CHRISTIAN ASARE-DJAN V TEACHERS’ FUND
JUSTICE ANANDA J. AIKINS (MRS)
Labour Law — Termination of Employment — Whether employer must give reasons — Whether termination amounted to redundancy — Whether termination was unfair — Employment contract — Notice or salary in lieu — Burden of proof. FACTS The plaintiff, a former Head of Operations of the defendant, challenged the termination of his employment, contending that it was wrongful, unfair, and amounted to redundancy. The defendant terminated the employment without assigning reasons but paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice in accordance with its Rules and Conditions of Service (Exhibit 2/2A). The plaintiff claimed termination could only be on grounds of misconduct or unsatisfactory performance and sought several reliefs including declarations, damages, redundancy compensation, and attorney’s fees. Held: 1. Termination valid under the contract and Act 651 — The employment contract and the defendant’s Conditions of Service permitted termination on one month’s notice or salary in lieu. The Labour Act does not require employers to give reasons for termination. The plaintiff received a month’s salary in lieu; hence the termination complied with governing terms. 2. No redundancy — The Operations Department continued to exist after the plaintiff’s exit and was still occupied. There was no evidence of major organisational changes or statutory notifications required under section 65 of the Labour Act. Termination therefore did not constitute redundancy. 3. Termination not unfair — Since no reason for termination was assigned, the situation did not fall within the statutory grounds under section 63 governing unfair termination. The employer was entitled to terminate per the contract without justifying fairness. 4. Plaintiff failed to discharge burden of proof — He did not establish that the termination violated his employment contract or the law. 5. Reliefs refused; costs awarded — All claims dismissed for lack of merit; costs of GHS 8,000 awarded against the plaintiff.
MARTIN KPEBU VRS ATTORNEY-GENERAL
WOOD CJ (MRS) PRESIDING, ADINYIRA (MRS) JSC, DOTSE JSC, YEBOAH JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, BENIN JSC, AKAMBA JSC
The Plaintiff, Martin Kpebu, challenged the constitutionality of section 104 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29/Act 30 reference) which imposed restrictions on the grant of bail for certain offences. He argued that the provision violated the right to personal liberty and the presumption of innocence under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Attorney-General of Ghana contended that the restriction was justified in the interest of public safety and crime control. The Supreme Court examined whether Parliament could impose an absolute bar on bail. The Court held that such restrictions were unconstitutional as they unduly fettered judicial discretion. Consequently, section 104 was struck down to the extent of its inconsistency.
THEOPHILUS ADDO & 9 ORS V STANDARD CHARTERED BANK & UNION OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE & FINANCE OF T.U.C OF GHANA
SENYO DZAMEFE JA (PRESIDING), N.C AGBEVOR JA, P. BRIGHT MENSAH JA
Labour Law — Redundancy — Collective Bargaining — Binding nature of negotiated agreements — Discrimination — Appeal against weight of evidence. FACTS The appellants, employees of the 1st respondent bank and members of the 2nd respondent union (UNICOF), challenged a 2016 redundancy Memorandum of Understanding (Exhibit B) negotiated between the respondents. They contended that they were not consulted, the package was discriminatory and unconstitutional, and the cap of 17½ years used in calculating redundancy pay was unfair. The High Court dismissed their claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the 2nd respondent union, being the certified bargaining agent under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), lawfully negotiated Exhibit B on behalf of the appellants, who were bound by its terms. There was no evidence of discrimination under Article 17(2) of the 1992 Constitution, as all employees affected by the 2016 MOU were treated equally. The redundancy process complied with statutory requirements under sections 62 and 65 of Act 651, and the termination was fair. The Court further held that most grounds of appeal were incompetent for non‑compliance with CI 19, but considered the omnibus ground that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. Upon re‑evaluation, the Court affirmed the trial judge's findings, emphasizing that appellate courts do not disturb primary findings of fact supported by the record. Held: 1. Exhibit B was validly negotiated under Act 651 and binding on the appellants. 2. No discrimination was established within the meaning of Article 17 of the Constitution. 3. The redundancy exercise constituted a fair termination under section 62(c) of Act 651. 4. The judgment of the High Court was supported by the evidence and properly applied the law. 5. Appeal dismissed; costs of GHS 5,000 awarded in favour of the 1st respondent
