continued vesting of its assets in the State, invoking the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction for constitutional redress. The key issue was whether the confiscation and its continued effect were protected under the transitional provisions of the 1992 Constitution. The Court examined whether such revolutionary decrees could be questioned under the current constitutional framework. It held that enactments like AFRCD 38 are protected by the Constitution and not subject to challenge. Accordingly, the action failed, and the confiscation remained valid.
SEBASTIAN DZAISU & 92 ORS V GHANA BRWERIES LTD.
AKUFFO, (MRS), J.S.C. (PRESIDING), BROBBEY, J.S.C., ANSAH, J.S.C., ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C. , ASIAMAH, J.S.C.
Labour Law — Casual Workers — Permanent Employment — Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) — Burden of Proof — Evidence — Discrimination — Employment Status — Applicability of CBA FACTS The appellants were engaged as casual workers between 1993 and 2003 by Ghana Breweries Ltd. They claimed they performed the same work as permanent employees yet were denied benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such as: a. Overtime b. Night allowance c. Annual leave d. Back pay e. Access to trade union rights They repeatedly requested upgrading to permanent status and reported to the Labour Office without success. They sued for declarations, compensation, and application of the CBA to them. The respondent denied liability, arguing: 1. Casual workers are not entitled to permanent status. 2. Permanent positions were offered subject to medical examination, but the appellants refused. 3. Casual and permanent employees did not perform the same duties. The appellants lost at the High Court and the Court of Appeal and appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: Appeal dismissed. Casual workers are not automatically entitled to permanent status; CBA applies only to unionized permanent/temporary workers; appellants failed to prove they performed same work as permanent staff; no evidence of discrimination or wrongful dismissal.
Republic v High Court (Land Division), Accra; Ex parte Nii Noi Morton F.K.A Company Ltd; Lands Commission (2016)
Justice G. Pwamang JSC (delivering the leading judgment), with Dotse JSC, Anin Yeboah JSC, Baffoe-Bonnie JSC, and Akoto-Bamfo (Mrs) JSC concurring
The applicant invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to quash an order of mandamus granted by the High Court directing the Lands Commission to cancel land registrations in his name. The applicant contended that he was not served with the second mandamus application despite being directly affected by the relief sought. The Supreme Court held that failure to serve and hear a party whose rights are affected constitutes a breach of the rules of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram partem rule. Accordingly, the order of mandamus was quashed by certiorari.
WILLIAM G.K. THOMPSON VRS TOTAL GHANA LIMITED
WOOD (MRS), CJ (PRESIDING) BROBBEY, JSC DOTSE, JSC YEBOAH, JSC GBADEGBE, JSC
Labour Law — Contract of Employment — Suspension — Burden of Proof — Allegations of Misconduct — Natural Justice The respondent, a senior employee of the appellant company and its Retail Network Development Manager for sixteen years, was directed by management to assist the Police with investigations concerning two arrested employees. Although the Police made no adverse findings against him, the appellant issued a suspension letter asserting that he had been implicated in the investigations. The respondent was not confronted with any allegations, nor was he given a hearing. He instituted an action challenging the suspension as unlawful. At the High Court, the appellant failed to call any evidence—neither the Police nor alleged witnesses—to prove the allegation underlying the suspension. The trial court found for the respondent, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the company’s appeal. At the Supreme Court, the appellant again relied only on bare assertions and sought to rely on an inadmissible police report offending the hearsay rule. Held: 1. Since the suspension was based on an allegation of misconduct, the burden lay on the appellant to produce credible evidence proving the allegation. 2. The appellant failed to discharge this burden; its conduct indicated that no such incriminating evidence existed. 3. A suspension founded on an unproven allegation is rash, unfair, unlawful, and without contractual justification. 4. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Result: Appeal dismissed; suspension declared unjustified and unlawful.
EMMANUEL FOSU BOATENG V. E.B ACCION SAVINGS AND LOANS COMPANY LTD
BARBARA TETTEH-CHARWAY (MRS) J
EMPLOYMENT LAW — WRONGFUL TERMINATION — BURDEN OF PROOF — MISCONDUCT — CONFLICT OF INTEREST — SUMMARY DISMISSAL The plaintiff, Head of Credit & Operations of the defendant financial institution, challenged his dismissal following investigations into allegations of manipulation of loan processes, corruption, and conduct bringing the institution into disrepute. The plaintiff denied wrongdoing and argued that the defendant breached its Human Resource Manual and failed to prove the allegations or accord him a fair hearing. He also alleged that he was never given a copy of the investigative report. Held: Action dismissed. In an action for wrongful termination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to produce the terms of employment and demonstrate how they were breached; the plaintiff failed to tender the HR Manual he relied upon. Evidence established that he improperly influenced the approval of the Randies Enterprise loan, and that the loan proceeds were deposited into his personal account, demonstrating conflict of interest and lack of candour. His conduct, particularly regarding the loan irregularities and reputational damage arising from his defaulted personal borrowing, justified summary dismissal. The defendant was entitled to recover the outstanding staff loan on its counterclaim. Costs awarded against the plaintiff.
