RIBY-WILLIAMS V. RIBY-WILLIAMS
ARCHER J.
In this case, the petitioner husband sought the dissolution of his marriage on the ground of the respondent wife’s cruelty, which arguably implied constructive desertion. The respondent cross-petitioned for divorce on the grounds of the petitioner’s cruelty, desertion, and adultery. Both parties presented conflicting and uncorroborated testimony concerning alleged cruelty, but neither produced independent evidence such as witnesses or medical reports, as required by judicial practice (see Kafton v. Kafton [1948] 1 All E.R. 435; Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190). The court held that for cruelty to constitute a valid ground for divorce, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and supported by independent corroboration. Since both parties failed to provide such evidence, claims of cruelty were not established. The respondent subsequently did not pursue the cruelty claim in her cross-petition due to condonation, leaving only the issues of desertion and adultery. The court found the petitioner’s claim of desertion by the respondent unproven, as there was insufficient evidence to show that the respondent had no intention to resume cohabitation or that the petitioner’s departure was without cause. However, the petitioner admitted to committing adultery with a named individual, Miss Doris Bannerman. On this basis, the court granted the respondent’s cross-petition and decreed the dissolution of the marriage solely on the ground of adultery. Custody of the couple’s two children was awarded to the petitioner, subject to reasonable access for the respondent. Costs of forty guineas were awarded to the respondent.
KOTEI V. KOTEI
SARKODEE J.
This case involved a marriage contracted in 1962 between a husband and wife, which effectively broke down when the couple separated in 1968. Since then, they had not lived together as man and wife. The wife contended that she remained open to reconciliation and awaited her husband’s initiative, while the husband asserted that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The couple had two children, Emmanuel Neequaye, born in 1962, and Sarah Adei, born in 1964. The husband, as petitioner, sought a divorce on the ground that the spouses had not lived together as man and wife for a continuous period of at least five years, pursuant to section 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The Act encourages reconciliation where practicable, and the court retains discretion to adjourn proceedings to allow attempts at reconciliation if there is a reasonable prospect of restoring the marriage. The court held that once the petitioner proved the continuous non-cohabitation, a decree of dissolution should ordinarily be granted, unless there were compelling reasons for refusal. Evidence showed that the petitioner had cohabited with another woman since the separation, fathering three children, demonstrating that he had ceased to recognize the marriage as subsisting. Accordingly, the court granted the dissolution of the marriage. Regarding custody, the court noted that both children were of school-going age. Emmanuel Neequaye was granted to the petitioner with the respondent having rights of access. Sarah Adei, though legally under the custody of the petitioner, was placed in the care and control of the respondent at her boarding school in Accra until further order.
ADJETEY AND ANOTHER V. ADJETEY
SARKODEE J.
This case concerned the marriage between Elizabeth Adjetey and Timothy Adjei Adjetey, both Ghanaians, solemnized on 18 May 1966 in London, England, with no children from the union. Elizabeth Adjetey initially filed a petition for divorce but failed to take steps to prosecute, resulting in dismissal of her petition for lack of interest. Timothy Adjei Adjetey subsequently filed a cross-petition, alleging desertion and adultery by Elizabeth Adjetey with two men, T.D. Baffoe and David Larbie. He claimed that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and sought its dissolution. The court found that Elizabeth Adjetey had deserted her husband and was cohabiting with T.D. Baffoe, inferring adultery from their conduct and opportunities for misconduct. However, the court did not find sufficient evidence to establish adultery with David Larbie. In determining whether the marriage had irretrievably broken down, as required under section 2(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the court concluded that Elizabeth Adjetey’s desertion and refusal to return demonstrated that the marriage had indeed broken down beyond reconciliation. Timothy Adjei Adjetey also claimed damages. While the court found no specific pecuniary loss, it awarded ¢600.00 for the injury to his feelings, honor, and pride caused by his wife’s adultery. Costs of ¢400.00 were awarded against the co-respondent, T.D. Baffoe. The court ultimately dissolved the marriage between Elizabeth Adjetey and Timothy Adjei Adjetey, granting the relief sought by the husband.
ACHIAMPONG V. ACHIAMPONG
ABBAN J.A.
