FRED QUAA-AFFUL V. VRA RESSETTLEMENT TRUST FUND
JUSTICE KWABENA ASUMAN-ADU
Labour Law — Legal Personality — Public Service — Termination of Employment — Wrongful and Unfair Dismissal — Compensation Facts Plaintiff, Fred Quaa‑Afful, was appointed Executive Director of the Defendant institution after a competitive interview conducted through the Public Services Commission. Following a change in government in 2009, the Plaintiff was asked to proceed on leave by the Board Chairman. While on leave, his appointment was terminated without stated reasons by a letter dated 9th October 2009. Plaintiff contended that: Termination violated the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) and Article 191 of the Constitution. Defendant is a public service; hence he enjoys constitutional protection against dismissal without just cause. There was no restructuring, contrary to the Defendant’s claim. Defendant argued that: The termination occurred by mutual agreement, and Plaintiff accepted two months’ salary in lieu of notice. The institution was not a legal person capable of being sued. Termination was lawful and in accordance with restructuring directives Holdings 1. Defendant is a legal person: Evidence (Registrar‑General search) showed the institution was incorporated under the Companies Act as a company limited by guarantee. 2. Defendant is a public service: It is a subsidiary of the Volta River Authority under the Ministry of Energy, and recruitment was conducted by the Public Services Commission. Termination was wrongful and unfair: 3. No mutual agreement existed; Plaintiff only cooperated because he was promised another post. No just cause was provided as required by Labour Act, Section 15 and Article 191 of the Constitution. Alleged restructuring was unproven and affected only the Plaintiff. 4. Plaintiff entitled to compensation: Reinstatement was impracticable because the position had been filled.
CHARLES MATE KOLE AND NENE AZAGO KWESITSU I VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NENE TEYE TITRIKU I AND AKUSE-AMEDEKA CITIZENS ASSOCIATION
ATUGUBA, J.S.C. (PRESIDING), DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C., ANSAH, J.S.C., ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C., DOTSE, J.S.C., ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS), J.S.C.
The Plaintiffs challenged the validity of L.I. 1983, which created and specified new district electoral areas and units, alleging it was unconstitutional. They contended that the Electoral Commission exceeded its powers and failed to comply with the Constitution in making the Instrument. The Supreme Court examined the scope of the Commission’s authority under Articles 45 and 51 of the 1992 Constitution. It held that the Electoral Commission has the exclusive constitutional mandate to create electoral areas and designate units through Constitutional or Legislative Instruments. The Court found that L.I. 1983 was properly made and laid before Parliament in accordance with constitutional requirements. Consequently, the action failed and the Instrument was upheld as valid.
KWAME BOADI ACHEAMPONG WISDOM NTIM AWUKU VRS GHANA HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY
GBADEGBE, JSC (PRESIDING), APPAU, JSC, DORDZIE (MRS), JSC, AMEGATCHER, JSC, KOTEY, JSC
Labour Law – Employment – Summary Dismissal – Dishonesty – Fraudulent Certification of Road Works – Disciplinary Procedure – Whether Employer Bound by Committee’s Recommendation – Articles 192 & 296 of the 1992 Constitution – Article 49 of Senior Staff Conditions of Service – Effect of Superior Orders – Entitlement to Terminal Benefits The appellants, senior officers of the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA), were found by an internal disciplinary committee to have engaged in dishonest conduct by preparing and certifying interim payment certificates (IPCs) for road works that were either not executed or poorly executed. The committee recommended demotion or possible removal with benefits, but the respondent employer instead summarily dismissed them under Article 49(D) of the Senior Staff Conditions of Service. The High Court held the dismissal unlawful, but the Court of Appeal set aside that decision, although reducing the summary dismissal to removal with full benefits on equitable grounds. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the evidence clearly established acts of dishonesty, including forged figures and pre‑payment certificates presented as actual work done. Dishonesty constitutes a major offence under the Conditions of Service, justifying summary dismissal, and management was not bound by the disciplinary committee’s recommendation. The Court rejected the defence of superior orders and held that unlawful practices cannot be justified by custom or regional routine. Equity could not be invoked to award terminal benefits to employees who breached trust and engaged in conduct detrimental to the public purse. Held: 1. The appellants were properly and lawfully summarily dismissed for dishonesty. 2. The Court of Appeal erred in abating the dismissal to removal with benefits. 3. Summary dismissals are restored, and any terminal benefits paid must be refunded to the Authority.