DR. GILBERT ANYETEI (SUBSTITUTED BY EMMANUEL TAMATEY OPAI-TETTEH) VRS MRS. SUSSANA ANYETEI
YEBOAH CJ (PRESIDING) PWAMANG JSC OWUSU (MS.) JSC HONYENUGA JSC PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
Matrimonial Property – Jurisdiction over Foreign Immovable Property – Equitable Distribution – Corporate Personality – Contributions of Spouses. This case concerns the scope of Ghanaian courts’ jurisdiction over foreign immovable property, the principles governing equitable distribution of marital property upon divorce, and the evidentiary burden required to establish joint acquisition under Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution. The dispute arose from divorce proceedings initiated by the husband in the High Court, Accra, despite both parties being Ghanaian residents in South Africa at the time. The marriage, contracted under the Marriages Ordinance in 1990, produced two children and lasted approximately twenty years. The husband petitioned for divorce on grounds of the wife’s alleged infidelity and disrespect, while the wife denied these allegations and counterclaimed, accusing the husband of adultery and seeking custody and 50% of all properties acquired during the marriage. The High Court hastily dissolved the marriage based solely on the parties’ statements without requiring proof of irretrievable breakdown, contrary to the law. It subsequently awarded the wife 50% of the properties, finding that she had made substantial contributions, including financial support and domestic services. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed most of the High Court’s orders. It held that the wife failed to discharge her burden of proving substantial contribution, that Ghanaian courts lacked jurisdiction over immovable property in South Africa under the common law Mozambique rule (from The British South African Co v The Companhia de Mozambique), and that company-owned assets could not be treated as personal property of the husband due to the doctrine of separate corporate personality. It also clarified that Article 22 requires equitable, not equal (50–50), distribution. The Supreme Court addressed three key issues. First, on jurisdiction, the Court clarified that although the Mozambique rule generally bars courts from adjudicating title to foreign land, exceptions exist where claims arise from contract, fiduciary relationships, or equitable obligations. Relying on authorities such as Deschamps v Miller and its earlier decision in Akoto v Akoto, the Court held that the wife’s claim—based on marital rights and equitable interests—fell within these exceptions. Thus, the High Court properly exercised jurisdiction since the relief sought operated in personam against the husband, not directly against the foreign land. Second, on the distribution of property, the Court reaffirmed that Article 22(3)(b) mandates equitable—not automatic equal—distribution. Citing Mensah v Mensah and Arthur v Arthur, it emphasized that while equality may be appropriate in some cases, distribution must depend on the specific circumstances. Importantly, the Court rejected the notion that all property acquired during marriage is subject to division; rather, only property jointly acquired qualifies. On the evidence, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal and found that the wife made substantial contributions through income support, domestic responsibilities, and participation in family arrangements that enabled property acquisition. The Court recognized that modern matrimonial law does not require direct financial contribution; non-monetary contributions such as homemaking and emotional support are equally relevant. Given the difficulty in quantifying contributions, the Court applied the principle that “equality is equity” in appropriate cases and largely restored the High Court’s distribution, albeit with modifications. Third, regarding company property, the Court clarified that assets owned by a company are not directly divisible between spouses. However, where a company is established during marriage and contributions are proven, the shares—not the company’s assets—may be treated as jointly acquired property. In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part. It upheld the jurisdiction of Ghanaian courts over foreign immovable property under equitable exceptions, reaffirmed equitable distribution principles under Article 22, and recognized the wife’s contributions as sufficient to justify a substantial share of the marital assets. However, it corrected the trial court’s order requiring the husband to bear all outstanding liabilities on properties allocated to the wife and instead placed that responsibility on her.
DR. OWUSU AFRIYIE AKOTO VRS ADWOA ABREFI AKOTO
ATUGUBA, J.S.C (PRESIDING) AKUFFO (MS), J.S.C. ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C. GBADEGBE, J.S.C. AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS), J.S.C.
