MARTIN A. ATUAHENE FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD VRS GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD
Supreme Court
Labour Law — Severance / Redundancy — Effect of Privatisation — Whether Change in Shareholding Constitutes Severance — Continuous Service — Diminution of Conditions of Employment — Burden of Proof The appellants, former employees of the Produce Buying Company Ltd (PBC), claimed entitlement to severance pay on the ground that the respondent, Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod), had wholly privatised PBC by off‑loading its shares on the Stock Exchange, thereby allegedly severing the employment relationship. The High Court upheld the claim, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision. Held by the Supreme Court dismissing the appeal: 1. Privatisation of PBC did not sever the employer–employee relationship, as PBC Ltd remained the employer before and after privatisation; a mere change in shareholding does not alter the legal personality of the employer company. Salomon v. Salomon principle applied. 2. No severance occurred under s.34 of the Labour (Amendment) Act, 1969 (NLCD 342) because the appellants did not become unemployed and continued in uninterrupted employment with PBC Ltd; continuous service was guaranteed under the privatisation agreement (Clause 6). 3. Appellants failed to prove any diminution in their terms and conditions of service as required by law. Scholarship schemes were discretionary; medical costs were covered by PBC; salary disparities arising after 2000 were attributable to separate union negotiations, not the privatisation exercise. 4.The Court of Appeal was justified in holding that the statutory conditions for entitlement to severance pay were not met, as both severance of employment and diminution in conditions must coexist.
CHARLES YAW KRAH DONKOR v GRACE DEDAAH, MAJOR T. A. DARTEH (RTD.) & LAWRENCE OSEI MENSAH
High Court
The plaintiff failed to establish a credible root of title as his documentary evidence was inconsistent and related to different parcels of land. The deed of assignment relied upon was defective and unreliable. The 1st and 2nd defendants’ documents were also found to be manipulated, while the 3rd defendant failed to prove any root of title. The Court dismissed both the plaintiff’s claim and the counterclaim but upheld the defendants’ possessory rights on the basis that possession prevails where no party proves a better title.
SEBASTIAN D.N.K. GAVOR VRS. BANK OF GHANA
Supreme Court
Employment Law — Summary Dismissal — Natural Justice — Effect of Criminal Acquittal — Appellate Review of Documentary Evidence — Misconduct and Gross Negligence The appellant, a senior officer of the Bank of Ghana, was summarily dismissed for alleged gross negligence and misconduct leading to the fraudulent withdrawal of US$1,500,000 from the Bank. Though subsequently acquitted of related criminal charges, he claimed that his dismissal was unlawful, violated Article 191(b) of the 1992 Constitution, and breached the audi alteram partem rule. The High Court upheld his claims, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding that internal investigations established culpable misconduct and that he had been given an opportunity to respond. On further appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that: (i) where a case is based largely on documentary evidence, an appellate court is entitled to draw its own conclusions; (ii) acquittal in criminal proceedings does not preclude an employer from taking administrative action based on internal investigations; (iii) the appellant’s own written admission of a “serious lapse of good judgment” supported the finding of misconduct; (iv) Article 13(b) of the Bank’s Conditions of Service lawfully permitted dismissal for dishonesty, fraud, gross negligence, or gross misconduct; and (v) the appellant was afforded an adequate opportunity to respond, satisfying the requirements of natural justice. Held: Appeal dismissed. The dismissal was lawful, supported by documentary evidence, and did not violate natural justice.
Beke Investment Limited v John Kodie & 2 Ors
High Court
The plaintiff claimed title to land at Dawhenya based on a lease executed in 2005 by the head of the Kodie family and supported by receipts evidencing payment. The plaintiff contended that it had taken possession and secured the land until the defendants unlawfully entered and commenced development. The defendants denied the claim and asserted that the land had earlier been sold in 2002 to Rosina Fiahagbe, who allegedly surrendered her interest to the family in 2015, after which the land was granted to the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant relied on a sub-lease and a land title certificate and claimed to have developed the land. The Court found that the alleged prior sale and surrender were not proved and that the documents relied upon by the defendants were defective and indicative of fraud. The Court held that the plaintiff’s lease was validly executed and conferred title notwithstanding non-registration. It further held that the 2nd defendant had no interest to grant a sub-lease and that the 3rd defendant’s title was invalid. The plaintiff was declared to have a valid leasehold interest, the 3rd defendant’s land certificate was ordered to be cancelled, and the defendants were restrained. However, in the interest of justice, the Court directed that the parties may regularise the 3rd defendant’s occupation through a negotiated sub-lease.
