Derek Barton Odro & Anor v. Lands Commission
ustice Jane Harriet Akweley Quaye (Mrs.)
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declarations and orders that a land conveyance by their late mother in 2000 in favour of their late father was fraudulently procured and should be expunged from the Lands Commission records. The defendant failed to participate in the trial despite proper service. The High Court held that the plaintiffs had not adduced sufficient evidence to prove fraud, and the land certificate in the name of their late father was conclusive evidence of ownership. The action was therefore dismissed.
Lands Commission v. Numo Noi Osikan III (Suing for and on Behalf of the Osu Stool, Osu Mantse Palace, Osu
Alexander Osei Tutu J.
The Defendant/Applicant applied to dismiss the Plaintiff’s action on the grounds that the High Court lacked jurisdiction and that the suit constituted an abuse of court process since the Plaintiff had already filed a Notice of Appeal against the earlier judgment. The Plaintiff, however, argued that it had discovered new evidence indicating fraud in the procurement of the earlier judgment concerning compensation for compulsorily acquired land at North Ridge, Accra. The Court held that the pendency of an appeal does not prevent the trial court from entertaining a fresh action where new material facts, particularly fraud, are alleged. Since the allegations of fraud required investigation through evidence, the action could not be summarily dismissed. Accordingly, the application to dismiss the suit was refused.
Woedem Kunutsor v. Adjin Tetteh & Others
Apaloo J.A.
The respondent commenced an action in the High Court seeking declaration of title to land, recovery of possession, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass against the appellants. Pending the determination of the suit, the respondent applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the appellants from entering the disputed land or engaging in activities such as demarcation, construction, or destruction of crops. The High Court granted the injunction. The appellants appealed against the ruling, challenging among other things the respondent’s capacity to sue and contending that the trial judge had misdirected himself in granting the injunction. The Court of Appeal held that grounds of appeal which sought to address the merits of the substantive dispute were incompetent in an appeal arising from an interlocutory ruling. The Court further held that although capacity must be proved when properly challenged, the issue must first be raised in the pleadings or as a preliminary issue before it can be determined. In the circumstances, the issue of capacity had not been properly raised. The Court found that the respondent’s claim disclosed a serious question to be tried and that refusal of the injunction would likely cause irreparable damage through continued activities on the land by the appellants. The trial judge had therefore properly exercised his discretion in granting the interlocutory injunction to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the substantive action. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the matter remitted to the High Court for continuation of the trial.
Yakubu Awabego (Head of Family of Awure Family of Kalbeo) v. Tindana Agongo Akubayela (Tindana of Tindonsobligo)
Justice W. A. Atuguba JSC (Presiding)
This appeal concerned a dispute over entitlement to compensation paid following the compulsory acquisition of land under Executive Instrument (E.I.) 10 of 2004 in the Bolgatanga Municipal Area. The Awure Family claimed entitlement to compensation as freeholders of portions of the land, while the Tindana of Tindonsobligo argued that as the traditional earth priest and allodial owner, he held the land in trust for the community and was therefore the proper person to receive compensation. The Supreme Court examined customary land tenure systems in Northern Ghana, particularly the role of the Tindana as custodian of communal lands. Relying on traditional evidence, documentary acts, and scholarly writings on customary land tenure, the Court held that the Tindana holds the allodial title to the land in trust for the community, while families may hold usufructuary interests. The Court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal, granted the declaration that the Tindana is the allodial owner of the land in trust for the community, and held that the parties remain bound by their Memorandum of Understanding regarding the sharing of compensation.
JOHN MICOCK V. RED SEA HOUSING SERVICE GH. LTD.