This appeal arose from a divorce proceeding under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), in which the wife sought dissolution of her marriage on the grounds of the husband’s adultery and physical abuse. The High Court granted the divorce, awarded custody of the children to the wife, and ordered the husband to provide for their maintenance and education. In addition to the divorce, the wife claimed joint ownership of several properties, including the matrimonial home and savings, which the High Court recognized in her favor. The husband appealed, contending that the house and other properties were his sole assets because he alone had financed their acquisition. The court, however, found that the wife had made substantial financial contributions toward these properties, either directly or indirectly. The court held that neither spouse could claim exclusive beneficial ownership of the properties and leave the other destitute, even in the absence of a formal agreement. Applying principles of equity and trust, the court reasoned that where one spouse had induced the other to contribute income or resources for the joint benefit of both, the spouse who legally acquired the property holds the beneficial interest as a trustee for both parties. Accordingly, the court concluded that the wife was entitled to a beneficial interest in all the disputed properties, regardless of the absence of an explicit agreement. The husband’s appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming that the High Court had correctly applied the law and equitable principles to ensure a fair and just division of matrimonial property.
GALL V. GALL
ARCHER J.
In this case, the applicant sought an order directing the respondent to pay maintenance, relying on the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. The applicant contended that the Act was applicable in Ghana and empowered the courts to grant maintenance. The issue before the court was whether the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, applied in Ghana and whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the originating summons seeking maintenance under that Act. The court held that the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, did not apply in Ghana. It explained that the jurisdiction of Ghanaian courts in matrimonial causes is derived from the Courts Act, 1960. The court further observed that the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, previously referred to in the Ghana Supreme Court Rules, had been repealed in the United Kingdom and therefore could no longer serve as a legal basis in Ghana. Additionally, the court found that the Ghanaian rules made in 1952 did not conform to the provisions of the 1950 Act. Consequently, the court concluded that the originating summons had no statutory foundation and could not be entertained by the High Court. It clarified that in Ghana, a spouse may only seek maintenance during pending matrimonial proceedings, or through common law remedies such as pledging the husband’s credit or enforcing a contractual agreement. The court dismissed the originating summons and discharged both the respondent and his surety from their bail bond, emphasizing that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter until the Rules Committee amended the relevant order or other legislative provisions were made.
ASHONG V. ASHONG
AMISSAH J.A.
The case involved an appeal by Mr. D. C. Ashong against a decision of Prempeh J., who had granted a summons filed by Mrs. Juliana Ashong, seeking maintenance on the ground that her husband had neglected to provide reasonable support. At the trial, the judge ordered Mr. Ashong to pay £G115 in total, calculated at £G10 per month from the date of filing of the petition until the date of judgment, and thereafter at £G20 per month. Mr. Ashong appealed, arguing that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the application under section 23 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. He contended that the Act could only apply in Ghana if specifically invoked by section 17 of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), and that the judge’s reliance on the Act was therefore invalid. The issue before the court was whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to order maintenance under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, as applied to Ghana, and whether the maintenance order could stand. The court held that the trial judge had proper jurisdiction. It reasoned that section 17 of the Courts Ordinance empowered English law to apply in Ghana where relevant, and the Rules Committee did not have authority to exclude the application of English law in such cases. The court further clarified that the interpretation of terms in Order 55, r. 1, did not exclude the application of relevant English laws to matrimonial proceedings in Ghana. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the maintenance order. Although it expressed concern over the trial judge’s approach in ordering different rates for arrears and future payments, the court allowed the order to remain unchanged. Consequently, Mr. Ashong was required to continue payment of maintenance to Mrs. Ashong as originally ordered.
ERSKINE V. ERSKINE
TWUMASI J.
The petitioner, Mr Kwamina Atta Erskine, a barrister-at-law, sought the dissolution of his marriage to Mrs Justina Gyanba Erskine on the ground of desertion and the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The respondent wife admitted that she had deserted the petitioner since January 1975 but provided explanations for her conduct, which the petitioner disputed. Despite this, she did not oppose the dissolution of the marriage but sought custody of their eight-year-old son, a request which the petitioner did not contest. The issue before the court was not only whether the marriage should be dissolved and custody determined, but also whether the wife was entitled to an award of costs based on the traditional position that a husband was obliged to bear his wife’s legal expenses in matrimonial proceedings. The court held that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and ordered its immediate dissolution. It further held that custody of the child should be granted to the wife, as there was no dispute on that issue. On the question of costs, the court rejected the argument that the husband was automatically liable for the wife’s legal costs. It held that modern matrimonial law placed husbands and wives on an equal footing and that the award of costs was a matter within the court’s general discretion. In the circumstances, the court refused the wife’s application for costs and also declined to award costs to the husband, noting that he had effectively waived any such claim by his conduct.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MOHAMMEDANS ORDINANCE, CAP. 129 (1951 REV.); IN RE REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN BYROUTHYAND AKYERE; EX PARTE ALI.
CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
The applicant applied for an order for the issue of a certificate to authorize the registration of a marriage allegedly celebrated in 1946 in accordance with Islamic law. The evidence showed that the parties had initially contracted a marriage under Fanti customary law, which was subsequently solemnized under Islamic law. However, the marriage was never registered as required by the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance. The applicant contended that the failure to register the marriage was due to inadvertence and sought to regularize the position many years later. The issue before the court was whether a marriage celebrated under Islamic law could be validly registered several decades after its celebration and after it had effectively come to an end. The court held that under section 5 of the Ordinance, every Islamic marriage must be registered, and section 9 provides that such a marriage is not valid unless it is registered. Although section 6(10) allows for late registration in certain circumstances, the court held that such an application must be made within a reasonable time after the celebration of the marriage and while the marriage is still subsisting. The court found that the application, brought approximately 34 years after the marriage and after the death of the bridegroom, was made far too late. It reasoned that the death of the husband had brought the marriage to an end, and therefore no valid marriage existed that could be registered. The court further emphasized that timely registration is essential, particularly for purposes such as succession to property. Accordingly, the court held that granting the application would effectively validate an invalid marriage, which the law did not permit. The application was therefore misconceived and was struck out.
BENTSI-ENCHILL V. BENTSI-ENCHILL
SARKODEE J.
The case concerned a husband and wife who had been married under the Marriage Ordinance, whose marriage was subsequently dissolved on the ground that it had broken down beyond reconciliation. Following the dissolution, the wife and her mother continued to reside in a flat owned solely by the husband. The husband requested that they vacate the premises, but the wife refused, asserting that the flat constituted her matrimonial home and that the husband had encouraged her to move in and promised she could remain there even after the divorce. The dispute raised issues regarding the ownership and title to matrimonial property, as well as the extent of a spouse’s right to occupy the matrimonial home after the breakdown of the marriage. The wife also relied on her alleged contributions and the intentions of the parties to support her continued occupation. The issue before the court was whether the wife had any legal or equitable right to remain in occupation of the flat after the dissolution of the marriage, despite the property being solely owned by the husband. The court held that where legal and equitable title to property is vested exclusively in the husband, the beneficial interest remains his unless there is evidence of contribution or a contrary intention. Although a wife may have a right to occupy the matrimonial home during the subsistence of the marriage by virtue of her right to maintenance and consortium, such a right does not necessarily survive the dissolution of the marriage. The court further held that the flat in question did not qualify as a matrimonial home in the circumstances and that the wife had failed to establish any proprietary interest in it. Any permission granted to her to occupy the premises amounted only to a licence, which the husband was entitled to revoke. Upon the breakdown of the marriage, and in the absence of any legal or equitable interest, the wife ceased to have any right to remain in the property. Accordingly, the court ordered the wife to give up possession of the flat and granted her a period of three months to vacate and remove her belongings. The custody of the child was, however, maintained with the wife despite the husband’s argument concerning her lack of accommodation.
TSOGBE V. TSOGBE
FRANCOIS J.
The court considered whether a petitioner in divorce proceedings could be cross-examined on allegations of adultery before the discretion statement had been admitted into evidence. The issue arose when the respondent sought to question the petitioner on alleged adulterous conduct referenced in the discretion statement prior to its formal admission. The petitioner contended that such questioning was premature and contrary to the Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1957, particularly Rule 28(5), which restricts the use of a discretion statement or its contents as evidence unless and until it is formally admitted in open court. The respondent, however, argued that the petitioner’s conduct, especially alleged adultery, was relevant to the court’s exercise of discretion and should be subject to early examination. The issue before the court was whether a petitioner could be cross-examined on matters contained in a discretion statement before that statement was put into evidence. The court held that, under Rule 28(5) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1957, the contents of a discretion statement could not be used as evidence against the petitioner until the statement had been formally admitted. It further held that although a petitioner seeking the court’s discretion must make full and frank disclosure of any misconduct, including adultery, such matters could only be probed after the discretion statement had been introduced in evidence. Relying on established authorities, the court emphasized that the petitioner’s candour and credibility, particularly regarding allegations of adultery, become subject to challenge only after the discretion statement is before the court. Accordingly, the respondent’s attempt to cross-examine the petitioner at that stage was premature. The court therefore disallowed the questioning until the discretion statement was formally admitted into evidence.
EKUBAN V. EKUBAN
BOISON J.