MIDAS APAABEY VRS KGM INDUSTRIES LTD
Supreme Court
mployment Law — Employer’s Duty of Care — Workplace Safety — Workmen’s Compensation Act — Negligence — Jurisdiction — Quantum of Damages The Plaintiff, employed as a factory hand, was trained to operate an injection machine but was reassigned to a blow‑moulding machine without training or supervision. His right hand was caught in the machine, resulting in the loss of four fingers. The Defendant offered GH¢2,081 as full settlement, which the Plaintiff rejected. He sued at the High Court claiming damages for breach of statutory and common‑law duties of care and for wrongful dismissal. The High Court awarded GH¢50,000 as general damages for permanent disability but dismissed the wrongful dismissal claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed. On a further appeal, the Defendant argued that (i) the Plaintiff’s claim fell exclusively under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1987 (Act 187); (ii) the High Court lacked jurisdiction; (iii) damages should have been assessed strictly by the statutory formula; and (iv) the award was excessive. Held: Appeal dismissed. 1. A civil action in negligence is competent notwithstanding Act 187 where injury arises from the employer’s negligence pursuant to section 24 of the Act. Evidence established clear breaches of duty: the Plaintiff was placed on a dangerous machine without instruction, contrary to section 36 of the Factories, Offices and Shops Act, 1970 (Act 328), and safety mechanisms were knowingly disabled by workers with management’s awareness. This amounted to negligence and breach of statutory obligations under Act 328 and the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). 2. The High Court had jurisdiction because the claim was brought independently of Act 187; the jurisdictional provisions of sections 19–21 and 38 of Act 187 apply only to matters specifically initiated under the Act. 3. The statutory formula for compensation under Act 187 did not apply, as the Plaintiff proceeded by a civil action. In such cases, damages are assessed according to established common‑law principles. 4. The award of GH¢50,000 was not excessive. The Plaintiff, aged 22 and right‑hand dominant, had permanently lost the use of his dominant hand. The trial court considered pain and suffering, loss of amenities, future earning capacity, and economic conditions. No wrong principle of law was applied. Decision: Appeal dismissed; Court of Appeal judgment affirmed; damages to attract interest at the prevailing bank rate from date of High Court judgment until final payment
Alhaji Abdul-Samed Abubakar v Joseph Tetteh & 1 Other
High Court
The plaintiff claimed title to land at Nganoman-Oyibi, alleging that he acquired it in 2015 from the Okunekatawele family and exercised acts of possession including development of the land. He further alleged that the defendants trespassed onto the land and interfered with his possession. The defendants denied the claim and each asserted competing interests in the same land based on earlier transactions with the same family. The 2nd defendant additionally relied on a power of attorney to support a subsequent grant. The Court found that the alleged grants to the defendants were not executed by the head of family and that the power of attorney relied upon did not confer authority to alienate family land. However, the plaintiff also failed to establish valid title due to defects in his lease, including lack of consent and concurrence of principal members and doubts regarding execution. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his case and dismissed the action. As no counterclaim was made and the defendants were in possession, their possession was left undisturbed.