JANET NAAKARLEY AMEGATCHER VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
ATUGUBA, J.S.C. (PRESIDING), AKUFFO,(MS.) J.S.C., DATE-BAH, J.S.C., ADINYIRA, (MRS.)J.S.C., ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS), J.S.C.
The Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of section 1(2) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), arguing that it was inconsistent with Articles 241(2) and 106(1) of the 1992 Constitution. She contended that the provision improperly delegated authority relating to local government structures without complying with constitutional law-making procedures. The Supreme Court examined whether the impugned provision conflicted with the constitutional framework governing local government administration and legislative processes. The Court held that section 1(2) was not inconsistent with the Constitution, as it operated within the permissible scope of delegated authority. It further held that the provision did not violate the requirements of Article 106(1) on legislative procedure. Accordingly, the action was dismissed.
ALEX ABOAGYE, MOSES ESSIEN & 257 OTHERS, VRS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERA THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR
ATUGUBA, (PRESIDING) ANSAH, JSC BAFFOE- BONNIE,JSC BENIN, JSC PWAMANG, JSC
Employment Law — Contract of Employment — Seafarers — Liquidation — Compensation/Ex‑gratia — Requirement of Written Contracts — Applicability of Statutes — Evidence. Plaintiffs claimed to be ex‑employees of the defunct Black Star Line (BSL) and sought uniform adequate compensation, ex‑gratia, and end‑of‑service entitlements following the company's official liquidation. Evidence showed that plaintiffs were engaged only on voyage‑by‑voyage contracts, discharged after each voyage, and free to work for other shipping lines between voyages. No written employment contracts existed, contrary to the mandatory requirement under section 11 of the Labour Decree (NLCD 157) for employment exceeding six months. Plaintiffs’ documents—discharge books, ID cards, promotion recommendations, and social security registration—did not constitute contracts of permanent employment nor prove continuous employer–employee relationships. The court held that reliance on the Ghana Shipping Act, 2003 (Act 645) and Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) was erroneous, as these statutes were enacted long after the plaintiffs’ alleged employment and BSL’s liquidation. The proper applicable laws were the Merchant Shipping Act, 1963 (Act 183) and NLCD 157. Held: Plaintiffs were not employees of BSL but were engaged intermittently as seafarers for specific voyages only. They were therefore not entitled to compensation, ex‑gratia, end‑of‑service benefits, or other employment‑related entitlements. Appeal dismissed.
CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
ATUGUBA, AG .C.J (PRESIDING), AKUFFO (MS), J.S.C., DR. DATE-BAH, JSC, ANSAH, J.S.C., ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C., ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.) J.S.C
The Plaintiff challenged the President’s submission of the Master Facility Agreement (MFA) with the China Development Bank to Parliament, alleging breaches of Articles 40(a), 57(3), 58(1)-(4), and 73 of the Constitution. It was argued that the President failed to respect procedural requirements for contracting public debt and obtaining parliamentary approval.
OHENEBA BEDIAKO ESSUMAN V THE CHURCH OF PENTECOST
ATUGUBA, JSC (PRESIDING) BONNIE, JSC BENIN, JSC APPAU, JSC PWAMANG, JSC
Labour Law — Employment Contract — Interpretation of Conditions of Service — Meaning of “Basic Salary” — Consolidated Salary under Ghana Health Service Scheme — Whether Applicable for Computing Benefits — Long Service Award — Leave Allowance — Annual Bonus — Transfer Grant — End of Service Benefit — Equity and Avoidance of Absurdity in Contract Interpretation. The Plaintiff, a Medical Assistant employed by the Defendant Church and paid on the Ghana Health Service (GHS) payroll, claimed that his long service award, annual bonuses, leave allowances, transfer grant, and end-of-service benefits were wrongly computed because the Defendant refused to use his higher GHS salary as his “basic salary” under the Church’s Conditions of Service. The Defendant contended that the GHS salary was a consolidated salary, not the “basic salary” contemplated under its own salary structure, and that allowances applied uniformly to all senior staff regardless of payroll origin. The High Court and Court of Appeal held for the Plaintiff. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that “basic salary” under the Defendant’s Conditions of Service did not include the consolidated GHS salary, and that interpreting it otherwise would create inequity and absurdity by giving GHS-paid staff unjustified advantages over Church payroll staff. The Court emphasized that contractual terms must be interpreted contextually, considering the entire document and the parties’ intentions, and avoiding unreasonable or inequitable outcomes. Held: 1. Plaintiff was an employee entitled to benefits under the Defendant’s Conditions of Service; dismissal of Defendant’s counterclaim affirmed. 2. However, Plaintiff was not entitled to have his benefits computed based on the consolidated GHS salary. 3. The term “basic salary” referred to the Church’s own salary scale, not the GHS scale. 4. Judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal set aside, save for the dismissal of the counterclaim.