IRENE TETTEY-ENYO V ELECTRICITY COMPANY GH LTD
PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING), DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC, PROF. KOTEY JSC, TORKORNOO (MRS.) JSC, AMADU JSC
Employment Law — Wrongful Dismissal — Burden of Proof — Natural Justice — Evidentiary Standards — Investigative Journalism Video — Reinstatement — Damages The Plaintiff, a Senior Customer Relations Assistant with the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), was dismissed after an investigative documentary aired footage showing her receiving a reddish piece of paper/money during working hours. ECG treated the act as misconduct that brought the company’s name into disrepute under Appendix C A(ix) of its Collective Agreement. A committee of enquiry concluded she took money from a customer, though the maker of the video was not called as a witness, and key witness interviews were conducted privately without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. The High Court held that the video was unauthenticated hearsay, the disciplinary process breached natural justice, and ECG failed to prove misconduct. The Court of Appeal affirmed. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that although ECG followed procedural steps, it failed to discharge the burden of proof required to justify dismissal. Plaintiff’s explanation — that she often sent individuals to buy lunch because she lacked breaks and may have been receiving change — was plausible. ECG failed to rebut this explanation or authenticate the video. The Court reaffirmed that even in non-judicial disciplinary bodies, decisions affecting employment rights must comply with constitutional fairness, sufficiency of evidence, and proper burden allocation. Hearsay “voice-over” commentary in a video is inadmissible unless authenticated. The committee’s private interviews without Plaintiff’s participation violated audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court upheld the finding of wrongful dismissal and reinstatement but set aside the award of 15 months’ salary as damages on grounds that reinstatement and damages cannot co-exist. Held: 1. Plaintiff’s dismissal was wrongful as ECG failed to prove misconduct or disrepute to the required evidentiary standard. 2. ECG breached the rules of natural justice by withholding witness testimony from Plaintiff and relying on unauthenticated video evidence. 3. Reinstatement was upheld. 4. Damages of 15 months’ salary were set aside; reinstatement rendered additional damages inappropriate
SAMUEL ANINKORAH V. BEATRICE YAA ANINKORAH
OWUSU-ANSAH, JA
Family Law — Divorce — Matrimonial property — Burden of proof — Contribution to acquisition — Judicial discretion in property settlement — Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), section 20(1). The parties contracted a monogamous marriage under the Marriage Ordinance in 1982, having previously married under customary law in 1969. The marriage produced six children, and several properties were acquired during the union. Marital relations deteriorated around 1993 when the petitioner (husband) relocated abroad, leading to allegations of adultery, desertion, and cruelty by the respondent (wife), who cross-petitioned for divorce and sought ancillary reliefs including property settlement and a lump sum payment. The High Court dissolved the marriage in 2000, awarding the respondent a house in Tema and ₵40 million as financial settlement but dismissed her claim to the Accra matrimonial home and her cross-petition. Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed, contending that the trial judge failed to adequately consider her claims, wrongly placed the burden of proof on her to establish her interest in the matrimonial home, and unfairly relocated her to Tema. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision, finding that the respondent failed to prove any direct or indirect contribution toward the acquisition of the Accra property, as required under the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), and guided by authority. The court reiterated that under section 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), property settlement upon divorce is discretionary and dependent on proof of contribution or agreement, not merely on occupation or duration of marriage. However, the court varied the financial award from ₵40 million to ₵50 million and dismissed all other grounds of appeal.
THEOPHILUS ATO HINSON V. FLORENCE ARABA HINSON
OFOE J.A.