GODSON AWORTWI DADZIE, PHILIP NYATUAME VRS BARCLAYS BANK OF GHANA LIMITED
Supreme Court
Employment Law — Wrongful dismissal — Assessment of damages — Whether special circumstances existed to justify departure from the established upper limit of damages for wrongful dismissal — Duty to mitigate loss. Facts: The Plaintiffs, long‑serving employees of the Defendant (29 and 24 years respectively), were interdicted and subsequently dismissed following their failure to detect fraudulent cheque instruments that led to an overdraft of GH¢11.7 million on a customer’s account. Considering the dismissal wrongful, they sued in the High Court, which awarded them salaries from interdiction to judgment, end‑of‑service benefits, three months’ salary in lieu of notice, and general damages. 1 The Defendant appealed only against the quantum of damages. The Court of Appeal substituted the High Court’s awards with two years’ salary as general damages for each Plaintiff. 1 The Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal failed to consider special circumstances warranting enhanced damages. Held: (1) The Plaintiffs failed to prove any special circumstances capable of justifying a departure from the established range of damages (one to two years’ salary) applied in wrongful dismissal cases. Most of the alleged special factors—difficulty in obtaining new employment, national unemployment conditions, and effects of police arrest—were speculative and unsupported by evidence. (2) The Plaintiffs presented no evidence of efforts to mitigate their losses during the period of litigation, contrary to the principle that an employee wrongfully dismissed must take reasonable steps to reduce loss. (3) Consistent with prior authorities (Ashun v Accra Brewery; Klah v Phoenix Insurance; GCMB v Agbettoh), the court reaffirmed that damages in Ghana for wrongful dismissal generally fall within a one‑to‑two‑year salary bracket, absent proven exceptional circumstances
Alex Dosu v Onyeanula Godwin
High Court
The Plaintiff claimed title to land at Kwabenya based on a 1996 lease from the Nii Kwao Blenya family and alleged acts of possession including fencing and depositing building materials. The Defendant also claimed title to the same land through a 2012 lease from the Odai Ntow family of Teshie, supported by a provisional land title certificate and evidence of actual possession, including construction of a dwelling house. The central dispute turned on which of the competing grantors had a better root of title. The Court found significant inconsistencies in the Plaintiff’s evidence regarding the root of title of the Nii Kwao Blenya family. Conversely, the Defendant’s grantors established a stronger claim through judicial decisions and statutory declarations affirming their ownership. The Court further held that although the Defendant, a foreigner, was granted a 99-year lease, such interest was not void but automatically reduced to 50 years by operation of law under Article 266(4) of the Constitution. The Defendant was found to be in effective possession of the land. Judgment was therefore entered in favour of the Defendant on his counterclaim, while the Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed.
FRANCIS OWUSU-MENSAH, STEPHEN O. ADJAPONG VRS NATIONAL BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL EXAMINATIONS (NAPTEX) PROF. PAUL N. BUATSI MR. FRANCIS W.Y. TAGBOR
Supreme Court
Employment Law — Administrative Law — Judicial Review — Termination of Employment — Due Process — Jurisdiction of the High Court — Order 55 of CI 47 NABPTEX organised the 2013 May/June Certificate II Examination, which suffered a massive nationwide leakage, leading to cancellation and re‑organization. A committee was established to investigate the leakage. During investigations, appellants were asked to proceed on leave, later interdicted, and finally dismissed without being informed of the committee's findings. They appeared before a Disciplinary Committee but were never given a hearing; no adverse findings were disclosed. Appellants filed an application for judicial review at the High Court seeking, among others, certiorari, mandamus, and declarations. Held: 1. The High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellants’ application for judicial review. Resort to Order 55 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (CI 47) was appropriate, as Act 492 does not prescribe any exclusive procedure for redress. 2. NABPTEX, being a statutory public body, is amenable to judicial review where its administrative decisions affect rights of employees. 3. The termination of the appellants’ appointments was in violation of Articles 23 and 191 of the 1992 Constitution, as they were denied a fair hearing; adverse findings were never disclosed; and due process was not followed. 4. The Court of Appeal erred in holding that judicial review was the wrong procedure and in failing to quash the termination despite clear constitutional violations. 5. Appeal allowed. The letter terminating the appellants’ appointments was quashed by certiorari.
