DANQUAH V. DANQUAH
OSEI-HWERE J.
The petitioner sought dissolution of his marriage, alleging that the respondent had deserted him and committed adultery. The respondent denied the allegations, accused the petitioner of violence and failure to maintain their children, and cross-petitioned for divorce. However, at the hearing, the respondent did not appear, and the petitioner abandoned his allegation of adultery. The issue before the court was whether either party had proved sufficient grounds, including irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, to justify a decree of divorce. The court held that both parties failed to prove their respective allegations. It found the petitioner’s evidence lacking in candour and emphasized its duty to inquire into all claims, which was hindered by the parties’ failure to properly prosecute their cases. Consequently, the court held that there was no proof of irretrievable breakdown and dismissed both the petition and the cross-petition, making no order as to costs.
BARNES V. BARNES
EDUSEI J.
The petitioner and respondent were married in 1966 and had one child. The marriage broke down in 1968 when the respondent disclosed that he was already married to another woman. He subsequently subjected the petitioner to physical abuse and expelled her from the matrimonial home. Despite attempts at intervention, the abuse persisted, leading the petitioner to leave the home permanently. The issue before the court was whether the respondent’s conduct amounted to cruelty and constructive desertion sufficient to justify a decree of divorce, and whether recent statutory reforms applied to the petition. The court held that the respondent’s actions constituted cruelty and constructive desertion. It further held that although the English Divorce Reform Act, 1969 allowed for divorce on grounds of desertion, it was inapplicable as the petition predated its coming into force. Accordingly, the court granted a decree nisi on the ground of cruelty, to be made absolute within seven days, and awarded costs to the petitioner.
ANSAH V. ANSAH
OWUSU-ADDO J.
The parties were married under the Marriage Ordinance and had two children. The marriage, initially stable, later deteriorated due to mistrust, quarrels, and accusations of adultery by the husband. The wife left the matrimonial home in 1972 and subsequently petitioned for divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, seeking custody of the children. The husband denied the allegations, claimed reconciliation, and accused the wife of adultery. The issue before the court was whether the wife had proved cruelty and desertion sufficient to establish that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, and whether she was entitled to custody of the children. The court held that the husband’s conduct, including assaults, false accusations, and degrading treatment, amounted to cruelty, making it unreasonable for the wife to continue cohabitation. It further held that the alleged reconciliation did not bar the petition, as the parties had not resumed marital life thereafter. Consequently, the court granted the divorce. However, it refused the wife’s claim for custody, determining that the children’s best interests were served by remaining with their current guardians while allowing visitation rights. No order as to costs was made.
COUSSEY V. COUSSEY
SARKODEE-ADDO J.
The petitioner sought leave to present a divorce petition within three years of marriage, alleging circumstances amounting to exceptional hardship or depravity. The applicable law required such leave to be granted only in exceptional cases, and prior judicial decisions had varied in interpreting what constituted “exceptional.” The court also considered whether there was any reasonable probability of reconciliation between the parties. The issue before the court was whether the petitioner had established sufficient grounds of exceptional hardship or depravity to justify the grant of leave to file for divorce within the restricted three-year period. The court held that, assuming the petitioner’s allegations were true, there was no reasonable probability of reconciliation before the expiration of the three-year period. It therefore found the case to be a proper one for granting leave. The court granted the petitioner leave to present the divorce petition, noting that the allegations would be fully examined at trial and the petition could be dismissed if they proved untrue
ARKU V. ARKU AND ABRAHAM
DJABANOR J.
The petitioner sought dissolution of his marriage on grounds that the respondent deserted him and committed adultery with another man. He admitted his own adultery and requested the court to exercise its discretion in his favour. The respondent admitted her adultery but argued that it resulted from the petitioner’s misconduct and cross-petitioned for judicial separation on grounds of his adultery and desertion. Evidence showed that the petitioner’s behaviour and neglect had strained the marriage. The issue before the court was whether the petitioner was entitled to a decree of divorce despite his own misconduct, and whether the respondent was entitled to judicial separation. The court held that the respondent had not deserted the petitioner; rather, the petitioner was guilty of constructive desertion as his conduct had driven the respondent away. It further held that his wilful neglect contributed to the respondent’s adultery, and thus he could not rely on her misconduct to obtain a divorce. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for dissolution and granted the respondent’s claim for judicial separation, awarding costs against the petitioner.