In the present case, the petitioner sought the dissolution of both the customary and ordinance marriages between the parties, together with recovery of possession of the matrimonial home and custody of their child. The respondent cross-petitioned for a 50% interest in the matrimonial home and all properties acquired during the marriage, as well as custody, maintenance, and financial provision. The trial High Court dissolved the marriage, granted custody of the child to the respondent with reasonable access to the petitioner, and ordered the petitioner to convey certain plots of land to the respondent. However, it held that the remaining properties, including the matrimonial home, were the exclusive property of the petitioner. Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed, contending that the trial judge erred in the distribution of property, the adequacy of the lump sum award, the grant of the matrimonial home to the petitioner, and the lack of specificity in the access arrangements granted to the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeal examined the evidence and the governing principles on distribution of matrimonial property, including the principle of equality. The court held that the respondent failed to establish substantial contribution, whether direct or indirect, to the acquisition of the disputed properties. Consequently, it upheld the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in the distribution of property. The appellate court further affirmed the custody order, maintaining that the arrangements made were in the best interest of the child, and endorsed the flexible access granted to the petitioner, leaving the parties to determine its modalities. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
ABUBAKARI UMAR & MOHAMMED HAFIZ V NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE AUTHORITY
APPAU, JSC (PRESIDING), PWAMANG, JSC, PROF. KOTEY, JSC, LOVELACE -JOHNSON (MS.), JSC, AMADU, JSC
Employment Law — Contract of Employment — Irregular appointments — Lapsed offer — Estoppel — Labour Act as special statute — Quantum meruit — Unjust enrichment — Salaries payable for work done — General damages. The appellants claimed they were employees of the NHIA pursuant to appointment letters dated 2 April 2012, which required acceptance by 6 April 2012. They actually received the letters in October 2012 and, upon instructions from a regional manager, backdated their acceptance. They worked and were paid from October 2012 to April 2014, after which their salaries were stopped. They sought restoration to payroll, unpaid salaries with interest, and general damages. The High Court dismissed their case; the Court of Appeal partly allowed it by granting salaries from October 2012 to April 2014. Held, allowing the appeal in part: 1. No valid contract of employment existed. The offer had lapsed before acceptance; backdating could not revive it. The process of engagement was fraught with irregularities rendering the alleged contract unenforceable under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), which as a special statute prevailed over estoppel arguments under the Evidence Act. 2. Restoration to payroll refused. Without a valid contract, the appellants could not be restored to the NHIA payroll. 3. Salaries recoverable on quantum meruit. Although there was no contract, the NHIA accepted and benefited from services rendered. To avoid unjust enrichment, the appellants were entitled to remuneration for services rendered: a. October 2012 – April 2014 (already paid; payment affirmed). b. May 2014 – 12 August 2015 (to be paid on the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit). c. Statutory interest (CI 52) was awarded on sums due for the period May 2014 – 12 August 2015. 4. General damages denied. As no valid contract existed, general damages for breach could not be awarded
SAMUEL ATTA-MENSAH VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND RT. HON. EDWARD DOE ADJAHO AND WRIT NO: J1/20/2015 PROFESSOR STEPHEN KWAKU ASARE VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
AKUFFO (MS), CJ PRESIDING, ANSAH, JSC, ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH ,JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO BAMFO (MRS), JSC, BENIN, JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiffs, Samuel Atta-Mensah and Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare, challenged the eligibility of Edward Doe Adjaho to act as Speaker of Parliament while also serving as a Member of Parliament. They contended that this dual capacity violated provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly regarding separation of roles and qualifications for the Speakership. The Defendants argued that the Constitution permitted the Speaker to be elected from among Members of Parliament. The Supreme Court examined the relevant constitutional provisions governing the office of Speaker. The Court held that the Constitution allows a sitting Member of Parliament to be elected Speaker without vacating his seat. Accordingly, the action was dismissed.
FREDERICK KORANTENG VRS MOBILE ZONE LIMITED
AFIA N. ADU AMANKWA (MRS.) J
Employment Law — Termination — Employer’s duty to follow statutory procedure — Effect of employer instructing employee to stay away from work — Salary entitlement during period of exclusion — Burden of proof on salary allowances — Claim for recovery of seized property. Facts Plaintiff was employed by the defendant on 10 August 2011 as a technician and eventually promoted to Manager of CarlCare Service Centre, Takoradi. On 4 October 2015, he was arrested on allegations of stealing, falsification of records and other misconduct, based on an internal audit. He was detained for days and subsequently arraigned before the Takoradi Circuit Court, but the case was struck out for want of prosecution on 15 January 2019. Following his arrest, plaintiff was instructed by management to stay away from the workplace pending investigations and was never recalled. Defendant neither paid him salary nor benefits from October 2015 onwards. Plaintiff sued in November 2020 seeking: 1. A declaration that he remained a bona fide employee. 2. Salary arrears from 2015 to date. 3. Interest. 4. Recovery of certain seized personal items or their value. 5. Costs and any other reliefs. Holding / Decision 1. Plaintiff remained an employee of the defendant. 2. Plaintiff was entitled to salary arrears of GHS 563.46 monthly from October 2015 to date of judgment. Total for 96 months = GHS 54,092.16. 3. Judgment debt to accrue interest at the prevailing bank rate until final payment. 4. Reliefs relating to seized items dismissed.