JOHN TENMOTTEY AFFUAH, CHARLES OKPATTAH VRS GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS COMPANY LIMITED
Supreme Court
Contract — Employment — Conditions of Service — Unsigned document — Acceptance by conduct — Estoppel — Terminal benefits. Where an employment document titled “Conditions of Service for Senior Staff – GDC Ltd., Reviewed 1st August 1988” (Exhibit F) had not been formally signed by the employer or employees but had, for many years, been kept in the employer’s Personnel Office and relied upon by the employer to regulate aspects of the employment relationship—including reference to its provisions in appointment letters and the payment of benefits such as funeral grants—the Supreme Court held that the employer’s consistent reliance and implementation of the document constituted acceptance by conduct, thereby rendering the document binding and enforceable, notwithstanding the absence of signatures. The Court further held that the employees’ act of signing for terminal benefits (Exhibits B and D) did not estop them from claiming the correct entitlements due under Exhibit F, as the employer prepared the calculations and the employees’ acceptance did not amount to a waiver of rights; estoppel cannot arise from an employer’s own misrepresentation or error. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s findings, dismissed the employer’s appeal, and ordered that the employees be paid their full gratuity and end‑of‑service benefits strictly in accordance with Exhibit F, together with interest from the date of demand (17 November 2008) until final payment, and imposed heavy costs on the employer for unnecessarily prolonging the litigation.
Abbey Rahman Wahab v Ben Bamfo
High Court
The plaintiff and the defendant each claimed title to the same parcel of land at Kokrobite, having both acquired leases from the same grantor family, the Nii Arde Nkpa Family of Plerno. The defendant’s lease was executed in February 2003, while the plaintiff’s lease was executed later in August 2003. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a land title certificate and relied on it to support his claim. The plaintiff alleged that he had been in possession of the land and that the defendant trespassed by erecting pillars on the land. The defendant, however, contended that he had acquired the land earlier, had exercised acts of ownership including erection of pillars and deposit of building materials, and had been in possession prior to the plaintiff. The court found that the defendant’s grant predated that of the plaintiff and that the grantor family had no interest left to convey to the plaintiff at the time of his purported acquisition. Applying the principle of nemo dat quod non habet, the court held that the plaintiff acquired no valid title. The land title certificate subsequently issued to the plaintiff was therefore of no legal effect. Judgment was entered for the defendant with orders for recovery of possession, damages for destruction of pillars, and cancellation of the plaintiff’s land certificate.
Aba Amokumah v Kobina Kum & Hannah Arthur
High Court
The appellant, the widow of the late Samuel Arthur, commenced an action claiming that certain properties including an orange plantation, an oil palm plantation, and a house numbered KK66 at Kokoado were self-acquired properties of her deceased husband obtained from Nana Kow Ansah, the Chief of Dompoase Kokoado. She alleged that the respondents, who were relatives of the deceased, had unlawfully taken possession of the properties after his death. The respondents denied the claim and contended that the land on which the house stood was family land originally acquired by their ancestors and that the deceased merely developed the property on family land. The District Court granted most of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff but held that the house built on the land formed part of family property. Dissatisfied with that aspect of the decision, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the appellant failed to establish the root of title of the deceased husband to the land on which the house stood. The court further held that the evidence adduced did not corroborate the appellant’s claim that the land was granted to the deceased by the chief. On the balance of probabilities the land formed part of family property and the deceased only acquired a life interest in the house built on it. The appeal was therefore dismissed and the decision of the trial court affirmed.
Lawrence Boulos v George Kissi & 1 Or.
High Court
Summary The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants seeking a declaration of title to a parcel of land measuring approximately 0.26 acres situated at Ashongman, Accra, together with recovery of possession, damages for trespass and a perpetual injunction. The plaintiff claimed that he acquired the land in 2011 through a deed of assignment derived from the Odai Ntow family, the allodial owners of the land, and later regularised the grant in 2018 by obtaining a lease executed by accredited representatives of the family. He subsequently obtained a Land Title Certificate from the Lands Commission. The defendants denied the plaintiff’s claim and asserted competing interests in the land. However, despite service of hearing notices and several opportunities granted by the court, the defendants failed to open their defence and their counterclaims were dismissed under Order 36 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47). The court also ordered the preparation of a composite survey plan to determine the identity of the disputed land, but the survey could not proceed due to the defendants’ failure to participate. The court held that a plaintiff seeking declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his own case and must establish the root of title, identity of the land and acts of possession. On the evidence before the court, the plaintiff successfully established his title, proved the identity of the land and demonstrated acts of possession. The court therefore entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff, granting declaration of title, recovery of possession, damages for trespass and a perpetual injunction.