Matrimonial Property – Jurisdiction over Foreign Immovable Property – Corporate Personality – Financial Settlement – Equitable Distribution of Spousal Property This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had affirmed the judgment of the High Court in favour of the Respondent in a matrimonial dispute involving property distribution and financial settlement. The central issues concerned jurisdiction over foreign immovable property, the doctrine of corporate personality, and the propriety of financial awards. The facts reveal that the parties were married under customary law in 1974 and subsequently converted their marriage into a monogamous ordinance marriage in England in 1976. They lived mainly in the United Kingdom and had three children. The marriage broke down in 1997 following the discovery of certain letters by the Respondent. The Appellant initiated divorce proceedings, and the Respondent filed a cross-petition seeking, among other reliefs, declarations of joint ownership of several properties located both in Ghana and the United Kingdom, financial settlement, and maintenance. The High Court and the Court of Appeal found in favour of the Respondent, granting her beneficial interests in the properties, financial settlement of £150,000, and other ancillary reliefs. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court on three main grounds: first, that the High Court lacked jurisdiction over immovable property situated abroad; second, that the courts erred in awarding to the Respondent properties owned by companies in which she had no legal interest; and third, that the financial award was excessive and erroneous. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Appellant argued that under the doctrine of lex situs, only the courts of the country where land is situated have jurisdiction over such property. The Respondent, however, contended that an equitable exception allowed the Ghanaian courts to assume jurisdiction. The Supreme Court acknowledged the general rule that immovable property is governed by the law of its location but emphasized that an exception exists where equitable relief is sought. Relying on authorities such as King v Elliot and Youhana v Abboud, as well as principles of private international law, the Court held that although lex situs applies, Ghanaian courts may exercise jurisdiction in equity where justice so demands, particularly in cases involving fraud or unconscionable conduct. Given the Appellant’s inequitable dealings—such as secretly using jointly acquired properties to secure loans and allowing them to be repossessed—the Court held that the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction in equity. On the second issue regarding corporate personality, the Appellant argued that properties registered in the name of companies could not be awarded to the Respondent since she was neither a shareholder nor a director. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the doctrine of separate legal personality cannot be used as a shield for fraud or injustice. Citing authorities including Worldwide Shipping v Darko and Re Polly Peck International plc, the Court affirmed that the corporate veil may be lifted where a company is used as a façade to conceal wrongdoing. The evidence showed that the Appellant had converted jointly owned properties into corporate assets for his personal benefit. In such circumstances, the courts were justified in lifting the corporate veil and granting appropriate relief to the Respondent. On the issue of financial settlement, the Court held that the award of £150,000 was not based on any wrong principle and was supported by the evidence. The Respondent had been treated unfairly in a long marriage during which she contributed significantly. However, given the mixed jurisdictional elements of the case, the Court ordered that the amount be converted into its cedi equivalent. In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety, except for the modification regarding the currency of the financial award.
KOFI AMOFA KUSI VRS AFIA AMANKWAH ADARKWAH
BAFFOE-BONNIE JSC (PRESIDING) DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC AMEGATCHER JSC LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC KULENDI JSC
Matrimonial Property – Equitable Distribution – Financial Provision – Practising Licence Objection – Presumption of Joint Ownership – Section 20 of Act 367 – Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution – Concurrent Findings of Fact This is an appeal before the Supreme Court of Ghana from the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 29 April 2021, which affirmed in part the judgment of the High Court dissolving a marriage and making consequential orders on property distribution and financial provision. The Appellant, dissatisfied with the decision, invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The parties contracted an ordinance marriage in 2002 and had four children. In 2015, the Appellant petitioned for divorce on the ground of unreasonable behaviour. The Respondent initially denied the breakdown of the marriage but later filed an amended answer and cross-petition seeking, among others, dissolution of the marriage, alimony of GH¢300,000, custody of the children, and a share in alleged matrimonial properties, including houses and vehicles. After trial, the High Court dissolved the marriage and awarded the Respondent GH¢200,000 as financial provision, the matrimonial home at Apramang, one vehicle (GN 902-13), custody of the children, and maintenance. The Court of Appeal largely affirmed this decision. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed on several grounds, including the validity of Respondent’s counsel’s licence, the award of property and vehicle, and the lump sum financial provision. The Supreme Court addressed the issues sequentially. On the first issue concerning the alleged lack of a valid practising licence by Respondent’s counsel, the Court held that the matter was not properly before it. The Appellant failed to raise the objection at trial and was denied leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal. Since the allegation was not part of the record, it could not be entertained. The Court reiterated that objections must be raised timeously, and new issues requiring evidence cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal without a proper evidentiary foundation. On the second issue regarding the award of the vehicle, the Court applied the established principle that property acquired during the subsistence of a marriage is presumed to be jointly acquired, although rebuttable. The Appellant admitted ownership of multiple vehicles acquired during the marriage but failed to provide evidence, such as proof of loans, to rebut the presumption of joint ownership. Consequently, the award of one vehicle to the Respondent was upheld as just and equitable. On the third issue of financial provision, the Court affirmed that sections 19 and 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) grant courts discretionary power to award financial provision based on what is just and equitable. The Court emphasized that such discretion must consider factors including the financial standing of the parties, their standard of living, contributions to the marriage, and dependency. Given the Appellant’s superior financial position and the Respondent’s reliance on him during the marriage, the award of GH¢200,000 was held to be reasonable and was therefore affirmed. The final issue concerned the award of the matrimonial home at Apramang to the Respondent. The Court drew a critical distinction between matrimonial property and property settlement. Matrimonial property refers to property jointly acquired during the marriage and is subject to equitable distribution under Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution. However, the Court noted that the trial court had found as a fact that the Apramang property was acquired before the marriage and that the Respondent made no contribution to its acquisition. Therefore, classifying it as matrimonial property and awarding it to the Respondent was a clear error that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside this aspect of the decision. Nevertheless, the Court observed that another property—the Kokobeng house—was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage but was not claimed in the pleadings. Evidence on record established its existence, and notably, the Appellant expressed willingness for it to be awarded to the Respondent. Given the presumption of joint ownership and absence of rebuttal, the Court held that this property qualified as matrimonial property. In the interest of justice and equity, the Court awarded the Kokobeng property to the Respondent. In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part. While it upheld the award of the vehicle and the financial provision, it set aside the award of the Apramang property and substituted it with the Kokobeng property.