High Court
Labour Law — Termination of Employment — Fixed‑Term Contract — Requirement of Notice — Unlawful Termination — Redundancy — Release and Quitclaim — Duress — Defamation — Jurisdiction over Unfair Termination Facts: The Plaintiff, a Canadian national employed as Marketing & Development Manager under a fixed‑term contract requiring 90 days’ notice of termination, was dismissed without notice on 7 October 2009 on grounds of a “global economic downturn.” He was paid only 30 days’ salary in lieu of notice and made to sign a Release and Quitclaim five days later, which he alleged was executed under duress. A newspaper notice was subsequently published stating that he had ceased employment. He sued for unfair termination, redundancy entitlements, unpaid benefits, and libel. Held: 1. Termination Unlawful: The Defendant’s failure to give the contractually stipulated 90‑day notice rendered the termination unlawful. Payment of 30‑day salary in lieu of notice was contrary to the contract. 2. Court Cannot Grant Remedies for Unfair Termination: Jurisdiction over unfair termination lies exclusively with the National Labour Commission (Labour Act, s. 64); therefore the High Court cannot award damages for unfair termination. 3. Termination Amounted to Redundancy: The employer’s reliance on the global economic downturn indicated changes affecting production and staffing; termination accordingly fell under the redundancy provisions of the Labour Act, requiring negotiation of redundancy pay. 4. Release and Quitclaim Signed Under Duress: Execution occurred after the unlawful termination and under financial pressure; it could not waive statutory or contractual rights and had no legal effect. 5. Newspaper Publication Not Defamatory: The notice merely informed the public that the Plaintiff had ceased employment. It contained no imputation of wrongdoing and was therefore not libelous. Entitlements: Plaintiff was entitled to (i) spouse’s airfare; (ii) medical expenses. He was not entitled to refund of stolen company money or reimbursement of vehicle repair costs.
BISMARK ABORBI ARYEETEY VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Bismark Aborbi Aryeetey, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seeking constitutional interpretation concerning the conduct and powers of the Electoral Commission of Ghana. He contended that certain actions of the Electoral Commission relating to electoral processes were inconsistent with provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly regarding the Commission’s constitutional mandate. The Plaintiff therefore sought declarations that the impugned conduct violated constitutional requirements governing elections. The Defendants argued that the matters raised did not disclose a real issue of constitutional interpretation but were administrative or statutory issues. The Supreme Court examined whether the case properly invoked its original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1). The Court held that the action did not disclose a genuine constitutional controversy and consequently dismissed the writ.
GREGORY AFOKO VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Gregory Afoko, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the decision of the Attorney‑General of Ghana to enter a nolle prosequi discontinuing his murder trial at the High Court. He argued that the decision, made when the trial was almost complete, violated Articles 23 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and was unfair and arbitrary. The State contended that the Attorney-General has constitutional authority under Article 88 to discontinue criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the power to enter a nolle prosequi is part of the Attorney-General’s constitutional prosecutorial mandate. It further held that the discretion is executive in nature and not subject to Article 296(c) governing quasi-judicial discretion. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s action.
CENTER FOR JUVENILE DELIQUENCY VRS GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Center for Juvenile Delinquency, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution to challenge provisions of the Ghana Revenue Authority and the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915), especially those relating to tax enforcement and taxpayer rights. It contended that certain tax enforcement mechanisms (including pre‑payment requirements and administrative powers) were inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of fair hearing and access to justice. The Defendants argued that the statutory regime was validly enacted and did not contravene the Constitution, and that issues raised were essentially administrative. The Supreme Court held that a constitutional complaint requires precise identification of impugned provisions and specific constitutional breaches. It found that many claims were vague, failed to properly invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction, and were not supported by clear constitutional inconsistency. Consequently, the writ was dismissed.
MARTIN KPEBU VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff challenged the unavailability of courts on weekends, public holidays, and during civil unrest, arguing that Article 14(3) of the Constitution requires arrestees to be brought before a court within 48 hours. He sought declarations that such “non-working days” should not hinder the 48-hour rule and that courts must sit on such days to hear bail and liberty-related applications. The Defendant contended that practical realities justified the inaccessibility of courts on these days and that bringing an arrestee on the next working day suffices. The Supreme Court held that “within forty-eight hours” includes all days, and constitutional rights to personal liberty override statutory holidays and court closures. Orders were made for courts to sit on public holidays, weekends, and during civil unrest where safe, and for police and judicial officers to ensure timely access. The judgment reinforced the supremacy of the Constitution in protecting personal liberty and mandated administrative adjustments for compliance.
FRED KWASI AWUAH VRS THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HONORABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Fred Kwasi Awuah, filed a writ against the Chief Justice of Ghana and Attorney-General of Ghana, claiming unlawful denial of his entitlements as a retired judicial officer. He contended that the Defendants failed to pay his pension and other statutory benefits due under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Judicial Service laws. The Defendants argued that all payments were in accordance with law and that any delay was administrative. The Court assessed whether the Plaintiff’s claims were legally enforceable under constitutional and statutory provisions. It held that retired judges have a clear and enforceable right to their benefits and that administrative delays do not justify withholding entitlements. The Court ordered the Defendants to immediately comply with the statutory and constitutional obligations to the Plaintiff.