ADDO V. ADDO
SARKODEE J.
In this case, the petitioner admitted adultery but attributed it to the respondent’s behavior, while the respondent complained of denial of sexual relations and maintained that the marriage had not broken down. The court found that both parties contributed to the breakdown: the petitioner’s refusal of sexual intercourse and the respondent’s persistent nagging created an intolerable situation. Given their long separation and conduct, the court held that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and that the respondent’s refusal to consent was unreasonable. In conclusion, the court granted a decree of divorce, affirming that consent cannot be used to prevent dissolution where it is unreasonably withheld and the marriage has clearly broken down beyond reconciliation.
KWAME ATTA VS ISRAEL QUAO
G. M. QUAYE J.A (PRESIDING) , F. KUSI-APPIAH J.A , P. K. GYAESAYOR J.A
Employment Law – Workmen’s compensation – Workplace injury – Milling machine accident – Contract of Service – Status of Employee/Workman – Employee Relationship – Oral Contract – Proof of Remuneration – Defences – Volenti Non Fit Injuria – Estoppel – Applicability of Common‑Law Defences to Statutory Compensation Claims – Negligence – Failure to Prove Negligent Conduct – Rejection of Claim for Damages for Negligence – Appeal – Grounds of Appeal – Weight of Evidence – Evaluation of Evidence – Partial Allowance of Appeal – Setting Aside Interest Award Facts The plaintiff/respondent, Kwame Atta, worked as an assistant at Isdee Bakery, owned by the defendants/appellants. After eight months, he was assigned to operate a milling machine. On 22 December 2002, his left hand was crushed by the machine while working at the defendants’ request. Despite the injury, he continued working for three years until a dispute caused him to report to the Labour Officer. When the defendants failed to honour the Labour Officer’s invitation, he sued in the High Court claiming workmen’s compensation, damages for negligence, interest, and costs. The trial court rejected the negligence claim but awarded GH¢4,300.80 as compensation, GH¢500 as cost, and GH¢5,193 as interest. The defendants appealed. Held 1. Plaintiff was an employee under the law – Appeal ground failed. The Court held that the plaintiff worked under a contract of service, was paid wages, and functioned as a bakery assistant; thus, he qualified as an employee under s.38 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The absence of a written contract was immaterial. 2. Continuing to work after the accident did NOT estop him from claiming compensation. The fact that he worked for three more years did not bar his right to statutory compensation. 3. The defence of “Volenti non fit injuria” is inapplicable to Workmen’s Compensation claims. Sections 1(6) and 6(a)-(b) of the Act exclude this common law defence where injury occurs in the course of employment, even if workplace rules were breached. 4. Negligence was not established – no damages awarded. The trial court properly denied the negligence claim, and the Court of Appeal affirmed this. 5. Award of interest set aside – not permitted under the Act. The Workmen’s Compensation Act contains no provision permitting interest, hence the award of GH¢5,193 was unlawful and was set aside. Final Orders 1. Appeal allowed in part. 2. Plaintiff entitled to GH¢4,300.80 compensation + GH¢500 cost. 3. Award of interest set aside.
SAMUEL KWABENA OPOKU V CARANA CORPORATION
JUSTICE M. WELBOURNE (MRS), J.A. (PRESIDING), JUSTICE A. OPPONG, J.A. , JUSTICE E. ANKAMAH, J.A.
