LINDA AKOTO VRS BRIGHT KWASI MANU
PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING) DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC OWUSU (MS.) JSC HONYENUGA JSC PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
The case concerns an appeal to the Supreme Court following a decision of the Court of Appeal, Accra, which had affirmed the judgment of the High Court dissolving a marriage and awarding matrimonial property in favour of the Respondent. The parties, both Ghanaians, were customarily married in 2004 and later registered their marriage in 2014. They had two children. The Respondent, who resided in Ghana, initiated divorce proceedings at the High Court seeking dissolution of the marriage, custody and maintenance of the children, and settlement of certain properties, including a thirteen-bedroom uncompleted house at Adjiringanor and a Kia Sportage vehicle. Although the Appellant, who resided in Holland, entered appearance through counsel, he failed to file an answer to the petition. At the trial, the Respondent testified, and during her evidence she asserted that the Appellant owned two other houses in addition to the matrimonial home. This assertion was neither challenged in cross-examination nor rebutted by any evidence from the Appellant. After failed attempts at reconciliation, and despite an indication by the parties that they might file terms of settlement, the High Court proceeded to deliver judgment. It dissolved the marriage and, relying on the unchallenged evidence that the Appellant owned other properties, awarded the matrimonial home entirely to the Respondent as a just and equitable settlement. The Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed this decision. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court on several grounds, including that the judgment was against the weight of evidence, that the courts below erred in disregarding the terms of settlement, that the High Court lacked jurisdiction after the filing of those terms, that he was denied a fair hearing, and that the courts failed to comply with Article 22(3) of the 1992 Constitution regarding equitable distribution of matrimonial property. The issues before the Supreme Court therefore centered on whether the judgment was supported by the evidence on record, particularly the unchallenged testimony regarding the Appellant’s ownership of other houses; whether the purported terms of settlement were binding and capable of ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court; whether the Appellant had been denied a fair hearing; and whether the courts below properly applied the constitutional requirement of equitable distribution of matrimonial property under Article 22(3). In its decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the Respondent’s evidence that the Appellant owned two other houses stood unchallenged and was therefore deemed admitted. In line with established principles of evidence, the trial court was entitled to rely on such evidence, and the Appellant’s failure to file an answer or lead contrary evidence meant that the case was properly decided on the basis of the Respondent’s testimony alone. On the issue of the terms of settlement, the Court found that they were filed outside the time stipulated by the trial court and, in any event, were not adopted as a consent judgment because the parties were not in agreement on their terms. Consequently, they were not binding and did not deprive the High Court of jurisdiction to determine the case. The Supreme Court further held that there was no breach of the Appellant’s right to a fair hearing, as he had been given the opportunity to present his case but failed to take advantage of it. Regarding the application of Article 22(3) of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the High Court had acted in accordance with the constitutional requirement of equitable distribution. In light of the unchallenged evidence that the Appellant possessed two other houses, it was just and equitable to award the matrimonial home to the Respondent. The Court therefore found no error in the concurrent decisions of the lower courts and upheld the distribution of property as lawful and justified.
FEDERATION OF YOUTH ASSOCIATION OF GHANA (FEDYAG) VRS PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES OF GHANA & ORS
ATUGUBA, JSC (PRESIDING), AKUFFO (MS), JSC, BROBBEY, JSC, ANSAH, JSC, ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, OWUSU (MS), JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS), J.S.C.
The Federation of Youth Association of Ghana challenged the constitutionality of the “full fee-paying policy” in public universities, alleging violations of Articles 17 and 25 of the 1992 Constitution. The Supreme Court interpreted Article 25 as guaranteeing equal educational opportunities, not absolute free tertiary education. It held that access to higher education is subject to merit (capacity) and availability of resources, with free education to be introduced progressively. The Court found that the fee-paying policy does not reduce merit-based admissions and rather expands access by supplementing funding. It further held that the policy is not discriminatory, as it does not disadvantage any constitutionally protected class. Accordingly, the action was dismissed, and the policy upheld as constitutional.
NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION V GHANA TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD
WOOD (MRS,) C.J (PRESIDING), BROBBEY , JSC, OWUSU (MS.), JSC, YEBOAH , JSC, BONNIE, JSC
LABOUR LAW — UNFAIR DISMISSAL — POWER OF NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION — ENFORCEMENT OF COMMISSION’S ORDERS — WHETHER HIGH COURT CAN EXAMINE CORRECTNESS OF COMMISSION’S DECISION — SUBSTITUTION OF CHARGES — COMPLETENESS OF ORDER — APPEALS UNDER SECTION 134 OF LABOUR ACT The appellant (National Labour Commission) sought to enforce its order directing the respondent (Ghana Telecom) to convert the dismissal of an employee to a termination under Regulation 206(b) of the Staff Rules and pay accrued benefits. The High Court refused to enforce the order on the grounds that (i) the Commission had substituted a charge different from that originally brought against the employee under Regulation 144(iv) (fraud/dishonesty), (ii) the Commission’s order was incomplete for failure to specify accrued benefits, and (iii) the correctness of the Commission’s decision required examination. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1. The High Court is not a mere rubber stamp in enforcement proceedings; it must satisfy itself that the Commission’s decision is justified in law and fact, especially where affidavit evidence raises legal and factual objections. Courts may examine depositions and, if necessary, the investigative record. 2. The Commission acted without jurisdiction when it substituted its own charge under Regulation 206(b), contrary to the original charge of fraud under Regulation 144(iv). An adjudicating body cannot base its decision on a ground not raised by the parties or notified to them. 3. The Commission’s order was incomplete and unenforceable, as it failed to specify the employee’s actual entitlements. Contested accrued benefits require evidence and cannot be enforced on the basis of a vague order. 4. Section 134 of the Labour Act (appeals) applies only to decisions made under section 133 relating to unfair labour practices, not to complaints of unfair termination. Ghana Telecom was therefore entitled to oppose enforcement without appealing.
Asare Emmanuel v Kwao Richard & Apostle Owusu Brempong
His Lordship Justice Nathan P. Yarney
The Plaintiff claimed title to farmland at Ponwaakrom, tracing ownership through his father who acquired the land in 1948 from the Bechem Stool and remained in long possession. The Defendants claimed title through a grant from the Duayaw Nkwanta Stool. The Defendants’ defence was struck out for failure to comply with procedural rules and failure to prosecute their case. The Court evaluated the Plaintiff’s unchallenged evidence and held that while the Plaintiff established long possession and trespass, he failed to establish title. Judgment was entered granting recovery of possession, damages, and injunction, but refusing declaration of title.
Osumanu Alhasan v Fatima Abubakar & Dr. Seidu Abubakar
Her Ladyship Justice Ananda J. Aikins (Mrs.)
The Plaintiff claimed title to land at Madina, Accra, recovery of possession, injunction, and costs. He relied on an assignment and confirmation from the La Traditional Council, as well as long-standing payment of ground rent. The Defendants, though served with processes and hearing notices, failed to respond or appear in court. The Court held that the Plaintiff had established title through documentary evidence and unchallenged testimony and granted all reliefs sought, including recovery of possession and perpetual injunction.
The Gbese Stool (acting by Dr. Nii Ayi-Bonte II, Gbese Mantse) v Jimmy Issaka & Ors (2025)
His Lordship Justice Kwame Gyamfi Osei
The Plaintiff Stool claimed title to land at Avenor, recovery of possession, damages for trespass, and injunction against the Defendants who had entered and occupied the land without authority. The Defendants, though served by substituted service, failed to appear or defend the action. The Plaintiff led evidence establishing allodial title and the expiration of a prior lease granted to earlier occupants. The Court held that the land reverted to the Stool upon expiry of the lease and that the Defendants were trespassers. Judgment was entered for the Plaintiff.
OWUSU-AFRIYIE v. STATE HOTELS CORPORATION
HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.A.
Master and Servant — Employment — Transfer and Assigned Duties — Distinction between failure to report for duty and refusal to perform unsuitable tasks — Statutory Corporations — Termination of employment — Requirement that dismissal be effected by the proper authority — Specific Performance — Reinstatement — Applicability in contracts of employment — Statutory modification of the common‑law rule — Damages — Salary — Entitlement after wrongful dismissal. Material Facts Plaintiff was employed in 1964 as a catering officer and later transferred several times, alleging victimisation, non‑promotion, and unfair postings. In 1970 she was transferred to the Continental Hotel as a pastry chef, but the hotel had no functioning pastry section. She was instructed instead to work as a sauce cook—a role the court later held was not reasonably related to that of a pastry chef. Plaintiff protested the assignment as degrading and wrote to the Minister of Trade, continuing to report physically to the hotel but refusing to work. Management claimed she had “abandoned her post” for over 10 days and removed her from payroll, declaring her post vacant. The Minister later issued a confusing directive: endorsing the management's action but asking plaintiff to continue reporting for duty. Management maintained she must work as a sauce cook before being recognized as present. Plaintiff sued for (a) wrongful dismissal, (b) reinstatement, and (c) salary recovery HELD: 1. Judgment for the plaintiff. 2. Plaintiff reinstated into her position. 3. Her name to be restored to the payroll from date of wrongful dismissal. 4. Defendant to pay full salary arrears from date of dismissal. 5. Costs awarded to plaintiff (₵400 including ₵300 counsel fees).
NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION V. HARLEQUIN INTERNATIONAL (GH) LTD.
KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU
LABOUR LAW — WRONGFUL TERMINATION — NOTICE REQUIREMENT — EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE — ENFORCEMENT OF NLC DECISIONS The National Labour Commission (NLC) applied to the High Court under s.172 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) to compel the respondent employer to comply with its earlier decision awarding various reliefs to the petitioner, a former employee, for wrongful termination of employment. The employee had been dismissed by a letter dated 3 November 2008, effective immediately, contrary to Clause 13.2 of the employment contract which required three months’ written notice prior to termination. A previous warning letter of 15 October 2008 concerning poor performance did not constitute the required notice. The Court held that the respondent employer breached the contract by failing to comply with the mandatory three‑month notice requirement. The termination was therefore wrongful. The Court affirmed the NLC’s award of reliefs including: three months’ salary in lieu of notice; compensation for wrongful termination; repatriation allowance (including the employee’s spouse); pro‑rated commuted leave; and salary from the date of termination to the conclusion of proceedings. On the question of the applicable salary, the Court held that extrinsic evidence — including bank transfers (Exhibits LB6–LB14) — could not vary the unambiguous salary provision in the written contract, which stated £9,600 per year (£800 per month). Consistent with the rule against admitting extrinsic evidence to vary written terms, the Court concluded that the employee’s entitlements must be computed on the basis of £800 per month. Application granted. Respondent ordered to pay all entitlements as determined by the NLC on the contractual salary rate, and to provide repatriation tickets and allowances. Costs of GH¢1,000 awarded against the respondent.
KOFI AGYEN-MENSA V. KUAPA KOKOO LIMITED
E. K. AYEBI (PRESIDING) JA, GERTRUDE TORKORNOO (MRS.) JA, ANGELINA M. DOMAKYAAREH (MRS.) JA
Employment Law — Termination — Redundancy — Corporate Authority — Collective Agreement — Compensation The appellant, an Administrative Manager employed by the respondent company and in service for almost ten years, had his employment terminated on grounds of restructuring and was paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice together with other accrued entitlements, but no redundancy compensation. He contended that the termination was wrongful, malicious, ultra vires the Board Chairman who signed the letter, and contrary to the conditions of service. Held, dismissing the appeal in part, that: 1. Termination not wrongful — Under the Collective Agreement and s.17 of the Labour Act, an employer may lawfully terminate employment during restructuring by giving the requisite notice or payment in lieu. The appellant failed to demonstrate any breach of specific contractual provisions. 2. Board Chairman’s authority not challengeable by employee — Questions relating to internal corporate management fall within the company’s own right to challenge and not that of the employee; any irregularity was capable of ratification under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 3. Redundancy compensation payable — The appellant, having served between 6 and 10 years, was entitled under Clause 16.2 of the Collective Agreement to four months’ gross salary as redundancy award. The sum previously paid to him comprised only accrued benefits and did not constitute redundancy compensation. The trial judge erred in treating these entitlements as part‑payment of the redundancy award. 4. Order — Respondent ordered to pay the appellant four months’ gross salary as redundancy award, with interest at the prevailing commercial bank rate from 10 January 2012 until final payment. Appeal allowed only on the issue of compensation.
Juliana Buckman v Ruth Appiah
His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Amo Yartey
The Plaintiff claimed title to land at Abesey-Pokuase and sought recovery of possession, damages for trespass, and injunction against the Defendant who had developed the land. Although the Plaintiff established her root of title, evidence showed that she permitted the Defendant to continue development on the land on the condition that the Defendant would provide a replacement land. The Defendant acted on that representation and completed a building. The Court held that the Plaintiff was estopped by her conduct from reclaiming the land and instead ordered compensation by way of valuation of a comparable plot.
Maxwell Adufah Ofosu (also known as Maxwell Ofosu) & Solomon Kwame Adufah (Customary Successors of William Kofi Adufah) v Augustine Maxwell Larbi & Richard Kwaku Asiedu
Justice Ruby Naa Adjeley Quaison
The Plaintiffs, as customary successors to family land acquired in 1968, sued the Defendants for trespass, alleging that the Defendants extended a fence wall and constructed a manhole on their land. The Defendants denied trespass and claimed lawful ownership of their adjoining land acquired in 2018. A composite survey plan revealed an overlap between the parties’ lands and showed that the Defendants’ structures, including the manhole, fell within the disputed area. The Court resolved the dispute as a boundary issue and found that the Defendants had encroached onto the Plaintiffs’ land.