LYDIA KWAO VRS PASCAL MUAKO TCHEMCO
GBADEGBE, JSC (PRESIDING) PWAMANG, JSC DORDZIE (MRS.), JSC KOTEY, JSC OWUSU (MS.), JSC
Matrimonial Property – Void Marriage – Equitable Distribution – Section 20 of Act 367 – Contributions of Parties – Concurrent Findings of Fact. This case concerns the effect of a void marriage on property rights and the applicability of equitable distribution principles under Ghanaian matrimonial law. The appellant challenged the decision of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the High Court’s ruling that properties acquired during the relationship be shared equally between the parties, despite the marriage being declared a nullity. The facts reveal that the appellant, a businessman of Cameroonian origin and Canadian citizenship, married the respondent, a Ghanaian trader, both under customary law and later under ordinance in 2003. The parties engaged in joint commercial activities involving the importation and sale of used clothing. The respondent subsequently petitioned for nullity of the marriage on the basis that it was void and sought a share in the properties acquired during the relationship. The appellant denied the validity of the marriage, describing it as a sham intended to facilitate immigration, and claimed exclusive ownership of all properties. The High Court declared the marriage null and void, having found that at the time of the ordinance marriage, the appellant was already married to another woman. Notwithstanding the nullity, the trial court held that the properties in question were acquired during the subsistence of the relationship through the joint efforts of the parties and ordered equal distribution. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, excluding only one vehicle belonging to a company. The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in ordering equal distribution of property despite the marriage being void, and whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence. The Supreme Court reiterated the well-established principle that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts unless such findings are perverse or result in a miscarriage of justice. Relying on authorities such as Fosua v Dufie and Achoro v Ankafela, the Court emphasized judicial restraint in second appeals. On the merits, the Court found overwhelming evidence that the properties were acquired during the relationship through joint commercial activities. The appellant supplied goods from abroad, while the respondent handled clearing, sales, and remittance of proceeds. Additionally, the respondent supervised construction projects and contributed to the acquisition of building materials. These facts supported the conclusion that the respondent made substantial contributions to the acquisition of the properties. Crucially, the Court held that the nullity of the marriage did not preclude the application of property distribution principles under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). Under section 20(1) of the Act, courts are empowered to make orders for financial provision and property settlement where it is just and equitable, regardless of whether the marriage is dissolved by divorce or declared void. The Court rejected the appellant’s attempt to benefit from his own wrongdoing in contracting a void marriage, emphasizing considerations of public policy. The Court concluded that, given the respondent’s contributions and the joint nature of the enterprise, an equal distribution of the properties (excluding the Nissan X-Terra) was fair and equitable. It further ordered, pursuant to section 21 of Act 367, that the appellant transfer half interest in the Aplaku properties to the respondent. In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.