MRS. MARGARET BANFUL AND HENRY NANA BOAKYE VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs, Margaret Banful and Henry Nana Boakye, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against the Attorney-General of Ghana and the Ministry of the Interior (Ghana), challenging the constitutionality of certain executive actions relating to public administration and state authority. They argued that the impugned actions were inconsistent with provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and violated constitutional principles governing the exercise of executive power. The Defendants contended that the measures complained of were lawfully undertaken pursuant to statutory authority and administrative mandate. The Supreme Court examined whether the issues raised disclosed a genuine matter of constitutional interpretation or enforcement within its original jurisdiction. The Court reiterated the principles governing the invocation of its original jurisdiction under Article 2 and Article 130. Ultimately, the Court clarified the constitutional limits within which executive and administrative powers must be exercised.
PROFESSOR STEPHEN KWAKU ASARE VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Stephen Kwaku Asare, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court challenging certain decisions and regulatory actions of the General Legal Council of Ghana. He contended that aspects of the regulation and administration of legal education and admission to the Bar were inconsistent with provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The action was brought against the Attorney-General of Ghana as the principal legal representative of the State. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional mandate of the General Legal Council and its authority to regulate professional legal training. The Court emphasized that regulatory bodies must exercise their statutory powers within the confines of the Constitution. It consequently clarified the scope of the Council’s powers and the applicable constitutional standards governing legal education and admission to the Bar.
GHANA INDEPENDENT BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NATIONAL MEDIA COMMISSION
Supreme Court
The Plaintiff, Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA), invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against the Attorney-General of Ghana and the National Media Commission challenging aspects of the regulatory framework governing broadcasting in Ghana. GIBA contended that certain regulatory requirements affecting private broadcasters were inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of media freedom under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The association argued that the measures imposed by the regulatory authorities unlawfully restricted the independence and operations of private broadcasting institutions. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional provisions governing media freedom and the mandate of the National Media Commission. The Court emphasized that while media freedom is constitutionally protected, reasonable regulatory mechanisms may exist to ensure professional standards and orderly broadcasting. It therefore clarified the scope of regulatory authority in relation to constitutional protections for the media.
RAPHAEL CUBAGEE VRS MICHAEL YEBOAH ASARE, K. GYASI COMPANY LIMITED AND ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH
Supreme Court
The case arose from a dispute between Raphael Cubagee and the Defendants, Michael Yeboah Asare, K. Gyasi Company Limited and the Assemblies of God Church Ghana concerning land ownership and development rights. During proceedings in the High Court, a constitutional question arose regarding the interpretation and application of provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana relating to property rights and the jurisdiction of courts. The issue was therefore referred to the Supreme Court under Article 130(2) for interpretation. The Supreme Court examined whether the matter truly involved constitutional interpretation or merely issues of land title and contractual rights. It held that the dispute was essentially a private civil matter involving property rights and did not raise a genuine constitutional issue. Consequently, the Court declined to exercise constitutional interpretative jurisdiction and directed that the matter be resolved by the appropriate trial court.
Dennis Kwabena Santiago v Nii Kotey Onyabrempong Susubiribi (alias Nii One) & Isaac Ofori Boakye
District Court
The plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaration of title to two plots of land situated at Abehenease in the Ga-West District of the Greater Accra Region, together with perpetual injunction and costs. The plaintiff contended that he acquired the land in June 2013 from the Agbeti Lanquaye Family after conducting due diligence, including a Lands Commission search, and subsequently entered into possession and commenced construction works on the land. The defendants disputed the plaintiff’s claim and asserted that the land formed part of the Abehenease lands belonging to the Ama Asor Family, of which the first defendant claimed to be the head and lawful grantor. Although the defendants filed a defence and counterclaim, they failed to appear during the trial, and their defence and counterclaim were struck out. The plaintiff’s evidence, including the search report, indenture, police report and photographs showing development works on the land, remained unchallenged. The court held that the plaintiff had discharged the burden of proof by establishing his root of title, mode of acquisition and acts of possession, and accordingly entered judgment in his favour.