ERASMUS NII AMOO AKUSHIE V. EPROCESS INTERNATIONAL SA
JUSTICE GIFTY DEKYEM
Employment Law — Redundancy — Notice to Chief Labour Officer — Negotiation of redundancy package — Burden of proof — Unfair termination — Discrimination — Entitlements under employment contract. The Plaintiff, an employee of the Defendant company until 31 December 2014, challenged the termination of his employment on grounds of redundancy, alleging lack of proper notice, failure to negotiate a redundancy package, discriminatory treatment, sexual harassment, and entitlement to various payments including salary arrears, enhanced severance, bonus, and loan absolution. The Defendant contended the redundancy was lawful, affected multiple staff categories, and complied with statutory requirements. Held, dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims: 1. Redundancy Notice — Under section 65(1)(a) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), the statutory three‑month notice is to be given to the Chief Labour Officer and the relevant trade union, not to the affected employee. The Defendant had given the required notice through correspondence dated September–November 2014. 2. Negotiation — Although the Plaintiff alleged no negotiation occurred, evidence showed invitations and counter‑offers exchanged between the parties. In any event, per Ashun v. Accra Brewery Ltd., Act 651 does not impose a mandatory duty on employers to negotiate redundancy packages except in cases of closure, arrangement, or amalgamation. The Plaintiff was free to accept or reject the offer. 3. Discrimination & Unequal Packages — The Plaintiff failed to prove that another employee (Rachel) received a superior redundancy package, nor that he suffered discriminatory treatment in promotion or benefits. Unsupported allegations did not satisfy the burden of proof. 4. Unfair Termination — The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his situation fell under any ground listed in section 63 of Act 651. His allegation of sexual harassment did not meet statutory requirements, as there was no evidence of repeated complaints or that he resigned as a result. 5. Contractual Entitlements — The Plaintiff did not prove any contractual basis for claims such as three months’ salary in lieu of notice for redundancy, absorption of car loan, bonus payments, or salary arrears. Under his employment contract, only one month’s notice applied, and redundancy terms were not contractually stipulated.
ROBERT AMISSAH V. ACCENTS AND ART GALLERY
JUSTICE GIFTY DEKYEM
Labour Law — Wrongful Termination — Burden of Proof — Absence Without Leave — Workmen’s Compensation — Effect of Compensation Agreement. The Plaintiff, a carpenter, sustained an eye injury in the course of employment and subsequently absented himself from work for nearly three months. Despite receiving several letters and queries from the Defendant requesting explanation and an indication of intention to return to work, Plaintiff failed to respond and did not produce evidence of authorized sick leave. The Defendant terminated his employment in accordance with its HR Manual. Held: 1. In an action for wrongful dismissal, the Plaintiff bears the burden to prove the terms of employment and breach thereof. Plaintiff failed to discharge this burden; the evidence showed unauthorized prolonged absence, amounting to misconduct justifying termination under section 15(e)(iii) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). 2. Defendant proved payment of Plaintiff’s medical bills except those unsubstantiated by Plaintiff. 3. Plaintiff had already accepted compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law (PNDCL 187) pursuant to a signed agreement, thereby precluding further claims for damages relating to the injury. 4. All claims dismissed; no order as to costs.
AGNES YARBOI V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE PER THE DISTRICT DIRECTOR, AKIM ODA.
DENNIS DOMINIC ADJEI J.A. (PRESIDING), CECILIA H. SOWAH J.A., L. L. MENSAH J.A.
Labour Law — Wrongful Dismissal — Internal Disciplinary Procedure — CHRAJ — Public Officer — Weight of Evidence — Natural Justice — Constitutional Interpretation Facts: The Appellant, a typist at CHRAJ’s Akim Oda District Office, was dismissed following a disciplinary inquiry into allegations including attempting to influence a Circuit Court Judge, habitual lateness, insubordination, and quarrelling with colleagues. She challenged the dismissal at the High Court on grounds of bias, breach of natural justice, and lack of jurisdiction due to absence of an identifiable complainant. The High Court dismissed her claims. Held: Appeal Dismissed.
NII TETTEH OPREMREH VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
ANSAH (PRESIDING), ADINYIRA (MRS) JSC, OWUSU (MS) JSC, DOTSE JSC, YEOBAH JSC, B.BONNIE JSC, ARYEETEY JSC, GBADEGBE JSC, A. BAMFO (MRS) JSC
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of L.I. 1983, arguing that Parliament unlawfully altered the instrument after it had been laid. The key issue was whether Parliament, under Article 11(7), has power to amend subsidiary legislation. The Supreme Court held that Parliament’s role is limited to annulment, not amendment of such instruments. Since the original instrument (NTO1) was neither annulled nor withdrawn, it automatically came into force after 21 sitting days. The altered version (NTO2), which emerged after the 21-day period, was held to be unconstitutional and void. Consequently, only the original instrument was valid, and actions based on the altered version were invalidated.
Agricultural Development Bank v D & K Everfresh Foods Ghana Ltd; Kofi Barnie; Benjamin Nikoi Kotey
Justice Mavis Akua Andoh
The Plaintiff bank granted a loan and subsequent overdraft facility to the 1st Defendant, secured initially by a mortgage over the 3rd Defendant’s property. Upon default, summary judgment was entered against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the mortgage against the 3rd Defendant’s property for the overdraft facility. The Court held that no fresh mortgage was executed for the overdraft facility and that the earlier mortgage could not be relied upon without the 3rd Defendant’s knowledge and consent. The claim against the 3rd Defendant failed.
Rev. Emmanuel Anim Nketiah v Trespasser
Her Ladyship Justice Jane Harriet Akweley Quaye
The Plaintiff claimed title to land measuring 0.34 acres at Gbawe and sought recovery of possession, damages for trespass, and injunction against an unknown trespasser. The Defendant, though served by substituted service, failed to enter appearance or defend the action. The Court proceeded to hear the matter and held that the Plaintiff successfully proved his title through an indenture and site plan, clearly identifying the land. Judgment was entered in favour of the Plaintiff, including recovery of possession, damages, and injunctive relief
A. D. Build Limited v Mrs. Gifty Yano & Lincoln Maya Limited
Her Ladyship Justice Comfort Kwasiwor Tasiame
The Plaintiff claimed title to land at Oyarifa allegedly granted by the 1st Defendant as a replacement for an earlier defective grant and sought declarations, damages for trespass, and injunctions against the Defendants. The 1st Defendant denied replacing any land and maintained that the Plaintiff was only permitted to temporarily use the land as a licensee. The 2nd Defendant claimed title through a grant from the 1st Defendant. The Court held that the Plaintiff failed to prove any valid grant of the disputed land. The Plaintiff’s presence on the land was as a licensee and did not confer any proprietary interest. The 1st Defendant retained title and validly granted the land to the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s claim failed, and the counterclaim substantially succeeded.
RICHARD ODUM BORTIER AND DANIEL QUAYE VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATUGUBA AG. CJ (PRESIDING), AKUFFO (MS) J.S.C, BROBBEY J.S.C., ANSAH J.S.C, ADINYIRA(MRS) J.S.C, YEBOAH, J.S.C, BONNIE, J.S.C, GBADEGBE J.S.C, AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), J.S.C
The Plaintiffs sought constitutional interpretation of Article 47(3), (4) and (7) and orders compelling the Electoral Commission (EC) to redraw constituency boundaries to ensure equal representation based on population. They argued that the EC’s past and intended practices led to mal-apportionment and unfair representation. The Supreme Court identified the core issue as whether its original jurisdiction had been properly invoked. The Court held that the Constitution provides a specific dispute resolution mechanism under Article 48 for boundary demarcation issues. It found that the Plaintiffs’ claims essentially challenged the EC’s exercise of its constitutional functions. Consequently, the action was incompetent and improperly before the Court, and was dismissed.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL VRS BALKAN ENERGY GHANA LTD, BALKAN ENERGY LLC AND MR. PHILIP DAVID ELDERS
ATUGUBA AG. CJ (PRESIDING), DR. DATE-BAH, JSC, ANSAH, JSC, ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, YEBOAH,JSC, GBADEGBE,JSC, BAMFO,(MRS) JSC
The case concerned the validity of agreements between the Government of Ghana and Balkan Energy entities regarding the operation of the Osagyefo Barge under Article 181(5) of the Constitution. The key issue was whether the agreements constituted “international business or economic transactions” requiring prior Parliamentary approval. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the parties and the substance of the transaction rather than merely its form. It held that where a transaction involves a foreign entity and the Government, it falls within Article 181(5). The Court found that the agreements had not received the requisite Parliamentary approval. Consequently, the agreements were declared unconstitutional, null and void.