DR. AKWASI AMPOFO TWUMASI V GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY
RICHARD ADJEI FRIMPONG JSC (PRESIDING), BRIGHT MENSAH JA , NOVISI ARYENE JA
Labour Law – Termination of Employment – Arbitral Awards – Enforcement – Computation of Award – Liability of Successor Public Institutions – Finality of Arbitration – Evidential Burden The Respondent, a former employee of the Appellant Authority, was dismissed after investigations revealed that he had simultaneously taken full‑time employment at Regent University while applying for extended medical leave supported by questionable medical documentation. He challenged the dismissal before the National Labour Commission, and the matter went to arbitration. In 2012, the Sole Arbitrator awarded him outstanding leave, welfare fund contributions, medical expenses, damages, and salary in lieu of notice. Seven years later, the Respondent sought an extension of time to enforce the award, which the High Court granted in 2020, directing the parties to recompute the amount due. The parties failed to reach agreement, and in 2021 the High Court—contrary to its earlier directive—ordered payment of GH¢218,711.92 as claimed by the Respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Respondent failed to prove the exact sum claimed, noting inconsistencies in the amounts he had presented at different stages and finding that no verified computation had been placed before the High Court. The Court ruled that the High Court erred in adopting the unproven figure and in departing from its own 2020 order requiring recomputation. The Court further held that the Appellant remained bound by the arbitral award because it failed to challenge it under section 58 of the ADR Act, 2010 (Act 798), and that liabilities of the defunct Internal Revenue Service had lawfully transferred to the Ghana Revenue Authority under section 34(1) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792). Held: 1. Appeal allowed. 2. High Court ruling of 23 July 2021 set aside. 3. Respondent entitled to payment under the arbitral award, but not the unverified sum claimed. 4. Matter remitted to the High Court to properly compute the amount due. 5. Costs of GH¢10,000 awarded to the Appellant.
AHMED ADAMS SEIDU, ABDUL LATIF, DANIEL ADONU & 97 ORS V AMEEN SANGARI INDUSTRIES LTD
JUSTICE BERNARD BENTIL
Labour Law — Redundancy — Enforcement of Arbitration Awards — Capacity (Locus Standi). The Plaintiffs, former employees declared redundant by the Defendant company, sought to enforce an arbitration award that granted two months’ salary for each completed year of service as redundancy pay. Following failed negotiations between the Defendant and the workers’ union (ICU), the dispute was referred to the National Labour Commission (NLC) and subsequently to a voluntary arbitration panel, which issued the award. The Defendant failed to comply fully, prompting the Plaintiffs to institute the present action. Held: 1. Evidence established that some former workers independently accepted a reduced severance package, but the Plaintiffs themselves had not been paid the arbitration‑mandated severance. 2. Under Section 172 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), only the National Labour Commission possesses the statutory authority to apply to the High Court to enforce arbitration awards. 3. The Plaintiffs lacked locus standi to enforce the award because they were not parties to the arbitration proceedings; the proper party was the NLC. 4. The action was therefore incompetent and dismissed, with costs of GH₵2,000 awarded against Plaintiffs’ counsel. Result: Suit dismissed for lack of capacity to enforce arbitration award.
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE PAUL UUTER DERY VRS TIGER EYE P.I., THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANSAH, JSC (PRESIDING), ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE BONNIE, JSC, BENIN, JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiff, Justice Paul Uuter Dery, a High Court judge, sued Tiger Eye P.I., the Chief Justice of Ghana, and the Attorney-General of Ghana following allegations of judicial misconduct arising from an investigative exposé. He sought to restrain disciplinary proceedings initiated under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, claiming breaches of due process and judicial independence. The Defendants argued that the constitutional procedure for removal of judges had been properly triggered. The Supreme Court considered whether it could intervene to halt the ongoing removal process. It held that Article 146 proceedings are constitutionally sanctioned and should not be interfered with except in exceptional circumstances. The Court therefore dismissed the action and allowed the process to continue.