AUGUSTINA ABENA BOAMAH VRS YAW AMPADU
LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING), KULENDI JSC, ACKAH-YENSU (MS.) JSC, KWOFIE JSC, DARKO ASARE JSC
Matrimonial Property – Customary Divorce – Burden of Proof – Equitable Distribution – Non‑Financial Contributions – Concurrent Findings of Fact - Equality is Equity Principle. This case concerns the equitable distribution of marital property and the legal requirements for dissolution of a customary marriage under Ghanaian law. The dispute originated from a petition filed by the wife (petitioner) seeking dissolution of a customary marriage, settlement of property, maintenance for children, and alimony. The High Court granted the petition, dissolved the marriage, awarded the matrimonial home at Taifa to the petitioner, ordered maintenance for the children, and granted a lump sum of GHS 20,000 as financial provision. The respondent (husband) appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal and further to the Supreme Court. The key issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the customary marriage had already been dissolved prior to the institution of the divorce proceedings; (2) whether the award of the matrimonial home to the petitioner was justified; and (3) whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence. On the first issue, the respondent argued that the parties had long separated and that customary rites for divorce had been performed. The Court rejected this argument, holding that mere separation, regardless of duration, does not amount to divorce in law. The Court emphasized that a party alleging customary divorce bears the burden of proving the essential elements under the applicable customary law. In this case, the respondent failed to provide credible and corroborated evidence of a valid customary dissolution. The inconsistencies in his testimony and failure to call key witnesses weakened his case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the marriage subsisted at the time the petition was filed. On the second issue regarding the matrimonial home, the respondent contended that the property was acquired before the marriage and that the petitioner made no financial contribution. The Court acknowledged that although the property was initially acquired before marriage, evidence showed that it was incomplete and substantially developed during the marriage. Additionally, income generated from the property contributed to the acquisition of other assets. The Court reiterated the modern Ghanaian position that strict proof of financial contribution is no longer decisive in determining entitlement to marital property. Relying on principles established in cases such as Arthur v Arthur and Mensah v Mensah, the Court affirmed that property acquired during marriage is presumed to be jointly owned and subject to equitable distribution. The Court further relied on Article 22(3)(b) of the 1992 Constitution and section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), which empower courts to make just and equitable orders regarding property settlement. In applying these principles, the Court considered the petitioner’s non-financial contributions, including homemaking, childbearing, and supporting the respondent’s economic activities. It concluded that awarding the matrimonial home to the petitioner, who had spent her adult life in the marriage and had four children, was fair and equitable, particularly as the respondent retained other income-generating properties. On the final issue, the Court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless there is a clear miscarriage of justice, as affirmed in Obeng v Assemblies of God Church, Ghana. No such exceptional circumstances were established. In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the marriage had not been dissolved prior to the proceedings, that the distribution of property, particularly the award of the matrimonial home, was just and equitable, and that the judgment was supported by the evidence.
JULIANA AMOAKOHENE V EMMANUEL K. AMOAKOHENE
YEBOAH C.J. PRESIDING B-BONNIE JSC DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC AMEGATCHER JSC OWUSU JSC
Matrimonial Property – Equitable Distribution – Constitutional Mandate – Concurrent Findings of Fact – Separate Legal Personality – Section 20 of Act 367 – Equality Principle This case concerns the proper application of constitutional and judicial principles governing the distribution of matrimonial property upon the dissolution of marriage. The dispute arose between a former couple who married in 1988 under both customary and civil law and acquired two landed properties in Kumasi during the subsistence of their marriage. Following the breakdown of the marriage in 2011 and its eventual dissolution in 2015, litigation ensued over the ownership of two properties: House No. 23 Block D, Adiebeba (Property A), and Plot 1 Block C, Kagyase Abuakwa (Property B). The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of Property A or, alternatively, joint ownership of both properties. The defendant, on the other hand, asserted exclusive ownership of both properties. The High Court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff, declaring Property A as his sole property and Property B as belonging solely to the defendant. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision. Dissatisfied, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the lower courts failed to equitably distribute properties acquired during the marriage and ignored constitutional provisions on spousal property rights. The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless there is a clear error resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that both the High Court and Court of Appeal had committed such errors. Upon a thorough review of the pleadings and evidence, the Court held that Property A was undeniably jointly acquired, as both parties admitted to contributing to its construction and intended joint ownership, further confirmed by the Deed of Assignment in their joint names. The trial court’s finding of sole ownership in favour of the plaintiff was therefore unsupported by evidence. Similarly, although Property B was acquired in the defendant’s name, the Court found that it was funded from joint resources, as the defendant failed to prove exclusive ownership, particularly after admitting that the business used to finance the purchase was funded from joint accounts. The Court criticized the lower courts for ignoring the constitutional framework governing matrimonial property, particularly 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which mandates equitable distribution of property acquired during marriage. It also reaffirmed the relevance of section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971, which empowers courts to make just and equitable orders regarding property rights. In line with established jurisprudence, the Court applied the “equality is equity” principle, emphasizing that while jointly acquired property is presumptively subject to equal distribution, the application of this principle depends on the specific circumstances of each case. Considering that the defendant had been in possession of Property A for several years and maintained it, the Court held that equity would be best served by awarding Property A to the defendant and Property B to the plaintiff. The Court further ordered the parties to execute the necessary conveyances in accordance with section 21 of Act 367. In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the lower courts, and reaffirmed the constitutional mandate for equitable distribution of matrimonial property.
ABU RAMADAN AND EVANS NIMAKO VRS ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND KWASI DANSO ACHEAMPONG VRS ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WOOD (MRS), CJ (PRESIDING), ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, BENNIN, JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiffs challenged the Electoral Commission’s use of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) card as proof of citizenship for voter registration, arguing it violated Articles 42 and 45 of the Constitution. They contended that the NHIS card does not establish Ghanaian citizenship and therefore could not be a valid basis for inclusion on the voters’ register. The Supreme Court examined whether the NHIS card met the constitutional requirement that only Ghanaian citizens of 18 years and above are entitled to vote. The Court held that the NHIS card is not conclusive proof of citizenship. It ruled that its use for voter registration was unconstitutional. Consequently, the Electoral Commission was ordered to delete names of persons registered solely with NHIS cards and compile a new register in compliance with the Constitution.
