A.G.A. 2006 EARLY RETIREES ASSOCIATION SUING PER SAMUEL BOADU AND 85 ORS V. ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI GHANA
Court of Appeal
Labour Law — Collective Agreements — Binding Effect — Redundancy — Requirement of Approval — Evidence of Agreement — Exit from Employment — Distinction Between Voluntary and Early Retirement — Civil Procedure — Capacity to Sue — Representative Actions — Limitation — Effect of Ongoing Grievance Processes — Inducement — Evidence — Probative Value — Documentary vs. Oral Evidence Facts 86 former employees of AngloGold Ashanti (“the Plaintiffs”) formed the AGA 2006 Early Retirees Association to pursue what they believed were unpaid redundancy entitlements. They alleged that: Management had agreed to declare them redundant under a labour rationalization exercise approved by the Chief Labour Officer. Instead, the company issued them early retirement letters, which reduced their benefits contrary to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The Plaintiffs pursued internal grievance procedures and petitioned the company and the National Labour Commission, without success. AngloGold Ashanti denied the existence of any redundancy agreement and argued the Plaintiffs voluntarily opted for early retirement. The company also raised a limitation defence, arguing the cause of action arose in 2006 and was time‑barred when suit was filed in 2015. The High Court accepted the Plaintiffs’ case that there was a redundancy agreement. Held that limitation had not run because: 1. Plaintiffs were actively engaged in grievance processes. 2. Defendant advised them to “wait patiently” for the outcome of a related lawsuit, inducing delay. The Court granted reliefs for: 1. Payment of redundancy awards 2. Interest from December 2006 to final payment Dismissed the claim for damages. AngloGold Ashanti appealed. Holdings of the Court of Appeal 1. The company’s “early retirement” letters were inconsistent with the CBA and appeared designed to deny employees their redundancy benefits. 2. The trial judge properly evaluated the evidence. The Defendant failed to demonstrate any factual or legal error. 3. Plaintiffs entitled to redundancy payments and interest.
MICHAEL ANKOMAH NIMFAH VRS. JAMES GYAKYE QUAYSON, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF GHANA & ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the eligibility of James Gyakye Quayson to contest and hold office as Member of Parliament for Assin North. He contended that at the time of filing his nomination, the 1st Defendant owed allegiance to a country other than Ghana, contrary to Article 94(2)(a) of the 1992 Constitution. The action also sought consequential reliefs against the Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Attorney-General. The Court examined whether the 1st Defendant had effectively renounced his Canadian citizenship before filing nomination forms. It held that the process of renunciation had not been completed at the material time. The Court consequently declared that he was not qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament.
CLEMENT AGBESI & 4 ORS. V. GHANA PORTS AND HABOUR AUTHORITY
Court of Appeal
Civil Procedure — Parties — Joinder — Class Actions — Amendment of Writ Labour Law — Collective Bargaining Agreement — Casual Workers — Conversion to Permanent Status Evidence — Burden of Proof — Need for Individual Proof in Multi‑Plaintiff Actions Remedies — Damages — Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreement — Severance Benefits FACTS Five named plaintiffs, described as casual workers of the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA), issued a writ “and others” seeking: 1. Damages for breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 2. Compensation for unlawful retention as casuals and discriminatory treatment 3. Payment of severance benefits equivalent to that of permanent workers after a 2002 reorganization Plaintiffs later filed a “full list” of 3,839 additional names, and subsequently sought to join 356 more persons. The High Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs and awarded damages and compensation to the five named plaintiffs plus 4195 additional persons. GPHA appealed. Holdings Majority (Akamba JA; Quaye JA concurring): 1. The 3,839 persons were not validly joined — filing their names without leave amounted to an improper amendment of parties. 2. The 356 persons were also not valid parties — despite the High Court granting leave, plaintiffs failed to amend the writ as required. 3. Only the original five plaintiffs were before the court. 4. Only the 1st plaintiff proved continuous employment beyond the 154-day threshold and was entitled to relief. 5. The remaining four plaintiffs failed to discharge their evidential burden. Dissenting Opinion (Addo JA) Justice Addo disagreed entirely with the majority and held that: 1. All 3,839 plaintiffs validly commenced the action as a group/class. 2. The technical failures to amend the writ were curable. 3. The Court should use its powers to regularize the joinder. 4. The evidence supported the High Court’s findings.