ABDULAI YUSIF FANASH MUHAMMED VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL & MINISTER OF JUSTICE, ALFRED AGBESI WOYOME AND MARTIN ALAMISI AMIDU
WOOD (MRS), CJ (PRESIDING), ANSAH, JSC, ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, DOTSE, JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE - BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO - BAMFO (MRS), JSC, BENIN, JSC
The Plaintiff, Abdulai Yusif Fanash Muhammed, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Attorney-General of Ghana, Alfred Agbesi Woyome, and Martin Alamisi Amidu. The case arose from the enforcement and recovery processes relating to the controversial judgment debt paid to Woyome. The Plaintiff challenged aspects of the legal steps taken, questioning their constitutionality and propriety. The Supreme Court considered whether the issues raised disclosed a fresh constitutional question or were matters already settled in prior litigation. It held that the claims were repetitive and constituted an abuse of the Court’s process. The action was consequently dismissed.
CECILIA OSEI OWUSU V. AKOSUA MANSAH & JAMES OSEI AKWASI
ASARE-KORANG, J.A.
The plaintiff instituted an action in the Circuit Court seeking the revocation of Letters of Administration granted to the defendants in respect of the estate of the deceased, James Osei-Owusu, on grounds of fraud, and also claimed general damages. The plaintiff asserted that she was the lawful wife of the deceased and tendered a certified copy of a marriage certificate as evidence. The defendants, however, contended that the 1st defendant was the only lawful spouse of the deceased and counterclaimed for a declaration to that effect, along with a perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, revoked the Letters of Administration, and dismissed both the plaintiff’s claim for damages and the defendants’ counterclaim. Dissatisfied, the defendants appealed, arguing that the trial judge had failed to properly evaluate the evidence and that the decision was against the weight of the evidence. The issue before the appellate court was whether the trial judge had adequately evaluated the evidence and whether the plaintiff’s marriage to the deceased was valid in light of an alleged prior customary marriage. The appellate court held that the trial judge had failed to properly assess the evidence and had not made essential findings on key issues, including whether the plaintiff was the sole surviving spouse and whether the 1st defendant had been validly divorced from the deceased. Upon its own evaluation, the court found that there was a subsisting customary marriage between the deceased and the 1st defendant at the time the plaintiff purported to marry the deceased. The court therefore held that the plaintiff’s marriage to the deceased was null and void for being contracted during the subsistence of a prior customary marriage. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court, upheld the defendants’ counterclaim, and entered judgment in favor of the 1st defendant as the lawful spouse of the deceased.
RUTH ARTHUR V. JOHN HECTOR ANSAH & NAOMI OWUSU
OWUSU ANSAH, J.A.
This case arose as an appeal from the High Court, Cape Coast, delivered on 16 June 2000, involving a dispute over the validity of two marriages contracted by the same man. The Plaintiff/Respondent filed a Writ of Summons against the Defendants/Appellants, claiming that the Ordinance marriage between the 1st and 2nd Defendants was unlawful, null, and void due to the existence of a prior customary marriage between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, which had not been dissolved. The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant had entered into a customary marriage approximately thirty years before the proceedings and had seven children, five of whom survived. Despite this, the 1st Defendant purported to marry the 2nd Defendant under the Ordinance on 13 March 1998. The High Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, declaring that the customary marriage between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant was still valid and that the Ordinance marriage between the 1st and 2nd Defendants was illegal, null, and void. The Defendants appealed, contending that the trial judge erred in holding the customary marriage subsisted, arguing that it had been dissolved prior to the Ordinance marriage. The court emphasized the allocation of the burden of proof: the Plaintiff had to prove the existence of the prior customary marriage, the subsequent Ordinance marriage, and that the customary marriage had not been dissolved before the Ordinance marriage. The 1st Defendant bore the burden of proving that the customary marriage had been dissolved. Upon review, the court found no satisfactory evidence that the customary marriage had been legally dissolved before the Ordinance marriage. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the High Court’s judgment was affirmed, upholding the validity of the customary marriage and nullifying the purported Ordinance marriage.
BARAKE V. BARAKE
BROBBEY J.