MR. JUSTICE KWAME ANSU-GYEABOUR (RTD) VRS THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Mr. Justice Kwame Ansu-Gyeabour (Retired), challenged the actions of the Chief Justice of Ghana and the Attorney-General of Ghana regarding the alleged denial of his entitlements as a retired judge. He argued that the Defendants failed to comply with constitutional and statutory provisions governing the payment of pensions and benefits to retired justices. The Defendants contended that all payments were made in accordance with law and that any alleged shortfall was due to administrative processes. The Court examined whether the Plaintiff was lawfully entitled to the claimed benefits under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and relevant judicial service statutes. It held that retired judges have enforceable rights to their benefits and that the State must honour these obligations without undue delay. The Court ordered the Defendants to comply with the statutory and constitutional provisions in full.
RICHARD PAA KWESI KORSAH VRS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ECONOMIC AND ORGANISED CRIME OFFICE AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Richard Paa Kwesi Korsah, challenged the legality of his detention by the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), claiming it violated his constitutional rights under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. He contended that EOCO acted beyond its statutory mandate and without proper judicial authorization. The Defendants argued that the detention was lawful under the provisions of the Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010 (Act 804) and necessary for investigations. The Supreme Court examined whether EOCO’s powers to detain persons were constitutionally permissible and consistent with statutory limits. The Court held that EOCO must strictly comply with the procedural safeguards in the Constitution and Act 804 when detaining suspects. Consequently, EOCO’s detention of the Plaintiff without adherence to these safeguards was unlawful.
YAW BROGYA GYAMFI VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Yaw Brogya Gyamfi, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seeking constitutional interpretation regarding the appointment of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). The action questioned whether the appointment procedure complied with the provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, particularly the requirement for parliamentary approval of certain presidential appointments. The Plaintiff argued that the appointment process undertaken by the Executive was inconsistent with constitutional requirements. The Defendant, represented by the Attorney-General's Department of Ghana, maintained that the appointment procedure prescribed under Act 959 was lawful and constitutionally compliant. The Supreme Court examined the relationship between the statutory provisions and the constitutional framework governing public appointments. The Court held that the appointment procedure under Act 959, including parliamentary approval of the nominee, was consistent with the Constitution and therefore valid.
DYNAMIC YOUTH MOVEMENT OF GHANA AND EDWARD TUTTOR VRS KEN OFORI-ATTA (HON. MINISTER OF FINANCE), THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHT AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The plaintiffs challenged the legality of the appointment of Ken Ofori‑Atta as Minister for Finance on the ground that he allegedly breached conflict-of-interest provisions under Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice guidelines and the Constitution. They sought declarations that the Minister’s business interests created an unconstitutional conflict and that CHRAJ should investigate the matter. The Supreme Court examined whether the plaintiffs had properly invoked its original jurisdiction under Articles 2 and 130 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Court held that the issues raised related primarily to administrative investigation and enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules. It found that the appropriate body to investigate such allegations was CHRAJ, not the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction. Consequently, the action was dismissed for failure to properly invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.
DR. DOMINIC AKURITINGA AYINE VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Dominic Akuritinga Ayine, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seeking an interpretation of constitutional provisions concerning the powers of Parliament to investigate matters involving public officials. The dispute arose from proceedings initiated by a parliamentary committee investigating the payment of judgment debts and related public financial matters. The Plaintiff contended that aspects of the committee’s actions exceeded the constitutional limits of parliamentary investigative powers. The Parliament of Ghana and the Attorney-General's Department of Ghana maintained that the inquiry was lawfully conducted pursuant to Parliament’s oversight authority. The Supreme Court examined the scope of parliamentary investigative powers under the Constitution. The Court held that while Parliament possesses broad oversight powers, those powers must be exercised within constitutional limits and cannot usurp the functions of the judiciary or other constitutionally established bodies.