CARL TIEDEMANN STEVEDORING ENTERPRISE BASED UNION & 236 OTHERS V. SAFEBOND COMPANY LIMITED AND 1 OTHER
High Court
Employment Law — Redundancy — Severance — Collective Agreement — Burden of Proof — Waiver of Employment Rights A trade union (1st Plaintiff) and 236 of its members brought an action against their employer, Safebond Company Ltd (1st Defendant), challenging a redundancy exercise carried out in 2011. They sought multiple reliefs including: an order compelling negotiation and execution of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), disclosure of workers affected by redundancy, negotiation of severance and redundancy benefits, injunctions restraining unilateral payments, and payment of outstanding salary arrears and allowances (educational grant, risk/dirty allowance, night allowance, overtime, leave allowances, T&T), as well as long-service awards and constitutional compensation for alleged violation of economic rights. Held: 1. Plaintiffs failed to prove entitlement to salary arrears, allowances, or long-service awards. 2. Redundancy pay under Exhibit K applied; severance pay under Act 651 was not triggered. 3. No evidence supported claims against the 2nd Defendant as a holding company. 4. Plaintiffs did not comply with statutory steps for initiating CBA negotiations. 5. No breach of constitutional economic rights was established. 6. All Plaintiffs’ claims dismissed in their entirety. No order as to costs.
GHANA CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND 8 OTHERS VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs, a coalition of civil society organisations, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the constitutionality of the Ghana Agyapa Royalties Limited Transactions Agreements arising from the proposed monetisation of Ghana’s mineral royalties through a special purpose vehicle. They contended that the agreements constituted international business or economic transactions requiring prior parliamentary approval under Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution. The Attorney-General argued that the structure was a commercial arrangement governed by domestic law and did not trigger Article 181(5). The Court examined the nature of the transaction and the extent of parliamentary oversight required. It held that the impugned agreements fell within the scope of Article 181(5). The Court consequently declared that parliamentary approval was constitutionally required before the transaction could proceed.
BENJAMIN ARYEE & 691 ORS. V. COCOA MARKETING COMPANY
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Casual Worker — Section 78 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) — Conditions for Classification as a Casual Worker — Legal Effect of Continuous Employment Beyond Six Months — Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) — Interpretation — Objective Approach — Termination — Effect on Contract of Employment— Wrongful Termination — Notice Requirements — Evidence — Appeal — Judgment Against the Weight of Evidence — Constitutional Law — Economic Rights — Daily Rated Workers Facts The Plaintiffs, 692 workers of the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), were engaged from May 2002 as cocoa carriers, loaders, tarpaulin handlers, cleaners, and sack sewers at the Tema Port. Although they worked continuously for over four years, the Defendant treated them as casual workers, paying them daily wages and denying them the rights and benefits due to permanent staff, despite the existence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiated on their behalf by the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU). On 31 December 2006, the Defendant terminated their employment without notice. The High Court held that they were permanent workers and granted several reliefs. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that they were casual workers under section 78 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). The Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. HOLDING 1. The Appellants were not casual workers 2. The CBA applied to the Appellants because they were ICU members and the agreement expressly included their job classifications. 3. Since the Plaintiffs were permanent employees, the Defendant was bound by section 17(1) of Act 651 to give one month’s notice or salary in lieu. Termination without notice was therefore wrongful, entitling the Plaintiffs to damages
FOOD SOVEREIGNTY GHANA VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff NGO challenged the constitutionality of the Plant Variety Protection Act, 2020, particularly Sections 61 and 63, arguing that they amounted to an unconstitutional ratification of the UPOV Convention contrary to Article 75 of the 1992 Constitution. It contended that Ghana had neither executed nor ratified the Convention before enacting Act 1050. The Attorney-General argued that the Act merely positioned Ghana to align with the UPOV regime and did not constitute ratification. The Supreme Court first considered whether its original interpretative jurisdiction had been properly invoked under Articles 2(1) and 130(1). The Court held that Article 75 was clear and unambiguous and that no genuine issue of constitutional interpretation arose. The action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, affirming Parliament’s plenary legislative authority under Article 93(3).