This case addressed a divorce dispute in which the first respondent had contracted a second marriage that was deemed bigamous and therefore null, as his first marriage was registered under Cap 127, which prohibits polygamy. The court held that the first marriage should be presumed valid in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary and rejected the first respondent’s claim of illiteracy as insufficient to challenge the marriage’s validity. Regarding custody, the court granted the children to the mother (the petitioner), dismissing the father’s objections based on religious grounds and allegations of the mother’s moral depravity. The court emphasized the welfare of the children, noting that living with their stepmother could have adverse effects. On financial matters, the court clarified that financial provision to a spouse does not depend on proof of ownership or contribution to property acquisition. The husband was ordered to honour his promises of property and provide additional financial support proportionate to his means. However, the wife’s claim for a share in the family properties was dismissed. The ruling thus balanced the mother’s entitlement to maintenance and the children’s welfare while recognizing the limitations of property claims post-divorce.
JEBEILLE AND ANOTHER V. ASHKAR AND ANOTHER
GRIFFITHS-RANDOLPH J.
The case concerned a marriage between the second plaintiff and the first defendant, which was challenged as null, void, and of no legal effect. The marriage had been solemnized on 19 January 1976 by a Mohammedan priest but was not registered in accordance with the requirements of the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance. The first plaintiff testified that the second plaintiff had informed him of the marriage and presented a certificate allegedly signed by a district magistrate. The first plaintiff further stated that the second plaintiff requested that the marriage be declared null and void to allow for a subsequent marriage to be properly registered. The court found that the marriage had not complied with the statutory registration requirements set out in the Ordinance and was therefore invalid. It declared the marriage null and void. In exercising its discretion on costs, the court declined to award costs to either party, holding that both parties shared responsibility for the failure to comply with the statutory formalities.
JOHN V. JOHN AND ANOTHER
ABOAGYE J.
The petitioner sought the dissolution of his marriage on the grounds of cruel conduct and adultery by the respondent. In addition, he claimed damages against the co-respondent for engaging in adultery with his wife. Both the respondent and co-respondent failed to enter an appearance in court. The petitioner presented evidence showing the respondent’s frequent association with the co-respondent, including compromising situations and returning home late at night. A witness for the petitioner corroborated the respondent’s admission of an extramarital affair with the co-respondent. The court found that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to the respondent’s adulterous conduct and her refusal to discontinue the affair. While the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971, does not provide a legal basis for a husband to claim damages against an adulterer, the court considered the matter for the purpose of costs. Accordingly, the court granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce and dissolved the marriage. The co-respondent was ordered to pay the petitioner’s costs in the sum of ¢200.00.
ADJEI V. FORIWAA
ROGER KORSAH J.
The case involved a dispute between spouses married under customary law concerning the matrimonial home and related reliefs. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the marriage subsisted, joint ownership of a property, recovery of expenses, and an order for future maintenance. The defendant, in turn, sought dissolution of the marriage, eviction of the plaintiff from the matrimonial home, and an injunction preventing her from entering the house. Initially, the magistrate’s court ruled in favor of the defendant, despite the plaintiff’s protest that a similar matter was already pending in the High Court. Acting on the magistrate’s order, the defendant ejected the plaintiff and her children from the matrimonial home. The proceedings were later consolidated in the High Court, which ordered the plaintiff and her children to be reinstated in the matrimonial home. Subsequently, the defendant requested that the plaintiff and three of her children provide undertakings not to provoke him or his wife. Both parties filed affidavits detailing various grievances, including allegations of abuse and assaults. The court considered the welfare of the children and the overall conditions in the home in making its decision. The court ultimately ordered that two adult children remove themselves from the matrimonial home and provide undertakings of good behaviour within 28 days, balancing the rights of the parties with the welfare and peaceful occupation of the household.
ARTHUR V. SIKA
ADUMUA-BOSSMAN J.
The case concerned a dispute over financial expenditure related to the construction of a building, arising between two parties whose relationship was in question. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was his wife under customary law and sought to recover money spent on her during the course of their marriage. The defendant, however, contended that their relationship amounted to concubinage rather than a lawful marriage. The writ filed by the plaintiff was unclear and failed to clearly state a cause of action. The central issue before the court was the nature of the parties’ relationship at the time the expenditure occurred. This determination was critical, as it affected whether the plaintiff could assert a claim arising from a marital relationship under native customary law. The court noted that disputes concerning divorce or financial claims between parties allegedly married under customary law fall within the jurisdiction of the Native Court “B,” which is the appropriate forum for such matters. Following established authorities, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and directed that the parties be referred to the competent local court to resolve the dispute regarding the existence and recognition of their customary marriage.