Employment Law — Wrongful termination — Performance appraisal — Interpretation of contractual rating metrics — Assessment of damages — Special vs general damages — Appellate review of factual findings. Facts: The Respondent, employed by the Appellant as a Finance Sector Support Unit Manager under a fixed‑term contract (2014–2018), was terminated in September 2016 for “deliverables not met following a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).” A mandatory Annual Performance Appraisal conducted earlier had assessed him at 3.75/5, described by the Appellant’s own reviewer as “better than average.” The Respondent challenged the termination as wrongful, citing non-compliance with contractual terms and the absence of any contractual basis for imposing a PIP. The High Court (Industrial & Labour Division) held the termination wrongful and awarded GHS 100,000 general damages, USD 150,000 special damages, and GHS 30,000 costs. The Appellant appealed on several grounds including misinterpretation of the performance rating, findings on underperformance, and wrongful awards of special/general damages. Held (Per Ankamah JA): 1. Performance rating of 3.75 — correctly interpreted as between “Average” and “Above Average”. The Court of Appeal held that Exhibit 2 clearly defined 3 = Average and 4 = Above Average. A score of 3.75 “falls between Average and Above Average,” which aligns with the evidence and the trial judge’s reasoning. The finding that the Respondent did not underperform was fully supported by the record, including evidence that the Respondent exceeded work targets. Grounds (a), (b) & (e) dismissed. 2. Judgment not against the weight of evidence. The appellate court, after reviewing the entire record, affirmed that the High Court’s factual findings were adequately supported. Appeal on this ground dismissed. 3. Special damages — award set aside. The Court of Appeal held that: Special damages in employment termination cases are rare and require strict proof. The Respondent adduced no evidence proving loss of reputation or professional integrity. The award violated principles requiring an employee to mitigate losses. USD 150,000 special damages set aside. 4. General damages — properly awarded. Given that the termination was wrongful, the award of GHS 100,000 general damages was upheld as appropriate. Ground dismissed.
RELIANCE PERSONNEL -VRS- NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION
CECILIA SOWAH J.A (PRESIDING), MERLEY A. WOOD (MRS), J.A, ADJEI FRIMPONG, J.A
Labour Law — Termination of Employment — Mutual Agreement — Notice or Salary in Lieu — Enforcement of NLC Decisions — Validity of Notice of Appeal Filed at Tribunal Registry — Court Below under C.I. 19 — Duty of High Court to Review Record Before Enforcement. FACTS The appellant, Reliance Personnel, employed a worker on a one‑year fixed‑term contract, terminable by either party upon two weeks’ notice or payment in lieu under clause 11 of the contract. The employer terminated the contract in accordance with the clause. The worker petitioned the National Labour Commission (NLC), which held that the termination was without disciplinary basis and ordered the employer to pay the salary for the unexpired term of the contract. The employer filed a Notice of Appeal at the NLC registry the same day the ruling was delivered. Despite this, the NLC applied to the High Court under section 172 of the Labour Act for enforcement of its decision. The High Court concluded that no valid appeal existed and enforced the NLC ruling. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the High Court erred in enforcing a decision that was contrary to sections 15(a) and 17(1)(b) of the Labour Act, since the termination was lawfully executed by mutual agreement through notice. The court emphasized that termination in accordance with agreed contractual notice provisions cannot be impugned as unfair where the Labour Act expressly allows it. It further held that a Notice of Appeal filed at the NLC registry was valid under Rule 8(2) of C.I. 19, since the NLC, being an adjudicating tribunal, constituted the “court below” for purposes of compiling the record. The High Court therefore misdirected itself by ignoring the stamped Notice of Appeal on record and by failing to examine the legality of the NLC decision before enforcing it, as required by controlling Supreme Court authority. Held: (1) Termination was lawful under the contract and consistent with the Labour Act; (2) Notice of Appeal filed at the NLC was valid; (3) High Court’s ruling was against the weight of evidence; (4) Enforcement application ought to have been dismissed. The High Court decision was accordingly set aside, the enforcement application dismissed, and costs of GHS 5,000 awarded to the appellant.