PROF. KWADWO APPIAGYEI-ATUA & 7 OTHERS V THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
the Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Imposition of Restrictions Act, 2020 (Act 1012), enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic to empower the President to impose restrictions on fundamental human rights. The Plaintiffs argued that the Act improperly authorised the unilateral suspension of rights without recourse to the emergency derogation procedures under Articles 31 and 32 of the 1992 Constitution and was thus inconsistent with fundamental rights protections. They contended that Parliament could not sidestep the constitutional emergency regime by relying on Article 21(4), a limitation clause, to justify such extensive restrictions. The Attorney-General defended the Act as a valid restriction regime under Article 21(4)(c), (d) and (e). The Supreme Court agreed with the Plaintiffs, holding that Act 1012 was inconsistent with Articles 21, 31 and 32 and therefore unconstitutional and void. The decision reaffirmed that powers to suspend fundamental rights during emergencies must conform strictly to the constitutional derogation framework.
CHILD RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
Child Rights International, a civil society organisation, filed a writ in the Supreme Court seeking declarations that the Government of Ghana was breaching constitutional provisions protecting children by failing to address the plight of children living on the streets. The organisation invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution, arguing that the Government’s inaction violated various articles guaranteeing children’s rights. The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff had not properly invoked its original jurisdiction and that the constitutional provisions relied upon did not raise a real issue for constitutional interpretation or enforcement. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ without addressing the substantive claims. The Court noted that while the concerns about street children were genuine, the case was not appropriately framed for constitutional adjudication. The dismissal underscored that constitutional complaints must clearly engage issues of interpretation or enforcement within the Court’s original jurisdiction.
FRANCIS OSEI-BONSU VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
A writ was filed in the Supreme Court under constitutional jurisdiction challenging sections 16(2)(a) and 16(2)(h)–(l) of the Citizenship Act, 2000 (Act 591) as being inconsistent with Articles 8(2) and 289(2) of the 1992 Constitution for expanding the list of public offices dual citizens could not hold. He argued that Parliament could not alter constitutional qualifications for public office outside the formal amendment procedures. The Attorney General conceded that the impugned provisions were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the additions constituted an implicit constitutional amendment that did not follow the prescribed amendment process. Accordingly, the Court struck down the challenged provisions as null and void. The judgment reaffirmed constitutional supremacy and the requirement that changes to qualifications for public office must comply with formal constitutional amendment procedures.
SOLOMON FAAKYE VRS UNIVERSITY OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Solomon Faakye, challenged certain provisions of the University of Ghana Act, 2010 (Act 806) and the University’s Statutes, alleging that the composition and powers of the University Council, including the designation of principal officers, violated the 1992 Constitution. He contended that the Statutes were procedurally invalid, including issues of publication and parliamentary laying. The actions were brought under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the impugned statutory provisions and University Statutes did not contravene the Constitution. It affirmed that the University’s governing instruments complied with both constitutional and legislative requirements. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writs, upholding the constitutional validity of the challenged enactments.