AKUSE AMEDEKA CITIZENS ASSOCIATION VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION
WOOD (MRS), C J (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE BONNIE , JSC, GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO BAMFO (MRS), JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiffs (Akuse Amedeka Citizens Association) challenged the constitutionality of the creation and inclusion of certain areas within the Greater Accra Region under PNDCL 26 as amended by PNDCL 28, arguing it violated Article 4(1) of the 1992 Constitution on regional boundaries. They contended that the continued recognition of these laws improperly altered regional boundaries without constitutional compliance. The Supreme Court examined whether pre-1992 laws on regional demarcation remained valid under the Constitution. It held that existing laws are preserved under the Constitution unless they are expressly inconsistent with it. The Court found no inconsistency between the impugned laws and Article 4(1). Consequently, the action failed and was dismissed.
BENJAMIN EYI MENSAH VRS THE CHAIRMAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL & MINISTER OF JUSTICE
ATUGUBA JSC (PRESIDING), AKUFFO (MS) JSC, ANSAH JSC, DOTSE JSC, ANIN YEBOAH JSC, BAFFOE-BONNIE JSC, GBADEGBE JSC
The Plaintiff challenged the Electoral Commission’s decision to open and close nominations for District Assembly elections before the coming into force of C.I. 85, arguing it violated Articles 51 and 106 of the Constitution. The Electoral Commission attempted to justify its actions by relying on existing laws (C.I. 75, C.I. 68, Act 473, and PNDCL 284), but failed to establish any valid legal basis governing nominations at the time. The Supreme Court found that no applicable constitutional instrument or legislation regulated the conduct of the elections when nominations were opened. It held that C.I. 85 could not operate retrospectively to validate the process. The Court concluded that the Electoral Commission acted without legal authority, rendering the process unconstitutional. Consequently, the impending District Assembly elections were halted and ordered to be conducted afresh under a valid legal framework.
JOHN DEPORRES AYIMBIRE VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY
ATUGUBA, JSC (PRESIDING), ANSAH, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS), JSC, BENIN, JSC
The Plaintiff challenged aspects of the Ghana Revenue Authority Act, 2009 (Act 791), particularly the integration of revenue agencies into the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), alleging constitutional inconsistencies. He contended that the structure and functions of the GRA, including the absorption of staff and powers, violated constitutional provisions on public services. The Defendants argued that Act 791 was a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to reorganize public services under Article 190. The Supreme Court held that Parliament has the power to create, restructure, and regulate public services, including revenue collection bodies. It found that the establishment of the GRA and transfer of functions and staff were constitutionally valid. The Plaintiff’s claims were therefore dismissed.
ANTHONY VICTOR OBENG VRS MRS THERESA HENRIETTA OBENG
ATUGUBA JSC PRESIDING DOTSE JSC YEBOAH JSC BENIN JSC AKAMBA JSC
Matrimonial Causes – Financial Settlement – Judicial Discretion – Section 20 of Act 367 – Article 296 of the 1992 Constitution – Short Duration of Marriage – Equitable Provision This case concerns the proper exercise of judicial discretion in awarding financial settlement upon divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971. The appellant, Anthony Victor Obeng, challenged the decision of the Court of Appeal affirming a High Court award of US$80,000 (or its cedi equivalent) in favour of the respondent, Theresa Henrietta Obeng, following the dissolution of their marriage. The parties married in 1996 in the United States and later cohabited in Ethiopia, where the appellant worked with the United Nations. The marriage, which produced no children, broke down irretrievably within a few years. The High Court granted a decree of divorce and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent a one-way ticket to the United States, a lump sum of US$80,000 as financial settlement, and legal costs. The Court of Appeal affirmed the award, subject to converting the sum into cedis and reducing costs. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the award was excessive and that the lower courts failed to consider relevant factors, including his age, retirement status, limited income, and the relatively short duration of the marriage. The core issue before the Court was whether the lower courts properly exercised their discretion by taking into account the material circumstances required by law in determining the quantum of financial provision. Delivering the judgment, Justice Akamba JSC reaffirmed that under section 20 of Act 367, courts have wide discretion to order financial provision that is “just and equitable,” but such discretion must be exercised judicially in accordance with Article 296 of the 1992 Constitution, which requires fairness, transparency, and avoidance of arbitrariness. The Court emphasized that relevant considerations include the financial means of the parties, their standard of living, contributions to the marriage, and future prospects. The Court further endorsed the modern principle of “equality is equity”, as articulated in Mensah v Mensah, while noting that this does not mandate strict mathematical equality in all cases. Instead, courts may adopt a flexible approach, particularly in short marriages. Relying on S v S (1977), the Court observed that in brief unions, special attention must be given to the actual impact of the marriage on each party, especially any financial disadvantage suffered. Applying these principles, the Court found that although the appellant had received a substantial gratuity after 27 years of service, the marriage lasted only about five and a half years. Consequently, the original award of US$80,000 was somewhat excessive in light of the proportional contribution of the marriage to the appellant’s accumulated wealth. Nonetheless, the Court accepted that the respondent was entitled to reasonable financial provision, particularly given her dependence during the marriage. In the result, the Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal by reducing the lump sum award to US$70,000 (or its cedi equivalent), while affirming the orders for a one-way ticket to the United States and costs.