EDNA ASANTE & 2 OTHERS VRS CENTRAL UNIVERSITY
NOVISI ARYENE JA (PRESIDING) , NOBLE-NKRUMAH JA , ACKAAH BOAFO JA
Employment Law — Wrongful termination — Redundancy — Constructive termination — Mutual separation agreement — Burden of proof — Appeal against findings of fact. Facts: Three long‑serving employees of Central University claimed they were declared redundant after being invited to a meeting between 26–29 January 2018 and presented with pre‑signed mutual separation agreements. They alleged they were told 31 January 2018 was their last working day and that their salaries, benefits, medical care and pension‑related entitlements were stopped thereafter. The University denied terminating their employment, contending that the separation process was voluntary, that the agreements were draft documents for consideration, and that plaintiffs failed to report to work and failed to communicate their rejection of the offer. The High Court held that the plaintiffs’ employment had been constructively terminated and granted salaries, benefits, research allowances, and pension‑related reliefs. Held (allowing the appeal): 1. Judgment against the weight of evidence. The plaintiffs failed to prove either redundancy or termination. No letters declared redundancy; no termination letters were issued; and no credible evidence showed they were told not to return after 31 January 2018. The burden of proof lay on the plaintiffs and was not discharged. 2.Redundancy under s.65 of the Labour Act not established. No evidence showed that the University introduced major organizational changes leading to job loss, as required under section 65. The claim that plaintiffs were declared redundant therefore failed. 3. Mutual separation agreement not imposed. Evidence established that the document given to staff was a draft for study. Plaintiffs had the option to accept or reject it. They rejected it and sought an enhanced package, which did not amount to termination. 4. No constructive termination. Constructive termination requires employer conduct making continued employment intolerable and a resignation in response. Plaintiffs did not resign; they voluntarily absented themselves after rejecting the package. Non‑payment of salary for February 2018 was justified, and no evidence supported allegations of withdrawn medical care or pension redemption against them. 5. Plaintiffs vacated their posts. In the absence of proof of termination, the plaintiffs were deemed to remain employees and were required to report to work. Their failure to do so amounted to vacating post. Orders: 1. High Court judgment set aside. 2. Plaintiffs entitled only to their Provident Fund and Tier 2 contributions as of 9 March 2018, with interest. 3. All other reliefs dismissed. 4. Costs of GH¢5,000 awarded to the Appellant University.
DONKOR V. DONKOR
OSEI-HWERE J.
The issue in this case is whether a court can grant a divorce where the respondent does not contest the petition and seeks removal of the petitioner’s allegations, and whether such a petition can succeed without sufficient proof of breakdown of marriage beyond reconciliation. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971, the petitioner must plead and prove that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The court has a duty to investigate the allegations and must be satisfied on the evidence, regardless of whether the petition is contested. In this case, the court rejected the respondent’s condition to remove the petitioner’s evidence, emphasizing that proof cannot be waived by agreement. It also found the evidence insufficient, particularly regarding prior reconciliation efforts. Consequently, the court referred the matter to the church for reconciliation and required a report. In conclusion, the court refused to grant the divorce and reaffirmed that proof of breakdown of marriage beyond reconciliation is essential, even in uncontested petitions, while also promoting reconciliation efforts.
EDEM VRS KWARLEYZ GROUP & BELFAST CITY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
JUSTICE AYITEY ARMAH-TETTEH
Employment Law — Corporate Personality — Wrongful & Unfair Termination — Probation — Burden of Proof — Notice Requirement Valid — Employment Contract — Offer Letter as Contract — Probation — Completion — Entitlement to Notice — Employer Must Prove Alleged Misconduct or Incompetence — Credentials and Qualifications — Improper Reliance — Remedies — Damages and SSNIT Contribution Facts Plaintiff was offered employment by the 2nd Defendant as Financial Controller, offer dated 19 November 2020, effective 4 January 2021. She alleged that a contract attached to the offer letter was on the 1st Defendant’s letterhead, implying joint employment. After 7 months, the Defendants requested her credentials for “re‑evaluation” of her role and later directed her to stop work pending evaluation. On 6 August 2021, during a meeting with CEO, HR, and Legal, her employment was terminated because operational expenses allegedly increased under her watch. She was not given notice or paid salary in lieu of notice. Plaintiff sought, among others: 1. Declaration of wrongful and unfair termination 2. General damages 3. Accrued salaries/benefits 4. Outstanding SSNIT contributions 5. Interest and costs HOLDING: 1. There was no evidence showed a contractual relationship with the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff’s employer was only the 2nd Defendant. 2. The termination of the Plaintiff's employment by the 2nd Defendant was wronful 3. Termination based on unproven grounds is unfair under Section 63(4)(a)–(b) of Act 651. Defendants failed to provide any evidence supporting allegations of incompetence or lack of qualification.
LT. COL. S. B. ASHUN Vrs ACCRA BREWERY LTD
DATE-BAH, J.S.C. (PRESIDING), ANSAH, J.S.C., OWUSU, J.S.C., DOTSE, J.S.C. , ANIN YEBOAH, J.S.C.