CLIFFORD SOWAH V. MCARIAN LIMITED AND IAN WEBSTER
High Court
Employment Law — Social Security Contributions — Employer’s statutory duty— Redundancy — Effect of accepting severance payment — Annual Leave — Cannot be exchanged for cash — Validity of purported commutation — National Labour Commission — Settlement — Proper forum for appeal Tort — Assault — Constitutional protection of dignity — Damages Evidence — Failure to cross‑examine — Effect Facts: The plaintiff worked as a carpenter for the defendants from 1994 to 2008. Upon termination, he claimed: (i) additional severance for alleged redundancy; (ii) unpaid SSNIT contributions (1994–2001); (iii) 14 years of accumulated leave; (iv) unpaid December 2008 salary; and (v) damages for assault after the 2nd defendant spat on him. The defendants argued that severance had been finally settled by the National Labour Commission (NLC); that SSNIT was not due before 2001; that leave was monetised; and that the assault had been settled through a purification ritual. Held: 1. Claim for further severance dismissed — plaintiff estopped after accepting the NLC‑ordered amount. 2. Employer must pay outstanding SSNIT contributions from 24 August 1994 to June 2001. 3. Plaintiff entitled to unpaid December 2008 salary (GH₵86). 4. Plaintiff entitled to cash in lieu of 14 years of annual leave (15 days per year). 5. Plaintiff awarded GH₵3,000 damages for assault. 6. Costs of GH₵2,000 awarded to the plaintiff.
DAFEAMEKPOR ROCKSON-NELSON, DR. CLEMENT ABAASINAT APAAK AND FREDERICK NII COMMEY VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The plaintiffs invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2 and 130, challenging the authority of the Article 71 Committee to recommend salaries and privileges for spouses of the President and Vice-President. The Court held that although the constitutional provisions were clear, its enforcement jurisdiction was properly invoked because Parliament had allegedly acted in excess of its constitutional mandate. Relying on prior decisions, the Court reaffirmed that the Committee’s role is advisory only and its recommendations are not binding until adopted by Parliament or the President. It found that the Committee exceeded its mandate by extending Article 71 benefits to spouses, who are not constitutional office holders. However, the recommendations themselves were not unconstitutional per se, as they lacked binding force until acted upon. The real constitutional breach arose from Parliament’s acceptance and implementation of the recommendations, not from the Committee’s advisory report.
SAMUEL M. K. ADRAH V. ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF GHANA
Court of Appeal
Employment Law – Redundancy – Accumulated Leave – Commutation of Leave to Cash – Effect of Termination on Earned Leave – Capacity to Sue – Collective Agreement – Burden of Proof The plaintiff, a senior staff employee of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), proceeded on 249 days of accumulated leave upon the employer’s directive. While on leave, his employment was terminated pursuant to a productivity screening exercise, and a severance package was offered. The plaintiff contended that the severance package unlawfully excluded payment for earned but unused leave, provident fund entitlements, certain allowances, and long-service benefits. The employer argued that (i) accumulated leave could not be commuted to cash under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), (ii) the plaintiff was bound by a negotiated redundancy agreement concluded by the Senior Staff Association, and (iii) the plaintiff had forfeited his accumulated leave due to failure to take it as instructed. Held: Appeal dismissed. 1. The plaintiff had the requisite capacity. Although the Senior Staff Association negotiated the severance package, provisions relating to provident fund, accumulated leave, and transportation were non-negotiable entitlements under the governing Collective Agreement. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to challenge the employer’s failure to honour them. 2. There was no evidence that the plaintiff refused lawful instructions to take leave. The employer controlled leave scheduling and had itself deferred plaintiff’s leave over several years. The employer could not rely on its own conduct to deny earned leave. 3. Termination does not extinguish earned leave. Section 31 renders void agreements by which employees purport to relinquish annual leave; it does not bar payment for earned leave upon termination, particularly where the employer itself created the accumulation. Equity prevents an employer from using statute as an “engine of fraud.” 4. The governing Senior Staff Manual (2009–2011) expressly provided for commutation of outstanding leave to cash in cases of redundancy, dismissal, resignation, or retirement. Where contractual terms are more beneficial than the Labour Act, they prevail. 5. The trial judge properly exercised discretion in awarding interest at commercial rates from 1 July 2010, considering the delay and the loss in value of money. 6. Fringe benefits – Petrol, utility, and car maintenance allowances were correctly excluded, as fringe benefits do not form part of cash commutation of leave.