SAMUEL BONNEY & 4,174 OTHERS VRS GHANA PORTS AND HARBOURS AUTHORITY (GPHA)
Supreme Court
Labour — Casual Workers — Termination Without Benefits — Remedies Sought in Contract — Review — Supreme Court — Scope of Review Jurisdiction — Not a Second Appeal — Exceptional Circumstances Required — Limitation of Actions — Application of Section 92(1) of PNDCL 160 — 12‑Month Limitation Against GPHA — Constitutionality Challenged FACTS: The applicants (approx. 4,169 workers) were former casual workers of GPHA who were laid off without receiving benefits normally due to regular workers. They sued at the High Court alleging discrimination and breach of employment obligations. The writ originally named Clement Agbesi & 4 Others, with “others” referenced in an addendum later listing 3,839 persons. Leave was granted to add 356 more plaintiffs, but the writ was never amended accordingly. The High Court gave judgment for all plaintiffs listed. The Court of Appeal held that only the original five named plaintiffs were properly before the court; however, it gave liberty to the others to commence a fresh action. When the fresh action was instituted, GPHA raised the defence of limitation. The High Court rejected it, but the Court of Appeal upheld the limitation defence under section 92(1) PNDCL 160, holding the action statute‑barred. Holding / Decision Application for review dismissed. The Supreme Court held that no exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated to justify reviewing the prior decision.
KWADWO DANKWA, FRANCIS ADOM, KWAKU ADDAE, YAW BOATENG & 249 OTHERS VRS ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD
Supreme Court
LABOUR LAW — EMPLOYMENT — CASUAL AND TEMPORARY WORKERS — TERMINATION — END OF SERVICE BENEFITS — LIMITATION — RES JUDICATA — JURISDICTION — INHERENT POWER OF COURT The plaintiffs, numbering 259, were engaged by the defendant mining company as casual and temporary workers, though they claimed to have worked full‑time. Their employment ended between 1994 and 2001. Several years later, they sought redress for alleged non‑payment of end‑of‑service benefits and failure to conduct mandatory medical examinations. Aware that their claims fell outside the six‑year limitation period under the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54), they applied ex parte for an extension of time, which Azumah J granted. Upon the defendant’s challenge, Mahamadu J declined jurisdiction on the basis that he could not set aside the order of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction. When the matter returned to Azumah J, he set aside his own earlier order and dismissed the suit as statute‑barred. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that Mahamadu J’s ruling operated as res judicata and that the suit could not be dismissed as statute‑barred without a defence pleading limitation. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that a ruling declining jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata since it is neither a final determination nor a decision on the merits. A void order—such as an order extending time where the statutory preconditions are not met—may be set aside by any judge of coordinate jurisdiction under the court’s inherent powers (Mosi v Bagyina applied). The plaintiffs’ own affidavits established that their cause of action accrued over a decade before commencement of the suit, placing the claims clearly outside limitation. In such circumstances, the court may summarily dismiss an action as frivolous or an abuse of process under Order 11 rule 18 of C.I. 47 even without a statement of defence. A trial would be unnecessary where admitted facts show the claim is statute‑barred. Held: 1. Mahamadu J’s refusal to assume jurisdiction did not operate as res judicata. 3. Azumah J properly exercised inherent jurisdiction to set aside his earlier void order extending time. 3. The plaintiffs’ own affidavits constituted admissions that their claims were statute‑barred; a defence was unnecessary. 4. The Court of Appeal erred. Appeal allowed in its entirety; suit dismissed as statute‑barred.