NANA YAA KONADU VRS ALHAJI ABDUL RASHEED
DOTSE, JSC (PRESIDING) APPAU, JSC PWAMANG, JSC DORDZIE (MRS.), JSC PROF. KOTEY, JSC
Matrimonial Property – Informal Documents – Conveyancing Formalities – Separate Legal Personality – Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution – Equal Distribution of Property. The Supreme Court decision delivered by Appau JSC concerns the legal effect of an informal document (Exhibit ‘E’) and the applicable principles governing the distribution of matrimonial property upon divorce. The dispute originated from a petition for dissolution of marriage brought by the wife, who initially claimed that no jointly acquired property existed between the parties except their jointly owned company, Nayak Company Ltd. However, the husband, in his answer and cross-petition, asserted that numerous properties had been jointly acquired during their 32-year marriage. In response, the petitioner claimed exclusive ownership of some of these properties based on a handwritten document (Exhibit ‘E’), allegedly executed by the respondent, ceding his interest in those properties to her. The trial High Court upheld the validity of Exhibit ‘E’, treating it as a binding agreement between the parties and concluding that the properties listed therein belonged exclusively to the petitioner. It further ordered equal distribution of the remaining properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that Exhibit ‘E’ did not satisfy the legal requirements of a valid conveyance under the Conveyancing Act, 1973 (NRCD 175), as it lacked attestation and witnessing. It therefore declared the document ineffective in transferring property and ordered that all jointly acquired properties be shared equally. On further appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether Exhibit ‘E’ was legally enforceable to transfer interests in landed property. The Court held that any document purporting to transfer an interest in land must comply with statutory formalities under the Conveyancing Act, including execution, attestation, and, where applicable, compliance with company law. Exhibit ‘E’, being a unilateral, unwitnessed document, failed to meet these requirements and was therefore incapable of conveying title. At best, it amounted to a mere declaration of intention without legal effect. The Court rejected the argument that the marital relationship between the parties exempted the document from formal legal requirements. The Court further emphasized the doctrine of separate legal personality, holding that properties owned by a company could not be transferred by individual shareholders without complying with company law procedures. Thus, any attempt by the respondent to transfer company-owned property through Exhibit ‘E’ was legally ineffective. On the distribution of matrimonial property, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional principle under Article 22(3) that property acquired during marriage is presumed to be jointly owned and must be distributed equitably. The Court endorsed the modern “jurisprudence of equality,” rejecting the outdated presumption of advancement in favour of wives. It held that all properties acquired during the marriage, whether in the name of one or both spouses, were jointly owned unless proven otherwise. Consequently, the Court upheld the equal (50-50) distribution ordered by the Court of Appeal, including the matrimonial home, rejecting the petitioner’s claim for exclusive ownership. On the cross-appeal, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal erred in declaring the Kumasi property as exclusively belonging to the petitioner. The evidence showed that the property was owned by the jointly held company, and not by the petitioner personally. The Court therefore reversed that finding and held that the property should be treated as company property, subject to company law principles. In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal in part, affirming that Exhibit ‘E’ was legally ineffective and that all matrimonial property acquired during the marriage should be distributed equally. The decision reinforces strict compliance with conveyancing formalities and consolidates the principle of equality in the distribution of marital property in Ghana.