ELIKPLIM L. AGBEMAVA VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff challenged section 10(15) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 (Act 919), contending that exempting certain GNPC borrowings from prior parliamentary approval violated Article 181(3) and (4) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court first struck out reliefs that were vague and incapable of invoking its original jurisdiction, holding that only the claim alleging inconsistency properly raised a constitutional issue. On the merits, the Court reaffirmed settled jurisprudence that “Government” under Article 181 refers to central government and does not ordinarily include autonomous statutory corporations like GNPC. It held that parliamentary approval is required only where central government raises a loan on its own behalf or on behalf of a public institution, not where such institution borrows independently. The Court declined the invitation to depart from its precedents in Klomega (No. 2) and Assibey Yeboah, emphasizing stare decisis and the presumption of constitutional validity. Accordingly, section 10(15) of Act 919 was upheld and the action dismissed in its entirety.
METROPOLITAN INSURANCE CO. LTD. V. FRANCIS NSIAH-AFRIYIEE
High Court
Employment Law — Termination of Employment — Notice and Payment in Lieu — Accumulated Leave — Bonus Entitlement — Award of Interest — Nature of Appeals — Omnibus Ground The respondent, a Chief Financial Officer of the appellant company, resigned from his employment by giving the contractually required three‑month notice. The appellant accepted the resignation but unilaterally shortened the notice period, thereby bringing the respondent’s employment to an earlier end. The respondent sued for salary in lieu of notice, accumulated leave commuted to cash, earned bonuses, and interest. The trial court granted the substantive claims but declined to award interest. The appellant appealed; the respondent cross‑appealed on the issue of interest and bonuses. Held, dismissing the appeal (save for recomputation of leave pay) and allowing the cross‑appeal: 1. Contractual notice rights operate bilaterally. Under clause 1.14 of the conditions of service, both employer and employee were entitled to three months’ notice or salary in lieu. The employer’s waiver of its right to notice did not extinguish the employee’s corresponding right to salary for the notice period. By truncating the notice period, the appellant breached the contract and became liable to pay salary in lieu. 2. Measure of damages for wrongful termination. The respondent was entitled to salary and accrued allowances for the remaining notice period, consistent with principles governing wrongful dismissal: Nartey‑Tokoli v. VALCO applied. 3. Accumulated leave must be computed on net salary/basic salary. Leave commutation is based on net/basic salary, not gross salary, in accordance with Bannerman‑Mensah v. GEA. The quantum awarded was therefore subject to recomputation. 4. Bonus entitlement proved on the evidence. The respondent belonged to the employer’s bonus scheme, bonuses had been declared for 2003, and evidence supporting the quantum (GH¢2,359.90) was unchallenged. The respondent was therefore entitled to the bonuses. 5. Interest must be awarded on sums wrongfully withheld. The trial judge erred in failing to award interest. In line with LI 1295 and the principle that a party deprived of the use of money is entitled to compensation, interest was awarded on all monetary awards from the dates they became due. 6. Omnibus ground of appeal — duty of appellate court. Where a party appeals on the ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, the appellate court must examine the entire record and re-evaluate the evidence: Tuakwa v. Bosom, Aryeh v. Iddrisu affirmed.
MARK DARLINGTON OSAE VRS FOOD AND DRUGS AUTHORITY AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was invoked, challenging regulatory directives issued by the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) on constitutional grounds. He contended that the impugned actions were unlawful and inconsistent with constitutional provisions governing administrative bodies. The Court examined whether the matter disclosed a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement to warrant its original jurisdiction under Article 2(1). It held that the dispute primarily concerned the exercise of statutory powers by the FDA rather than a real constitutional controversy. The Court reaffirmed that not every allegation of unconstitutionality properly invokes its exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with the Plaintiff directed to pursue the appropriate statutory remedies.