The petitioner-applicant filed a motion seeking a review of an earlier court order which had held that a petition in divorce and matrimonial causes constituted a writ within the meaning of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. The application for review was grounded on the contention that the respondent’s appearance was defective in law because it had been entered under protest without stating concise grounds. The applicant further argued that there was no prescribed time limit for the service of a matrimonial petition, and therefore the earlier ruling was erroneous. The respondent opposed the motion, arguing that no new facts or material had emerged since the initial order was made and that the issue concerning the form of appearance was immaterial to the validity of the proceedings. The issue before the court was whether there was sufficient ground, such as an error apparent on the face of the record, to justify a review of the earlier order, particularly regarding the classification and validity of a divorce petition and the rules governing its service. The court held that matrimonial causes are governed by Order 55 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, together with the Matrimonial Causes Acts and the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, all of which were applicable in Ghana. It found that under these rules, there was no specific time limit prescribed for the service of a matrimonial petition. The court was satisfied that there was an error apparent on the face of the record or sufficient reason to review the earlier decision. Accordingly, the court reversed the previous order and held that the petition was valid and effective from the date it was filed. Costs of ¢48.00 were awarded to the petitioner-applicant.
AMOAH V. APPAU ALIAS AMOAH
OWUSU-ADDO J.
In the present case, the High Court considered whether statutory matrimonial law could be applied to a marriage contracted under customary law and whether the wife could be restrained from remaining in the matrimonial home during the pendency of divorce proceedings. The facts were that the respondent husband had applied for an order to restrain his wife from staying in the matrimonial home and from interfering with his person or curtailing his liberties. The parties had been married under customary law in Ghana and later underwent a ceremony in the United States, which was held to be merely a church blessing of the existing customary marriage. The respondent had argued that the Matrimonial Causes Act did not apply because the marriage was governed by customary law and that there was no obligation under customary law to provide accommodation for his wife. The petitioner wife had denied the allegations and stated that she remained in the matrimonial home because she could not afford alternative accommodation. The issue before the court was whether the Matrimonial Causes Act could be applied to a customary marriage and whether the wife was entitled to remain in the matrimonial home pending the final determination of the divorce. The court held that it had the discretion to apply the Matrimonial Causes Act to customary law marriages where necessary to achieve justice. It reasoned that the court could consider the peculiar circumstances of the marriage and apply statutory provisions or other legal principles in accordance with justice, equity, and good conscience. The court therefore held that the wife was entitled to remain in the matrimonial home until the divorce proceedings were concluded and refused the respondent’s application. It further advised the parties to adopt a practical arrangement to minimize conflict while living together pending the final resolution of the case.
JOHN WILLIAM MENSAH V. GRACE MENSAH
MRS. J. BAMFORD-ADDO J.S.C.
The husband filed a petition seeking divorce, custody of children, and ownership of a matrimonial house. The wife cross-petitioned for the same reliefs. The Court of Appeal held that the house was jointly owned but awarded the extensions solely to the wife, reasoning that she had funded them entirely. The husband appealed, arguing that the extensions were inseparable from the main house and that he had contributed to their construction. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the extensions formed part of the jointly owned matrimonial property and how the property should be equitably divided on divorce. The Court held that both the main house and the extensions were acquired during the marriage and that both parties had contributed to their acquisition and improvement. Applying the principle of equitable sharing, the Court declared both parties joint and equal beneficial owners. It ordered the property to be valued and sold, with the proceeds shared equally, granting the wife the first option to purchase the house.
EMMANUEL NOBLE KOR VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND JUSTICE ISAAC DELALI DUOSE
ATUGUBA JSC, DOTSE JSC, ANIN YEBOAH JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, AKOTO - BAMFO (MRS) JSC, BENIN JSC, AKAMBA JSC
The Plaintiff, Emmanuel Noble Kor, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Attorney-General of Ghana and Justice Isaac Delali Duose, challenging actions taken by the judge in the course of judicial proceedings. He alleged that the conduct and decisions of the judge violated provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly relating to fair hearing and judicial propriety. The Defendants contended that the matters complained of were judicial decisions properly made within jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined whether the claims disclosed a constitutional issue or merely dissatisfaction with judicial rulings. The Court held that the action was an improper attempt to challenge judicial decisions through the Court’s original jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ was dismissed.
SIMPSON V. SIMPSON AND ROSSI
GRANVILLE SHARP J.A.
the petitioner claimed to be domiciled in Ghana, asserting that he had no settled home elsewhere and intended to marry a Ghanaian woman and settle permanently in Ghana. No supporting evidence was presented from the alleged companion or any other source. The petitioner’s counsel relied on authorities that domicile can be proved by the person asserting it. The issue before the court was whether a petitioner’s mere statement of intention, without corroborating evidence, was sufficient to establish a change of domicile by choice. The court held that intention alone, unsupported by evidence of acts or circumstances corroborating the claimed change, was insufficient to prove domicile. It found no basis to interfere with the learned Commissioner’s conclusion and affirmed that a change of domicile by choice must be established by evidence beyond the petitioner’s statement of intention.