ERIC KOFI AGYEI ADDO VRS SALOME ALU ALLOTEY
YEBOAH CJ (PRESIDING) PWAMANG JSC DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC AMEGATCHER JSC AMADU JSC
Matrimonial Property – Distribution – Equitable Principles – Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution – Separate Legal Personality of Companies – Lump Sum Awards – Appellate Review of Evidence. The Supreme Court decision delivered by Amegatcher JSC addresses the proper application of equitable principles in the distribution of matrimonial property following divorce. The parties, who married under customary law in 1997, acquired substantial assets during the marriage, including a matrimonial home at Ogbojo, land at Aburi, two properties in the United Kingdom, and business interests in Atlas Pharmacy Ltd. and Stomet Company Ltd. After the High Court dissolved the marriage and made limited property orders, the Court of Appeal substantially varied the decision by awarding the matrimonial home solely to the Respondent, redistributing other properties, and increasing the lump sum award to GHS 300,000. Dissatisfied, the Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court on grounds including that the judgment was against the weight of evidence, misapplication of Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution, wrongful award of the lump sum, and improper distribution of the UK properties. On the omnibus ground that the judgment was against the weight of evidence, the Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court must review the entire record to determine whether the conclusions reached were supported by evidence. The Court found that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate any material misapprehension of evidence. In particular, regarding the Aburi land, the Court held that documentary evidence from the Lands Commission conclusively established the property in the Petitioner’s name. His bare assertion that it belonged to his brother was uncorroborated and insufficient to rebut the presumption of ownership. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the property constituted matrimonial property acquired during the marriage. On the issue of the matrimonial home, the Court affirmed that under Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution, marital property must be distributed equitably, not necessarily equally. While the Court of Appeal was correct to treat the Ogbojo house as matrimonial property, the Supreme Court found that its decision to award the property entirely to the Respondent was not entirely fair when viewed against the totality of assets available. Emphasizing that equity depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case—including contributions, earning capacity, and future prospects—the Court varied the distribution by awarding 70% of the matrimonial home to the Respondent and 30% to the Petitioner, with a buyout option. Regarding company assets, the Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, reaffirming the doctrine of separate legal personality. It held that assets belonging to Atlas Pharmacy Ltd. and Stomet Company Ltd. could not be treated as personal property of the Petitioner for purposes of matrimonial distribution. Similarly, the Respondent’s claim to shares in the companies failed, as the companies were not parties to the proceedings and their internal regulations governed share transfers. On the lump sum award of GHS 300,000, the Court found no error in law. It held that under section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), courts have broad discretion to make financial provision based on what is just and equitable. The Court affirmed that the Respondent’s non-financial contributions—particularly her role in homemaking and supporting the Petitioner’s business—justified the award. It also noted the disparity in earning capacity between the parties and concluded that the award was reasonable and should not be disturbed. With respect to the UK properties, the Court held that since they were acquired during the marriage and stood in the Respondent’s name, they were properly treated as matrimonial property. The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of joint acquisition. His claims that the properties were mortgaged or funded by his father were unsupported by documentary evidence and therefore carried little probative value. In conclusion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the governing principle in matrimonial property distribution in Ghana is equity and fairness, not strict equality. While it upheld most of the Court of Appeal’s decision, it varied the distribution of the matrimonial home to achieve a more balanced outcome. Consequently, the appeal was largely dismissed, except for the adjustment granting the Petitioner a 30% interest in the matrimonial home.
KWADJOGA ADRA VRS THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS, PAA NII LAMPTEY, ERNESTINA YAWSON, GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY, ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND ATTORNEY GENERAL
AKUFFO (MS), JSC (PRESIDING), ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE BONNIE, JSC, AKOTO - BAMFO (MRS), JSC, BENIN, JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiff challenged the eligibility of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants—employees of the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA) and Ghana Education Service (GES)—to contest for political party executive positions, arguing they were civil servants disqualified under Articles 94(3)(b) and 55(8) of the Constitution. The Court examined whether employees of GES and GHA fall within the category of “Civil Service” as contemplated by Article 94(3)(b). It held that although both institutions are part of the Public Services under Article 190, they are distinct from the Civil Service. The Court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, noting that only specifically listed services are disqualified. It further emphasized that constitutional limitations on political participation must be clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, the Court held that the Defendants were not disqualified and dismissed the Plaintiff’s action.
ISAAC OSEI NYANTAKYI V. GHANA GRID COMPANY LTD.
JUSTICE KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU
Labour Law — Wrongful Termination — Summary Dismissal vs. Termination— Disciplinary Procedure — Collective Agreement — Notice — Requirements Damages — Measure The Plaintiff filed a writ claiming wrongful termination and several related reliefs. The Defendant denied liability. Issues were set down for trial, including whether the termination was fair and whether GRIDCo followed the applicable Senior Staff Association Conditions of Service. Material Facts Plaintiff began work with VRA in 1989, later transferred to GRIDCo in 2008 under continuous service conditions. He was involved in assignments regarding the Osagyefo Barge project. Several incidents occurred, including: 1. Alleged misconduct published in the Insight newspaper. 2. A committee of enquiry was set up without prior notice to Plaintiff. 3. Plaintiff faced this committee on the day of his scheduled departure for a sponsored MSc programme in the UK. Plaintiff was later directed to take leave, then denied release for his course, and subsequently had his assigned vehicle replaced with an older model. On 14 July 2010, Plaintiff’s appointment was terminated with one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Plaintiff claimed: Committee was improperly constituted (no Senior Staff Association representative), No proper disciplinary process was followed under the 2009 Senior Staff Conditions of Service, As an A4 staff, he was entitled to three months’ notice, not one. Defendant claimed: Plaintiff committed a serious offence warranting summary dismissal, but termination was chosen out of fairness. They acted within their rights under the Labour Act and internal procedures The Court held that the termination of Plaintiff's appointment was wrongful because GRIDCo breached the applicable Senior Staff Conditions of Service.