Employment Law — Redundancy — Severance Pay — Acceptance of Package — Compromise Agreement — Effect of NLCD 342 — Wrongful Termination Facts Plaintiff, a Chief of Security at Accra Brewery Ltd (ABL), was informed on 29 November 1996 that his position had been declared redundant due to a manpower rationalization exercise. He was paid: 1. Salary up to 2 December 1996 2. Three months’ salary in lieu of notice 3. Severance pay: 2½ months’ salary for each year of service from 1991 4. Compensation for accrued leave days Plaintiff accepted the redundancy package and later collected the severance award on 5 December 1996. Two months later, through counsel, he challenged the legality of the redundancy, arguing no such provision existed in the company’s Senior Staff Conditions and that the redundancy breached the Industrial Relations Act 1965 (Act 299). Plaintiff sued seeking: 1. Declaration that the redundancy was unlawful 2. General damages for wrongful termination 3. Compensation of 8 months’ salary for each year of service 4. Payment of all salary and benefits for the remaining 6 years until retirement Trial High Court Judge held that the Labour (Amendment) Decree 1969 (NLCD 342) required negotiation of severance pay and entered judgment for the plaintiff “as per the writ.” Both parties appealed; the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court. Plaintiff further appealed to the Supreme Court. Holding (Decision) The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that: a) Acceptance of the redundancy package ended the plaintiff’s rights By taking the package without stating “under protest” or “without prejudice,” plaintiff entered a binding compromise agreement and could not later challenge the redundancy. b) NLCD 342 did not apply to redundancy NLCD 342 applied only to closure, arrangement, or amalgamation of an organisation—not redundancy situations. Thus, no statutory duty to negotiate severance existed. c) Termination was not unlawful Since plaintiff voluntarily accepted the redundancy package, the termination became mutual, eliminating any cause of action for wrongful dismissal. d) Court of Appeal was right The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s reasoning and conclusions.
IVAN YELIPOIE V BARCLAYS BANK OF GHANA LTD
BAFFOE-BONNIE JSC (PRESIDING), AMEGATCHER JSC, PROF. KOTEY JSC, LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC, PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
Employment Law — Demotion — Salary Reduction — Constitutional Law — Whether employer’s actions amounted to breach of economic and administrative justice rights — Limitation Act — Contract vs. Constitutional claim — Jurisdiction — Severability of claims. The appellant, an employee of the respondent bank from 1985 until his redundancy in 2011, challenged a 2001 demotion letter that downgraded him from Supervisor to Clerk, resulting in a reduction of salary effective January 2002. He commenced an action in 2014 claiming violations of his constitutional economic rights, administrative justice rights, breaches of international labour conventions, and sought salary differentials, unpaid bonuses, allowances, and redundancy-related entitlements. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed his claims as statute‑barred and found no constitutional violations. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the substantive nature of the appellant’s complaints was purely contractual, arising from the employment relationship and governed by his conditions of service. The alleged breaches did not fall within Articles 12–32 of the 1992 Constitution, and the appellant failed to identify or prove any specific constitutional right infringed. The Court further held that the cause of action accrued on 3 December 2001, the date of demotion, and the suit filed thirteen years later was clearly barred under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 1972 (NRCD 54). Attempts to reframe contractual grievances as constitutional breaches were rejected, and claims for mixed reliefs could not be severed as none were meritorious. The Court also noted that although the Court of Appeal raised certain procedural issues suo motu, the final decision did not rest on those issues. Held: 1. No breach of the appellant’s constitutional economic rights, administrative justice rights, or any international conventions was established. 2. The appellant’s cause of action accrued on 3 December 2001; all monetary claims arising from the demotion and salary reduction were statute‑barred by the Limitation Act. 3. The claims were contractual in nature; couching them as constitutional violations could not confer jurisdiction or remove limitation. 4. The doctrine of severability did not apply as all claims were unmeritorious. 5. Appeal dismissed; Court of Appeal judgment affirmed
DANIEL EVANS DZAM & NICHOLAS NYANTEKYI V PENTECOAST UNIVERSITY
JANE HARRIET AKWELEY QUAYE (MRS.) J.