MAHAMA AYARIGA VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, GHANA AMALGAMATED TRUST PLC. & NATIONAL TRUST HOLDING COMPANY. (NTHC)
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that Ghana Amalgamated Trust Plc (GAT) was validly incorporated as a public corporation under Article 295(1) and the Companies Act, and that Article 192 does not require every state-owned commercial entity to be established by an Act of Parliament. The Court interpreted Articles 190 and 192 harmoniously with Article 295(1), concluding that public corporations may be set up either by statute or out of public funds. It further held that Government’s GH₵800 million subscription for redeemable preference shares in GAT constituted expenditure, not a loan under Article 181, since there was no obligation of repayment. Accordingly, parliamentary approval under Article 179 through the national budget process was sufficient. The Court also ruled that the Put-Call Option Agreement (PCOA) was not a loan but an international business transaction involving a sovereign guarantee. As such, its approval by Parliament satisfied the requirements of Article 181(5), rendering the impugned transactions constitutional.
KWASI AFRIFA VRS COMMISSIONER-GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal on the enforcement of fundamental human rights under article 33 and for administrative justice under Article 23 of the constitution by Kwasi Afrifa against the GRA and Attorney General. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE A tax liability was imposed on Kwasi Afrifa after a tax assessment was done by the GRA t in 2017. He objected to it and following communications with the GRA paid what was determined to the outstanding taxes from 2012 to 2016 inclusive of 30% of the amount in dispute and the sum computed as penalty. As section 42(5) of Act 915, that is titled objection to tax decision, states that, an objection against a tax shall not be entertained unless the person has; a. in the case of import duties and taxes, paid all outstanding taxes including the full amount of the tax in dispute, and b. in the case of other taxes, paid all outstanding taxes including 30% of the tax in dispute. In June 2019, kwasi Afrifa applied for a Tax clearance certificate (TCC). GRA's response was that unless Kwasi Afrifa provides information relating to the client account, utility, medical bills and all return of income between 2017 and 2018 his tax objection could not be decided on. On this note, Kwasi Afrifa brought an action in the high court of Kumasi, for which the issue of the objection of the tax liability between 2012 to 2016 was determined as moot. Kwasi Afrifa later appealed, and the court of appeal determined that the case is not moot. As the court defined a moot case as one that does not present a justiciable controversy because the issue involved have become academic and dead, for which this case is not one. The court of appeal referred this case to the supreme Court. ISSUES 1. Whether upon a true and proper interpretation Article 23 of the 1992, section 42(5) of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 Act 915 is inconsistent with and violative of his constitutional right to administrative justice guaranteed under the provision of article 23 of the 1992 constitution and is unconstitutional. 2. Whether Kwasi Afrifa not begin qualified for Tax clearance certificate is null, void and of the no effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with kwasi Afrifa’s right to administrative justice as provided for in article 23 of the 1992 constitution. THE APPELLANT’S CASE 1. That the statutory requirement in section 42(5) of Act 915 to pay outstanding taxes and a portion of the assessed tax constitutes a fetter on a tax objector’s access to administrative justice as provided for under article 23 of the 1992 constitution. 2. The scope of the provision in Act 915 for exercising discretion when a tax objection is raised, disenables officials of the GRA from exercising discretion regarding objections to tax assessment in a manner consistent with article 23 of the 1992 constitution, because they violate the duty placed on administrative bodies and officials to “act fairly and reasonably”. Therefore, for this reason section 42(5) of Act 915 should be struck down. THE RESPONDENT’S CASE 1. Tax is the mainstay of the economy and the constitutional duty of citizens to satisfy all tax obligations. So, any consideration of a claim to fundamental human right vis a vis the constitutional duty to pay tax should therefore be evaluated as subject to overriding consideration of the public interest as dictated by article 12 of the constitution. 2. The imposition of tax is the sole prerogative of parliament and so any rate or quantum of tax is supported by law. The reasoning behind the imposition of section 42(5) is to ensure that taxpayers do not indulge in frivolous tax objections and appeals. So therefore, the court must appreciate the balance between the interest of the state, the state’s developmental agenda and peace as against a private interest. 3. Again, section 42(5) does not create a fetter against the right to administrative justice because a party against whom section 42(5) became applicable would have access to both the right to judicial review and the appellate procedure in Act 915. 4. The dictates of article 296 concerning the exercise of discretion by officials had been complied with in section 42(6) and (7) of Act 915 because the two provisions allow a person objecting to assessed tax to seek a waiver, variation or suspension of part of the assessed tax whiles the objection is considered. DECISION OF THE COURT The Court held that, upon a true and proper interpretation of article 23 of the 1992 constitution, section 42(5) of the revenue administration Act, 2016 is not inconsistent with and violative of the constitutional right to administrative justice guaranteed under the provision of article 23 of the 1992 constitution. Kwasi Afrifa cause of action in this matter is one in respect of which Act 915 has prescribed routes for resolution of disputes under the dispute resolution regime in section 41 to 45. The extent that any ‘tax decision’ taken by the commissioner general is an administrative decision, and tax decision are by Act 915 made subject to objection, judicial review and appeal, the regime provided under Act 915 for the regulation of tax decision by the commissioner general passes the test of constitutionality. IMPLICATION AND KEY TAKEAWAYS OF THE HIGH COURT’S DECISION 1. If any citizen has any objection to any decision, section 42(5) Act 915 does not create a fetter to the due hearing of that objection. 2. A tax decision is one made under the tax law and therefore an assessment of under Act 915 cannot be arbitrarily determined by tax authorities, and even where they exercise discretion, make judgments, give a directive, express an opinion, grant an approval or consent, or express themselves as satisfied in respect of a matter, those acts must comply with tax law. CONCLUSION The court held that, section 42(5) of the revenue administration Act, 2016 is not inconsistent with and violative of the constitutional right to administrative justice guaranteed under the provision of article 23 of the 1992 constitution and tax decision by the commissioner general passes the test of constitutionality.
KOFI SENKYIRE V ABOSSO GOLDFIELDS LTD.
Supreme Court
Employment Law — Wrongful dismissal — Gross misconduct — Disciplinary procedure — Standard of proof — Whether employer complied with conditions of service — Whether dismissal was justified. The appellant, a foreman in the Sampling Department of Abosso Goldfields Ltd, was found at the security gate carrying a sample bag containing gold‑bearing rocks contrary to standard practice. He was arrested by security personnel, suspended, and subsequently appeared before a disciplinary committee established under section 12 of the employer’s Conditions of Service. The committee found the evidence circumstantial but considered his conduct suspicious and recommended termination with payment of entitlements. He was dismissed accordingly. The Circuit Court held the dismissal wrongful and awarded the appellant damages and unpaid entitlements. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the employer had complied with the contractual disciplinary procedure. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that (a) the judgment was against the weight of evidence, (b) the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the high standard of proof required for such an allegation, and (c) the committee itself recommended payment of entitlements, indicating no clear proof of misconduct. Held: Appeal dismissed; decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed. 1. In an action for wrongful dismissal, the employee must prove the terms of the employment contract and demonstrate that the dismissal breached those terms. 2. Where an employer elects to use disciplinary procedures for gross misconduct, it must comply with the agreed process, but is not required to prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt; the disciplinary committee is not a criminal court. 3. The evidence—particularly the appellant’s possession of gold‑bearing material at an unauthorized location and his inability to provide a satisfactory explanation—created a reasonable suspicion undermining the trust essential to the employment relationship. Misconduct inconsistent with faithful discharge of duties justifies dismissal. 4. The employer complied with the disciplinary provisions of the Conditions of Service (Exhibit 3), giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard. 5. The dismissal was lawful, and the appellant’s refusal to collect his entitlements did not render the dismissal wrongful.