BILLA V. SALIFU
TAYLOR J.
The respondent sought civil damages from the petitioner for adultery under Dagomba customary law. The High Court examined whether such a claim for general damages was recognized by the customary law of the Dagomba people. The issue before the court was whether a husband could claim civil damages for adultery as a stand-alone cause of action under Dagomba custom. The court held that Dagomba customary law did not recognize a husband’s claim for civil damages for adultery. Remedies under the custom were limited to quasi-criminal sanctions, such as fines payable to the chief, and restitution of marriage expenses only in cases of divorce. Consequently, the court set aside the district court’s award and allowed the appeal, dismissing the respondent’s claim.
OFORI V. OFORI
AMUA-SEKYI J.
The petitioner sought dissolution of his marriage, alleging that it had broken down beyond reconciliation due to persistent disagreements and the respondent’s conduct. The respondent admitted to quarrels but argued that her actions, including seeking co-ownership of the matrimonial home, were reasonable. Evidence showed repeated conflicts, failed reconciliation attempts, separation, and subsequent legal proceedings in both Ghana and the United States. The issue before the court was whether the marriage had irretrievably broken down and what orders should be made regarding custody of the children. The court held that the cumulative conflicts, separation, and failed attempts at reconciliation demonstrated that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. It therefore granted a decree of divorce. The court further awarded custody of the children to the respondent, granting the petitioner liberty to apply for access, and allowed the respondent to seek maintenance for the children.
KNUDSEN V. KNUDSEN
AMISSAH J.A.
The petitioner initially sought a divorce alleging that her husband desired separation without justification. The husband denied this and filed a cross-petition, alleging that the petitioner engaged in persistent misconduct, including nagging, destruction of property, and physical violence. The petitioner later withdrew her petition, and the court proceeded to hear the husband’s cross-petition. The issue before the court was whether the petitioner’s conduct amounted to such unreasonable behaviour that the respondent could not reasonably be expected to continue living with her, and whether reconciliation was a necessary precondition for granting divorce. The court held that the cumulative effect of the petitioner’s conduct over time made it unreasonable for the respondent to continue cohabitation. It further held that reconciliation attempts were not a mandatory requirement in such circumstances. Consequently, the court granted the divorce in favour of the respondent on his cross-petition.
KNUDSEN V. KNUDSEN
AMISSAH J.A.
The petitioner initially sought a divorce alleging that her husband desired separation without justification. The husband denied this and filed a cross-petition, alleging that the petitioner engaged in persistent misconduct, including nagging, destruction of property, and physical violence. The petitioner later withdrew her petition, and the court proceeded to hear the husband’s cross-petition. The issue before the court was whether the petitioner’s conduct amounted to such unreasonable behaviour that the respondent could not reasonably be expected to continue living with her, and whether reconciliation was a necessary precondition for granting divorce. The court held that the cumulative effect of the petitioner’s conduct over time made it unreasonable for the respondent to continue cohabitation. It further held that reconciliation attempts were not a mandatory requirement in such circumstances. Consequently, the court granted the divorce in favour of the respondent on his cross-petition.
OSEI - BONSU VRS GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK & BANK OF GHANA
DENNIS ADJEI, JA (PRESIDING), P. BRIGHT MENSAH, JA, JENNIFER A, DODOO, JA
Labour Law – Banking Law – Alternative Dispute Resolution – Statutory Ouster Clauses – Jurisdiction of the High Court. Facts The Appellant, an employee of UT Bank, commenced an action at the High Court (Labour Division) seeking declarations and injunctive reliefs challenging the Bank of Ghana’s appointment of receivers for UT Bank and a subsequent Purchase and Assumption (P&A) transaction with GCB Bank. He contended that the Bank of Ghana acted ultra vires and that his employment rights had been violated. The Respondents objected to the High Court’s jurisdiction, relying on section 141 of the Banks and Specialised Deposit‑Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930), which mandates arbitration for grievances arising from decisions of the Bank of Ghana relating to receivership, licence revocation, and related matters. The High Court declined to set aside the writ but stayed proceedings and referred the parties to arbitration under the ADR Act, 2010 (Act 798). The Appellant appealed. Held Appeal dismissed. High Court’s referral to arbitration affirmed