Employment Law — Termination — Wrongful and Unfair Termination — Notice Requirements for Faculty Members — Contractual vs Statutory Standards — Book Allowance — Whether Payable Without Fulfilling Contractual Preconditions — Burden of Proof — Issue Estoppel The Plaintiffs, both lecturers at the Defendant University, claimed unpaid book allowances and sought declarations and compensation for alleged wrongful and unfair termination of their employment. They asserted entitlement to USD 1,000 per annum (1st Plaintiff for two years; 2nd Plaintiff for one year) pursuant to their appointment letters and the University’s Conditions of Service. The Defendant denied indebtedness, arguing that book allowance was payable only upon the production of receipts following book purchases and that the Plaintiffs had resigned rather than been terminated. Held: 1. Book Allowance — Not Proven: Although the Conditions of Service and appointment letters generally provided for book allowance, the Employment Contracts—being the special and governing documents—required submission of receipts before payment. Failure by the Plaintiffs to adduce evidence of submitting receipts meant they did not discharge the burden of proof. No book allowance was therefore payable. 2. Termination — Wrongful and Unfair: The resignation letters were received after the Defendant had already issued termination letters. Since the Plaintiffs were faculty members, the applicable contract and Conditions of Service required six months’ notice or salary in lieu. Defendant gave no valid reason, issued no warnings, and failed to follow statutory and contractual procedure. Under sections 62–63 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), the termination was unfair, and under common law principles, it was wrongful. 3. Issue Estoppel: A previous judgment involving the 1st Plaintiff had already determined the status of the 2020 employment letter; the matter could not be re-litigated.
JOHN AKPARIBO NDEBUGRE VRS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AKER ASA AND CHEMU POWER COMPANY LTD
ATUGUBA, JSC (PRESIDING), ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC, GBADEGBE,JSC, AKOTO - BAMFO (MRS), JSC, BENIN JSC
The Plaintiff, John Akparibo Ndebugre, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction against the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Aker ASA, and Chemu Power Company Ltd. He challenged the legality of agreements and transactions in the energy sector, alleging violations of constitutional provisions governing natural resources and public interest. The Plaintiff contended that the arrangements were unconstitutional and not in the national interest. The Defendants argued that the agreements were lawfully executed within statutory and constitutional frameworks. The Supreme Court examined whether the issues raised disclosed a genuine question of constitutional interpretation. The Court held that the Plaintiff failed to establish a real constitutional issue and dismissed the action.
ABU RAMADAN AND EVANS NIMAKO VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WOOD (MRS), CJ (PRESIDING), DOTSE, JSC, ANIN YEBOAH, JSC, BAFFOE-BONNIE,JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, BENIN, JSC, AKAMBA, JSC
The Plaintiffs, Abu Ramadan and Evans Nimako, challenged the validity of the voters’ register compiled by the Electoral Commission of Ghana. They argued that the inclusion of persons who registered using National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) cards as proof of citizenship violated the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which limits voting to citizens. The Electoral Commission and the Attorney-General of Ghana contended that the register was lawful and compiled under existing regulations. The Supreme Court examined whether the use of NHIS cards satisfied the constitutional requirement of proof of citizenship. The Court held that NHIS cards are not proof of citizenship and their use undermined the integrity of the register. It consequently ordered the Electoral Commission to cleanse the register by deleting such names and provide an opportunity for affected persons to re-register using valid identification.
MICHAEL TETTEH ACHIM V LINCOLN COMMUNITY SCHOOL
ANANDA JULIANA AIKINS (MRS.) J.
Facts Plaintiff was employed from 14 July 2014 to 6 October 2017 as Director of Finance. A dispute arose following a tax assessment of USD 8 million (later reduced to USD 3.8 million) imposed on the Defendant school by the GRA. Plaintiff opposed the Board’s application for tax exemption. The Board demanded explanations from Plaintiff, which he declined to give orally, insisting on recording the proceedings. The Board considered his conduct uncooperative and recommended his dismissal. The new Head of School, Sheena Nabolz, attempted a mutual termination. Plaintiff rejected a 6‑week salary offer and demanded two years’ salary and benefits. Defendant then terminated his employment, citing “blackmail amounting to gross misconduct” based on allegations that he threatened to release confidential information. Plaintiff denied this and maintained he was merely making a counter‑offer and asserting his right to seek legal redress. Holding The Court held that: 1. Plaintiff proved unfair termination on the balance of probabilities. 2. Defendant maliciously terminated his employment based on false accusations. However, the Plaintiff failed to prove specific reputational damage.