GHANA INDEPENDENT BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of a directive issued by the National Communications Authority requiring radio and television stations to re-register their broadcasting authorisations. The Association contended that the directive and its enforcement threatened the operational continuity of several broadcasters and infringed constitutional guarantees relating to media freedom. The Defendants argued that the directive was a lawful regulatory measure aimed at ensuring compliance with licensing conditions and maintaining order within the broadcasting sector. The Supreme Court examined the regulatory authority of the NCA vis-à-vis constitutional protections for the media. The Court held that the NCA possessed statutory authority to regulate broadcasting frequencies and enforce licensing requirements. However, the Court emphasised that such regulatory powers must be exercised in a manner consistent with constitutional safeguards for media freedom and due process.
THE REPUBLIC VRS THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL; EX-PARTE: JUSTICE KWAME OHENE-ESSEL (RTD)
Supreme Court
The Applicant, Justice Kwame Ohene‑Essel (Rtd), sought the Supreme Court’s review of constitutional issues arising from impeachment proceedings initiated against him under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution, and the consequent effect on his entitlement to pension and retirement benefits. The High Court, in a judicial review action, referred questions on the interpretation of Articles 146(3), 146(5) and 155(1)(b) of the Constitution to the Supreme Court under Article 130(2). The central issue was whether retirement or incomplete impeachment proceedings could affect a judge’s constitutional entitlements. The Supreme Court emphasised the need for timely and fair adjudication of impeachment processes and clarified the constitutional rights and protections afforded to superior court judges. It held that Justice Ohene‑Essel was entitled to pension and gratuity under Article 155(1)(b) despite the impeachment process not being concluded before his retirement. The judgment underscored that delays in impeachment proceedings should not unjustly deprive constitutional benefits.
VALENTINE EDEM DZATSE VRS MR HENRY AMETEFE, THE CHAIRMAN, HOHOE CONSTITUENCY (NDC), THE SECRETARY, HOHOE CONSTITUENCY (NDC), PROFESSOR MARGARET KWEKU, THE REGIONAL ELECTORAL OFFICER (HO) AND THE MUNICIPAL ELECTORAL OFFICER (HOHOE)
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court answered a constitutional reference arising from a High Court case concerning the boundaries of the Hohoe Constituency following the creation of the Oti Region. The Plaintiff argued that Constitutional Instrument (C.I.) 95, which defined the Hohoe Constituency boundaries, was inconsistent with Article 47(2) of the 1992 Constitution because it placed the Santrofi, Akpafu, Likpe and Lolobi (SALL) areas partly in the Volta Region and partly in the newly created Oti Region. This, he contended, caused a constituency to straddle two regions, which the Constitution forbids. The Electoral Commission of Ghana agreed that C.I. 95 should be amended to reflect current regional boundaries. The Supreme Court held that C.I. 95 was inconsistent with Article 47(2) to the extent that it left those areas in Hohoe despite their inclusion in the Oti Region. It refrained from striking down the law immediately, noting that any alteration to constituency boundaries would take effect only after Parliament’s dissolution. The Court directed the Electoral Commission to amend C.I. 95 to align constituency boundaries with the current regions.
PROFESSOR STEPHEN KWAKU ASARE VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of certain statutory and administrative measures adopted by the State. He alleged that the impugned provisions violated specific constitutional guarantees, including principles of accountability and lawful governance. The Attorney-General contended that the action failed to disclose a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation and was speculative in nature. The Supreme Court examined whether the Plaintiff had established a clear inconsistency between the challenged measures and express constitutional provisions. It reiterated that constitutional litigation demands precision and a demonstrable nexus between the impugned act and the alleged constitutional breach. Finding no such inconsistency established, the Court dismissed the action.
ZOOMLION GHANA LIMITED VRS THE AUDITOR-GENERAL
Supreme Court
The Applicant, Zoomlion Ghana Limited, invoked the Supreme Court’s review jurisdiction to challenge findings and disallowances made by the Auditor-General of Ghana under Article 187(7)(b) of the 1992 Constitution. It contended that the Auditor-General exceeded his constitutional mandate by issuing certain surcharge and disallowance directives arising from public waste management contracts. The Respondent argued that the Constitution expressly empowers the Auditor-General to disallow unlawful expenditures and surcharge responsible persons. The Supreme Court examined the scope and limits of the Auditor-General’s disallowance and surcharge powers. The Court clarified that while the Auditor-General possesses broad constitutional authority to protect the public purse, such powers must be exercised within the confines of legality and procedural fairness. The reference was resolved by affirming the constitutional mandate of the Auditor-General subject to judicial oversight.