BAFFOUR OSEI-AKOTO VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
DR. DATE-BAH,J.S.C (PRESIDING), ANSAH, J.S.C., ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C., ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.) J.S.C
The Plaintiff challenged the validity of E.I. 80, E.I. 81, and E.I. 82, instruments creating districts and municipalities, claiming they violated Article 11(7) of the 1992 Constitution. He argued that the instruments were made without proper authority or adherence to constitutional procedure. The Supreme Court examined whether the instruments were validly issued by the Executive and whether parliamentary involvement was required. The Court held that the President, acting with advice of the Council of State and under constitutional powers, validly made the instruments. It further held that the instruments did not contravene Article 11(7). The Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, affirming the constitutionality of the creation and declaration of new districts and municipalities.
MOSES OKRAH VRS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK
AKUFFO JSC (MS), (PRESIDING), BAFFOE - BONNIE, JSC, AKOTO – BAMFO (MRS),JSC, APPAU, JSC, PWAMANG, JSC
Employment — Wrongful dismissal — Damages — Measure of damages — Mitigation of loss — Remoteness — Salary in lieu of notice — SSNIT and provident fund contributions — Interest. The appellant, a bank employee dismissed after 13 years of service, succeeded in the High Court on a claim for wrongful dismissal, receiving extensive awards including salary and allowances from date of dismissal to judgment, end‑of‑service benefits, SSNIT/provident fund arrears, GH₵30,000 for prospective loss of employment, 3 months' salary in lieu of notice, interest, and costs. On appeal, the respondent abandoned all but the ground that damages were excessive; the Court of Appeal varied the awards downward. Held, allowing the appeal in part: 1. Damages for wrongful dismissal lie in contract, not tort; assessment is governed by restitutio in integrum and limited to a reasonable period within which the employee might find alternative employment. Extraneous considerations—such as number of dependants, arrest, failed prosecution, or alleged delay tactics—are irrelevant and too remote to influence quantum. 2. The appellant admitted he mitigated his loss by becoming a trader within a year, making the High Court’s 11‑year salary award unsustainable. The Court of Appeal’s award of 15 months’ salary and allowances from 6 April 1999 was therefore reasonable. 3. Salary computation must be based on earnings at the time of dismissal, not current salaries of similar employees; inflation‑based "current value" adjustments are impermissible and would dangerously extend the scope of contractual damages. 4. SSNIT and provident fund contributions for the 15‑month period must be paid to SSNIT, including the employer’s portion. All other contractual entitlements accruing during the same period (e.g., leave allowance, bonus, long‑service awards) must also be paid. 5. The Court of Appeal wrongly reduced salary in lieu of notice; the High Court’s award of three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice was restored. 6. Interest on the 15‑month accrued salaries and allowances, from 6 May 2010 under C.I. 52/2005, was restored. Other variations by the Court of Appeal remained undisturbed.
RANSFORD FRANCE VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
ATUGUBA, AG .C.J (PRESIDING), DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C, ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C., OWUSU (MS.)J.S.C, ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.) J.S.C
The Plaintiff challenged the creation of new constituencies by the Electoral Commission, claiming it violated Articles 23, 51, and 296(c) of the 1992 Constitution. He contended that the process undermined citizens’ rights to fair representation and required proper legislative oversight. The Supreme Court examined whether the Electoral Commission acted within its constitutional powers. It held that the Commission has the authority to create constituencies, subject to the Constitution and parliamentary approval. The Court emphasized the need for consultation, transparency, and adherence to legal procedures in delineating constituencies. The action was dismissed, affirming that the Electoral Commission’s creation of new constituencies was constitutional.
MRS JANET DOE VRS SOCIAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL INSURANCE TRUST, THE TRUST HOSPITAL LIMITED
ATUGUBA, JSC (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC, BENIN, JSC, PWAMANG, JSC
Employment Law — Redundancy — Section 65, Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) — Collective Bargaining — Whether redundancy package was arbitrary — Whether employer discriminated in exit packages — Whether employee’s refusal to resume work after withdrawal of package constituted vacation of post — Whether employer’s counterclaim for refund of redundancy benefits was justified. The 1st Defendant (SSNIT) undertook a redundancy exercise in 2012 during which the Plaintiff, a member of the Senior Staff Association, was compulsorily declared redundant and paid an exit package based on a negotiated redundancy framework originally agreed between management, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, and the Senior Staff Association in 2009. The Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the package through her solicitors, causing SSNIT to withdraw the entire package, demand a refund of GH¢66,066.14, and instruct her to return to work for the remaining period before her compulsory retirement. The Plaintiff refused to resume work and instead initiated legal proceedings seeking declarations that the redundancy package was arbitrary and discriminatory, and that her economic and employment rights had been violated. SSNIT counterclaimed for refund of the full package and a declaration that she had vacated her post. Held: 1. The redundancy package was not arbitrary; it was derived from a collectively negotiated agreement binding on all senior staff. The Plaintiff, as a contributing member of the Senior Staff Association, was bound by the negotiated terms. 2. The Plaintiff’s substantive claims, including allegations of discrimination and violation of economic rights, were properly dismissed, as the evidence showed consistency with established redundancy arrangements. 3. However, the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim—seeking refund of the exit package and a declaration of vacation of post—failed. The Supreme Court held that SSNIT’s withdrawal of the package and subsequent counterclaim constituted an unjustifiable punitive response to the Plaintiff’s lawful challenge to the exit package. The Defendant would not have sought a refund but for the Plaintiff’s complaint, and the counterclaim was therefore untenable on the evidence. 4. Accordingly, while the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s main claims was affirmed, the grant of the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim was set aside. Appeal dismissed in part; counterclaim set aside.
DR. CLEMENT APAAK VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
ATUGUBA, AG .C.J (PRESIDING), DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C, ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C., OWUSU (MS.)J.S.C, ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.) J.S.C
The Plaintiff challenged the authority of the Minister responsible for Local Government to create electoral areas in districts, municipalities, and metropolitan assemblies. He contended that such powers were either unconstitutionally exercised or encroached upon the functions of the Electoral Commission. The Supreme Court considered the interplay between the Minister’s statutory powers under relevant local government laws and the constitutional authority of the Electoral Commission. It held that the creation of electoral areas by the Minister is subject to approval by the Electoral Commission. The Court emphasized that the Minister cannot unilaterally establish electoral areas without the Commission’s concurrence. The action was therefore dismissed, affirming that the Electoral Commission retains oversight and final authority.
AMBROSE DOTSE KLAH VRS PHOENIX INSURANCE CO
DATE-BAH JSC (PRESIDING), ANSAH JSC DOTSE JSC, BONNIE JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO(MRS) JSC
Employment Law — Wrongful Dismissal — Severance and Benefits — Pleadings — Burden of Proof — Damages — Evidence Act, 1975 — Measure of Damages — Mitigation. The appellant, Chief Accountant of the respondent company, was summarily dismissed for alleged refractory and unprofessional behaviour, resulting in the loss of his employment benefits. He sued for wrongful dismissal, defamation, severance/benefits, and damages. The High Court held the dismissal unlawful and awarded, inter alia, GH¢701,128,000 as severance and other benefits. The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of wrongful dismissal but set aside the severance award on the ground that no evidence supported it. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1. Pleadings are not evidence. Once the respondent denied the pleaded severance entitlement, the appellant bore the burden under ss. 10–11 Evidence Act, 1975 to lead proof. The appellant failed to substantiate the claim with any documentary or oral evidence. Mere repetition of the pleaded figure in the writ or Statement of Claim does not amount to proof. 2. The High Court erred in treating the unproven severance claim as established, and the Court of Appeal rightly reversed that award. There was no evidential basis to conclude that the sum represented benefits earned by the appellant. 3. In wrongful dismissal, damages are determined according to Hadley v. Baxendale principles: compensation measured by what the employee would reasonably have earned within the period required to secure alternative employment, subject to the duty to mitigate. Salary until retirement is not recoverable except in limited public‑law‑based employment. 4. The award of GH¢200 million general damages (uncontested on appeal) remained intact.
FRANK DAVIES VRS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
ATUGUBA, J.S.C. (PRESIDING), ANSAH, J.S.C., OWUSU (MS.), J.S.C., ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), J.S.C.
The Plaintiff challenged the Electoral Commission’s exercise of its powers in relation to the creation and demarcation of constituencies under Article 47(6) of the 1992 Constitution. He contended that the Commission acted improperly and sought judicial intervention to question the validity of its actions. The Supreme Court considered the scope of the Electoral Commission’s discretion in constituency demarcation. It held that Article 47(6) grants the Commission broad discretionary authority, subject only to constitutional guidelines such as population equality and effective representation. The Court further held that such functions are primarily administrative and technical, not readily justiciable unless clear constitutional breach is shown. The action was therefore dismissed.
EMMANUEL C. PLANGE & 437 ORS V GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. AND BENJAMIN A. BOATENG & 72 ORS V GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK LTD CONSOLIDATED
ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C. (PRESIDING), DOTSE, J.S.C., YEBOAH, J.S.C., BAFFOE BONNIE, J.S.C., GBADEGBE, J.S.C., AKOTO BAMFO (MRS), J.S.C., AKAMBA,
Review – Employment – Pension Rights – Special Pension Scheme – Exceptional Circumstances – Miscarriage of Justice – Limitation Law – Exceptional circumstances – Overlooking decisive facts – Employees who retired before abrogation of private pension scheme – Accrued pension rights – Whether omission by ordinary bench resulted in miscarriage of justice – Effect of Section 24, Social Security Act (NRCD 127) and Limitation Decree (NRCD 54). FACTS This was an application by 10 former employees of Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) seeking a review of the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment of 21 May 2014 which had non‑suited all plaintiffs in consolidated actions concerning the bank’s Special Pension Scheme. The applicants contended that they had retired before 31 December 1990, the date the Scheme was abrogated, and that the ordinary bench had overlooked this material fact, thereby wrongly treating them as part of employees who retired around the year 2000. The Court held that the overlooking of the applicants’ retirement dates constituted an exceptional circumstance within Rule 54(a) of CI 16 because it was a decisive fact supporting their entitlement to accrued pension rights under the Special Pension Scheme, which the ordinary bench itself acknowledged would vest in staff who retired before the abrogation. The omission amounted to a miscarriage of justice necessitating correction. Accordingly, the Court granted the review for nine applicants who had demonstrably retired before the Scheme’s termination and declared them entitled to their accrued pension benefits, with interest at the Bank of Ghana rate from the date of the High Court judgment to final payment. The application of one applicant (Dennis Nii Lassey), who retired on 31 December 1999, was dismissed as he did not fall within the qualifying category.
FELIX KLOMEGA VRS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, GHANA PORTS AND HARBOURS AUTHORITY, MERIDIAN PORT HOLDINGS LIMITED AND MERIDIAN PORT SERVICES LIMITED
ATUGUBA, J.S.C (PRESIDING), DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C, ANSAH, J.S.C, ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C., OWUSU (MS.), J.S.C, DOTSE, J.S.C, ANIN-YEBOAH, J.S.C., BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C, GBADEGBE, J.S.C
The Plaintiff challenged agreements relating to the Tema Port expansion involving GPHA and Meridian entities, arguing they required Parliamentary approval under Article 181(5) since they were international business transactions with the “Government.” The Defendants raised a preliminary objection, contending that GPHA and the Meridian companies were distinct legal entities and that the agreements did not fall within Article 181. The Supreme Court considered whether GPHA constituted “Government” for purposes of Article 181. It held that not every statutory corporation or state-owned entity is synonymous with “Government” under Article 181. The Court emphasized that the application of Article 181 depends on the nature of the entity and the transaction, not merely state ownership. Consequently, the preliminary objection succeeded, and the action was dismissed.
Board of Governors, Achimota School v Nii Ako Nortei II; Platinum Equities Ltd & Lands Commission (2020)
Dotse JSC (lead), Appau JSC, Pwamang JSC, Dordzie (Mrs) JSC, Owusu (Ms) JSC
This case concerned a dispute over Achimota School lands and the validity of a prior judgment obtained without notice to the school. The Supreme Court addressed issues of capacity, abuse of process, and procedural irregularities affecting land rights. The Court held that failure to notify a party in possession rendered prior proceedings a nullity and emphasized the need to protect public lands and interests. However, the Court also considered whether the Board of Governors had capacity to sue following repeal of its enabling statute.
REGIONAL MARITIME ACADEMY V J. APPIAH AMANING & ORS.
ATUGUBA, J.S.C. (PRESIDING) , MISS AKUFFO, J.S.C., LARTEY, J.S.C., ANSAH, J.S.C., ANINAKWA, J.S.C.
Employment Law—End‑of-Service Benefits—Collective Bargaining—Authority of Statutory Board—International Administrative Law—Negotiations Without Board Approval FACTS The plaintiffs, former employees of the Regional Maritime Academy (“RMA”), were declared redundant in April 1995. They claimed that following negotiations conducted by their union (TEWU) with the Ministry of Transport and Communications, an agreement was reached that the Academy would pay each employee 2½ months’ salary for every completed year of service as severance benefit. The defendant Academy, however, insisted that its Board had approved only a flat three months’ salary, irrespective of length of service. The High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that RMA, being an institution of international character created under PNDCL 33, was governed solely by its Board whose approval was necessary to validate any agreement on remuneration. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed this decision, holding that a binding agreement had been concluded. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that under sections 7 and 17 of PNDCL 33, the Board of Governors had exclusive authority to determine conditions of service and remuneration. None of the exhibits relied on by the plaintiffs (including Exhibits A, B, C, and A8) demonstrated that the Board had approved the alleged 2½‑month rate. Statements attributed to the Principal could not bind the institution, since he had no delegated authority. Negotiations do not become binding unless accepted by the parties, and there was no evidence of Board acceptance. The alleged agreement was therefore unenforceable
JUSTICE KWAME ANSU-GYEABOUR VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OWUSU [MS], JSC [PRESIDING], DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO [MRS], JSC
This case arose from a presidential reference concerning the legality of the Justice Sophia Adinyira Committee, set up to investigate matters relating to the judiciary. Justice Ansu-Gyeabour challenged the constitutionality of the committee, arguing that its establishment and functions infringed provisions governing judicial discipline and independence. The Supreme Court considered whether the President had the authority to constitute such a committee outside the framework of the Judicial Council and constitutional disciplinary procedures. The Court held that matters relating to the discipline of judges are strictly governed by the Constitution, particularly provisions ensuring judicial independence. It found that any parallel mechanism must not usurp constitutionally mandated bodies. The Court therefore clarified the limits of executive power in setting up investigative committees affecting the judiciary.
Ogyeedom Obranu Kwesi Atta VI v Ghana Telecommunications Co. Ltd & Lands Commission (2021)
E. Y. Kulendi JSC (majority), with Owusu (Ms.) JSC, Honyenuga JSC, Amadu JSC concurring; Yeboah CJ dissenting
This case concerned an application by a successful party (Respondent in the substantive appeal) seeking leave to adduce fresh evidence to rebut new evidence which the Appellant had been granted leave to introduce on appeal. The Supreme Court held that although applications to adduce fresh evidence are typically made by appellants, a respondent may also be granted such leave where it is necessary to ensure fairness and prevent prejudice. The Court emphasized that the overriding consideration is the interest of justice and the need to ensure a fair hearing. The application was granted, though there was a dissent cautioning against reopening cases on appeal.