LABOUR COMMISSION V CROCODILE MATCHET
ATUGUBA, JSC. (PRESIDING), ANSAH, JSC, OWUSU (MS), JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC, AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS), JSC
Labour Law — Delegation of quasi‑judicial functions — Composition and quorum of the National Labour Commission (NLC) — Whether a two‑member committee may hear and determine an industrial dispute — Statutory requirement of tripartite representation — Effect of non‑compliance. The National Labour Commission received a complaint from six workers of Crocodile Matchet (GH) Ltd alleging unfair termination under section 64 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). A two‑member panel purportedly acting as a committee of the Commission heard the matter and found in favour of the workers, issuing consequential orders. The employer failed to comply, prompting the Commission to apply to the High Court for enforcement under section 172. The High Court granted the application. On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the ruling on grounds that the two‑member panel lacked the statutory quorum required by section 140(3). The Commission appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: Appeal dismissed. 1. The Labour Act requires strict compliance with the quorum and representational requirements prescribed for the National Labour Commission when exercising its adjudicatory functions. For the settlement of industrial disputes, the Commission must sit with at least five members, comprising the Chairperson (or Deputy) and at least one person each representing Government, employers, and organised labour. A two‑member body does not satisfy this mandatory statutory structure. 2. Although section 141 permits the Commission to delegate its functions to committees, such delegation must comply with the composition principles embedded throughout Act 651. The Act’s overall scheme—seen in sections 140(3), 144(2), and 164(3)—reflects a clear legislative intention that tripartite representation is essential for bodies adjudicating labour disputes. A committee performing judicial or quasi‑judicial functions must therefore consist of at least three members, each representing the tripartite interests. Delegation to only two persons is inconsistent with the statute and therefore invalid. 3. Any decision taken by a committee not properly constituted is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. Since the two‑member panel lacked authority to determine the matter, its proceedings were void and incapable of enforcement. 4. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal and dismissed the Commission’s appeal.
JAMES DAVID BROWN V THE NATIONAL LABOUR COMMISSION & AHANTAMAN RURAL BANK LTD.
N. A. AMEGATCHER JSC, J. V. M. DOTSE JSC, A. A. BENIN JSC, G. PWAMANG JSC, A. M. A. DORDZIE (MRS.) JSC
Labour Law — Unfair Termination — Appellate Jurisdiction — National Labour Commission (NLC) — Proper Appellate Forum — Time Limits for Appeal — Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court — Improper Joinder of NLC — Interpretation of Legislative Gaps. FACTS: The appellant, a Chief Clerk of Ahantaman Rural Bank, was dismissed for gross misconduct after abandoning a staff training trip and received one month’s salary in lieu of notice. He petitioned the National Labour Commission (NLC) for unfair termination. The NLC found in his favour and awarded three months’ salary compensation. Dissatisfied, he appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal on the grounds that (1) it lacked jurisdiction since appeals lay only for unfair labour practices, and (2) the appeal was filed out of the 14‑day statutory limit. On further appeal, the Supreme Court struck out the NLC as an improperly joined party, holding that adjudicatory bodies should not be listed as respondents in appeals arising from their own decisions. The Court held that although the Labour Act expressly provides appellate rights only for unfair labour practices and compulsory arbitration awards, Parliament’s omission to provide appellate remedies for other NLC determinations (including unfair termination) should not bar access to justice. Employing a purposive interpretation, the Court ruled that all determinations of the NLC are appealable to the Court of Appeal, thereby affirming that the Court of Appeal does have jurisdiction to hear appeals from NLC decisions on unfair termination. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s finding that the appeal was filed out of time, noting that the appellant prepared his Notice of Appeal 19 days after the NLC’s decision and that statutory timelines must be strictly complied with. The late filing rendered the appeal a nullity. Furthermore, the Court held that appeals to the Supreme Court from matters originating before tribunals lower than the High Court require leave of the Court of Appeal under Article 131(1)(b), or alternatively, special leave of the Supreme Court under Article 131(2). Since the appellant sought neither, the appeal before the Supreme Court was incompetent. Held: 1. NLC improperly joined — struck out. 2. Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over NLC unfair termination decisions. 3. Appeal to Court of Appeal filed out of time — nullity. 4. Appeal to Supreme Court incompetent for lack of leave. 5. Appeal dismissed except on the point confirming Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction.